under the Act 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 42, having obtained an advance, mortgaged the property purchased therewith to the trustees as security for the advances, and by the deed covenanted to pay the subscriptions which should become due on his shares. The defendant subsequently redeemed by paying, under the provisions of one of the rules, all subscriptions which would become due up to the end of the thirteenth year, of the society, at the expiration of which period it was calculated all the objects of the society would be accomplished. That turned out not to be so, and the trustees brought an action on the defendant's covenant for subscriptions subsequently becoming due: Held, that (following Farmer v. Smith, 4 H. & N. 196, 32 L. T. Rep. 371), the defendant had not ceased to be a holder of the shares. [Ex. and each and every of them, accrued and became payable, he the defendant had wholly and finally ceased to be, and was no longer, a holder of the said shares, or any or either of them, or of any shares in the said society, or a member thereof, or subject to the rules or liable to pay the subscriptions in the first count mentioned. Fourth to first count.--That one of the said rules in the first count mentioned (which before and at the time of the making of the said indenture and of the defendant becoming a holder of the said shares in the said society in the first count mentioned and the commencement of this suit, and hitherto was and is in full force and binding upon the said society and upon the plaintiff's as trustees thereof, and upon the defendant as such shareholder) was and is in the words and figures following, that is to say: "Reference of disputes to arbitration. The board for the time being, or the major part of them, shall determine all disputes which may arise concerning the affairs of the company, or respecting the construction of these rules, or any of the clauses or things herein contained, and also of any bye-laws, That the question as to the defendant's liability on his covenant was not "a matter in dispute arising concerning the affairs of the said company and benefit building society, and between the said society and the defendant as holder of the shares, and between the other share-additions, alterations, or amendments which shall or holders of the new company and society and the defendant," within the meaning of the rule of the society, which required all such disputes to be referred to arbitration, pursuant to the 10 Geo. 4, c. 56, s. 27. may hereafter arise between the trustees, officers, or other shareholders of this company; and the decision of the board, if satisfactory, shall be conclusive; but, if not satisfactory, reference shall be made to arbitration pursuant to the 10 Geo. 4, c. 56, s. 27. The plaintiffs sued as trustees of the British Build-And at the first meeting of the company after ing and Investment Company. the enrolment of these rules five arbitrators shall be elected, none of the said arbitrators being beneficially interested directly or indirectly in the funds of the company, and in each case of dispute the names of the arbitrators shall be written on pieces of paper and placed in a box, and the three whose names are first drawn by the complaining party, or by some one appointed by him or her, shall be arbitrators to decide the matters in difference, whose decision shall The declaration stated that by an indenture of the 20th Nov. 1845, made between the defendant of one part and the then trustees of the society on the other part, after reciting, as the facts were, that the said society had been formed for the purpose of raising by subscription a fund to assist the members thereof in obtaining freehold or leasehold property pursuant to the said Act, and that rules had been made for the government of the said society, certified, allowed and en-be final and binding on all parties, and each of the rolled, and that the sums of money to be contributed by subscription in respect of each share in the funds of the said society amount to 1207., and that the defendant was, according to the said rules, entitled to receive out of the said fund thereof, by way of anticipation, the sum of 600l. in respect of his shares numbered as in the said indenture mentioned, upon his entering into the security thereinafter mentioned, the defendant covenanted with the said trustees, parties to the said indenture, and their successors, trustees for the time being of the said society, that he the defendant should and would pay the subscriptions and interest payable on his said shares, according to the rules of the said society, on the days and in manner therein mentioned, and abide by and perform the rules thereof in respect of the said shares; and the plaintiffs aver that after the making the said indenture, a large sum of money, to wit, 804, became due and payable from the defendant to the said society for and in respect of the subscriptions payable on his said shares according to the rules of the said society, and that all things have been done on the part of the said society, and of the plaintiffs as trustees as aforesaid, to entitle them to have the said money paid by the defendant, yet the defendant has not as yet paid the same; and for money payable by the defendant to the said society for subscriptions and moneys due and payable by the defendant to the said society under