Companies Act 1862 which prevents a mortgage effectually being made of capital which is to be called up by the liquidator in the winding-up. He said that it is prohibited by the Act. Now, in the Act there is nothing in terms which is a negative of the right to mortgage these calls which are a part of the assets and capital of the company, namely, that capital which, when the winding-up commences, has not already been called up. Then, as there is nothing in terms expressly preventing the directors of a company from mortgaging that portion of their capital-I have expressed my opinion that it is really to be considered as part of the capital of the company which has not been already called up-there ought, in my opinion, to be something like a necessary implication from the Act to prevent a company-the directorsfrom effectually mortgaging that part of their property if, as I think it is, it is to be considered as part of the capital. Now, what is relied upon? It is said that this part of the capital of the company, namely, calls made by the liquidator, ought to be collected and applied equally in payment of all the unpaid creditors, and for that sects. 98 and 133 of the Act are relied on. But then the question arises what are to be considered assets of the company? The assets of the company which are there expressed to be dealt with, must mean that portion of the capital which the directors have not actually dealt with before the winding-up commenced, and are like an equity of redemption which is the property of the company. Whenever the legal estate is not in the mortgagee, while it is still in the company, that is an estate which is to be got in by the liquidator. He must get in the property, but the only portion which can be looked upon as a fund in the winding-up for paying the creditors will be that portion-the equity of redemption-which remains the property of the company subject to the performance of all the obligations which the directors have properly thrown upon this part of the property of the company. Therefore, although the assets must be applied by the liquidator rateably in payment of all the creditors then unpaid, yet the unpaid capital of the company which has been mortgaged is not assets-that is, free assets -which can be dealt with by the company in payment of debts. It is not said that there is anything which expressly prevents these mortgages being effectual, but it is said that the general object of the Act will be defeated if they are. Well, I think myself that it might be better, perhaps, if there had been some prohibition against the mortgaging of calls which have not been paid, but that has not been done, and, in my opinion, as the company has power to deal with its assets, and there is nothing to prevent it from dealing with this portion of its assets by mortgaging them, it would be wrong, simply because we think the Act would have been better if there had been such a restriction, to introduce it merely from our view, or the view of anyone, that the objects of the Act-that is, the paying of all creditors equally-would be better carried into effect by preventing this property from being mortgaged. If Parliament had intended that that should not be done, an Act would have been passed to prevent it; but that has not been done. I think we ought not to introduce that into the Act which would interfere seriously with the disposal by the company of that which, in my

[CT. OF APP.

opinion, still remains its property, and which, in this case, has been dealt with by the company by way of mortgage. I do not think that sect. 43 of the Act is to be disregarded in this case, because, although it is true that various cases have decided that a mere power to mortgage property will not of itself enable a mortgage of unpaid calls to be made, yet I think when we come to sect. 43, in construing that section we ought to consider that the directors are required to make a list of all mortgages, not only of mortgages on the parts of their property, but of those mortgages which they have created over their uncalled or unpaid capital when the winding-up commences. We ought not to hold from the reasoning of the Act that there is not a power of mortgaging these assets of the company, and I do not think that the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, giving the power to mortgage unpaid calls, is to be disregarded. There express power is given to mortgage or dispose of that portion of the capital which is not called up. It is very true there was no winding-up Act with reference to such companies, but creditors had power to obtain, by scire facias, unpaid calls, and I do not know that there was any means of letting creditors know that a mortgage had been made. There was no necessity to make that known, but yet it would have been better for creditors if they had got some means of knowing that unpaid calls had been mortgaged; and though that Act is no authority in this case, yet it tends to show that the Legislature did not think it necessary in those cases to prevent such mortgages. The Companies Act of 1862 does not expressly prohibit mortgaging unpaid calls, and the Legislature did expressly authorise it with regard to companies under the Act of 1845. Then have the decided cases which we are bound to follow, laid down that there can be no such mortgage of unpaid calls? There is said to be no authority which we ought to follow, but, as far as I can see, the decided cases are against the appeal. One cannot disregard what was said by the late Master of the Rolls in the case of Re The Phoenix Bessemer Steel Company, where he treated it as undoubted that there could be a good mortgage like this, because what he says is (44 L. J. 685, Ch.), "The first question is whether a company can mortgage future calls "-that was a call in the winding-up-" There can be no doubt that the power can be given to a company by the articles of association." I agree that, as far as we can see, the point was not particularly argued, but the late Master of the Rolls treats it as undoubted that if power is given by the articles and the memorandum, a mortgage can be effectually made of this part of the capital. Then there is the case of Howard v. Patent Ivory Manufacturing Company, where all the cases were considered by Kay, J. which were then, I think, decided on this point. But it does not stand there, because, although those cases were not decided by the Court of Appeal, and if we thought them clearly wrong we should not be bound by them, still there was the decision of the Master of the Rolls in 1875, and the point has frequently arisen since as to whether in particular cases there has been an effectual mortgage of the unpaid calls; and yet it has never been said in any of those cases that what was said by Sir George Jessel is wrong, and

