Ex.] REG. v. PEARHAM. [Ex. Thomas Piper and Wilson Piper, to depart from his | or intimidation, or by other methods stated in the Act said hiring, contrary to the Act made in the sixth year of Parliament; the offence being the endeavouring to of the reign of King George the Fourth, intituled, 'An force a man from performing his duty and contract, Act to repeal the laws relating to the combination of the means being either personal violence or violence to workmen, and to make other provisions in lieu thereof.' the property, threats or intimidation, and the other And I, the said magistrate sitting at the police-court means mentioned in the Act of Parliament. On the aforesaid, do hereby order and adjudge the said William present occasion the charge is that it was by threats and Pearham for the said offence to be committed to and intimidation. It appears that an application had been confined in the House of Correction at Coldbath-fields, made to the Court of Q.B., who gave judgment refusing in the said county, and within the said district, for the the writ, on the ground that the objections made to the space of two calendar months. Given under my hand conviction were not well founded. The objections which and seal the day and year first above written, at the were repeated by Mr. James yesterday on the application police court aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, and within to us were these: first, he said that the nature of the the said metropolitan police district. (Signed) WILLIAM threats was not set out; and, secondly, that it was not CORRIE (L.S.)" To this conviction it was objected before set out to whom the threats were made. And then Mr. the Court of Q. B. that it did not, on the face of it, contain James stated that the character and description of the or set out any offence within the statute; that it did not threat ought to be set out, so that the court might set out what the threats were, and did not state that they judge whether it was that description of threat that were made, in point of fact, to anybody. To constitute would be within the intention of the Legislature; and, a good conviction, it should set out on the face of it-first, secondly, that it should be set out to whom the threat what the threats were, that the nature of them might was made, that the court might see that the threat appear, and the court be able to judge of them; was made under circumstances so that the offence secondly, it should apply the threats to some person, could be committed by the means charged in the conand state that they were used to the party sought to be viction. The answer to these objections given by the intimidated, or at least to some person, in order to Court of Q.B. is in substance this: The 48th section of affect him. Sufficient should appear on the face of the the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, commonly called the Metropoliconviction to enable the court to judge whether it was tan Police Act, provides that in all cases of conviction in accordance with the Act: (Re W. Baker, 2 H. & Nit shall be sufficient if the offence is set out in the 219.) On the hearing of the appeal against the conviction, counsel for the prisoner called for the production of the information which formed the foundation of the whole proceeding, contending that the offence should appear on the face of it. The information was not produced; but since the unsuccessful application for the writ to the Court of Q. B. a copy of it had been procured: it was as follows:"The complaint, on oath, of Charles Robjohn, taken before William Corrie, Esq., one of the magistrates of the police-courts of the metropolis, sitting at the Clerkenwell police-court, within the metropolitan police district, on the 18th Oct. 1859. Charles Robjohn, on oath, says: 'I live at No. 37, Luard-street, Caledonian-road. I am in the employ of Messrs. Piper and Son, Bishopsgate-street. On Saturday night, the 1st Oct. inst., I was in the Goswellroad with William Jocelyn and fifteen or sixteen other workmen, all engaged by Messrs. Piper as workmen. William Pearham was there- he came in; he said to the men "If you there work we shall consider you as blacks, and when we go in we shall strike against you, and strike against you all over London." He followed us all the way to my house.'" This sets out no offence at all; it merely relates the idle gossip of a public-house -it ought to state an offence clearly: (Reg. v. Bent, 2 Car. & K. 157.) [BRAMWELL, B.-No particular form of information is required-it need not be in writing.] It need not be in writing, but if it is in writing it must be sufficient. There is nothing in the information or in the conviction as to whom the threats were addressed. [CHANNELL, B.-That is all matter of evidence for the magistrate.] The Act of last sion, 22 Vict. c 34, makes a combination by workmen legal. He also cited Paley on Convictions, 173. Cur, adv. vult. Nov. 25.