the rules of the said society in the shares of the defendant in the said society, and in respect of the defendant being and continuing a member thereof. Pleas:-Third to first count. That before and at the time when the said sum of 801., and every part thereof, is alleged to have accrued and become due and payable from the defendant to the said society, and before and at the time when the said subscriptions in the first count, alleged to have been payable on the said shares according to the rules of the said society, [MAG. CAS.] three arbitrators so drawn and attending shall receive five shillings remuneration; the costs of the reference shall be paid by such party as the arbitrators shall direct; the party requiring the arbitration shall deposit with the manager fifteen shillings." And the defendant avers that the word "board" in the said rule means the persons appointed to and holding the office of directors in the said benefit building society in the first count mentioned, and that the word " company in the said rule means the said benefit building society; and the defendant further saith that the claims and causes of action in the declaration mentioned, so far as the same relate to the first count, at the commencement of the suit and always were and still are matters in dispute arisen concerning the affairs of the said company and benefit building society and between the said society and the defendant as the holder of the said shares in the first count mentioned, and between the other shareholders of the said company and society and the defendant as the holder of the said shares in the first count mentioned, and between the plaintiff's as the trustees of the said company and society and the defendant as the holder of the said shares in the said first count mentioned; that is to say, the defendant, as such holder of the said shares, hath always disputed and denied, and still doth dispute and deny, his liability to pay the said sum of 801. in the first count mentioned to the said society or to the plaintiffs as trustees thereof, and the right of the said society and the plaintiffs as trustees thereof, or either of them, to bring or maintain any action for the alleged breach of covenant in the first count mentioned, and hath always disputed and denied, and still disputes and denies, that any breach of covenant ever was committed by him the defendant, as alleged in the first count: of all which the plaintiffs, as such trustees as aforesaid, and the said society have S always had notice, and the defendant avers that all conditions precedent, matters and things requiring to have been performed and to have happened and existed to enable the defendant to have the said matters in dispute adjudicated upon, decided and settled as pointed out and provided for in and by the said rules, and to further prevent the accruing of any right of action in respect of the plaintiffs' claim, so far as the same relates to the first count, and to oust this court of all jurisdiction over the said claim, were performed and did happen and exist before the commencement of the suit. Sixth to the second count, the same as the fourth. Demurrer to the third, fourth and sixth pleas, and joinder. The plaintiffs also joined issue on the pleas and replied. Secondly, to the fourth plea, that before the matter in dispute therein mentioned arose, the arbitrators appointed in pursuance of the rule had refused to act; that no others were appointed to act in their place, and that when the matter in dispute arose there was no arbitrator to whom it could be referred. Thirdly, also to the fourth plea, that the board had decided the defendant's liability to pay, and that the defendant had never requested the plaintiffs to refer the said dispute to arbitration, or taken any steps to appoint arbitrators according to the rules. There were similar replications to the next plea. [Ex. POLLOCK, C.B.-I am of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to our judgment on the demurrers to the third and fourth pleas. As to the third plea, which alleges that the defendant was not a member of the society, I think the case of Farmer v. Smith, lately decided in this court, is conclusive. As to the fourth and sixth pleas, the question raised by them is substantially the same; they amount to this, that by the rules of the society, and the Act to which they refer, such a question as is raised here cannot be brought before the ordinary legal tribunals, but must be made matter of reference. It appears to me clear that, according to the cases decided, a mortgage and a covenant connected with it cannot be considered as within the rule or the Acts of Parliament to which it refers. If we were to hold that a mortgagor was within the rule, how would it be possible to enforce the rights of the parties? Under the statute, if a member refuses to obey the award, recourse must be had to a justice of the peace to compel him; but could a justice of the peace honestly do justice between the parties in such a case as this? The power of the justice is not co-extensive with the rights of the parties. The Act could not be intended to introduce a remedy which would not be competent to do justice between the parties, and this case must be excluded from the class of cases in which the aid of the justice is to be called in. He could not do justice here; and the Act of Parliament caunot have been intended