V.-C. M. DUTTON v. HOCKENHULL. Construction of Will-Contents of a Desk-Money-Small Coins. A testator gave to his wife his writing-desk in his lodgingroom, and also two silver table-spoons, together with his chimney ornaments, and all the small coins, curiosities, and other articles in his writing-desk. At the death of the testator the desk contained various papers, curiosities, and other articles, and also 1757. in gold, 951. in bank notes, a cheque for 13., a bill for 39%., and silver and copper, making up 3217. He had previously given his wife by his will a money legacy of 10607. The wife had since died, and her representatives claimed the 3211. under the bequest in the will. Glasse, Q.C., and Collins, for the claimants. April 28. | peleff, but she had refused to come to an account or make such Cotton, Q.C., and Ince, Bristowe, Q.C., and Macnaghten, Higgins, Q.C., and Buesnel, and Waller, Q.C., and Bunting, for other parties interested in the testator's estate. Glasse, Q.C., Simpson, and Gill, for the demurrer by the com THE VICE-CHANCELLOR Considered that the testator only intended to give small coins as being ejusdem generis with curiosities, and if he had intended to include all his money in the desk he would have used other expressions than small coins, curiosi-pany, contended that the plaintiff could have no relief in this ties, and other articles. He should therefore disallow the claim. Solicitors: G. C. Rice; Doyle & Edwards; J. W. Hicken; Meredith, Roberts, & Mills. V.-C. M. MATTHAEI v. GALITZIN. Court, because this was a bill filed by an agent against the plaintiff was a foreigner; the property was in Russia, though lessor of the property to obtain his commission; and because the worked by a company having an office in England, and the money never would come to England; and the Princess Galitzin was a foreigner not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court; and also because the plaintiff's remedy was in a Russian court. Cotton, Q.C., and Kenyon Parker, for the demurrer by the Princess Galitzin. Higgins, Q.C., and Cottrell, in support of the bill, contended that as Carl Matthaei was a naturalised Englishman the domicile of the plaintiff, his widow, would follow his domicile, and as there was no allegation that she was out of the jurisdiction it must be assumed she was within the jurisdiction. That the company was an English joint stock company, limited, and the profits, though derived from Russian property, was brought to England to be divided and "remitted" to Russia. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said it was clear that if the plaintiff had no remedy against the Princess Galitzin she could have no remedy against the defendant company, who were mere stakeholders. This was a case of a foreigner entering into a contract with another foreigner, neither of them being resident in England, respecting property situate abroad. It was not the duty of this Court to settle disputes between foreigners unless some ground were shewn for the exercise of the jurisdiction, and no ground being shewn in this case the demurrers must be allowed. Solicitor for the plaintiff: J. Rand Bailey. Solicitors for the defendants: Rickards & Walker. April 28. Suit by a Foreigner against a Foreigner-Foreign Property worked by English Company-Agent's Commission-Demurrer. This was a bill filed by Julie Matthaei, described as of the Charing Cross Hotel, London, and of Antwerp, in Belgium, widow and administratrix of Carl Matthaei, a naturalised Englishman, against the Princess Anna Galitzin and the Russian Ironworks Company. The bill stated that previously to the year 1863 Ivan Chepeleff and Nicolas Chepeleff were entitled to certain mining property in Russia, and that having become embarrassed they were desirous of forming a company in England for working the mines upon this property. That they, therefore, entered into an agreement in November, 1863, with Carl Matthaei, then of Hanover, merchant, whereby they agreed that if the said Carl Matthaei should succeed in forming a company for working the property they would pay him a commission of 10. per cent. upon all moneys which should be payable to or received by them during the whole period of such working. The said Carl Matthaei, acting upon such authority and agreement, expended much time and money in endeavouring to obtain funds necessary for working the property, and ultimately succeeded in establishing the defendant company, which was incorporated in the year 1865. That the company obtained from Ivan and Nicolas Chepeleff a lease or grant for working the property for the term of thirty-seven years upon certain terms, one of which April 15. was that the net profits should be shared between the company and Ivan and Nicholas Chepeleff, and their heirs or successors, in Mortgage-Sale-Pro Confesso-Cons. Ord. xxii., r. 15.