-POLLOCK, C.B. delivered judgment.-In the case of William Pearham, convicted before a magistrate, and the conviction affirmed on appeal, Mr. Edwin James yesterday applied for a writ of habeas corpus to bring him up before this court on the ground that he was unlawfully detained, the conviction being illegal. The conviction was founded upon the 6 Geo. 4, c. 129, s. 3, which makes it an offence. It is better to state it, using the words of the Act of Parliament. The section of the Act makes it unlawful to "force or endeavour to force" any workman from his engagement, either by violence to the person or property, by threats conviction in the very language in which the offence is described in the Act of Parliament creating it. My brother Channell, yesterday, in the course of the argument, did in reality give a very distinct and clear answer to this objection, which was this: the offence is, "forcing, or endeavouring to force, a workman to leave his employment "-the means charged in the present instance, "by threats and intimidation." To whom the threats were addressed, and whether they were threats of a description that might have acted on his mind so as to produce the effect of working out the crime charged, that is all matter of evidence; and if the magistrate be satisfied that the evidence is of threats addressed to a person so as to create the offence, it is only necessary for him to set out in the conviction that he convicts the party of the offence in the very language of the Act, and the conviction in the present case complies with the requisites of the statute. We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment given by the Court of Q.B. upon this precise point is perfectly correct. In reality, the grounds of objection taken by Mr. James reduce themselves to one, namely, that the offence is not so described as that the court can perceive that the offence has been committed. We think the Q. B. is perfectly right, and in conformity with what they have held, as far as that ground is concerned, we ought to refuse the writ. But Mr. James presented another matter to our attention. He brought before us by affidavit what professes to be a copy of the information that was filed, and upon which the magistrate granted the summons; the parties being before him, he then ses-proceeded to inquire, and convicted the defendant. Now, the information which is brought before us is this: "The complaint of Charles Robjohn, made before William Corrie, Esq., one of the magistrates," and so on; then "the informant upon his oath says, 'I live,' &c.; and then he says this, 'On Saturday night, the 1st Oct. inst., I was in Goswell-road with William Jocelyn and fifteen or sixteen other workmen, all engaged by Messrs. Piper as workmen; William Pearham was there; he came in; he said to the men, ' If you there work we shall consider you as blacks, and when we go in we shall strike against you, and strike against you all over London.' He followed us all the way to my house.'" It appears to me and to all my learned brethren that this is a statement of the facts which constitute the offence, though it is not a statement of the offence as it is Q. B.] Ex parte PEARham-Reg. v. JUSTICES OF LEICESTERSHIRE. [Q. B. described in the conviction or in the statute. It the 40th section of the statute in question, it is enacted is impossible, I think, to doubt what is the that "the appellant shall not be heard in support of meaning of this, and what is the object of it. It is the appeal, unless within fourteen days after the making impossible to doubt that there is here evidence of a of the order appealed against he give to the local threat-"we shall consider you as blacks." It is not authority notice, in writing, stating his intention to necessary that in the information those words should bring such appeal, together with a statement in writing, be explained. It appears to us, therefore, that this of the grounds of appeal, and shall within two days of information does substantially contain a complaint of giving such notice enter into a recognisance before som e the offence, because it contains a statement of those justice of the peace, with sufficient securities conditioned facts which constitute the offence. It may, however, to try such appeal," &c. In the present case the applibe very much doubted whether, as it is clear the in- cant had done all he could do to comply with the formation need not be in writing, if all the parties were requirements of the statute. The statute must be read before the magistrate, and complaint was made not in to mean that the recognisance shall be entered into writing, and the magistrate then and there heard all within two clear days on which business is transacted, the parties and came to the conclusion which he has and cannot be held to include Sunday as one of them: recorded in the conviction-it may be very well (Morris v. Barrett, 1 L. T. Rep. N S. 38) The case of doubted whether it would not be perfectly sufficient, Peacock v. The Queen, 2 C. B., N. S., is distinguishable; and whether it was necessary that there should be any there the party had power to comply with the terms of the other information than what was given on the occasion. Act; here he has done everything in his power, but was Apart from that, we think that this information does unable to do so. [CROMPTON, J.