to give damages, if it be a proper case; and it is also competent for me to declare the rights, having regard to the state of the pleadings. [His Lordship stated the facts, and continued :] Was the defendant responsible for the nuisance created by Mr. Studt's show? Unquestionably he was. A man in possession of land is responsible if he authorises another to do anything on the land which amounts to a nuisance to others. It is quite immaterial how the authority is granted, whether it is by express licence or whether it is by licence to be implied from the surrounding circumstances, or, as was explained by Lord Blackburn in the case of Harris v. James (35 L. T. Rep. N. S. 240; 45 L. J. 545, Q. B.), it is immaterial whether it is granted by lease. What you have to find out is whether there is an authority. If a man makes a lease to another for the purpose of a noxious business being carried on, then he is responsible. If a man makes a lease to another for the purpose of a noisome trade being carried on, or for a noisy trade being carried on, he is responsible if the trade is there carried on in the usual way such trades are. About this proposition there is no question whatever. If a man lets his land for purposes of business which, as ordinarily carried on, would result in a nuisance, he would be exempt if he takes precautions by way of covenants, proper and convenient to the circumstances, to prevent the business being so carried on. But in this case, as I have said, Studt was only the licensee, and Studt of course himself was liable. But I have had some experience of these itinerant showmen, and my experience certainly is not peculiar. What they do is, they come and they go. You apply for an injunction just as they are moving off. The plaintiffs might have joined Studt, and taken the same course as was taken in White v. Jameson (L. Rep. 18 Eq. 303), where it was held that both the licensee and the owner of the land in possession were responsible for the nuisance. Now, I look at the defence for the purpose of seeing what was said in regard to Studt's nuisance. It was put in issue. defendant does not deny and he does not admit, and for this purpose that is exactly the same thing. He says: I do not admit it was a nuisance; you must prove it was a nuisance." That is the way it stood in the defence before the action came on for trial. However, the defendant was advised that he could not sustain the case that it was not a nuisance, and that the plaintiff could prove it, and so the defendant made an admission admitting the nuisance as alleged. When a man threatens and intends to authorise others to do those acts upon his land which will amount to a nuisance when done, it is scarcely necessary to say that he is liable to be restrained by the injunction of the court. have heard from the defendant's counsel long arguments upon what appears to me the only point which requires any consideration at all, namely, whether at the time the action was commenced the defendant threatened and intended to commit this nuisance-that is to say, to authorise the committal of it. The argument is this: that no damages are asked for in respect of the past nuisance-that is, the nuisance of the four days and therefore, the court must in some way or other eliminate that part of the case from consideration. That cannot be maintained. The I [CHAN. DIV. Of Authorities were cited with reference to what is technically termed the quia timet doctrine. The quia timet doctrine is very simple. A man, having suffered no injury, apprehends that an injury will be inflicted upon him. Accordingly he comes to the court to ask for an injunction. Then the court has to consider―to put it in the way it has been put by the late Master of the Rolls, Sir George Jessel-whether inevitably there will be a nuisance if the thing is done, which, if done, the plaintiff alleges will be a nuisance. If a man erects a chimney on his own land and his neighbour apprehends that there will be a nuisance arising from the smoke, as a general rule he cannot get an injunction, because the chimney may be so used that the smoke that arises from it will not injure him. A man apprehends that a neighbouring mine owner is so conducting his mining operations that he will flood his neighbour's land. The neighbour asks for an injunction to restrain the doing of that which, if done, he says will be an irreparable injury to him. That is a case of quia timet, and the plaintiff of course has to establish, either that the result is inevitable, or, perhaps I might better have said, that the result is one which all reasonable men skilled in the matter would expect would happen. I am only giving these as illustrations; and the point which I am endeavouring to bring out, as strongly as I can, is that they are all cases of merely apprehended injury. They have nothing to do with the case where an injury has been already inflicted. If an ornamental tree is cut down by a tenant for life, who has no right to do so, it is a matter of course, to restrain him, on that act alone, from cutting other trees of a similar character. course, there may be circumstances which would go to show that it would be a wrong inference to draw from the fact of his cutting one that he will cut others. But, speaking very generally, in an ordinary case, the fair inference is that a man who has done the wrong act intends to repeat