it has always turned, where the mortgages have been held to be ineffectual, on this, that there was not sufficient power given by the articles to enable the mortgage to be made. In the case before the Privy Council of the Bank of South Australia v. Abrahams, it was held that the mortgage was not effectual; that certain debentures were not effectual to mortgage unpaid calls. But that case decided simply, not that it could not have been done if the power given by the articles was sufficient, but that, having regard to the power given, and the terms in which it was attempted to be given, that power would not include a mortgage of unpaid calls. Then there was the decision of James, V.C. in Re Sankey Brook Coal Company (No. 2) that a power to mortgage or charge the works, plant, property, and effects of the company may be carried into effect by mortgaging calls to be made, yet that it cannot be so as regards a call which has not been made before the winding-up. If James, V.C. had had a different opinion to that which was afterwards expressed by Sir G. Jessel, he would not have dealt with that case in that way, namely, by holding that there was no power by the particular articles to mortgage, but he would have said that, whatever might have been the power given by the articles, no effectual mortgage could have been made. In my opinion, therefore, it is right to say here that there is nothing in the Act, either expressly or by necessary implication, to prevent an effectual mortgage being made of calls unpaid at the time when the mortgage was made -calls not made which were afterwards made by the liquidator in the winding-up. As regards one of these mortgages, there was some special question raised which Stirling, J. has given no decision upon, and, therefore, it would not be right for us to give any opinion on that point. But I ought to mention this, that some of these mortgagees were shareholders, and it is said that these mortgages are not effectual in their favour because they would infringe the provisions of the Act of Parliament as to set-off. I do not consider this as a case of set-off. In Black and Co.'s case there was only a charge on the shares of a particular creditor, and that is merely set-off, but here that is not the case. It is not a charge only on the particular call made on the particular person who was the shareholder; it is a general charge on the unpaid assets, which, in my opinion, is good, and we ought not to say that it is a mere question of set-off when it is not. It is a mortgage generally of the unpaid calls, which, no doubt, if my view is correct-and I believe the other members of the court agree with me- -will be effectual, and, in my opinion, ought not to be treated as bad simply because one or more of those who claim under the mortgage happen also to be, as regards part of the assets mortgaged, persons bound themselves to provide their calls, and this they have done because they have paid the entire calls which were due from them. It is not that they are attempting to be released from the calls which have been made, but they have paid up all their calls, and the only question is whether their calls and the calls of others are well and effectually bound by this mortgage. opinion, the appeal fails.

In my

LINDLEY, L.J.-In order to decide the question raised by this appeal, it is necessary to study the Companies Act 1862, and the Acts amending it,

[CT. OF APP.