to give him jurisdiction. As to the decided cases, I think they clearly go the length of deciding that in the case of a mortgage the rule of reference does not apply. This is not so much a question between a member and the society as between a mortgagor and his mortgagee. The deed is a distinct security, and creates an obligation quite apart from the member's liability to pay on his shares. As our judgment is for the plaintiff on the demurrers to the plea, it is unnecessary to say anything about the replications and the demurrers to them: they fall to the ground. Knowles, Q.C. (with him Beasley) for the plaintiffs. -There are two questions raised on the demurrers. The first on the third plea is, whether the covenant in the mortgage-deed is not binding until the society is finally at an end, not withstanding the defendant has paid up the entire amount of his subscription as originally fixed; that point is decided in favour of the plaintiffs by a case in this court, Farmer and others v. Smith, 4 H. & N. 196; 32 L. T. Rep. 371. The second question arises on the fourth plea; the rule of BRAMWELL, B.-I am of the same opinion. As to the society relied on in it requires "the board to decide the third plea, it seems to amount to this, that the all disputes which may arise concerning the affairs defendant, having paid up his subscription, has ceased or respecting the construction of the rules or any of the to be member. There is nothing in the rules as to clauses therein contained, and also of any bye-law, ceasing to be a member in that case; but supposing, additions, alterations, or amendments which shall or in fact, that by paying up he has ceased to be a memmay arise between the trustees, officers, and other ber because he has paid up all he had to pay, or shareholders of the company, and if the decision of the all it was supposed he would have to pay, yet his board is not satisfactory, arbitration shall be had pur- covenant remains, and he is liable on that. As to the suant to 10 Geo. 4, c. 56, s. 27." This is not other pleas, I agree with my Lord. I think the matter a dispute concerning the construction of that sec- is substantially decided by the former cases. tion. In Crisp v. Bunbury, 8 Bing. 394, the word-point arises thus: The statute says that provision shall ing of the rule was different, and the society was be made by the rules for referring disputes to arbitraof a different kind. Cutbill v. Kingdon, 1 Ex. 494, is tion; it does not say all disputes, but only such dismore like the present case; that was also a building putes as the members of the society think fit. What society, and the words of the rule as to arbitration were disputes does the rule in this case say shall be referred ? almost exactly the same as in this case, yet the Court [His Lordship read the rule.] It seems to me this of Ex. held the trustees might notwithstanding main- dispute is not within that rule. It refers only to such tain an action on the covenant. Morrison v. Glover, disputes as arise between the trustees and the share4 Ex. 430, decides that the rule applies only to dis- holders generally, and not particular disputes. This putes with a member as a member. This is not a dis- is not a dispute as to the construction of any rule of pute with the defendant as a member: (Reg. v. Traf- the society, as is a question between mortgagor ford, 24 L. J. 20, M.C.; Kelsall v. Tyler, 25 L. J. and mortgagee, arising on a covenant in a mortgage153, Ex; Fleming v. Self, 1 Kaye, 518.) Lush, Q.C. (with him M Lachlan).-The cases cited do not apply. In Cutbill v. Kingdon the rule provided only for the reference of "all disputes respecting the construction of the rules;" in the present case the rules applies to "all disputes concerning the affairs of the company." In Morrison v. Glover the question arose on a mortgage of a lease and a covenant by the shareholder to pay the ground-rent. In Reg. v. Trafford the rule applied only to disputes as to money matters; so also in Fleming v. Self. Knowles, Q.C., in reply, referred to Reeves v. White, 17 Q. B. 995. deed. The CHANNELL, B.-I also am of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on the demurrer to the pleas. As to the third plea the declaration, which is good on the face of it, charges the defendant on an absolute covenant to pay money. The defendant pleads he has ceased to be a shareholder: it is not very clear what he means, but the plea is clearly no answer to the declaration, which charges him on an absolute covenant. As to the fourth and sixth pleas also, I think the plaintiff's are entitled to our judgment. The fourth plea is to the special count, and the sixth, substantially the same, is to the money counts. As to these the plaintiffs are primâ facie entitled to sue. They declare on a covenant by the defendant with certain trustees and their successors to pay the subscription on his shares. They aver that 80%. has become due in respect of his shares; that all things have been done to entitle them to have the money paid, yet the defendant has not paid it. They show that prima facie they are entitled to sue. The defendant, however, by his plea sets up that the right which these plaintiffs would otherwise have to sue in this court is taken away from them by the operation of the 10 Geo. 4, s. 56, s. 27, as applied to the rules of the society, which is enrolled under