—Form of the proportions of two-fifth parts thereof for the company, and three-fifth parts for the said Ivan and Nicolas Chepeleff, and their heirs or successors to the property. The defendant company had ever since the year 1865 obtained large sums of money from working the property. Ivan and Nicolas Chepeleff were both dead, and the beneficial interest in the property had devolved upon the defendant, Anna Galitzin, who was now entitled to three-fifth shares in the profits of the working by the company subject to the payment thereout of the commission to Carl Matthaei. The company had during the year 1872 paid to Anna Galitzin for her share of the profits 43,000l. Carl Matthaei died in the year 1868, and letters of administration were granted in England to the plaintiff, his widow, who was now his personal representative. The defendant Anna Galitzin was resident in Russia, and the plaintiff had on several occasions applied to her for an account of the moneys she had received from the company, and for payment of the commission under the agreement between Carl Matthaei and Ivan and Nicolas Che V.-C. B. WOODFORD v. BROOKING. Order. In this case, upon the application of defendants, the third mortgagees, a sale instead of a foreclosure had been directed, with consent of plaintiffs (second mortgagees) and defendants (first mortgagees), in the absence of the mortgagor, against whom the bill had been taken pro confesso (Law Rep. 17 Eq. 425). The decree, as drawn up by the registrar, was expressed to be subject to the provisions of the rules contained in Cons. Ord. xxii. as to making absolute decrees founded on bills taken pro confesso (see Seton, 1128). It was now objected by defendants, the first mortgagees, that this clause would, under Cons. Ord. xxii., r. 15, prevent the sale from being carried out until the expiration of three years from the date of the decree. Bristowe, Q.C., and Cozens-Hardy, for the first mortgagees, now applied for an order for an immediate sale, or that the usual foreclosure decree should be made. Kay, Q.C., and Grosvenor Woods, for the third mortgagees, re- | the first instalment of 50007. of the sum which I owe you. The ferred to Ord. xxii., r. 13, shewing that the Court was at liberty, under the circumstances of the case, to direct proceedings to be taken under the decree without service on the defendant, against whom the bill has been ordered to be taken pro confesso. Davey, for plaintiffs, referred to Darlow v. Simcock (14 W. R. 664). THE VICE-CHANCELLOR considered that he had power to dispense with such service, and directed the decree to be drawn up for an immediate sale, without requiring service of the decree or any proceedings under it on the mortgagor, the defendant, against whom the bill had been taken pro confesso. The form of order, as finally settled after directing an immediate sale, proceeded as follows:-" Dispense with service on defendant (the mortgagor) of this decree and all proceedings under it; but this decree is to be subject to the provisions of the rules contained in the 22nd of the Cons. Ords, as to making absolute decrees founded on bills taken pro confesso.' Solicitors: West & King; Sole, Turner, & Turner, April 21. Gift by Uncle to his Niece-Husband and Wife-Separate Banking Account-Settlement-Separate Estate-Divorce-Remarriage of the Wife. second instalment will come from Stork & Van West, and I will Dickinson, Q.C., Jackson, Q.C., and Ince, for the plaintiff. Serjt. Ballantine, Kerslake, Q.C., and Waller, Q.C., for the THE VICE-CHANCELLOR referred to the parts of the letters above set forth as being the beginning of the gift and provision by the uncle for the plaintiff, and after commenting upon the language of those letters, and referring to the separate account at the bankers, and the acts and conduct of the parties, held that upon the authorities the gift was one for the separate use of the plaintiff; that the defendant was a trustee for her; and that the investments or the proceeds must be restored with interest at 4 per cent. from the date of the last payment of the interest. It was understood that the trust fund now consisted of sums amounting in the aggregate to 89627. 