Ex.] Re FERNANDEZ. [Ex. POLLOCK, C.B.-We think we ought to take time to consider the argument which has been prepared with so much pains, and presented to us with such ingenuity, and here we do no wrong to the applicant, because, if we gave judgment now, it would probably be adverse to his application. Cur, adv. vult. a verdict of acquittal:" (Sheriff of Middlesex case, | [WILDE, B.-The result would be that you would 11 A. & E. 292.) In Lord Shaftesbury's case, this never be able to obtain an answer to the simplest quesdistinction between the powers of a superior and in- tion: a man might refuse to tell his name.] Lastly, ferior court is referred to; that was a committal by the witness should have been asked if he had any cause the House of Lords for contempt, and the return to a to show why he should not be adjudged guilty of conwrit of habeas was to the effect that the committal tempt, and then the matter and the bona fides of the was under a general warrant, and in giving judgment, refusal could have been inquired into. But this was remanding the prisoner, it is expressly said: "Such a not done, and no proper opportunity was given to the return, if made by an ordinary court of justice, would witness to explain his conduct. In his affidavit the have been ill and uncertain:" (1 Mod. 157.) witness swears to his bonâ fide belief that the answer And in Reg. v. Patey, 2 Ld. Raym. Rep. 1106, Gould, would have a tendency to criminate him; that he was J., in giving judgment, says: "If this had been a not acting in collusion with J. B. Charlesworth, and return of a commitment by an inferior court it had that he had no intention to commit a contempt of been naught, because it did not set out a sufficient court. cause of commitment." As to what ought to appear on the face of general warrants, he referred to judgments of Coleridge, J., in Howard v. Gossett, 10 Q. B. pp. 380-1, and Lord Denman, C.J. Ib. p. 407. Again, the court of assize exercises its power by virtue of a statute, and where special jurisdiction, independent of the ordinary power of the court, is exercised, it is ne- April 23.-POLLOCK, C.B. now delivered the judgcessary to show plainly the facts giving the jurisdiction: ment of the court.-I have the written judgment of (Christie v. Unwin, A. & E. 373, per Coleridge, J., the court in the matter of Fernandez, and I now proceed p. 379; Harrison v. Wright, per Parke, B., 13 to deliver it. This was a case moved by Mr. Bovill, M. & W. 818; Ex parte Leake, per Parke, B, 9 on Friday last, and the motion was for a writ of habeas B. & C. 240; Rex v. Brown, 8 T. R. 26; Thomlin-corpus to bring up the body of the deft. in order to son's case, 12 Rep. 104.) Another objection is, that his being discharged on the ground of the commitment the warrant does not show whether the offence was being illegal. The argument occupied a considerable committed during a civil or criminal trial, or whether time, and was founded on cases not very often cited or not before a jury. It says, "At the assizes held," in court, and some of them of an ancient date. We &c., and this court having adjudged," &c. It is had little doubt at the close that the writ ought not to impossible to say whether this took place under issue, but we thought it desirable to take a short time the commission of oyer and terminer, or of assize, to look into the state of the law upon the subject, or whether it was an information laid by the and we are Attorney-General before the justices, as commis-writ ought to be granted. now clearly of opinion that no sioners of the peace. The only question It is bad too for not showing in reality before us is, whether the court of assize at special authority and jurisdiction. Wilde, B. refers to York which ordered this commitment is a superior or the judgment of Ashurst, J. in R. v. Joliffe, that although an inferior court. judges of assize derive authority under a particular sta-set out the cause of commitment with the particular If superior, it is not required to tute, yet all that is done by them is virtually done under circumstances-it is sufficient to state the cause genethe authority of the court above. Again, it ought to appear rally; and the case would be otherwise if it be an infeon the warrant whether it emanated from a Superior rior court. Court, which the court of oyer and terminer is not. court of assize is an inferior court, two authorities, and To support the view of Mr. Bovill, that a [BRAMWELL, B.