the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 32. The question therefore is, whether or not is the jurisdiction of the court ousted by those statutes and by the rules. I am of opinion that it is not. I think the rule applies only to disputes between the trustees or officers and the shareholders, that is to disputes between them and the shareholder or shareholders. In this case defendant, by becoming a mortgagor and executing the mortgage-deed, has acquired a new character, and the trustees have acquired a new remedy on the security in the event of his nonpayment. I cannot but think the rule as to arbitration was intended to apply to such a case as this. The 27th section of the statute gives a remedy which is apt for the exigencies of the case to which I think it is intended to apply, but which is totally inapplicable to such a case as this. The defendant has assuined a new character, and new relations have arisen between him and the trustees to which, when disputes arise, new remedies are applicable. I think this is not a dispute between the trustees and the defendant as a shareholder, to which alone I think the rule applies, and therefore the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment. Judgment for the plaintiffs on the demurrers to the third and fourth pleas; the second count and all pleadings on it to be struck out. Lewis and Sons, attorneys for the plaintiffs. MARITIME LAW CASES. [NOTE-This will contain a Digest of all important Cases relating to Maritime Law decided in other than the Superior Courts that are regularly reported here.] THAMES POLICE COURT. (Before Mr. SELFE.) THE VICTORY STEAM-TUG. Penalty for steam-tug not consuming its own smoke. This was a prosecution against Mr. B. T. Harris, the master of a steam-tug called the Victory, belonging to the Steam-towing Company, for a penalty on account of using on board the tng furnaces so constructed as not to consume their own smoke. The superintendent of the company appeared in place of the defendant. He expressed a doubt whether smoke-consuming furnaces could be applied to steamtugs, the power of which, in proportion to their size, so greatly exceeds that of other steam-vessels; but he offered to carry out anything practicable which the Government surveyor could suggest. The Government inspector stated that there would be no difficulty in finding effectual means to consume the smoke on board of the Victory, although the means hitherto adopted on that vessel were of little use. [C. CAS. R. CROWN CASES RESERVED. Reported by JOHN THOMPSON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Saturday, April 28. REG. v. FRANCIS LOOSE. Friendly Society-Trustee-Larceny by-Treasurer -In whom property vested—18 § 19 Vict. c. 63, s. 18. The prisoner was a trustee of a friendly society (a lodge of Odd Fellows) and appointed, by resolution of the society to receive money from the treasurer He received the money, and carry it to the bank. but instead of taking it to the bank he applied it to his own purposes. He was indicted as a bailee of the moneys of the treasurer R. C., feloniously converting the money to his own use; and also for a common law larceny of the money of R. C. The Friendly Societies Act, 18 of 19 Vict. c. 63, s. 18, vests the property of such societies in the trustees and directs the property to be laid in the names of the trustees in indictments: Held, that the prisoner could not be convicted of feloniously converting or stealing the moneys of R. C. as charged in the indictment. Case reserved by Williams, J. for the opinion of this court. In this case the indictment alleged that on the 20th July 1859 the prisoner became and was bailee of moneys of Richard Carraway, deceased, to the amount of 40., and that being such bailee he fraudulently and feloniously did take and convert the said moneys to his own use, and that the prisoner in manner and form aforesaid felonionsly did steal, &c. the said moneys. There was another count for a common law larceny. The deceased R. Carraway, whose money the 40l. was alleged to be, was at the time in question the treasurer of a lodge of Odd Fellows, which was a friendly society duly enrolled. The prisoner was one of its trustees. On the 20th July 1859, at a lodge meeting, it was proposed and resolved that 40%. should be sent to the bank of Messrs. Gurney at Fakenham, and that the prisoner should take it there. The 401. in gold and silver was taken from a box which was in Carraway's keeping as treasurer, by a person who acted for him, and having been counted, was put into a bag and carried away by the prisoner. Instead of taking it to the bank, he dishonestly applied it to his own purposes, and no such sum was ever placed to the credit of the society. On these facts it was submitted by the counsel for the prisoner, that the money was not shown to be the property of R. Carraway as alleged in the indictment." Cain's case, 2 Mood. C. C. 204, it was argued, did not apply, because that case was decided on the construction of the stat. 10 Geo. 4, c. 56, by which the property of a friendly society was vested in the treasurer or trustee for the time being: whereas by the Act now in operation (stat. 18 & 19 Vict. c. 63, s. 18) the property is vested in the trustee or trustees of the society. And that supposing the treasurer to have a special property in the 407., such property ceased as soon as the resolution of the lodge meeting was acted