it. I quite admit that there may be circumstances in the case which show that it is a solitary act, and that the beginning and end of the wrong is that one act. The argument for the defendant reduced itself to this curious proposition that if the plaintiffs had come on the 8th June for an injunction they would have obtained it. So far as I see, they would not, because the defendant would have said there was no nuisance. But the argument admits that, if the true facts had been known, they would have been entitled to get an injunction on the 8th June to restrain the defendant from going on on the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th June. Then it is quite plain that if the injunction, which, if the facts had been known, would have been granted, had been granted, it would not be an injunction against that particular show, but against all similar shows. The strange position taken up is that, because the plaintiffs did not sue on the 8th June, but waited till the 19th June, they are in a worse position. It would have been said in this case, if they had come on the 8th June, it was quia timet, but coming on the 19th June itwas no longer because they were afraid, but because the injury had been actually inflicted. Then what takes place when the show was beginning? Immediately on the 6th June Messrs. James complain, and they did it in courteous terms, and they proceeded with their complaint after the show had ceased, and there is a letter written on the 13th June which sets out after the event in detail what Messrs. James had suffered by the nuisance. I am not going to read the correspondence through, but the substance of it is that at the beginning the defendant was asked to stop, and afterwards, before the writ was issued, the plaintiffs courteously asked for an undertaking, and the undertaking was refused. Now, upon the evidence I know what the shows were that were held up to 1873, and I know that they were nuisances. The result, therefore, is that there is on the defence a claim of right to hold the shows of this kind, notwithstanding that they may be a nuisance. I hardly think it necessary to say that where the defendant claims a right to do the thing, and has done the thing previously to the action commenced, the injunction goes. If authority were wanted, it will be found in Hext v. Gill (27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 291; L. Rep. 7 Ch. App. 699, 711), where Mellish, L.J., in giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said: "The defendants being sought to be restrained from getting china clay, they say, 'We have a title to get china clay out of the estate called Greys, and we are entitled to get it in the way in which it is ordinarily got; but we have no present intention of getting it.' We are of opinion that after this it is idle for the defendants to say they do not threaten to get the china clay under the inclosed part of Greys, and to contend that this court is precluded from deciding the question whether they are entitled to get it in the way in which they say they have a right to get it." But the matter does not rest there, although what I have stated is ample to show that there is a case for an injunction against the defendant. [His Lord. ship examined the pleadings, and proceeded:] Without reading further on or criticising too minutely this pleading, which has evidently been most carefully prepared, and is the result of elaborate thought on the part of the pleader, the result is this: "I, the defendant, have an immemorial right to carry on shows such as Studt's shows are. Studt's shows were not a nuisance, and therefore I am to interpret the meaning of lawful shows as shows lawfully carried on." There is no denial of the allegation that the defendant threatens and intends to allow the square to be used for shows similar to Studt's. It is plain that this is not a mere question of the verbal accuracy of this very carefully prepared statement of defence. But the substance of it is, that Studt's shows are not a nuisance, and the defendant is going to permit the areas in question to be used for shows such as Studt's were. The sum of the case is this: that there is sufficient evidence on the facts to show the threat and intention. The case on the threat and intention is made stronger by the line adopted throughout the defence, and I have no hesitation in saying that the plaintiffs were justified in bringing this action for an injunction. The result is, that there must be an injunction. If, before the judgment is drawn up, the parties are willing, because they are on good terms, to modify the judgment, they may do so. I have suggested that it might be considered sufficient for the protection of the plaintiffs if they take a declaration of right-that is to say, a declaration that the defendant was not entitled by immemorial custom or otherwise to cause or to permit or authorise the areas in ques [CHAN. DIV. tion to be used for the purpose of shows whereby a nuisance was caused; and upon that, with 40s. damages and costs, the order may be so drawn up. But, if there is no arrangement, I think the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction asked. There was one circumstance which I did not mention, that is, that this Market-square is in the centre of a large town of some 50,000 inhabitants; and, although both sides very properly state nothing