-It was not necessary contain substantially a statement of a part of the that he should wait until the order was drawn up; he offence upon which the justice was justified and entitled might have given his notice of appeal earlier.] and empowered to act, and that it was his duty to do CROMPTON, J.-I am of opinion that we should not 80. On the whole we think the conviction right. The grant a rule. The general rule of construction is well additional objection presented has really no foundation laid down in Peacock v. The Queen; there the court when it comes to be examined. With respect to this of C.P. held that, unless Sunday was specially excluded ground also the application for the writ must be re-by the statute, it counts as one of the days specified in fused. Writ refused. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. it. No doubt a different rule obtains in matters of procedure before the courts; but that is under an old rule of court. Here the appellant might have given notice of appeal at an earlier time within the fourteen Reported by JOHN THOMPSON, T. W. SAUNDERS, and C. J. B days, and by so doing have avoided the chance of being HERTSLET, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. day. The Nuisances Removal Act, by sect. 40, provides that take it: Held, that the justice was right; that Sunday was to be considered as one of the two days allowed for entering into the recognisance after notice of appeal. Merewether moved for a rule, calling on the justices of Leicestershire to show cause why they should not hear an appeal from an order made under the Nuisances Removal Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 121. It appeared that applicant (Simkins) was summoned by the inspector of nuisances before two justices for an infringement of the Nuisances Removal Act, and the order in question was made by the justices against the present applicant on the 13th of the month, and was served upon him at his residence, three-and-a-half miles from Leicester, on the 24th. On the 25th he consulted with his solicitor on the subject of the order, and on the following day, the 26th, a notice of appeal was regularly served. On Saturday, the 27th, he went with the intention of entering into the requisite recognisances, but he was unable to find a justice, and on his presenting himself on the following Monday, an objection was made that he was too late, as the statute required that the recognisances should be entered into within two days after the appeal, and Sunday intervening the Monday was the third day. By MAG. C. thrown over the Sunday. As it is, we cannot put a different construction from that put upon the statute in the case of Peacock v. The Queen. HILL, J.-I am of the same opinion. When an Act of Parliament gives a particular time for doing a particular thing, without making any special mention of Sunday, it must be taken that Sunday is to be reregarded in construing the Act as any other day. BLACKBURN, J. concurred. Rule refused. Tuesday, No". 22. REG. v. JUSTICES OF MONMOUTHSHIRE. The 43 Geo. 3, c. 59, s. 2, provides that where any Held, tha' the po ver so given to the justices is discretionary, and the court therefore refused a mandamus to compel them to widen a bridge: Held, further, that the finding of an indictment at common law was not such a presentment as required by the statute. Dowdeswell moved for a rule calling on the justices of Monmouthshire to show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding them to take steps for widening and improving, &c., Newport bridge. The 43 Geo. 3, c. 59, s. 2, provides that "when any bridge, or bridges or roads at the end thereof, repaired at the expense of any county, shall be narrow and incommodious, it shall and may be lawful to and for the said justices at any of their general quarter sessions to order and direct such bridge or bridges or roads to be widened, improved, and made commodious for the public;" and it goes on to provide "that no money shall be applied to the amendinent or alteration of any such bridge or bridges, until presentment shall have been made of the insufficiency, inconveniency or want E Q. B.] REG. v. THE JUSTICES OF MONMOUTHSHIRE-PROCTOR v. ANNISON. of reparation of such bridge or bridges in pursuance of some or one of the statutes made and now in force concerning public bridges." The bridge in question was built in 1810, the