upon by payment of the money into the hands of the prisoner who was nominated by the lodge, and not the treasurer, to carry it to the bank. It was further urged that, independently of the statutes, assuming the treasurer to be the owner, the prisoner received the money not as the servant of the treasurer, but as a person not bound to take it, and he was therefore only guilty of a breach of trust. Lastly, it was argued that the prisoner was not Mr. SELFE, referring to the case of Walker v. Evans, 35 L. T. Rep. 59, Q. B., relative to a steamer, the Tam O'Shanter, belonging to the same company, where it was held that a steam-vessel plying between London-bound to pay in that particular 401., but that any sum of bridge and the Nore is within the meaning of the Act, fined the company 51., and intimated that on a second conviction the fine would be increased to 107. 40l. would have sufficed, whereas by the statute he must hold something specific. The prisoner was convicted, but I respited the judg C. CAS. R.] REG. v. SAMUEL HUDSON, &C. ment until the opinion of this court should be taken whether the above objections were well founded. Metcalfe (Drake with him) for the prisoner. It is submitted that the property is not well laid in Richard Carraway's name, in any of the counts of the indictment. The case of Rex v. Cain, 2 Mood. C. C. 204; S. C. 1 Car. & M. 309, relied upon on the part of the prosecution, is not applicable; for that was the case of a benefit society enrolled under the 10 Geo. 4, c. 56, and the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 40, and it was held that the property of the society might in an indictment be laid to be in the treasurer by his proper name, for sect. 21 of the 10 Geo. 4, c. 56, provided expressly that the property in such societies "for all purposes of suit, as well civil as criminal,” should be deemed and taken to be, and in every such proceeding where necessary, stated to be the property of the treasurer or trustee of the society for the time being, in his or her proper name, without further description. The 18 & 19 Vict. c. 63 (the Act now in force relating to friendly societies), sect. 18, vests the property of such societies in the trustees, and directs that in all actions, or suits, or indictments, or summary proceedings before magistrates, touching or concerning any such property, the same shall be stated to be the property of the persons for the time being holding the office of trustees in their proper names as trustees of such society, without any further description. So that Richard Carraway being treasurer only, and not a trustee, had no property vested in him by virtue of the statute, and the property ought to have been laid in the indictment as the property of the trustees. Then, as to R. Carraway's having any special possession of the money stolen, it is found as a fact that it was the duty of Carraway to pay over the money to the prisoner, whose duty it was to take it to the bank. There could not therefore be a felonious taking by the prisoner, who was a trustee and legal owner of the money, as well as being the person specially appointed by the resolution of the society to receive the money from Carraway and take it to the bank. It does not appear by the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 63, how a trustee is to be made liable to the criminal law for his felonious acts. No counsel appeared for the prosecution. POLLOCK, C. B.-We are all of opinion that the indictment in this form cannot be sustained. In Cain's case the prisoner had obtained the money wrongfully, and the property in it was vested by the 10 Geo. 4, c. 56, in the treasurer of the society; but in this case the property was not vested in the treasurer, but in the trustees. Moreover, as the prisoner was specially appointed by resolution to take the money to the bank, how can it be said that he stole the money of Richard Carraway as charged in the indictment? For as soon as Carraway parted with the money he had nothing more to do with it. The prisoner may have been guilty of a breach of trust as against the other trustees; but it cannot be said that he stole the money of Carraway. The conviction therefore, cannot be Conviction quashed. (a) sustained. REG. v. SAMUEL HUDSON, JOHN SMITH AND JOHN DEWHIRST. [C. CAS. R. Whilst he was absent, one of the two who remained took the pen out of the case and put a pin in its place. The two remaining prisoners then induced the prosecutor to bet the other prisoner when he returned, 50s. that there was no pen in the case. The prosecutor put his money down, and one of the prisoners snatched it up to hold. The pencase was then turned up into the prosecutor's hand, and another pen, with the pin, fell into his hand, and then the prisoners took the money: Held, that the evidence was sufficient to support a count for conspiracy, by divers unlawful and fraudulent devices and contrivances, and by divers false pretences, unlawfully to cheat, &c. Case reserved for the opinion of this court, by J. B. Maule, Esq., barrister-at-law, sitting as deputy for the Recorder of York. At the Epiphany sessions 1860, held for the city of York, the prisoners were jointly indicted and tried before me upon an indictment, the two first counts of which charged them with an offence under the 8 & 9+ Vict. c. 109, as follows: First count charged, "That on the 18th Nov. 1859, by fraud, unlawful device and ill practice in playing at: a certain game or sport, to wit, in and by a wager with one Abraham Rhodes, whether a certain pencil. case had a pen in it or not, unlawfully and fraudulently they did win from the said Abraham Rhodes, to a certain person to the jurors unknown, a certain sum of money, to wit, 27. 