17s. 11d.-The defendant was ordered to pay all the costs of the suit, including the costs of the plaintiff's present husband. Solicitors: J. Lott; Deane, Chubb, & Co. The bill was filed in May, 1871, by Mrs. Carnegie, at that time | the wife of the Honourable S. T. Carnegie. The marriage between them was, in November, 1872, dissolved by a decree abso-in lute, and Mrs Carnegie some time afterwards married Baron de Billing. The bill was amended in 1873, by making him a defendant. The object of the suit was to obtain a declaration that two sums, together 10,000l., mentioned in the pleadings, were given or belonged to the plaintiff for her separate use, indepen-defendant Carnegie. dently of S. T. Carnegie; and that he was a trustee for her of so much of the sums, and of the securities in which the same were invested, as he had received; and for accounts, and costs of the suit. The plaintiff was a niece of the late Henry Thomas Hope. She was married to S. T. Carnegie in September, 1858. Her late father, Adrian John Hope, settled a sum of 10,000. upon her and S. T. Carnegie in the manner mentioned in the pleadings. She had, with the consent of S. T. Carnegie, a separate banking account with Coutts & Co., into which her separate income was paid by the trustees of the settlement. On the 2nd of April, 1859, Henry Thomas Hope wrote to the plaintiff a letter, in which he said, "It is my intention, as soon as I can do it consistently with certain other financial arrangements, to request your acceptance of a sum of 10,000l., to be settled as may be most agreeable to you and to Captain (now Admiral) Carnegie. I hope this will be taken as a proof of my affection for you, and of my esteem and respect for Captain Carnegie, whose public and private character stands so high that it cannot in any way be affected by any praise or blame from us or ours. I hope it may also be considered in some degree as a protest against the want of liberality exhibited by my eminently respectable' brother in his arrangements with regard to you. Of this I, as head of our branch of the family, confess to be ashamed, and as your father condescends to occupy himself about my affairs, I am sure he cannot take amiss any interest which I may express in his." In a letter of the 4th of April, 1859, to the plaintiff, H. T. Hope said, "neither you nor Captain Carnegie had the slightest intimation of my intention to make such a proposition. I had only confided it to my excellent wife, who has nothing mean in her nature or disposition, and is never so happy as when ruminating on some plan from which others may derive pleasure or advantage. The operation will be completed before the end of the year; I hope considerably so; and if I do not survive, you may depend on those I leave behind me for carrying out my wishes." In a letter of the 8th of June, 1859, to the plaintiff, H. T. Hope wrote thus:-" I have directed my bankers Sir S. Scott & Co. to pay unto your account at Messrs. Coutts, V.-C. H. TYSON V. BENSON. BENSON v. TYSON. April 22. Bill and Cross Bill-Contract for Sale of Real Estate-Drunkenness and Incapacity of Vendor-Specific Performance-Costs. The plaintiff Tyson filed his bill in December, 1872, for the specific performance of "This agreement is to certify that I Jonathan Benson have sold to Joseph Porter Tyson on this 30th day of October, 1872, all the estates called Paddock Wray and Christcliff, together with 400 heath-bred and heath-going sheep, for the sum of 2150." The agreement was signed by the plaintiff and the defendant and a witness-a nephew of the plaintiff-but without the intervention or assistance of professional advice. The defendant Benson filed his bill in January, 1873, praying for a declaration that the agreement was an invalid one and not binding upon him, and for an order that it might be cancelled. Benson was about 71 years of age. He inherited one estate from his father, and the other he purchased. The whole consisted of seventy-six acres, situate in Eskdale, and was let with 400 sheep for 70l. a-year. After the death of his wife and his surviving daughter, Benson let his estates and resided alone at Christcliff, and gave himself up, as he alleged, to drinking, frequently resorting to the Woolpack and the Mason's Arms, two publichouses in Eskdale, and his defence was that he was incapacited by drinking; that he was wholly unfit to manage matters of any consequence, or in any way attend to important business, without proper advice, and that at the time of signing the contract he was intoxicated and incapable of properly understanding what he was doing. It was also alleged that the property was sold at too low a sum. The parties and their witnesses were cross-examined in Court on their affidavits. Lindley, Q.C., and E. G. White (Hawkins, Q.C., of the Common Law Bar with them), for the purchaser Tyson. Karslake, Q.C., and T. A. Roberts, for the vendor Benson. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR after reviewing the evidence, held that Benson was on the day when the contract was executed capable of making his own bargain, it having been proved that he talked over with Tyson and fixed the price which he was to pay for the property. Benson's bill was dismissed with costs, and on Tyson's bill a decree was made for specific performance with costs up to the hearing. Solicitors: Park, Nelson, & Morgan, agent for H. Myers Meakin, Broughton-in-Furness; Helder & Roberts, agents for Brockbank & Helder, Whitehaven. V.-C. H. WILKINS v. CHARRETTON. April 23. Marriage Settlement in 1829 —Appointment of Real Estate by Will in 1829 under a Testamentary Power in a Will of earlier Date, and Appointment of Personal Estate by the same Will under a power in the Marriage Settlement-Statute of Frauds-Statute 25 Geo. 2, c. 6-Gift to an attesting Witness of a Codicil in 1830 to Will of 1829 valid. By an indenture of settlement of the 17th of March, 1829, made on the marriage of John and Naomi Story (the widow of Elmund Hooke) certain sums of stock were vested in trustees in trust for the sole and separate nse and benefit of the wife, and to be given, sold, conveyed, and disposed of by her by deed or will, or otherwise, to any person or persons, and subject thereto to be held, enjoyed, and the income to be received by her in exclusion of her husband, and at her decease, in case she made no disposition of the same by deed, will, or otherwise, in trust for Mrs. Charretton, Mrs. Bellairs, and Mrs. Jekyll, her three daughters by Mr. E. Hooke, equally for their separate estate. It was agreed that all such real and personal estate as Mrs. Story should acquire during the coverture should remain for her sole and separate use, with power to her of appointing it as she should think fit. Mrs. Story on the 24th of March, 1829. by will, after reciting that under the will of Edmund Hooke she had a testamentary power of appointment in favour of his children, Mrs. Charretton, Mrs. Bellairs, and Mrs. Jekyll, over estates situate in the parishes of Mulbarton and Welbourne in Norfolk, appointed the Mulbarton estate in trust (subject to an annuity for Mrs. Bellairs for life) to the use of Mrs Jekyll in tail, with remainder to Mrs. Bellairs in tail, with remainder to Mrs. Charretton in tail, with remainders over, and she appointed the Welbourne Estate to the use of Mrs. Bellairs in tail with remainder to Mrs. Jekyll in tail, with remainder to Mrs. Charretton in tail, with remainders over. At the same time she appointed estates comprised in the settlement of the 17th of March, 1829, to Mr. Story for life, with remainder to her said three daughters as he should appoint, and in default to the uses declared of the Mulbarton Estate, and after giving various bequests (not including any bequest in favour of Mrs. Bellairs) the testatrix gave to Mr. Story and two others (who were also appointed executors) all the residue of her personal estate upon trusts for the benefit of her three daughters, for life, and after their deaths for that of their children. On the 11th of August, 1830, Mrs. Story by a codicil revoked that part of her will which gave her Mulbarton Estate to her daughter Mrs. Jekyll, and gave the same to her daughter Mrs. Bellairs and her heirs in the same way and with the same provisoes as were therein mentioned in regard to her daughter Mrs. Jekyll, but without its being charged with any annuity, but as she had also given the Welbourne Estate to her daughter Mrs. Bellairs and her heirs, she revoked that part of her will which gave any sum of money to Mrs. Bellairs, as it was her intention that the Mulbarton and Welbourne Estates were to compose the whole property that she was to take under her will, and any money that she might have been entitled to under her will she bequeathed equally to her two daughters Mrs. Charretton and Mrs. Jekyll, so that their personal property might be in all respects equal. The codicil was signed in the presence of Mr. Story, Mrs. Jekyll, and Harriet Davey. Mrs. Jekyll was one of the attesting witnesses. Mrs. Story died on the 12th of August, 1830. After the payments which she directed Mrs. Story's separate estate when invested in annuities amounted to the sums of 89867. 