-There were two judges assigned to two authorities only, were cited. The first was in take the assizes: records are drawn up under different Bacon's Abr. tit. "Courts," D; upon referring to which captions, according to the business done-the criminal it appears to be an authority directly the other way. business under the commission of oyer and ter- The courts of record are there divided into supreme, miner; the civil, under the commission of assize.] superior, and inferior. Superior Courts of record are Then if it is to be assumed, from the caption, that it more principal or less principal; the more principal was under the commission of assize, it is bad for are-Parliament, Chancery, Queen's Bench, Common not showing that the proceedings were under an in- Pleas, and Exchequer, the justices itinerant, &c.; the formation sent down by the Court of Q. B. Further, less principal courts are such as are held by commission the warrant does not state what the question was, nor of gaol delivery, oyer and terminer, assize, Nisi Prius, that it was material. In such a case nothing must be &c. All these seem to stand on the same footing. A presumed. But, apart from all question as to jurisdic- court of assize, or of Nisi Prius, is therefore a Supetion and the validity of the warrant, the witness was rior Court, although a less principal one, and as such, not bound to answer the question; the 9th and 10th sec-as far as this authority goes, has authority to commit tions of the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 57, do not extend to impeachment by the House of Commons. The certificate, however powerful to shelter the witness from any other proceedings, cannot stop the House of Commons-it is a casus omissus. Nor could the judge protect him by his opinion. The witness alone can determine whether an answer has a tendency to criminate him, and it is his privilege so to do; and even if he were mistaken in supposing himself liable to impeachment, he is still entitled to the privilege, and it is not to be assumed that the tendency to criminate must have reference solely to bribery. Suppose he had embezzled the money; the certificate would have been no protection there, whilst the answer might be a link in the chain to convict him hereafter. In Fisher v. Ronalds, 12 C. B. 765, Maule, J. clearly states the nature of the privilege, and his view has been adopted by Pollock, C. B. in Adams v. Lloyd, 3 H. & N. 361, and was referred to in Garbett's case, 2 Carr. & Kir. is no for contempt without setting forth the particulars of Ex.] REG. on the prosecution of MAPPIN AND OTHERS v. YOULE. decision was undoubtedly quite right in law to the extent of holding that the cause of commitment must appear in the commitment of the inferior court. The argument therefore fails to show that the court of commissioners at the Old Bailey was an inferior court. But there is an authority, not cited by Mr. Bovill, which goes directly to show that that court is a Superior Court, in the opinion at least of Abbot, C. J., and also was expressly so held by Wood, B., in the case of Rex v. Clement, 4 B. & Ald. 218, and 11 Pri. 70. In that case the court at the Old Bailey had made an order forbidding any publications of a portion of certain trials until the whole were concluded. This order had been disobeyed by the deft, and the court fined him 5001. for his contempt in disobeying the order, not stating what was the order he had disobeyed. The presiding judge at that session was Abbot, C. J., and we have no doubt that the order, imposing the fine for the contempt of the deft. in disobeying the order, was very carefully considered and prepared. It is set out at full in the report in 11 Price, and it is an authority to show that the court, at that time, Abbot, C.J. being the commissioner, claimed to act and did act as a Superior Court, not setting out the particulars of the contempt it proposed to punish, and Wood, B. in his judgment (11 Price, 87), expressly speaks of the court as a Superior Court of Record. Assuming, therefore, that a court of assize is a Superior Court (and it certainly may be taken without any doubt that a court of assize is as much a Superior Court of Record as a court of commissioners at the Old Bailey was before it was superseded by the present court established by Act of Parliament), assuming a court of assize to be a Superior Court, the law applicable to this commitment is really not open to any doubt. It was solemnly decided in the H. of L, in Burdett v. Abbott (in error, 5 Dow. Rep. 200), as it had been in the court below, 14 East, and in The Sheriff of Middlesex case, 11 Ad. & Ell. 292, that in a warrant of commitment by a Superior Court, the adjudication of the contempt may be general, and the particular circumstances need not be set forth. This is all that is necessary for the purpose of the decision of this case now before us; but we do not regret that Mr. Bovill brought under our notice all the circumstances that took place at the trial, as it affords us an opportunity of saying that we entirely concur in the view taken by the learned judge who presided (Hill, J.), as to the whole course of proceeding on that oecasion. There will be no writ of habeas corpus issued. Writ refused. Attorneys for the applicant, Singleton and Pitman. Monday, April 29. [Ex. him by his attorney that he is not bound to return in consequence of the previous conviction having put an end to the contract, but the justices nevertheless convict him for not returning: Held (per totam curiam), that the workman in acting upon such bona fide claim of right is not liable to be proceeded against before the justices a second time, and that the second conviction is bad on that ground. Held also, that a conviction under 6 Geo. 3, c. 25, s. 4, is bad on the ground that that statute is repealed or practically superseded (quoad these particular proceedings) by