population of Newport at that time being 2000; the present population amounted to 28,000, and there were, further, 2000 living in Christchurch, on the other side of the bridge. The entire width of the bridge was twenty-one feet, and, allowing for footpaths, there was but fifteen feet left for the carriage-way, besides which there was a descent of one in twenty-one. In 1857 a discussion took place with reference to the bridge, and an indictment was found on the ground that it was too narrow; but it was afterwards discovered that the case of R. v. Dixon, 4 B. & C. 670, decided that no indictment would lie to widen a bridge; but for such a remedy it must be in a ruinons state. No other presentment had been made. The statute must be read as imperative, and a mandamus will lie. [Q. B. The respondent is the owner of a copyhold house of two stories high, situated in a borough. Neither floor is, with the staircase and entrance passage, of the yearly value of 101. The floors are let as distinct tenements, at a yearly rent of less tha 10, to a separate tenant, from year to year. Except as to the common use of the entrance-passage, each tenunt has always had the exclusive use and occupation of the tenement so let to him. The house is of more than the clear yearly value of 101. over and above al rents and charges payable thereout, and would therefore confer a vote for the borough. The owner claimed to vote in respect thereof at the election of knights of the shire: Held, that, the ten ments being in a vertical line under one roof, he was disqualified by sect. 25 of (Reform Act) 2 Will. 4, c. 45, from voting at elections for the county. CASE. At the court for revision of the list of voters in the election of knights of the shire for the northern division of the county of Durham, holden at Sunderland, in the said northern division, on the 6th day of October, in the year of our Lord 1859, before me, Edward Thomas Chitty, the barrister appointed in this year to revise the list of voters in such election for the county of Durham, William Proctor the younger objected to the name of Ralph Annison being retained in the township of Bishopwearmouth list of voters in such election for the said division, and Ralph Annison appeared for the purpose of maintaining his right to CROMPTON, J.-I am of opinion that there should be no rule. We ought not to grant the prerogative writ of mandamus unless we see a clear right on which it should issue, and not to bring a party forward, that advantageous terms may be made. Then is this enactment discretionary or compulsory? and that depends principally upon the subject-matter of the enactment, unless there be something to the contrary. Prima facie these words are permissive; and so they should be held, unless it be clear that the Legislature intended otherwise. In the case of Reg. v. The Bishop of Chichester, 33 L. T. Rep. 301, Wightman, J. held that the issuing a commission under the Church Dis-be retained in the list. cipline Act was discretionary. Prima facie we should read may" in its primary sense, but that will bear modification if it appears from the subject-matter to be dealt with, that it would be inconsistent or improper. Now I think it is clearly discretionary. The justices are to take all the matters into their consideration; and those are matters for their discretion; and in such cases no doubt the Legislature intended to give a discretion; and on that ground I think there should be no rule. 66 Ralph Annison was entered in the list thus:- 13, Sans-street.. Copy hold house in tenements, D'Arcystreet. Many years ago he became seised at law in his demesne as of fee at the will of the lord of the manor, according to the custom of the manor, of the copy hold house so de cribed in the list, and has ever since continued so seised and been in the actual HILL, J.-Mr. Dowdeswell referred to the preamble receipt for his own use of the rents and profits. The of this statute, and to the 2nd section. The words "it house is of more than the clear yearly value of 107. shall be lawful" may undoubtedly be imperative or other- over and above all rents and charges payable out of wise, and that depends on the subject-matter. Then look- and in respect of the same. It is situate within the ing at the subject-matter here, I do not think it is such as borough of Sunderland, which borough was for to be imperative. Great expenses might be incurred; electoral purposes created by the Reform Act (2 who are to judge of them? It appears to me that they Will. 4, c. 45). It is two stories or floors are left to the discretion of the justices; they have high; has only one entrance from the street, considered, and think the expenses ought not to be and a door at that entrance with a bolt, but no lock incurred. I think, therefore, the rule ought to be on it. The entrance passage and staircase and refused. I would add that I think the