10s. of the money of the said A.. Rhodes, and so did then and thereby unlawfully obtain such money from the said A. Rhodes by a false pretence, to wit, by the fraud, unlawful device and ill practice aforesaid, with intent then to cheat and defraud the said A. Rhodes of the same, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided,”* &c. The second count charged the prisoners that they unlawfully and fraudulently did combine, confederate and conspire together, and with divers other persons to the jurors unknown, by fraud, unlawful device and ill. practice in playing at a certain game or sport, and by divers other fraudulent devices and false pretences, unlawfully to win from the said A. Rhodes a certain sum of money, to wit, the sum of 27. 10s., of the money of the said A. Rhodes, and so then and thereby unlawfully to obtain from the said A. Rhodes the said sum of money in this count mentioned, by a false pretence, with intent then to cheat and defraud the said A. Rhodes of the same, against the form of the statute, &c. Third count. The prisoners were charged with a conspiracy to cheat in the following form:-"That they unlawfully and fraudulently did combine, confe-derate and conspire together with divers other persons to the jurors unknown, by divers unlawful and fraudulent devices and contrivances, and by divers false pretences, unlawfully to obtain from the said A. Rhodes the sum of 27. 10s. of the money of the said A. Rhodes, and unlawfully to cheat and defraud the said A. Rhodes of the same, against the peace, &c.. The evidence disclosed that the three prisoners were in a public-house together with the prosecutor A.. Rhodes, and that, in concert with the two prisoners, Conspiracy to cheat-False pretences-Gaming and the prisoner John Dewhirst placed a pencase on the wagering-8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 17. The prisoners were at a public-house in the same room with the prosecutor; one of them placed a pencase on the table and left the room to get writing paper. (a) The explanation of this decision is, that the prisoner, as the trustee of the society, was the legal owner of the property, and not merely in legal possession of it. He could not, therefore, be guilty of larceny of his own money; It was a breach of trust as against his co-trustees, and possibly as against the secretary, for which the remedy was a civil one; but it was not criminal. table of the room where they were assembled, and left the room to get writing-paper; whilst he was absent the other two prisoners, Samuel Hudson and John Smith, were the only persons left drinking with the prosecutor, and Hudson then took up the pencase, and. took out the pen from it, placing a pin in the place off it, and put the pen that he had taken out under the bottom of the prosecutor's drinking-glass, and Hudson then proposed to the prosecutor to bet the prisoner Dewhirst, when he returned, that there was no pen in the pencase. The prosecutor was induced by Hudson and Sinith to stake 50s. in a bet with Dewhirst upon his returning into the room that there was no pen in the pencase, which money the prosecutor placed on the table, and Hudson snatched up to hold. The pencase was then turned up into the prosecutor's hand, and another pen, with the pin, fell into his hand, and then prisoners took his money. Upon this evidence it was objected, on behalf of the prisoners, that no offence within the meaning of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, was proved by it, and that the facts proved in evidence did not amount to the offence charged in the third count. I thought the objection well founded as to the offence under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, but held that the facts in evidence amounted to the offence charged in the third count, and directed the jury to return a separate verdict on each count, a case having been asked for by the prisoners' counsel, for the consideration of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on each of the three counts. The prisoners were sentenced to eight months' imprisonment, and committed to prison for want of sufficient sureties. If the Court for the consideration of Crown Cases Reserved shall be of opinion, that the above facts in evidence constituted in law any one of the offences charged in the indictment, and was evidence to go to the jury in support thereof, the verdict is to stand for such of the counts in which the offence is laid to which the evidence applies. Price for the prisoners.-It is submitted that the prisoners have not been guilty of any of the offences charged in the several counts of the indictment. The first two counts of the indictment are framed upon the Games and Wagers Act, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 17, which enacts "that every person who shall by any fraud or unlawful device or ill practice in playing at or with cards, dice, tables, or other game, or in bearing a part in the stakes, wagers, or adventures, or in betting on the sides or hands of them that do play, or in wagering on the event of any game, sport, pastime, or exercise, win from any other person to himself, or any other or others, any sum of money or valuable thing, shall be deemed guilty of obtaining such money or valuable thing from such other person by a false pretence with intent to cheat or defraud such person of the same, and being convicted thereof shall be punished accordingly." The object of that provision was not to meet a case like the present. Sects. 