The

and in particular those portions of them which relate to capital, to calls, to the liabilities of members, and to the collection and distribution of assets in the event of a winding-up. sections which relate to capital are sects. 8 (subsect. 5), 14, and 26. It is plain from these sections that what is meart by the capital of a company having its capital divided into shares, is the nominal capital mentioned in the company's memorandum or articles of association, as the case may be. This is the sum which the directors are empowered to raise by issuing shares, and which those who take shares agree to pay to the extent of the nominal amount of the shares which they respectively hold. A power conferred by the articles of a company to call up or to mortgage or otherwise deal with its capital extends to its nominal capital and (unless restricted in terms) to the whole of such capital. But such a power does not extend to other moneys which, although raisable in the event of a winding-up, form no part of the capital of the company. The sections which relate to calls and to the liabilities of members in respect of their shares are sects. 7, 9 (4), 16, 38, 75, 101, 102, and the Companies Act 1867, s. 25. The general effect of these sections is to render each member liable to pay the full amount of his shares, and in the case of unlimited companies and companies limited by guarantee a further sum in the event of a windingup, but only in that event. This liability is in the nature of a specialty debt due to the company accruing in respect of each share held from the time of its acquisition, and it is a liability which in the case of limited companies can only be discharged by payment in cash, unless an agreement to the contrary is duly registered. sections which relate to the collection and distribution of assets in the event of a winding-up are sects. 94, 95, 98, 101, 102, 133. All actions which have to be brought in order to get in the distributable assets are brought by the liquidator in the name of the company-sect. 95 (1)—and although he is empowered to take proceedings in his own name when it is inconvenient to use the name of the company-sect. 95 (7)—he ought not to adopt this form when there is no necessity for doing so. The form of procedure is, however, immaterial as regards the rights and liabilities sought to be enforced, as was held in Re The Bank of Hindustan, China, and Japan Limited; Ex parte Kintrea (21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 688; L. Rep. 5 Ch. App. 95). The assets when got in are distributable pari passu amongst the unsecured creditors of the company, and members of a limited company cannot set off money due to them from the company against moneys which the liquidator is empowered to collect for the payment of the debts of the company. careful study of the foregoing enactments will be found to warrant the following inferences-1. That uncalled-up capital on any share is money which its holder is bound to the company to pay to it when required by the proper authority. The right to require payment of this money is vested in the company, and when payment is required the amount payable is a debt due to the company in all cases, whether the payment is required before or after liquidation. 2. That the Companies Act 1862 does not say when or by whom the uncalled-up capital is to be called up before the company is in

The

A

liquidation. The Act leaves this matter to be regulated by the company's articles of associa tion. But after a liquidator is appointed, he is the person to exercise the power of calling it up. 3. That directors can only make calls at such times, after such notices, and of such amounts, as are prescribed in the articles of association, but liquidators are not bound to observe the articles as regards these matters; liquidators both can and must collect the assets which it is their duty to distribute as speedily as circumstances will permit. 4. That the Act contains no clause

forbidding mortgages of assets, although every mortgage withdraws from the unsecured creditors that which, but for the mortgage, would be distributable among them in a winding-up. So far from forbidding mortgages, the Act of 1862, sect. 43, requires limited companies to keep a register of all mortgages and charges on their property, from which it is obvious that such mortgages were contemplated. The members are left to decide for themselves what powers of mortgaging they will confer on their directors. All mortgages and charges by limited companies under powers conferred by their articles ought, I apprehend, to be registered under sect. 43, whether what is mortgaged or charged is, at the date of the mortgage or charge, existing property of the company, or property which the company has only a power of acquiring and of equitably charging. There being no prohibition in terms against mortgaging uncalled-up capital, is such a transaction forbidden by necessary implication-i.e., are there provisions in the Act to which full effect cannot be given if such a transaction is upheld? I can find none. Those moneys which are payable only on a winding-up, and which by the Act are excluded from the capital of the company, are never under the control of the directors, and cannot, I apprehend, be dealt with in any way by them. Those moneys form a statutory fund, which only comes into existence when the company is in liquidationthat is to say, when the powers of the directors have ceased. But uncalled-up capital is in a totally different position. The liability to pay it up does not depend on the contingency of liquidation. The power to call it up can be exercised by the directors, and all money raisable in respect of it is an asset of the company. When calls are made by directors it is the capital which they call up; and where calls are made by liquidators it is capital that they call up, so long as there is capital to call. In ordinary limited companies they can require payment of nothing else, in other companies they can, and it is unnecessary to distinguish the calls in respect of capital from calls in respect of further liability. But the proposition that calls made by the liquidators of an ordinary limited company are not calls of capital, but of other moneys payable by statute, seems to me very paradoxical, and to be a proposition which leads to the strange conclusion that members of such companies are under two liabilities and not one-viz., a liability to pay up the capital, and another to pay up a sum equal to it, with, I suppose, a substitution of the latter liability for the former in the event of a windingup. This view is, I think, erroneous, and the language of the Companies Act 1879, to which I will refer presently, is inconsistent with it. Webb v. Whiffin appears to me to be rather in

[CT. OF APP.