the 4 Geo.4, c. 34, s. 3. Special case under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, stated by two justices of the borough of Sheffield for the opinion of the court, as to the validity of a conviction by said justices under 6 Geo. 3, c. 25, s. 4, of a workman for absenting himself from his master's service before his contract had expired. The facts found by the case are as follow: The app., a journeyman cutler, was in the service of Messrs. Mappin, of Sheffield, under a written agreement, signed by both parties, in the following form : "An agreement made this 19th Dec. 1859, between Robert Youle of the first part, and Edward Mappin and Joseph Charles Mappin of the second part. The said R. Youle doth hereby hire himself and agree to work for the said parties of the second part as a journeyman springknife cutler, for the term of three years from the date hereof, during all which time the said Robert Youle shall and will diligently and wholly employ and apply himself in the service of the said parties of the second part, and shall not work for, serve, or assist any other person or persons whatsoever," and in consideration thereof the said E. and J. C. Mappin did thereby" hire and agree fully to employ the said R. Youle in the capacity and for the term aforesaid," and to pay him as in the said agreement mentioned for the work which he should do, with a proviso enabling either party to determine the hiring at the end of two years, on giving to the other of them one month's notice in writing; "and if the said R. Youle bo the person giving such notice, on his paying to the said parties of the second part at the time of giving such notice the whole of any debt which he may then owe to them." The app. was to be paid by piecework-that is to say, not by wages by the week or month, but in proportion to the value of the work done according to a certain scale of prices. Under this contract he entered and remained in Messrs. Mappin's service until the 7th July last, when he absented himself without their consent, and continuing so absent, a complaint was laid against him on the 3rd Aug. After hearing evidence upon oath on both sides, the justices conREG. on the prosecution of MAPPIN AND victed the said R. Youle of a misdemeanor in resOTHERS (resps.) v. YOULE (app.) pect of his contract, "for that he did on the 7th July, Master and workman-Absenting from service-Con- and still did, unlawfully absent himself from his said viction for by justices under 6 Geo. 3, c. 25-Second master's service, without leave or lawful excuse, and leaving service under bonâ fide claim of right-without his said master's consent, and neglected to Statutes 6 Geo. 3, c. 25, and 4 Geo. 4, c. 34Repeal of former by latter Act. Where at the time of the original departure from the master's service the workman means it to be a permanent departure, and has no intention to return to such service: Held (per Pollock, C. B. and Martin, B.; dissentiente, Bramwell, B.), that the master puts an end to the contract of service by proceeding against the workman summarily under the Act; and that the justices have no power to convict the workman a second time for not returning to the service after the expiration of the first imprisonment. Where a workman declines to return to the service after his first imprisonment, under a bona fide claim of right founded on his belief in the advice given fulfil the conditions of the said contract, contrary to the statute in that case made and provided;" and the said justice did thereupon adjudge that the said R. Youle should be "imprisoned in the house of correction at Wakefield, and kept to hard labour for the space of twenty-one days, and that during the said term the wages of the said Robert Youle should abate." In pursuance of the above conviction, which was made under the 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 3, the app. was committed to prison for twenty-one days. He did not return to Messrs. Mappin's service at the expiration of his imprisonment, whereupon on the 12th Sept. they preferred a second complaint against him, "for that he did, on the 29th Aug. last, before the term of his contract was completed, unlawfully absent himself without leave or lawful excuse," This complaint was Ex.] REG. on the prosecution of MAPPIN AND OTHERS v. YOULE. [Ex. heard on the 13th Sept., before the two justices who | prisonment had expired, the app. had stated, in answer state this case. to the question why he had not returned to his work at Messrs. Mappin's, that he was willing to pay them the money he owed them for advances, which they ought to accept, and release him from his contract, as he was earning higher wages elsewhere, and more than Messrs. Mappin would allow him to earn ; and secondly, that he absented himself from his work owing to a dispute with his master about the prices allowed for work, and also about the kind of work on which he had been employed; and that he was advised by his attorney that the contract was at an end, and that he was not compellable to return, and the justice thought it very probable that he bonâ fide believed the opinion of his attorney. The following are the sections