proviso at the landing at the top of the staircase are the same as in end of the 2nd section is imperative, and Mr. Dowdes-ordinary dwelling-houses. All the doors of the rooms well failed to persuade me that an indictment at com- of the house have locks. Neither floor is with the mon law is such a presentment as is there intended. staircase and entrance passage of the yearly value of so much as ten pounds. Each floor has been always let separate, and as a distinct tenement of Ralph Anuison, at a yearly rent of less than ten pounds, to a separate tenant from year to year, the tenant of the upper floor having the staircase and the use in common with the other tenant of the entrance passage. Except as to such common use of the entrance passage, each tenant has always, and throughout the six months ending on the last day of July, had the exclusive use and occupation of the tenement so let to him. The entrance door has very rarely been bolted or fastened; the doors of the rooms have been locked by night, and but for such locking there would have been free access from the street into the rooms. The whole house might conveniently be the residence of one family. The objection was, that upon the facts above stated, R: Iph Annison was, by the 25th section of the Reform Act (2 Will. 4, c. 45), not entitled to have his name retained on the list. I decided that the section did not affect his right, If I and that his name should be retained on the list. The said William Proctor the younger appealed from my decision in each of the above cases, and I enter tained the appeals. The several appeals depend on the same decision, and ought to be consolidated. I named the said William Proctor the younger to be the appellant, and Ralph Annison to be the respondent in the consolidated appeal. Manisty for the appellant.-Here the voter seeks to be retained on the list of voters for the county of Durham in respect of a copyhold house in Sunderland, the rent of which is now 10., and the question arises whether, under the circumstances, he is entitled to vote as he clains to vote. That will depend upon the construction the court will put upon sect. 25 of the Reform Act (2 Will. 4, c. 45), which enacts "that no person shall be entitled to vote in the election of a knight or knights of the shire in respect of his estate or interest as a copyhold or customary tenant, or tenant in ancient demesne holding by copy of court-roll, or as such lessee or assignee, or as such tenant and occupier as aforesaid, in any house, warehouse, counting-house, shop or other building, such house, warehouse, &c. being either separately or jointly with the land so occupied therewith of such value as would, according to the provision hereinafter contained, confer on him or any other person the right of voting for any city or borough, whether he or any other person shall or shall not have actually acquired the right to vote for such city or borough in respect thereof." The 27th section enacts, "that in every city or borough, every male person of full age, &c., who shall occupy within such city or borough, as owner or tenant, any house, warehouse, &c., being either separately or jointly with any land within such city or borough or place occupied therewith by him as owner or as tenant, under the same landlord of the clear yearly value of not less than 107, shall, if duly registered accordingly, be entitled to vote in the election of a member or members to serve in Parliament," &c. Here the respondent does not him self occupy the house, but he lets it out to tenantssay to two tenants, at 51. a-year rent each-and he seeks to vote for the county in respect of the whole house. No doubt, if he were himself in occupation, he would be entitled to vote for the borough. It may be that no one is entitled to vote in respect of the house for the borough, but that is not the question. The point is, can a person claim to vote for copyhold premises situate in a borough, when the same is let out to several tenants, neither of whom an amount of rent which would entitle him to a vote for the borough? It is contended that the owner of such a copyhold house so let oat is not entitled to a vote for the county in respect of it. It is value, and not occupation, that is the test; and it is to value, and that alone, the 25th section relates. holds to Davison for the respondent. It is clear that a person occupying to the extent of 107. can vote (within the provision of the 27th section) for a borough. It is also clear, that the same meaning should be attached to the same words in the 25th section. The words "house or building" may apply to a part of a house. By sect. 19 of the Reform Act, "every male person seised at law or in equity of any lands or tene [C. B. ments of copyhold or any other tenure whatsoever, except freehold, for his own life, &c. or for any larger estate, of the clear yearly value of not