waiting for the master and the rest of the crew, in consequence of which she was lost. Under these circumstances, the jury being satisfied that the ship had been sent to sea in an unseaworthy state, the judge called their attention to each particular cause of unseaworthiness which had been proved, and directed them to find whether the loss was attributable to all or any of such causes, but did not ask them to say whether the inducing cause of the loss had been the sending of the ship to sea in an unseaworthy state, which rendered it necessary to detain the ship in a dangerous position for a considerable time. The jury, according to the report of the judge, found in effect that the vessel was lost owing to the dragging of the cable, and the inability to cut or slip it, which inability was accidental, and arising, for the moment, and was not caused directly or indirectly, by an unseaworthiness. On this finding, the judge directed the verdict to be entered for the plaintiffs. The direction was held to be imperfect, the proper question being, "not only whether the loss was attributable to all or any of the alleged causes of unseaworthiness, but whether the loss was, in their opinion, occasioned by any wrongful act or default alleged in the plea, whatever had been the proximate cause." The misconduct of the assured (said L. C. J. Campbell) need not be causa causans, but they cannot recover if it was causa sine qua non. In that case they have brought the misfortune on themselves by their own misconduct, and they ought not to be indemnified.-(Thompson v. Hopper, 28 L. T., Rep. 143, and 5 W. R. 84).

INSURANCE-Fire.-Alterations without additional risk.—One of the conditions of the policy required notice to be given, "If, after the assurance shall have been effected, the risk shall be increased, by any alteration of the building, or by the erection of any stove, etc., or other alteration of circumstances," otherwise the policy was to be void. The plaintiff, without notice, erected the machinery of a steamengine, but it was worked in a manner that the actual risk was not increased (although steam engines were stated in another part of the policy to be special risks).

The Court (Ex. C.) was of opinion that, under the condition referred to, all that the insured was called upon to do was, in the event of his making an alteration in the circumstances of the premises, by which the risk would be increased, to give notice of the alteration to the office. Here-the case finding that there was no increase of risk-there was no obligation upon the plaintiff to give the notice. (Stokes v. Cox, 28 L. T., Rep. 161, and 5 W. R., 89.)

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.-Title to Sue.-By a charter-party, between the owners of a ship and plaintiff, " on behalf of the Geelong and Melbourne Railway Company," the former agreed that the ship should take on board certain locomotive engines, etc., to be delivered at Geelong, Victoria. One-third of the total freight to be paid in London. The charter-party was signed by plaintiff simpliciter, and by the defendants. One of the locomotives, whilst being taken on board, fell and was injured.

It was pleaded that the plaintiff was merely an agent for the purpose of effecting a contract, and had no interest or property in the goods, to entitle him to sue, The Court (C. P.) considered that the plaintiff signed substantially on his own account; and the defendants were held to be liable for the damage their negligence occasioned.-(Cooke v. Wilson, 28 L. T., Rep. 103.)

PARTNERSHIP.-Promissory Note― Limitation.—In the course of partnership transactions by B. and C., a promissory note was granted, signed by the firm B. and Co. B. died, leaving his partner C. as his executor, who continued to pay interest until within six years ago. The holder having claimed payment out of B.'s estate, V. C. Kindersley held that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the interest was paid by C. as a partner, and not as executor, and, therefore, under the English Mercantile Amendment Act (19 and 20 Vict., c. 97), the demand was barred.--(Thomson v. Waithman, 28 L. T., Rep. 95.)

PARTNERSHIP.-Dissolution-Return of Premium.-A premium having been paid by a surgeon for a partnership, for a term of years, application was made for a dissolution of the firm before the expiration of the period, on account of differences, arising from incompatibility of temper, etc. The M. R. granted dissolution; but there being no fraud or misrepresentation, the premium was apportioned over the whole period of endurance, and a direction given to repay the sum effeiring to the unexpired term.—(Astle v. Wright, 28 L. T., Rep. 134.)

PATENT-Validity of.-A party having obtained permission to use a patented invention for the manufacture of manure, in respect of a payment of 10s. per ton, objected to pay the same, as the patent was void.

Answer.-If so, he should have given notice, to determine the agreement. The plea of invalidity was held to be bad, as it was an executed contract, from which the defendant was deriving benefit, and there was no allegation of fraud on the plaintiff's part, or that he was not the inventor.-(Lawes v. Purser, 28 L. T., Rep. 84.)

new.