favour of than opposed to the view which I take of this matter. On a winding-up it is the liquidator's duty to get in and distribute the assets of the company, including all uncalled-up capital if it is required. But what are assets of the company which the liquidator can get in and distribute depends on what alienations, charges, or incumbrances have been validly made or created before the winding-up began? If the company has mortgaged or charged its property, or any debt due to it, or any money which, although not a debt, the directors had the power of requiring payment of, there is nothing in the statute which entitles the liquidator to disregard such mortgage or charge. Those who contend that the liquidator, although bound to regard mortgages of specific property and floating charges, is at liberty to disregard charges on uncalled-up capital, are bound to show why these last charges are less valid than the first. Reliance is placed on the statutory enactment prohibiting set-off and on the cases relating to that subject; and unquestionably there are passages in some of the judgments in those cases which, if taken as starting points and made the basis of further reasoning, might lead to a conclusion different from that at which I have arrived. I allude more particularly to Black and Co.'s case and Re Whitehouse and Co. But the proper starting point is the statute itself. The exposition of it given in those and other cases is valuable; but it must never be overlooked that there is a section in the Act (sect. 101) expressly forbidding set-off in the winding-up of limited companies, and that this express prohibition is the basis of the reasoning in the cases in question. In Re Whitehouse and Co. the late Master of the Rolls criticised the reasoning of the Court of Common Pleas in Brighton Arcade Company v. Dowling (17 L. T. Rep. N. S. 541; L. Rep. 3 C. P. 175), on the ground that the court there was wrong in considering a call made by the liquidator in a voluntary winding-up as a debt due to the company. But, with deference to Sir George Jessel, it appears to me that on this point he was himself mistaken. The decision in Brighton Arcade Company v. Dowling was, in my opinion, clearly erroneous, because, although the call was a debt due to the company, the statute, properly construed, prohibited the allowance of the set-off in cases of voluntary winding-up, as well as in cases of winding-up by the court or subject to its supervision. I have thought it desirable to call attention to this matter, as, although the decision in Re Whitehouse and Co. is, in my opinion, quite correct, some of the observations in it are, I think, themselves open to comment, and are opposed to conclusions at which I have myself arrived. Having now dealt with the Act, and the decisions most opposed to the validity of mortgages of uncalled capital, it is necessary to refer to the authorities in which such mortgages have been held valid. The cases of Re The Phoenix Bessemer Steel Company and Howard v. Patent Ivory Company are distinct authorities in their favour. But there are many other cases in which the courts have taken for granted that such mortgages would have been valid if the regulations of the company had authorised them in sufficiently plain language. Re Sankey Brook Coal Company; Re Colonial Trusts Corporation ; Ex parte Bradshaw; Bank of South Australia v.

Abrahams; and Stanley's case paved the way for these by treating the question as one of construction only. Further, art. 7 of Table A, relating to the prepayment of uncalled capital, shows that uncalled-up capital may be anticipated, and the fund for distribution in the event of winding-up be thereby reduced. Members who prepay the amounts which may be called up on their shares are not liable to pay them up again in the event of a winding-up. This was decided in Poole, Jackson, and Whyte's case (ubi sup.), and this case goes far to show that calls made by the liquidator in winding-up a limited company are in respect of uncalled capital and not in respect of a liability to contribute to some other fund. The Companies Act 1879, sect. 5, enables a limited company to divide capital into two parts, one of which shall only be called up in the event of a winding-up. When the capital of a company has been so divided, that part which can only be called up in the event of a winding-up ceases to be subject to the control of the directors, and cannot, I apprehend, be charged or disposed of by them. Whether such part can be prepaid need not be discussed. The language of this enactment, however, again supports the view that calls made by the liquidator of an ordinary limited company in course of winding-up are made in respect of capital and not in respect of some statutory fund more or less distinguishable from it. The Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 expressly enables companies governed by that Act to mortgage unpaid-up capital. Such a mortgage would, I apprehend, prevail against a judgment creditor of the company who was proceeding by scire facias against a shareholder whose shares were not fully paid-up, and such a mortgage would equally prevail against a liquidator making calls in winding-up a company governed by the same Act and capable of being wound-up under the Companies Act 1862. This shows that there is nothing contrary to public policy in allowing companies with limited liability to mortgage their unpaid-up capital. It is true that there is no such express power given in the Companies Act 1862, but this is accounted for by the fact that the Act in question leaves powers of mortgaging and other powers of directors to be regulated by the company's articles of association. The omission of express power to mortgage unpaid-up capital affords, therefore, no sufficient ground for negativing such power. In conclusion, I can find nothing in the Companies Act 1862, or subsequent Acts amending it, expressly or by necessary implication, prohibiting limited companies from mortgaging their unpaid-up capital; nothing to show, in the view hitherto taken and daily acted upon, and according to which such mortgages are valid even as against creditors in a winding-up-nothing which would justify the court in holding the mortgages in this particular case invalid. Finding nothing to prohibit them, and an article expressly authorising them, I am of opinion that they are valid, and that the appeal ought to be dismissed with costs.