less than 10/. over and above all rents and charges payable thereon, shall be entitled to vote in the election of a knight or knights of the shire in which such lands or tenements shall be situated." But there is a case conclusive on the point (Webb v. The Overseers of Birmingham, 1 Lutw. 18), where it was held that " a lessee of houses situate within a borough, for the unexpired residue of a term originally created for not less than sixty years, is entitled to vote for the county in respect of such of the houses as are not individually of sufficient value to give a right of voting for the borough, but are collectively of the clear yearly value of not less than 10%. over and above all rents and charges payable out of or in respect of the same; although one of the houses comprised in the lease is of sufficient value to confer the borough franchise." In Welsby and Beavan's Chitty's Statutes, in a note to the 25th section of the Reform Act, the effect of the clause is said to be this; that by it "the party is excluded from the county franchise if the property be of such a description and value, and so occupied, that it might be made use of for the purpose of acquiring a vote for the city or borough either by the claimant himself or any other person." Manisty in reply.-The respondent would have the court read the 25th section as if at the end of it the words "and so occupy as to give the qualification were introduced. As is pointed out in the note to Chitty's Statutes, there is a marked distinction between the language of the 24th and 25th sections; in the former section it turns on occupation; in the latter, on value. [WILLIAMS, J.-The question is, whether one house split into tenements is to be considered as several copyhold houses.] The statute says in effect this: "If you are the owner of a house in a borough of such a value as you might, if you choose, get a borough vote for it, you shall not have a vote for the county in respect of it." [WILLIAM S, J.-If this is to be looked at as a single house, you are right; if it is to be regarded as houses, you are wrong. It has been held, in Webb v. The Overseers of Birmingham, that the vote may be in respect of several houses.] The case speaks of the tenement as a house," not as houses." As the claim stands, it is in respect of a copyhold house in tenements." Value, and that alone, is the test, not occupation. Cur, adv. vult. 66 66 Davison, at request of the Court, gave references to the following cases :- Wright v. The Town Clerk of Stockport, I Lutw. 32; Scole v. Huggett, 1 Lutw. 198; Daniel v. Coulsting, 1 Lutw. 230; Toms v. Luckett, 2 Lutw. 19; Downing v. Luckett, 2 Lutw. 33. Nov. 24.-ERLE, C.J.-In this case the claimant is the owner of a copyhold house of such value as would confer on him the right of voting for the borough, and cause him therefore to be disqualified, according to the express words of sect. 25, for the county; but he has contended that the letting of the house to separate tenants in such a manner as would give to them a qualification for the borough as separate tenements, and if they were of sufficient value, makes the single house equivalent to separate houses during the time it is so occupied; and it is true that if the two tenements, instead of being in a vertical line under the saine roof, had been in a horizontal line under separate roofs, the separate value of each being insufficient for the borough, but the aggregate value being sufficient for the county, that would have qualified for the county, as in Webb v. The Overseers of Birmingham. But, in the case supposed, they would be separate houses. Here it is found to be one house, and being so, it gives no qualification for the county. The clause at the end of the section expressly provides that it is immaterial whether the owner or any other person shall have acquired the right to vote for the borough in respect of the same house or not. Therefore the judgment is for the appellant, and the decision of the revising barrister will be reversed. Appeal allowed.—Judgment for appellant with costs. COURT OF EXCHEQUER Wednesday, Nov. 16. WHITE v. LEESON. Private roadway-Local private Act authorising tenant for life to set out-Construction- Who to use such roadway. A private local Act of Parliament, passed 21st June The plaintiff, tenant for life, had granted certain [Ex. enable the Rev. James White and the persons for the time being entitled to certain estates situate in the parish of Bonchurch, in the Isle of Wight, in the county of Southampton, devised by the will of Charles Fitzmaurice Hill, Esq., dece sed, to grant building leases;" and the defendant says that under and by virtue of the said Act the plaintiff (being the said Rev. James White therein mentioned) and his wife were enabled and empowered to grant leases of the said estates, being the said land and hereditaments hereinbefore mentioned, including