against the character of their fellow-townsmen, yet it is plain that the popula tion is one which would enjoy sports of this kind, would flock there in great numbers, and that they would get, as men will do, excited with the pleasure of the entertainments. Speaking only generally, the class of persons inhabiting the town are miners and foundry men, who are entitled, of course, to enjoy themselves just as much as any others. But when they are brought in large numbers to the centre of a town of this kind, it is almost impossible, I think, to carry on shows-certainly of the class in question-without there being a nuisance; and I am by no means satisfied, though I do not pronounce a judicial opinion on it, that Mr. James was not right when he said that no show-and of course he meant shows of this description-could be carried on in Market-square without the show causing a nuisance. I understood Mr. James to be referring to shows of this class; because I can conceive it quite possible that there might be some more innocent shows, such as flower shows, which I mention by way of illustration, which could be carried on there without a nuisance. About that I say nothing. The injunction will be to restrain the defendant, his agents, and so forth, from using, or causing or permitting to be used Market-square and the second area or any part thereof for the purpose of any sports, exhibitions, entertainments, or otherwise - in fact, as asked by the statement of claim leaving out the word "annoyance "-whereby a nuisance may be occasioned to the injury of the plaintiffs. The word "annoyance" is in the form in Seton, but I do not think there is any legal value in it. You do not want the word " annoyance." "Annoyance," if I may say so, is wrong. It is an unnecessary word. The plaintiffs will of course have the costs of the action. Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Schultz and Son. Solicitor for the defendant, T. Pearse Gandell. Wednesday, June 11. (Before CHITTY, J.) MURRAY v. WATKINS. (a) Tenant in tail Limitation Real property The plaintiff's mother was tenant in tail by descent of certain property which was entailed by the will of a testator who died in Jan. 1811, and she became entitled to the possession of the property on the death of R. W., which took place in Nor. 1871, at which time the plaintiff's mother was under no disability either of coverture or infancy, She married in 1875, and died in 1882, without (a) Reported by A. COYSGARNE SIM, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. ever having acquired possession of the property. Upon her death the plaintiff became entitled to possession as her issue in tail, and in 1889 he commenced an action to enforce his right to such possession. The point of law raised by the pleadings in the action was set down for hearing before the trial, the question being whether the plaintiff, not having claimed or taken possession until after the expiration of twelve years from Nov. 1871, and who was an infant on his mother's death, and also at the date of the action, was entitled to the benefit of his infancy to prevent the Statute of Limitation from running. Held, that as the plaintiff claimed through his mother, as a tenant in tail, the right to possession first accrued to her; that, as there had been no possession by either of them for twelve years, the statute applied; and that, therefore, the plaintiff was not now entitled to claim the property. ADJOURNED SUMMONS. Richard Watkins was at the date of his will, and thenceforth down to and at the time of his decease, seised of certain hereditaments, in his will described as situate at or near Bagdale, in the township of Ruswarp, for an estate of inheritance in fee simple in possession free from incumbrances. Richard Watkins by his will, dated the 16th May 1807, devised all that his messuage, dwellinghouse, or tenement which he then inhabited, situate at or near Bagdale, in the township of Ruswarp, with all and singular the rights, members, and appurtenances to the premises belonging or appertaining, unto and to the use of his wife Hannah Watkins, and her assigns, during such time and so long as she should continue his widow and unmarried; and from and after the decease or second marriage of his wife, which should first happen, he gave and devised the hereditaments, with the appurtenances, unto and to the use of his younger son Francis Watkins, and the heirs of his body, and in default of such issue unto and to the use of the testator's own right heirs for ever; and the testator also devised unto and to the use of his said wife, so long as she continued his widow and unmarried, one moiety of all his dwelling-houses, with the yards and gardens, or other ground adjoining to or near the same, respectively situate also at or near Bagdale, in the township of Ruswarp, then in the occupation of certain persons; and subject to such estate he devised the same moiety, and he also devised the other moiety of the same dwelling-houses, yards, gardens, and ground unto and to the use of his son Francis Watkins, and the heirs of his body, and in default of such issue to the testator's own right heirs for ever. The testator died on the 5th Jan. 1811, leaving his son Francis Watkins his heir-at-law. The testator's widow died on the 13th Feb. 1823, without having married again. Francis Watkins thereupon entered into possession or