LOPES, L.J.-With regard to the main point raised in this case, whether future calls can be mortgaged where such mortgage is authorised by the memorandum and articles of association, it is to my mind difficult to distinguish in principle this case from Black and Co.'s case and Re Whitehouse and Co. It is said those decisions are based

[CT. OF APP.

on a question of set-off, and are not applicable to the case of a mortgage on future calls. Mellish, L.J. no doubt in Black and Co.'s case does base his judgment on sect. 101 of the Act of 1862, a section which prohibits in limited companies a set-off; but Lord Selborne does not, in my opinion, rest his judgment on that section, but rests it. rather on the ground that when a winding-up comes, all the creditors are to be paid, and in the first instance pari passu. I will not refer again to the many passages in that judgment which to my mind are of importance. I will satisfy myself by merely referring to the very clear and comprehensive summing up of his opinion which is to be found at the end of the judgment (28 L. T. Rep. N. S. 53; L. Rep. 8 Ch. App. 264): “I am clearly of opinion that it is not competent_for any persons whatever, by any antecedent. contract, to alter the administration of the assets of the company under such a winding-up. I am not at all sure that, on the construction of this particular contract, it is necessary to hold that there has been any attempt to do so; but even if there was an attempt, my judgment would be that that attempt is necessarily ineffectual, because it would be an attempt, by private agreement, to get out of and over-ride an Act of Parliament." Now I cannot help thinking that Lord Selborne, when he used those words, intended to express an opinion that there could be no anticipation of future calls in any case so as to alter the administration of the assets ina windingup. But it is said that the Act of 1862 does not prohibit these mortgages. That is true, and I do not think it has been suggested that there is anything in the Act which authorises such mortgages; but it is to be observed that in the Companies Clauses Act 1845, where it was intended that a mortgage of future calls should be authorised, there is an express power given to mortgage future calls. Now, it has been argued that the anticipation of the fund out of which creditors are to be paid before that fund is created, is contrary to the policy of the Act and inexpedient. I cannot help saying that I feel there is weight in that argument. But it is said, with truth, that Re The Phoenix Bessemer Steel Company and Howard v. The Patent Ivory Manufacturing Company, if correctly decided, govern the case now before the court. With regard to Re The Phoenix Bessemer Steel Company, and I think I may say with regard to Howard v. The Patent Ivory Manufacturing Company, the point we have now to corsider was scarcely if at all argued. The late Master of the Rolls, in the former case seems to have assumed the power to mortgage. Black and Co.'s case was decided in 1872, Re The Phoenix Bessemer Steel Company being decided in 1875, and it is remarkable that in the latter case Black and Co.'s case, which was decided three years before, was not cited. Neither, again, in Howard v. The Patent Ivory Manufacturing Company, which was decided in 1888, was Black and Co.'s case noticed. The late Master of the Rolls seems to have assumed the power, and given no reason for the conclusion at which he arrived. Now, Re The Phoenix Bessemer Steel Company has no doubt been acted upon for some fifteen years, and, so far as I know, it has not been impeached by any other decision. I feel the weight of this, and I need not say I feel the weight of the judgments which

CHAN. DIV.]

Company-Foreign

lottery-Illegal contractProspectus-Injunction-Lotteries Acts (9 Geo. 1, c. 19, s. 4; 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 66).