the said land in which the said supposed trespass is alleged to have been committed, upon such terms and at such rents as in the said Act mentioned; and that since the passing thereof the plaintiff and his wife have, by virtue and in exercise of the powers so given to them, duly granted a great number of leases of different portions of the said estates, land and hereditaments, upon such terms and at such rents as by the said Act required; and that a great number of houses and other buildings have been erected thereon by the tenants and occupiers of the said leases, and that he, the defendant, before and at the time of the committing of the said alleged trespass and from thence hitherto, was and still is a tenant of divers lands and houses at a high rent under subsisting leases thereof duly granted by the plaintiff and his said wife by virtue of the said Act, being parcel of the said estates, lands and hereditaments thereby authorised to be leased; and the defendant says that by the said Act it is amongst other things enacted that it should and might be lawful to and for the person or persons for the time being empowered by that Act to grant leases as aforesaid to lay out and appropriate, or to concur in laying out and appropriating, any part of the said land and hereditaments therein before authorised to be leased as and for a way or ways, street or streets, avenue or avenues, square or squares, passage or passages, sewer sewers, or other conveniences for the general improvement of the estate, and the accommodation of the tenants and occupiers thereof. And the defendant says that, after the passing of the said Act, and many years before the committing of the said supposed trespass, the plaintiff and his said wife did, by virtue and in exercise of the powers so given to them by the said Act, duly lay out and appropriate the said land in the declaration mentioned, to wit, the said roadway (being parcel of the said lands and hereditaments by the said Act authorised to be laid out and appropriated) as and for a way for passing freely and at pleasure, at all times, as well on foot as with horses, carriages and carts for the accommodation of the tenants and occu or The declaration stated that the defendant heretofore, to wit, on the 20th Sept. 1858, with certain horses and carts broke and entered certain land of the plain-piers of the said estates, lands and hereditaments, that tiff, to wit, a certain roadway of the plaintiff running through certain lands and premises called Horseshoebay, situate in the parish of Bonchurch, in the Isle of Wight, which had theretofore been demised to one Jonathan Joliffe down to the sea, and forming the eastern extremity of a certain private road from the village of Bonchurch to the sea; and the plaintiff claimed 50%. is to say, for a way from and out of a certain common and public highway, in the said parish of Bonchurch, unto the seashore at Horseshoe-bay, in the said parish; and the defendant says that the said way was a general improvement to the said estate, and was a great convenience and accommodation to the tenants and occupiers thereof, to wit, of the lands and hereditaments so leased as aforesaid, in many respects, and among Plea 2.-That long before and until and at the time of other things in that it afforded a convenient access to committing the said alleged trespass, one Rosa White, the seashore from their respective houses, both for the the wife of the plaintiff, was entitled for life, and the purposes of pleasure, and also for the purpose of plaintiff during all the time aforesaid was entitled in fetching from the seashore sand and other things reher right, as the husband of the said Rosa, to the said quired by them in and about their houses, buildings, land in which the said supposed trespass is alleged to gardens and lands, without which access many of the have been committed; and also to divers lands and said houses would be greatly depreciated in value and hereditaments partly abutting upon and contiguous to eligibility, and also the probability of letting many and partly in the neighbourhood of the said land, to parts of the said lands and hereditaments which are wit, the said roadway, and lying in the parish of Bon-still unlet would be diminished; and the defendant church, in the Isle of Wight, in the county of Southampton, and they so being entitled heretofore and before the committing of the said supposed trespass, to wit, in the session of Parliament holden in the 6th year of his late Majesty King William the Fourth, a certain Act of Parliament was passed, intituled "An Act to says that the said tenants and occupiers have, and that he himself has for many years, to wit, since that way was so laid out and appropriated, used the said way accordingly; and that the said alleged trespass was a use of the said way by the defendant. Replication to the plea of the defendant above |