-Subject of—Improvement of Process.-An action for the infringement of a patent, for the production of gas from seeds. Plea,-the invention was not Gas was formerly produced from oils, extracted from seeds; but the present improvement was dispensing with the intermediate process of expressing the oil from the seed. The Court (Ex. C.) was of opinion, that the improvement in the process was a useful invention, and the proper subject of a patent.-(Booth v. Kennard, 28 L. T., Rep. 160.)

RAILWAY.-Liability for Loss of Goods.-By the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854 (17 and 18 Vict., c. 32, s. 7), railway companies are liable for the loss or injury in the receiving, forwarding, or delivery of goods, occasioned by the neglect or default of the company or its servants, notwithstanding any notice, condition, or declaration made or given by such Company contrary thereto, unless the said condition is adjudged by the Court or judge before whom any question relating thereto shall be tried, to be just and reasonable.

In an action for the price of certain oxen sent with a drover, and killed by suffocation during the journey, caused by the falling of the flap of the truck,the Company pleaded, that the cattle were received to be carried on a special condition, that they were not to be responsible for any loss in respect of loading or unloading, suffocation or fire. The Court (Ex.) thought the condition not unreasonable, seeing a drover was allowed to accompany the cattle gratis, and he had the means of judging whether the accommodation was sufficient. Per Barons Martin and Bramwell. Where the stipulation is of the nature of a special contract, the Act does not apply.-(Pardington v. South Wales Railway Company, 28 L. T., Rep. 67, and 5 W. R. 8.)

-Transit over lines of several Companies.-A party delivered, at the Great Western Railway Station at Bath, a quantity of furniture, and signed a receipt note as follows: "Bath Station-To the Great Western Railway CompanyReceived the undermentioned goods on the conditions stated on the other side, to be sent to Torquay station, and delivered to the plaintiff or his agent." The fourth condition was, that the Company would not be liable for damage by fire. The tenth condition stated, that the Company would not be responsible for damage beyond the limits of their railway. The furniture duly arrived at Bristol, where the Great Western line ends, but was destroyed on the Bristol and Exeter line, in being conveyed to Torquay. The Court (Ex. C.) construed the contract to mean, that the Great Western would receive the whole sum for the carriage throughout, but that they only stipulated for their own responsibility. The exception, therefore, from risk did not apply to losses on the line of the defendants, who acted as common carriers merely.—(Collins v. Bristol and Exeter Railway Company, 5 W. R. 89.)

THE

JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE.

Review of the Month.

The Lord Advocate-Trial of Dr Wielobycki-The Freedom of Defence-Abandonment of a case of Fraud-Prisoners' Declarations-Review in Justiciary-The Rights and Wrongs of a Lord Lieutenant-Business of the Court-Delays in the Outer-HouseExtension of the Sheriff's Small Debt Jurisdiction.

THE presentation of the freedom of the city to the Lord Advocate, was one of those graceful compliments which, coming from so respectable a quarter, afford to public men some compensation for the anxieties of official life, and, if not too lavishly bestowed, have a good effect in preserving a proper standard of political and professional character. Such distinctions, we believe, are really appreciated by public men, as the best reward with which a successful career can be followed. Accordingly, we can well understand the pride with which his Lordship alluded to the additional gratification which the event gave him, from those local considerations that were naturally suggested by the place of its occurrence, and his own individual history. The special ground on which the honour was bestowed, was his Lordship's share in passing two measures-one of some interest to the city particularly, and the other of great importance to burghs throughout the country-the Municipal Extension Act, and the Act for the Registration of Voters. But, though such only was the limited view taken of the Lord Advocate's services in Parliament, we think we may say, with all confidence, that the commendatory tone of the Lord Provost might be very safely applied to a much larger portion of his public conduct. Looked at from a purely legal point of view, and apart from the deranging influence of party politics, there are few of those whose duty it is to

VOL. I.-NO. II. FEBRUARY 1857.