receipt of the rents of the hereditaments, and continued in such possession or receipt until his death. He died on the 21st Sept. 1842, without having barred his estate tail in the hereditaments, and leaving him surviving his wife Christiana Watkins, his eldest son Richard Watkins, his second son John Watkins, and several younger children. [CHAN. DIV. Richard Watkins (the eldest son of Francis Watkins) died on the 25th Nov. 1871, without having had any issue, and without having barred his estate tail in the said hereditaments. John Watkins (the second son of Francis Watkins) had died on the 22nd Sept. 1850, leaving an only (posthumous) child, Clarens Fanny Watkins, who was born on the 28th Oct. 1850, and who on the 9th Nov. 1875 was married to Lewis Murray, who died on the 3rd Aug. 1881. Clarens Fanny Murray died on the 24th Aug. 1882, without having barred her estate tail in the hereditaments, and leaving Lewis Murray her only son. Lewis Murray, who was born on the 22nd Sept. 1878, became on the decease of his mother Clarens Fanny Murray, and now claimed to be, entitled to the hereditaments for an estate tail in possession. Francis Watkins by his will, dated the 7th July 1841, devised all his real estate unto and to the use of his sons Richard Watkins and Thomas Watkins, their heirs and assigns, in trust for his wife Christiana Watkins for her life, and after her decease upon trust to sell the same, and to hold the proceeds upon the trusts in the will declared. Thomas Watkins was the surviving devisee in trust under the will of Francis Watkins. The estate of Francis Watkins was being administered in an action of Re Francis Watkins, deceased; Watkins v. Watkins, in which Mary Watkins was plaintiff and Thomas Watkins and William Watkins were defendants, and it was claimed in that action that the hereditaments were vested in Thomas Watkins as tenant thereof in fee simple in possession upon the trusts declared by the will of Francis Watkins of the real estate thereby devised. Christiana Watkins by her will, dated the 15th Oct. 1875, devised her real estate to William Watkins and Mary Watkins upon the trusts therein declared concerning the same. The estate of Christiana Watkins was being administered in an action of Re Christiana Watkins, deceased; Watkins v. Watkins, in which the children of William Watkins were plaintiffs and William Watkins and Mary Watkins were defendants, and it was claimed in that action that the hereditaments were vested in William Watkins and Mary Watkins as joint tenants thereof in fee simple in possession upon the trusts declared by the will of Christiana Watkins concerning her real estate. Upon the death of Francis Watkins in 1842, it was erroneously supposed that the fee simple in possession of the hereditaments passed under his will, and accordingly Richard Watkins and Thomas Watkins, as devisees in trust under the will of Francis Watkins, entered into receipt of the rents of the hereditaments, and continued in such receipt until 1850, when they both went abroad. Thenceforth Richard Watkins remained out of the jurisdiction until his death in 1871, and Thomas Watkins had ever since resided in South Africa. Shortly after their departure out of the jurisdiction, George Smith, who claimed to be a creditor of Christiana Watkins, entered into possession or receipt of the rents of the hereditaments, and continued in such possession or receipt until the 27th Dec. 1872, when possession of the hereditaments was recovered in an action of ejectment against George Smith by Thomas Watkins, the then surviving devisee in trust under the will of Francis Watkins. With the exception of the time during which George Smith was in possession, the rents of the hereditaments, from the death of Francis Watkins in 1842, down to the death of Christiana Watkins in 1878, were paid by the trustees of the will of Francis Watkins to Christiana Watkins, the tenant for life under his will, under the erroneous supposition that the hereditaments passed under that will. After the death of Christiana Watkins the rents were received by Thomas Watkins as such surviving trustee (or by William Watkins as his attorney, under a power of attorney dated the 21st June 1873) down to Nov. 1887, since which time the rents had been received by a receiver appointed in the action of Re Christiana Watkins, deceased; Watkins v. Watkins. Thomas Watkins, William Watkins, and Mary Watkins respectively contended that the claim of Lewis Murray to the hereditaments was barred by the Statute of Limitation. Thomas Watkins contended that he had acquired as against Lewis Murray a title to the hereditaments by possession, and that he held the same upon the trusts of the will of Francis Watkins. William Watkins contended that Christiana Watkins acquired, as against the trustees or trustee for the time being of the will of Francis Watkins, a title to the hereditaments by possession, and that the hereditaments passed by her will, and were now vested in William Watkins and Mary Watkins upon the trusts of the will of Christiana Watkins. Mary Watkins, however, contended that the hereditaments were part of the estate of Francis Watkins. Lewis Murray contended that the possession of Christiana Watkins was the possession of the trustees of the will of Francis Watkins, and that Richard Watkins, who was one of such trustees, and also the rightful tenant in