of the two statutes bearing on the question : The 6 Geo. 3, c. 25, "An Act for better regulating apprentices and persons working under contract." It was proved before them that the app. entered Messrs. Mappin's service under the aforesaid agreement and was absent therefrom on the day named in the information (29th Aug.), and had not returned since that day; that he was found on the 11th Sept. working at another manufactory, when, on being asked why he had not come to his work now he was out of prison, he said he had offered to pay Mr. Mappin the money he owed him, and he thought Mr. Mappin ought to accept it, and release him from the agreement, for he was earning more money there and did not want to return." His previous committal on the 3rd Aug., and that he had not returned to his service since his discharge from prison, were also proved. In answer to a question by the justices, he said he declined now to return to Messrs. Mappin's service in consequence of his solicitor having advised him not to do so. It was urged on his behalf before the justices Sect. 1. Recites, that persons employed in several that, having been once convicted for leaving the service, manufactories of this kingdom frequently take apprenhe could not again be convicted for not returning; that tices, and such apprentices frequently absent themthe justices had no jurisdiction, inasmuch as it was one selves from their service, for remedy whereof it is offence which had been satisfied. The justices, how-enacted, that "if any apprentice shall absent himself ever, convicted him " of having on 29th Aug. last past, from his master's service before the term of his at the borough aforesaid, without notice, and before the apprenticeship shall have expired, every such apprentice term of his contract was completed, unlawfully, with- shall, at any time or times thereafter, whenever he out the consent of his said masters, or either of them, shall be found, be compelled to serve his said master and without just or lawful excuse, absented himself for so long a time as he shall have absented himself from his said service; and of not having fulfilled his said from such service, unless he shall make satisfaction to contract, contrary to the form of the statute made and his master for the loss he shall have sustained by his passed, &c. (6 Geo. 3, c. 25), and did adjudge the absence from his service; and so, from time to time said R. Youle to be imprisoned in the house of correc- as often as such apprentice shall, without leave of his tion at Wakefield, in the West Riding of Yorkshire, for master, absent himself from his service before the term the space of one month." of his contract shall be fulfilled; and in case any such apprentice shall refuse to serve as hereby required, or to make such satisfaction to his master, such master may complain, upon oath, to any justice of the peace for the county or place where he shall reside, which oath such justice is hereby empowered to administer, and to issue a warrant under his hand and seal for Being dissatisfied with the above decision, as erroneous in point of law, the app. applied to the justices for a case, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, and was admitted to bail in the meantime. upon hearing the complaint, may determine what satisfaction shall be made to such master by such apprentice; and in case such apprentice shall not give security to make such satisfaction according to such determination, it shall and may be lawful for such justice to commit every such apprentice to the house of correction for any time not exceeding three months." The justices say: "We were of opinion that the deft. was proved to be guilty of the offence charged in the information and complaint, and against the provi-apprehending any such apprentice; and such justice, sions in that behalf contained in the statute of 6 Geo. 3; and we were also of opinion that deft. was liable under the above statute to be again convicted and imprisoned for not returning after his said imprisonment, under the same agreement, but on the contrary, advisedly, absenting himself from the service of his masters, and working for others, after his former imprisonment and before the time of his agreement with Messrs. Mappin had expired; and we accordingly adjudged him to be imprisoned in the house of correction at Wakefield for one month. If the court shall be of opinion that the said determination is not erroneous in point of law, then the said determination shall be confirmed; but if the court shall be of a contrary opinion, then the said determination shall be reversed." The case came on for argument in Hilary Term, when the court directed the case to be sent back for amendment and more specific statement by the justices on the two following points: 1. If any evidence was given before them to show whether the absence of the app. in respect of which the first conviction was made was a temporary absence, or an absence with intention not to return at all, and not to fulfil the contract? and if there was, to state it, and the conclusion they draw from such evidence. Sect. 4. "And whereas it frequently happens that artificers, calico