15s. 31. and 58497. 14s. 24., and it was considered by all parties that the latter sum represented Mrs Jekyll and her children's share. The suit was instituted in February, 1872, for the administration of the trusts of the will so far as they related to the said two sums of annuities, and the material question now was whether Mrs. Jekyll (who died in January, 1872) having been an attesting witness of the codicil could take any interest thereunder. B. B. Rogers, for the plaintiff, the surviving trustee. Karslake, QC., and Davey, for the defendants, the Charrettons, contended that the gift to the attesting witness was on the true construction of the Statute of Frauds and of the Statute of 25 Geo. 2, c. 6, void. Dickinson, Q.C., and Cozens-Hardy, for other defendants in the same interest. Bristowe, Q.C., and Smart, for the defendants, two of the Jekylls, contended that the case was not within the Statute of Frauds; that the Statute 25 Geo. 2, c. 6, had no application, and that therefore the gift to Mrs. Jekyll was not void. Lindley, Q.C., and Robinson, for the defendants, Mrs. Bellairs and others. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR was of opinion that this was a case of a power of appointment and not one of a disposition by will at all within the scope and intention of the Statute of Frauds, and therefore the Statute of 25 Geo. 2, c. 6 had no application, and that having regard to the authorities, the gift to the attesting witness was valid. Solicitors: Norris, Allens, & Carter, agents for Simpson & Son, Norwich; E. F. Sealy; Druce, Sons, & Jackson; Merriman & Pike. BANKRUPTCY. Ex parte KEIGHLEY. In re WIKE. April 27. Rehearing-Jurisdiction-Discretion of Court-Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 71. This was an appeal from a decision of the judge of the Man chester County Court. He had refused to admit a proof tendered by Keighley against the joint estate of John Wike & Son, bankrupts, on the ground that the evidence did not shew that the alleged debt was one for which the firm were liable. An application was afterwards made for a rehearing, on the ground that new evidence had been discovered since the original hearing. The judge refused to grant a rehearing, and expressed an opinion that sect. 71 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, would not authorize a rehearing for the purpose of making a new case on new evidence. Keighley appealed. De Gex, Q.C., G. W. Lawrance, and Ambrose, for the appellant. Little, Q.C., Jordan, and Finlay Knight, for the trustee. THE CHIEF JUDGE held that the discretion to rehear given by sect. 71, is as wide as possible in a proper case. But he thought that on the present occasion no sufficient case had been made out. He therefore dismissed the appeal. Solicitors: Mackrell & Co.; Torr, Janeway, & Co. Q. B. Common Law. April 22. WAYLAND V. METROPOLITAN RAILWAY COMPANY. Evidence-Inspection of Documents— Confidential Communications -Reports to Defendants by Medical Men of State of Plaintiff injured on Defendants' Railway. Action for negligence of defendants in carrying plaintiff as a passenger on defendants' railway. Pleas, not guilty, and that plaintiff was not received as a passenger. Shortly after the accident in which the plaintiff was injured Dr. W. medically examined the plaintiff on behalf of the company, and continued to do so from time to time, and made reports to the company, some before and some after the writ was issued. Cockburn, CJ., at chambers, made the usual order for plaintiff, &c., to inspect and take copies of the reports made before action brought, with leave to defendants to go to the Court. R. T. Reid moved accordingly to rescind the order, on the ground, as stated on affidavit, that the reports were made to the company for the purpose of assisting the company to establish their defence in anticipated litigation. The trial took place at the last Gloucester Assizes before Lord Coleridge, C.J., when the facts appeared to be as follows:-The alleged libel was published in the South Wales Daily News, and related to the conduct of the plaintiff at a