Н

study the current legislation, who will not freely admit, that his Lordship's administration has given satisfaction to the country. During his now considerable tenure of office, some measures of the greatest possible importance have been passed into law-measures not merely providing for a temporary emergency, or remedying a defect in mere matters of detail, but measures of a comprehensive kind, the sound policy of which has been already proved by their successful operation. Not to speak of his Lordship's efforts (ably seconded by Mr Dunlop) in matters affecting the social condition of the people-the Registration Act, already referred to, and the Valuation Act--there have been, in that important department of legislation, judicial procedure, amendments on the law of evidence, the Court of Exchequer Act has been passed, the Bankruptcy Law consolidated, and various other measures enacted, all indicating the same tendency-the simplification of process, and thereby the economy of public time, and the economy of public money. It is always with reluctance that we see inroads made on the traditional usages of centuries, and the habits of thought which they produce; but if alterations are to be made to suit the changed state, the more enlightened views and the new interests of society, by all means let these alterations proceed, under the direction of one who not only has acquitted himself so well hitherto, but has on all occasions shown such a thorough community of thought and feeling with the various interests of the profession of which he is a member. One leading feature in the multifarious duties of the Scotch minister, is to be a ready channel for the communication of practical sugges tions on those matters on which practical lawyers are most entitled to be heard; and we are not aware that any charge can be made against the present Lord Advocate, either on the score of discourtesy, or on the ground of a cold attention to the many applications which his office brings upon him. With all these qualifications for his responsible post, we must not forget to include that popular rhetoric which he is happy in having preserved during the dry duration of legal study, and which is the more remarkable, considering that Scotch advocates cannot, like their English brethren, have the advantage of a Parliamentary training during the monotony of brieflesshood. To this is chiefly attributable his great success in the House of Commons, where, we believe, he has produced an impression more favourable to the Scotch Bar, than many other famous men who have held his distinguished position.

A fair specimen of this talent was exhibited at the trial of that unhappy individual, whose tragic end has excited so much sympathy among a certain portion of the public. The case of Dr Wielobycki is indeed a cause celebre. Rarely has the High Court of Justiciary been thronged by such a crowd, or one so attentive during the whole of the protracted trial, in watching every point in the case, as the guilty history was gradually unfolded. There is nothing in the case, either in a legal or medico-legal point of view, that would

warrant any reference to its details-excepting, perhaps, the remark, that fourteen years transportation is the very minimum of punishment which, considering the aggravated nature of the case, and the previous practice of the Court, could have been imposed. We consider that many offences (eg., that of an ex-civic functionary), of which the same sentence seems to be the recognized penalty, are of a much more venial kind than the forgery of a will, by a person in the prisoner's position, holding the confidential relation of a medical man, and having so frequently a death-bed for the scene of his professional duty. But the moral to be drawn from the case is, that one profession should not interfere with the sphere of another. Had the Polish doctor not confounded law and physic, and endeavoured to monopolise in his own person the emoluments of both, law would not have taken the terrible revenge upon him which it has been forced to do. We never heard of a lawyer aspiring to a knowledge of the principles of Hahnemann; and we know we but echo the opinion of every medical man whose opinion is worth having, when we say, that in this, as in all other cases, no one should ever profess that which he has not been licensed to practise.

The conduct of the defence enabled the Dean of Faculty to make one of those brilliant appearances in which he has no superior. The tone adopted-perhaps the only one possible in the circumstances— has revived the question, as to how far the privilege of the Bar in this particular ought morally to extend. Admittedly, in many cases, the only possible course is to destroy an adversary's case, by showing, that, as regards a witness with the most perfectly honest intentions, his means of knowledge are imperfect, his memory treacherous, or that, in the statements he has made, he was too much influenced by causes peculiar to himself, to entitle his testimony to be received with that weight to which, in other circumstances, it would have been entitled. This right of unlimited criticism on a person's character and conduct, is one of those privileges which in all countries is conceded to the Bar, not for the advantage of the counsel himself, but with the view of enabling him to protect properly the solemn interests which are committed to his care. Every person being innocent till he is proved to be guilty, the duty of counsel is to see that his client is not convicted save on evidence of a kind which, in the opinion of all men, is beyond suspicion, and of an amount such as the law in the particular case requires. What may be his own views of the case are quite out of the question. Because what is he retained for? The question is very clearly answered in a paper lately read before the Juridical Society by Mr Daniel, Q.C. The system of advocacy, he says, was essential to the administration of justice; (1) Because the suitor was generally unable to state his own case either as to law or facts; (2) Because he was possibly unable to cope with his opponent; and finally, because the power and influence of the judge, and his unintentional errors, demanded protection for the party. An advocate, the learned gentleman argued,