printers, handicraftsmen, &c. and others, who contract with persons for certain terms, do leave their respective services before the terms of their contracts are fulfilled, to the great disappointment and loss of the persons with whom they so contract, for remedy whereof be it further enacted, that if any calico printer, handicraftsman, &c., or other person shall contract with any person whomsoever, for any time or times whatsoever, and shall absent himself from his service before the term of his contract shall be completed, or be guilty of any other misdemeanor, that then and in every such case it shall and may be lawful for any justice of the peace of the county or place where any such artificer, &c. shall be found, and such justice is hereby authorised and empowered, upon complaint thereof made upon oath to him by the person with whom such artificer, &c. shall have so contracted, or by his or her steward or agent, which oath such 2. Whether on the last occasion on which he refused to return to the service, he bona fide believed that he was not bound to return to the service, injustice is hereby empowered to administer, to issue his consequence of the previous conviction? The amended case states in substance, first, that there was no evidence to show whether the first absence was temporary only, or an absence with intention not to return at all, and not to fulfil the contract except that, on the 11th Sept., eighteen days after his im warrant for the apprehending every such artificer, &c., and to examine into the nature of the complaint; and if it shall appear to such justice that any such artificer, &c. shall not have fulfilled such contract, or hath been guilty of any misdemeanor, it shall and may be lawful for such justice to commit every such person to the Ex.] REG. on the prosecution of MAPPIN AND OTHERS v. Youle. house of correction for the county or place where such justice shall reside, for any time not exceeding three months nor less than one month." The 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, "An Act to enlarge the powers of justices in determining complaints between masters and servants, and between masters, apprentices, artificers and others." Sect. 1 recites the 6 Geo. 3, c. 25, and other Acts, and that "it is expedient to extend the powers of the said Acts," &c. Sect. 4. "And be it further enacted, that if any servant in husbandry, or any artificer, &c., shall contract with any person or persons whomsoever, to serve him, her, or them for any time or times whatsoever, or in any other manner, and shall not enter into or commence his or her service according to his or her contract (such contract to be in writing, and signed by the contracting parties), or having entered into such service shall absent himself or herself from his or her service before the term of his or her contract, whether such contract shall be in writing or not in writing, shall be completed, or neglect to fulfil the same, or be guilty of any other misconduct or misdemeanor in the execution thereof, or otherwise respecting the same, then and in every such case it shall and may be lawful for any justice of the peace of the county or place where such servant in husbandry, artificer, &c., shall have so contracted, or be employed or be found, and such justice is hereby authorised and empowered, upon complaint thereof made upon oath to him by the person or persons, or any of them, with whom such servant in husbandry, artificer, &c., shall have so contracted, or by his, her, or their steward, manager, or agent, which oath such justice is hereby empowered to administer, to issue his warrant for the apprehending every such servant in husbandry, artificer, &c., and to examine into the nature of the complaint; and if it shall appear to such justice that any such servant in husbandry, artificer, &c., shall not have fulfilled such contract, or hath been guilty of any other misconduct or misdemeanor as aforesaid, it shall and may be lawful for such justice to commit every such person to the house of correction, there to remain and be held to hard labour for a reasonable time, not exceeding three months, and to abate a proportionable part of his or her wages for and during such period as he or she shall be so confined in the house of correction; or in lieu thereof, to punish the offender by abating the whole or any part of his or her wages; or to discharge such servant in husbandry, artificer, &c., from his or her contract, service, or employment, which discharge shall be given under the hand and seal of such justice gratis." [Ex. damages may be recovered, but in both these cases the cate on wages, they could not do so where a man is paid by piecework, as there the wages would deduct themselves, since he could not do any work whilst in prison. No doubt the last-named Act says the justices are so to adjudicate, but it does not follow because the nature of the contract is to do without their adjudication what the Legislature intended should be done, that therefore the conviction must be under the 6 Geo.3. The justices have fairly stated the case, but they were wrong. How is it brought before the magistrate? Has the magistrate no power to decide under 4 Geo. 4, even though the information is laid under 6 Geo. 3?] The argument on the other side is that it is cumulative. The case states that the deft. having been charged with an offence contrary to the statute 6 Geo. 3," the justices sentenced him in terms under that Act; and the reason, it is apprehended, why they rely on that statute April 29.