meeting held in Swansea to promote the election to Parliament of the liberal candidate for that borough. The plaintiff, who was a supporter of the conservative candidate, had, from motives of curiosity, attended the meeting with two companions, also conservatives, and a disturbance had arisen at the meeting in consequence of them conduct" consistent with their having imbibed too freely of their presence. The paragraph in the newspaper imputed to the cup that inebriates." The learned judge left it to the jury to say whether the paragraph exceeded the limits of fair discussion by a writer in a public newspaper of a matter of public interest. The jury found for the defendant. nisi for a new trial on the ground that the learned judge misHuddleston, Q.C. (Bosanquet with him), now moved for a rule directed the jury. He contended that the conduct of private persons attending an election meeting, as the plaintiff had done, did not raise any question of privilege. THE COURT (Lord Coleridge, C.J., Brett and Denman, JJ.) held that the direction was right, and accordingly refused the rule. Rule refused. Attorneys for plaintiff: Gover & Norton. THE COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn and Lush, JJ.) refused the rule, expressly adhering to their decision in Baker v. London and South Western Railway Company (Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 91), in preference to the decisions in later cases in the Court of Com- C. P. mon Pleas. Attorneys for defendants: Burchells. Q. B. DENNIS v. WHETHAM AND ANOTHER. April 27. Sheriff-Action for false Return of nulla bona-Prior Writs fraudulent. Action against defendants, the Sheriff of Middlesex, for making a false return of nulla bona to a writ of fi. fa. to levy 1287. Pleas, not guilty, and that there were no goods of the execution debtor on which defendants could have levied under plaintiff's writ. At the trial it appeared that the defendants had not levied at all; but that there were goods of the execution debtor (which the jury valued at 50%.) upon which they might have levied. The defendants set up as a defence that there were two writs of fi. fa. against the execution debtor for more than 50%. lodged with them prior to the plaintiff's writ, and that therefore the plaintiff was not damnified. The jury having found that the prior writs were fraudulent, the judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff for 50%. M. Chambers, Q.C., moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, contending that as the defendants had no notice that the prior writs were fraudulent, they were not bound to know it; and therefore if they had levied on the execution debtor's goods, the plaintiff would have got nothing, and therefore was not damnified, and the action would not lie without damage. THE COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn and Lush, JJ.) refused the rule. It was the sheriff's duty to have levied, and assuming the prior writs to have been fraudulent, the plaintiff might have been able to interplead or to take other steps to dispute the validity of the prior writs, and so to obtain the procecds of the levy, and he was therefore damnified, and the action would lie. Attorney for defendants: W. Maynard. April 21. STEWART v. EDDOWES AND ANOTHER. Alteration of Written Contract by Parol. These were actions arising out of a contract for sale of a ship, which were tried at Liverpool before Amphlett, B., when a verdict passed in both actions against Stewart. The question in both actions was, whether there was a contract for sale of the ship between the plaintiffs and the defendant in the second action as vendors and purchaser respectively. It appeared that the defendants in the first action, the Messrs. Eddowes, were acting as brokers for the vendors for the sale of the ship, and negotiations had taken place in the matter between them and Mr. Stewart. One of the Messrs. Eddowes had drawn up a written memorandum of the terms of the sale, and sent it unsigned to Stewart. The latter made certain interlineations in red ink, and having signed the document as altered submitted it to Eddowes. Eddowes stated that it was no use to submit the document as altered to the vendors as it would not be assented to. The red ink interlineations were then struck out with the assent of Stewart, and the document was sent to the vendors. They made certain further interlineations, and sent the document back to Eddowes, who then signed it on behalf