tail, remained in legal possession of the hereditaments down to his death on the 25th Nov. 1871, and, notwithstanding that he, in ignorance of his rights, accounted for the rents to Christiana Watkins, his possession prevented the Statute of Limitation from running against him, and his title as tenant in tail in his own right was not barred at any time during his life, and accordingly that upon his death Clarens Fanny Watkins (afterwards Murray) succeeded to the hereditaments as tenant in tail, and, as the Statute of Limitation did not run against her during her coverture, her title as tenant in tail was not barred at the time of her death. Lewis Murray claimed the rents of the hereditaIments which had accrued since the decease of Clarens Fanny Murray. Accordingly this action was on the 17th July 1889 commenced on behalf of Lewis Murray by Edmund Rowbotham, his next friend, against Thomas Watkins, William Watkins, and Mary Watkins; and by his statement of claim, delivered on the 16th Jan. 1890, the plaintiff claimed a declaration that he was entitled to the hereditaments as tenant in tail thereof; delivery of possession of the hereditaments; and an account of the rents of the hereditaments accrued since the decease of Clarens Fanny Murray on the [CHAN. DIV. 24th Aug. 1882 which had been received by any of the defendants. The plaintiff also claimed that he might be at liberty to apply in the action of Re Christiana Watkins, deceased; Watkins v. Watkins for the discharge of the receiver appointed in that action of the rents of the hereditaments, or otherwise as he might be advised in relation to the hereditaments, and, if necessary, the appointment in this action of a receiver of the rents of the hereditaments. The statement of defence of the defendant Mary Watkins was delivered on the 7th Feb. 1890, and that of the defendant William Watkins on the 5th March 1890. The defendant Thomas Watkins, being out of the jurisdiction, had not been served. On the 21st April 1890 a summons was taken out by the plaintiff, under rule 2 of Order XXV. of the Rules of Court 1883, asking that the following point of law raised by the pleadings in this action might be set down for hearing and disposed of before the trial of the action, namely, whether the plaintiff's title to the hereditaments as alleged in his statement of claim was or was not barred or extinguished by the statute for the limita tion of actions. The summons was adjourned into court, and now came on to be heard. Sect. 3 of the Real Property Limitation Act 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 57) provides that If at the time at which the right of any person. to recover any land or rent shall have first accrued as aforesaid, such person shall have been under infancy, then such person, or the person claiming through him, may, notwithstanding the period of twelve years hereinbefore limited shall have expired bring an action or suit to recover such land or rent at any time within six years next after the time at which the person to whom such right shall first have accrued shall have ceased to be under any such disability, or shall have died (whichever of those two events shall have first happened). Sect. 1 provides that No person shall bring an action to recover any land but within twelve years next after the time at which the right to bring such action shall have first accrued to some person through whom he claims; or if such right shall not have accrued to any person through whom he claims, then within twelve years next after the time at which the right to bring such action shall have first accrued to the person bringing the same. Romer, Q.C. and J. W. Dunning, for the plaintiff, referred to 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, ss. 16, 22; The Trustees, Executors, and Agency Company Board v. Board, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 459; L. Rep. 9 Williams v. Pott, L. Rep. 12 Eq. 149; 40 L. J. 774, Paine v. Jones, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 779; L. Rep. 18 W. H. Upjohn, for the defendant William Watkins, referred to Goodall v. Skerratt, 3 Drew. 216; 1 Jur. N. S. 57: 85. [CHITTY, J. referred to Cotterell v. Dutton, 4 Taunt. 826.] F. A. Milne for the defendant Mary Watkins. Romer, Q.C. replied. The CHITTY, J.-The plaintiff sues as tenant in tail, claiming to be entitled by descent. The estate tail was created many years ago. It is sufficient for the purpose of my judgment to say that the plaintiff's mother was tenant in tail by descent, and entitled to the possession on the death of Richard Watkins, which event took place in Nov. 1811. At that time the plaintiff's mother was under no disability; she had attained her age of twenty-one, and she afterwards married. She never had possession of the estate, nor has the plaintiff, who, upon her death, became entitled as issue in tail to the possession. The question is whether the plaintiff, who was an infant upon his mother's death, is entitled to the benefit of his infancy, and to set up that disability to prevent the statute further running. I am of opinion that he gains nothing by the fact that he was an infant at the time of his mother's death. section which applies to this case with regard to disability is the 3rd section of the Real Property Limitation Act 1874, and that section runs thus, so far as it need be read: "If at the time at which the