A company entered into a contract for the purchase of a concession granted by the Shah of Persia for the sole and exclusive right and privilege of initiating and conducting throughout the Persian Empire all operations relating to lottery loans. The prospectus which had been issued by the company and advertised in the newspapers, stated that the company was formed to acquire and work concessions granted by the Shah for lottery loans. It then referred to the acquisition of the concession which had been granted by the Shah, and stated that the head-quarters of the system would be in Persia, but the company would not be limited to that country in the field of its operations, for it was intended that the company shoud be represented by agents in the chief cities of Eastern Europe for the purpose of obtaining subscriptions, and that at least five issues had to be made annually in Persia with minimum drawings of 10,000l., and it was estimated that these operations would return continuously increasing dividends.

In an action brought by a shareholder in the company on behalf of himself and the other shareholders against the company and the directors for an injunction restraining the company from acquiring or dealing with the concession and from advertising any such prospectus : Held, that the contract to acquire the concession was not illegal within sect. 4 of 9 Geo. 1, c. 19, and that the issuing of the prospectus was not an advertisement or notice of a foreign or other illegal lottery within 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 66, and action dismissed with costs.

THE Persian Investment Corporation Limited was incorporated on the 26th Nov. 1889 with a capital of 275,000l., divided into 54,000 ordinary shares of 51, each and 500 founders shares of 161. each. The objects for which the company was formed, as set out in the memorandum of association, were, so far as material, as follows:

(1) To acquire any concessions, rights, or privileges for any objects or purposes whatsoever granted or to be granted by his Majesty the Shah of Persia, or by any other sovereign, state, government, power, or authority which the company may think capable of being profitably (a) Reported by G. WELBY KING, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

[CHAN. DIV.

dealt with, and to carry into effect, work, exercise, or otherwise turn to account, deal with, or dispose of, any such concessions, rights, or privileges.

(2) To carry on all kinds of financial and banking business, and in particular to negotiate loans and advances, to offer for subscription, place, buy, sell, and deal in shares, bonds, obligations, stock, bills, notes, and securities of all kinds.

(19) To adopt and carry into effect, with or without modification, the agreement referred to in clause 3 of the company's articles of association.

The agreement referred to in clause 3 of the articles of association was an agreement of the 15th Nov. 1889 between the Anglo-Asiatic Syndicate Limited of the one part and John Thorby as trustee for the then proposed company of the other part, for the purchase by the company for 220,000l. in cash and shares of a concession granted on the 20th July 1889 by the Shah of Persia of the exclusive right and privilege for a period of seventy-five years from the date of the concession of initiating and conducting throughout the whole of the Persian empire, all operations relating to loans redeemable by drawings with bonuses and lotteries and the promotion of lottery companies and the sale of lottery tickets.

On the 25th Nov. 1889 a prospectus was issued and advertised inviting the public to apply for shares in the company. This prospectus stated that the company was formed to acquire and work concessions granted by the Shah of Persia for lottery loans; that the company would acquire in the first instance the concession granted by the Shah, dated the 20th July 1889, conferring for the period of seventy-five years the exclusive privilege of conducting all operations in connection with lottery loans and other similar issues in Persia during the term of the concession; and then followed these statements:

The granting of an important concession of this special nature, with all its attendant rights and privi leges, is almost, if not quite, unique in the annals of fiscal procedure; for the profits inseparably connected with business of the character in question are most remunerative; in fact, several continental nationsnotably, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain, &c.—to a certain extant rely for revenue upon the government lottery schemes which they support by every means in their power. The income so derived cannot be ascertained with absolute accuracy as regards every continental nation resorting to this method of increasing its revenue, but the details are forthcoming with respect to both Italy and Austria-Hungary, and in these States the net revenue from this source is, according to authorities, respectively 3,052,000l. and 2,150,000l. per annum.

The head-quarters of the system will be in Persia, but the company will not be limited to that country in the field of its operations, for it is intended, as in the case of the continental issues above referred to, that the company should be represented by agents in the chief cities of Eastern Europe for the purpose of obtaining subscriptions.

The intended operations of the company will (pursuant to the terms of the concession) be conducted generally upon the lines adopted in the European states where government lotteries are in vogue. At least five issues have to be made annually in Persia, with minimum drawings of 10,000l., and it is estimated that these operations should return continuously increasing

dividends.

It is known that lottery loans, in which there are chances of drawings with prizes, are a favourite form of investment, not only with Persian and oriental capitalists generally, but also for the savings of other classes of the community, who for years past have invested largely in Greek and other loans. It is confidently expected that whenever the government requires to raise money, local lottery loans issued by the company under its