of the vendors and took it to Stewart, who assented to the terms of it as it then stood. It was contended by the counsel for Stewart that parol evidence could not be given of what had taken place after Stewart had signed, on the ground that this would be to vary the written contract by parol, in contravention of the provisions of the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds. The learned judge received the evidence. Benjamin, Q.C. (Baylis with him), now moved for a new trial on the ground of misreception of evidence. THE COURT (Lord Coleridge, C.J., Brett and Denman, JJ.) held that the evidence was admissible, on the ground that there never was a contract until Stewart had finally assented to the terms of the contract, and the evidence only went to shew what the written contract was upon which the parties had agreed that their signatures should operate. They therefore refused the rule. Rule refused. Attorneys for Stewart: Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Rawle, for Hull Stone, & Fletcher, Liverpool. House of Lords. TABLE OF CASES. Common Law. WATT e. LIGERTWOOD (Contempt of Court-Consequent Penalty) Equity. M. R. ASTLEY V. EARL OF ESSEX (Will-Devise in tail-Name and Arms Clause-Forfeiture-Condition-Ignorance of Rights—Statute of Limitations-3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, 88, 3, 4) BEST'S SETTLEMENT TRUST, In re (Marriage Settlement-Ultimate Trust of Personalty for Persons who should be the "Personal Representative or Representatives of the Wife"- Her Administrators, and not her Next of Kin held entitled) V.-C. H. BRUFF v. COBBOLD (Amalgamation of Railway Companies—Fund set aside to compensate Officers of former Company—Inquiry who entitled as " Officers"-Distribution of Fund as Annuities) V.-C. H. 100 FRY, In re. MATTHEWS v. FREEMAN (Construction of Will-Name or Description) V.-C. M. Guthrie v. WaLROND (Executor proving after Decree-SuppleV.-C. M. mental Order) 99 99 102 GUY v. HOLMAN (Will-Bequest to Children equally-Legatees HANCOCK v. HEATON (Partnership Accounts-Separate Business— 99 SMITH V. HARDING (Direction to Trustees to sell Real Estate Gift V.-C. M. TAYLOR, Ex parte. In re MORRISEY (Liquidation-Refusal of Registrar to register Resolutions-Appointment of ReceiverAction by Debtor against a Creditor—Injunction-Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, r. 260) C. P. 106 Cox v. LEIGH (Sheriff-Landlord and Tenant-Payment of one Year's Rent-8 Änne, c. 14, s. 6). Q. B. 104 FLETCHER V. BAKER (County Court-Notice of Jury-Three clear Days before" the day for hearing"-9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, 88. 70, 71-County Court Rules, 101, 105) Q. B. MELLOR v. WATKINS (Landlord and Tenant-Effect of Surrender of Lease on Interest of Sub-lessee-Parol Licence, Revocation of Rights of Licensee) PETROCOCHINO AND OTHERS v. BOTT (Shipping-Construction of Bill of Lading) PITTS, APP.; MILLAR, RESP. (Cruelty to Animals-12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 3-Place used for the Purpose of baiting Animals) Q. B. 103 REG. v. CASTRO (Indictment for Perjury removed from Central Criminal Court by Certiorari-Offence charged to have been committed in the City of London and in the County of Middlesex-County in which Indictment shall be tried-9 & 10 Vict. c. 24, 8. 3-Trial at Bar, Order for--11 Geo. 4 & 1 Wm. 4, c. 70, 8. 7—Sentence passed in Vacation and not in Term) Q. B. 104 Reg. v. Cooper (Misappropriation of Money-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, 88. 75, 76). C. C. 108 REG. v. FARRELL (Evidence-Depos 'tion-Witness too ill to travel -11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 17) C. C. 168 REG. v. GUARDIANS OF STEPNEY UNION (Criminal Lunatic, Order of Justices on Parish of Settlement for Maintenance of 9 Geo. 4, c. 40, s. 54-" Debt, claim, or demand incurred by or become due from orerscer or guardians to be paid during the current half-year”—22 & 23 ̊ Vict. c. 49, s. 1) Q. B. 103 REG. v. GUARDIANS OF WORCESTER UNION (Poor Law-Removal of Pauper-Irremoveability—Break of Residence-9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, 8. 1) Q. B. 105 Reg, v. PemblitON (Malicious Injury to Property—24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, 8.5 51-Malice-Intention) C. C. THORN . THE MAYOR, &C., OF LONDON (Building_Contract Plans and Specifications - Implied Warranty by Employer of Sufficiency) 99 TRENCHARD, Ex parte (Attorney and Solicitor-Articled Clerk- Bukey. 103 |