right of any person to make an entry or distress, or to bring an action or suit to recover any land or rent, shall have first accrued as aforesaid such person shall have been under any of the disabilities hereinafter mentioned." Now, what is the meaning of "first accrued as afore. said" ? To ascertain that, I turn to the 1st section of the Act, which, so far as I need state it, is this: "After the commencement of this Act no person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action or suit, to recover any land or rent, but within twelve years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action or suit, shall have first accrued to some person through whom he claims." That Act is to be read, according to the 9th section, and construed together with the old Act of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, and it is clear by the 1st section of that Act, which contains the interpretation of terms, that issue in tail claim under tenants in tail. The right of action, and the right to make the entry, first accrued to the plaintiff's mother, and that is the right which is referred to in the 3rd section of the Act of 1874. That is the settled construction with reference to this Act of Parliament. It is clear that this 3rd section, which corresponds to the 16th section of the old Act, intended, with regard to this kind of question about disability, that where once the statute begins to run as against a tenant in tail, and at that time there is no disability on the part of the tenant in tail, the statute is not stopped by subsequent disability. That is well explained by Lord St. Leonards in the passage that has been cited from his book on the Real Property Statutes (2nd edit., pp. 84 and 85). Speaking of the Act 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, he says: "These were reasonable provisions. The neglect of a tenant in tail will bar all those-issue in tail and remaindermen-whom the tenant in tail himself might have barred; and if the whole time has not run against him, the persons, issue, or remaindermen, whom he could have barred, have only the time which remains to run within which to prosecute their right." He is referring there to the 22nd section, but it is proper for the purpose of this question to read these various sections together. I am satisfied-indeed, I think it is established-that in a case of this kind the i [CHAN. DIV. issue in tail claim under the tenant in tail, and when the statute has once begun to run against the tenant in tail, it does not cease to run by reason of subsequent disability. In fact, it was very properly admitted in this case in the opening that, as regards the plaintiff's mother, who married shortly after her right of entry accrued to her, she gained nothing by that subsequent disability. The simple ground upon which my decision proceeds is that her son claims under her, and that the interpretation of that 3rd section is that "first accrued " is "first accrued to the plaintiff's mother." That being so, I dismiss the action with costs. Solicitors for the plaintiff, Van Sandau and Co., agents for Kidd and Bentley, Holmfirth, Yorkshire. Solicitors for the defendants, C. A. Clulow; Johnson and Master, agents for J. B. Coaks and Co., Norwich. Thursday, April 17. CALDWELL V. MATTHEWS. (a) Mortgage Redemption of first mortgage by second-Loss of mortgage deed and other documents-Indemnity. In 1867 M. mortgaged his life interest in certain funds subject to the trusts of his marriage settlement and three policies of insurance on his own life. In 1876 he executed a second mortgage of his life interest to the plaintiffs. This mortgage did not include the policies of insurance. In 1886 an action was brought by the plaintiffs against the mortgagor and II., the legal personal representative of the first mortgagee, to redeem the first mortgage and foreclose the mortgagor. Pending the progress of the action it was discovered that the mortgage of 1867 and the policies were not in the possession of H., and an inquiry was directed as to the loss of the documents, and whether any and what indemnity should be given in respect of the loss in case it should be found that any of them had been lost. In the meanwhile the plaintiffs had paid into court the amount which had been certified to be due to the defendant H. under the mortgage of 1867, and for her taxed costs of the action. The chief clerk, in answer to the inquiry, found that the mortgage of 1867 and the policies had been lost, and he also found that the plaintiffs were entitled to "such an indemnity as will equal that which the insurance company may require." The plaintiffs took out a summons to vary this certificate, by which they asked that the whole of the fund in court might be retained until further order by way of indemnity to them. The insurance company declined to make any arrangement with regard to an indemnity until claims should be made on the policies. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to a bond of indemnity, to be given by the defendant H. as executrix, the bond to be settled in chambers in case the parties differed, and that they were also entitled to have retained in court the sum of 100l., and no more, to meet any possible costs that might be incurred when the policies should become claims. (a) Reported by G. E. JEFFERY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. |