-Mellish, Q.C. for the deft.-The ques-is, that as the justices must, under 4 Geo. 4, adjudition is, whether a workman who has been convicted for absenting himself from his employment, and sentenced to imprisonment, and who declines to return to his service after his discharge, is liable to be summoned and punished again. Assuming that he was bound to return, he could not be convicted criminally for not returning, if he bona fide believed he was not bound. The case of Ryder v. Wood, 29 L. J. 1, M.C., is an express authority to that effect. No doubt in that case the man thought he had complied with the contract. Here the deft. acted on a supposed right, and under the advice of his attorney, and adopting the view expressed by Pollock, C.B., in Ex parte Baker, 2 H. & N. 219, Ex., he declined to return to the service. But, secondly, the prior conviction put an end to the contract. The leaving the service permanently was one offence, and having been once punished, he cannot be punished a second time: the justices have no further jurisdiction in the matter. An ordinary case of contract of service is put an end to by the party going away and abandoning it, and the remedy a master has is by an action for damages. So if a servant be wrongfully dismissed an action lies, and [MAG. CAS.] Quain, contra, in support of the conviction.-There are so many Acts in pari materiâ regulating the dealings between masters and workmen, that it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this question, especially the court should accede to the view of this case propounded on the other side. He contended that the first conviction did not put an end to the contract for the purpose of a second conviction. In Ex parte Baker, 7 El. & Bl. 697, there is the unanimous judgment of Lord Campbell, C.J. and Erle and Coleridge, JJ. to that effect. That case first came before the Q.B. It was under the 4 Geo. 4, but for the purpose of this argument it is no matter on which 2 Z Ex.] REG. on the prosecution of MAPPIN AND OTHERS v. YOULE. [Ex. Mellish, Q.C. in reply.-It is not necessary to say whether the Act is entirely repealed or not. The question is, is it superseded quoad this particular case? (Here he was stopped by the court.) POLLOCK, C.B.-I am of opinion that this conviction is bad. It appears to me that the deft. acted perfectly bona fide in refusing to return; and having proceeded against him once, the justices could not compel him to return. I also think his original depar ture was intended to be permanent; and, without discussing the question whether the justices can interfere more than once where the absence is temporary (on which I retain my former opinion), I think, where the man clearly shows an intention to leave altogether, the magistrate should deal with the case once and for all: and whatever may be the power of the justices to punish a short absence, such as an unpermitted holiday more than once, yet where the workman means to quit the service altogether, the punishment should include the whole question of compensation, and be final. On that ground I think the present conviction not sustainable, The conviction is under the 6 Geo. 3, expressly, with imprisonment for one month, being the minimum allowed by that statute. Possibly the justices committed him for that period, thinking they could not commit for less; but the 6 Geo. 3, being repealed by the 4 Geo. 4, they were wrong, and the conviction is bad on that ground also. statute the question arose. [POLLOCK, C. B.-Was | pense with the criminal law altogether. No bona fides the attention of the Q.B. drawn to the difference between was shown here. [MARTIN, B.-Suppose a man the two statutes?] No. Your Lordship first stated imagines his masters are not working out his contract that distinction when Ex parte Baker came before this fairly by him, and so leaves, is not that bonâ fide?] In court. The main point there was, could there be a Ryder v. Wood, the mens rea was absent. Not so in second conviction upon an absenting himself after the this case. He refers also to Willett v. Boote, and judgfirst imprisonment had expired? And the Q.B. held that ment of Bramwell, B., 30 L. J. 6, M. C. The advice there could, and of that opinion also were Bramwell given by his attorney is no excuse; if he stands on it and Watson, BB. when the case afterwards came before he must take his chance; and both in fact and in law this court; Pollock, C.B. being of a contrary opinion, it fails. As to repeal, a later statute which is general and Martin, B. doubting: (S. C. 2 H. & N. 219.) As and affirmative cannot repeal a prior affirmative statute to the policy of these statutes, it was of immense im- unless in express terms, or unless there is some gross portance to hold artificers to their contracts. To bring inconsistency between