8 and 15 show that the provision was directed to the ordinary games played at common gaming houses, and not against tricks like the one in this case. POLLOCK, C.B.-You may confine your argument to the offence charged in the third count. Price.-As to the third count. To sustain that, the evidence should have shown such a false pretence as per se would constitute the ordinary misdemeanor of false pretences. POLLOCK, C.B.-Why so? This is a count for conspiracy to cheat. Price-Yes, by false pretences. CHANNELL, B.-If the count had said merely to conspire, and had omitted the words "by false pretences," it would have been good. BLACKBURN, J.-Here the prisoners cheated the prosecutor into the belief that he was going to cheat, when in fact he was to be cheated. Price. This is a mere private deceit not concerning the public, which the criminal law does not regard, but is a deceit against which common prudence might have guarded. There is no evidence of any indictable combination to cheat and defraud. [Q. B. Price. That affects the public. At the trial thepresent case was likened to that of Rex v. Barnard, 7 Car. & P. 784, where a person at Oxford, who was not a member of the university, went for the purpose of fraud, wearing a commoner's gown and cap, and obtained goods. This was held a sufficient false pretence. The present case, however, was nothing more than a bet on a question of fact, which the prosecutor might have satisfied himself of by looking at the pencil-case. It is more like an ordinary conjuring trick. Besides, here the prosecutor himself intended to cheat one of the: prisoners by the bet. No counsel appeared for the prosecution. POLLOCK, C.B.-We are all of opinion that the conviction on the third count is good, and ought to be supported. The count is in the usual form, and it is not necessary that the words "false pretences" stateds in it should be understood in the technical sense contended for by Mr. Price. There is abundant evidence of a conspiracy by the prisoners to cheat the prosecutor, and though one of the ingredients in the case is that the prosecutor himself intended to cheat one of the prisoners, that does not prevent the prisoners from liability to be prosecuted upon this indictment. Conviction affirmed. (a) COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Reported by JOHN THOMPSON, T. W. SAUNDERS, and C. J. B.. HERTSLET, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.j Thursday, May 24. REG. v. JUSTICES OF MACCLESFIELD. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43-Order to justices to state special case-Jurisdiction-Error in point of law Determination. The court refused a rule to justices, ordering them to state a special case for the opinion of the court, where the objection was that they had improperly received evidence. To enable the court to interfere it must appear that the determination of the justices was wrong. conviction of John Holland, with a view to its being Kenealey moved for a certiorari to bring up the quashed. The conviction was under the 17 Geo. 3, be purloined or embezzled concealed in his dwellingc. 56, ss. 10 & 14, for having materials suspected to house, outhouse, yard, garden, or other place, for which. offence the justices had imposed a penalty of 201. The objections to the conviction were, first, that the 17 Geo. 3, c. 56, was repealed by the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 40; that the justices who heard the complaint were interested, being connected with the silk trade, and members of the Macclesfield Silk Throwers' Associa tion, and that the attorney for that association conwas ordered to be paid as informer; but these two latter ducted the complaint, to whom a portion of the penalty justices had improperly refused to grant a special case were waived. There was a further objection, that the for the opinion of this court. He therefore moved for a rule under 20 & 21 Vict. C. 43, s. 5, ordering a case to be stated. It appeared from the affidavits that during the hearing of the case a witness of the name of David Welch, one of the constables who made the search, used a certain paper or memorandum for the purpose of refreshing the silk seized, and where it was found, and other his memory as to certain material facts, and as to (a) It should be observed that this conviction was sus tained upon the third count only, charging a conspiracy to cheat: the first count, charging an obtaining of the money by false pretences, was not supported; and the second count, charging a conspiracy to obtain the money by false pretences, was held to fail. This case, therefore, is an authority only to the extent of determining that, if the exorbi-jury was satisfied that, in fact, the prisoner intended to cheat the prosecutor by some fraudulent contrivance, the conviction could be sustained. CHANNELL, B.-If two persons conspire to puff up the qualities of a horse, and thereby secure an tant price for it, that is a criminal offence. |