them. There are provisions in the an action against men in their position would be nuga- prior Act which are not in the subsequent Act, and tory; without this statutory remedy the contracts of there is an appeal given in the former Act, but not in hiring would be unilateral; the masters would be the latter; and the effect of holding the prior Act bound, whilst practically the men would be free. The repealed will be to throw a large number of operatives Legislature intended these Acts as a mode of compelling throughout the kingdom out of the operation of the performance of the contract-a kind of bill in equity statute altogether. [POLLOCK, C. B. referred to the to enforce performance, as distinguished from an action judgment of Bramwell, B. in Ex parte Baker, 2 H. & to recover damages for the breach of a contract; and N. 242, on this point.] if this conviction is reversed the court will impliedly repeal these useful and salutary statutes. The effect will be very disastrous to the masters who are in the habit of advancing money and buying tools for their workmen, on the faith of their contracts, the work being piecework, and taken by the men to their own homes. No master will prosecute for misconduct on the part of his workmen if twenty-one days' imprisonment is to annul the contract, and thus the men will have the upper hand of their masters. The 20 Geo. 2, c. 19 is the earliest of this class of statutes, and throws light on the construction of the statutes in question. By the 2nd section of that Act, three modes of punishment were given alternatively. The 4 Geo. 4 is founded on that, and it cannot be said that the latter statute, any more than the former one, meant to put an end to the contract of service certainly. Where the Legislature so intends it says so expressly, as in the 3rd section of 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 43, s. 3, relating to colliers, where it says: "And upon such conviction every such contract shall become void." [POLLOCK, C. B.-In Ex parte Baker I did not mean to say that the contract was at an end, but that there was no power to convict a second time; and looking at the way that case is reported in the Q. B., it is not an authority against that view. It is a matter of very large substance, and which I consider to be of immense importance. MARTIN, B.-The 1st section of 6 Geo. 3, c. 25, in which alone the words MARTIN, B.-I also think the conviction, being "from time to time" occur, obviously points to the expressly under 6 Geo. 3, is not supportable. I agree apprentice's refusal to serve or to make satisfaction; with what my brother Bramwell said in Ex parte and in case of such refusal he may be imprisoned. Baker on the question of the repeal of that statute by BRAMWELL, B.-The words "from time to time" re- the 4 Geo. 4, and I think the Legislature must be fer not to the justices punishing, but to the appren- taken to have intended that the one Act shall be subtice's refusal to make satisfaction.] The analogy of stituted for the other. It is a plain superseding of the an action for breach of contract fails; there, in bringing one Act by the other. We cannot apply the strict an action, a person elects to rescind, and recovers rules laid down for construction to such a case; we damages once for all. Here the master goes before the must take a common-sense view of the matter. The justices, not to rescind, but to compel performance of justices are confined to the 4 Geo. 4, and had no right the contract; and the conclusion seems inevitable that, to fall back on 6 Geo. 3. True there is an appeal after punishment for one offence, he may, if he offend under the 6 Geo. 3, and none under the 4 Geo. 4, and again, be punished again. Rex v. Inhabitants of Barton- so it may be said there is a hardship done in holding upon-Irwell, 2 M. & S. 329; and Rex v. Inhabitants of the former Act repealed; but that objection is reHallow, show that imprisonment under the 20 Geo. 2, moved by the very statute under which this case comes c. 19, was held no dissolution of the contract of ser- before us. I may say that my brother Wilde intimated vice. [POLLOCK, C.B.-Those are settlement cases; to me, before he left the court, that on this point he and Lord Eldon once complained of such cases being concurred in opinion with me. As to the other point, cited as authorities upon other branches of the law.] I adhere to the opinion I expressed in Ex parte Baker, With regard to the guilty intention, he absented him- that it is one offence, and can only be dealt with self wilfully, and to get higher wages. It was only at once for all if the man absent himself meaning to leave the last moment that the dissolution of the contract altogether. In contemplation of law all men are equal, was rested upon. Then he says, "My attorney tells me and we must not look at the ability of people to pay there is the opinion of one judge in my favour, so damages. The master has a right to act upon the I'll break my contract, and take the chance of a point statute, but if he do so act he must do so once for all; of law being in my favour." Such a course would dis-neither the master nor the justices may split the |