Ex. Cn.] WARD AND ANOTHER v. LOWNDES. [Ex. CH. Then, as to the fifteenth plea. That plea is a good answer to the mandamus. [WILLES, J.-The jury have found, as to the 201., for the defendant; the Statute of Limitations does not apply to such a proceeding as this.] Then I am entitled to arrest the judgment. You can only proceed by mandamus in cases where you could proceed by action against a private individual. This is an ordinary debt for work and labour. Kendall v. King, 17 C.B. 483, shows an action may be brought against the committee of a lunatic asylum on a contract entered into by them for plans, though the judgment could not be enforced. The writ of mandamus is a sort of statutable execution given by the C.L.P.A. 1854, but the Statute of Limitations is a good bar. This is neither a specialty debt nor a statutory debt, and the fifteenth plea is a good bar, and the judgment of the court on that plea ought to be for the defendant. The count in the declaration praying a mandamus is bad in arrest of judgment. The point taken in the court below was that you could not have a prayer for a mandamus for unliquidated damages. What is there that gives the jury the right to ascertain an amount? The first count was abandoned, but the second refers to the first, and for the purpose of ascertaining what are the allegations referred to we must look to it. The first count then alleges a contract out of which the claim had accrued and the circumstances under which the defendant's liability arose, and it concludes with claiming 500l.; then the second count incorporates by reference the allegations in the first, and following the form required by the C. L. P. A. 1854, concludes by claiming a writ of mandum's commanding the defend incurred at any time within six months before the making of the rate." The debt claimed was due from the commissioners to the plaintiffs before the provisional order mentioned in the declaration was made; and by that provisional order, which has the force of an Act of Parliament, the commissioners were abolished, and their property transferred to the local board of health. The demand should have been made within six months from such transfer, but here there was no duty upon the defendant to make the rate, for the charge was not incurred within six months of the demand, and the six months began to run directly the deficiency in the chargeable property transferred by the commissioners was ascertained; after the six months the remedy is lost, and the effect of a mandamus would be to charge parties not legally liable. The debt of the plaintiff was an ordinary simple contract debt; 20. is for the premium for the plan, and the larger part of the claim is for work and labour done. The debt was due at the time the powers of the commissioners were transferred to the local board; the order was made in 1855, and confirmed by Act of Parliament, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 125 This debt became a charge upon the rate as soon as the order was published and confirmed. [MARTIN, B. -Is not the six months confined to rates which they are willing to make? In the judgment of Erle, C. J., with reference to the case of Waddington v. The City of London Union, 28 L. J. 113, M. C., heard before him and the other judges of the Court of Q.B., when he sat there, and communicated by him to me, there is a distinction between rates made for the poor generally, and rates made under an Act of Parliament.] Lord Camp-ant to levy a rate for the payment of the said debts and bell, C.J. in his judgment in the court below says: "The moneys so due and owing to the plaintiffs; but the 89th section applies only to rates to be made to defray ex- amount is unascertained, and the defect is not supplied penses incurred by the board, and not to cases like the by the claim for 500/. in the first count. There must present, where the charge is cast upon the rates. be an action in which the amount may be When by Act of Parliament it is provided that a debt ascertained, and the question of right be established. shall be a charge upon the rates, that impliedly No new obligation was created by the C. L. P. A., gives a power to raise a rate to answer the charge." but only a inore convenient mode of procedure. The six months began to run as soon as the claim [CHANNELL, B.-Must we not take it upon this became a charge, and it became a charge as soon as record that there is a sufficient debt alleged?] There there was a deficiency. [WILLIAMS, J. - The is no amount stated; the amount must be known and insufficiency of the fund is a fact which exists, demanded, and payment refused. How can a jury although it may not be ascertained.] Lord Campbell assess and fix a proper amount? [CROWDER, J.seems to have thought that a special rate might have They have done so.] Yes; but they were not warranted been made to satisfy this demand; but that is not so. in so doing by the record. [BYLES, J.-The record says The order says that if the property and estate is in- that the commissioners owed the plaintiffs then a sufficient, the insufficiency should be charged upon large sum of money for work and labour.] Yes; but rates leviable under the Public Health Act; this was the amount is not stated; no specific amount is a charge incurred after and by reason of the transfer. claimed. [WILLES, J.-I believe in the old books it [BYLES, J.-Do you maintain that if there had been would not be difficult to find cases in which plaintiff's no other demand and no other claim, a rate could have had failed in actions of debt for want of proof of the been made?] Yes; a general rate ought to have amount alleged to a farthing; then, to remedy that, been made as soon as the debt accrued, and within six the action of indebitatus assumpsit was introduced; months after. [MARTIN, B.-Suppose they deny and in course of time the judges became accustomed their liability and so postpone it for more than six to that, and their minds being softened, they applied months.] That supposition is explained away in Reg. the same practice to actions of debt; and then the v. Local Board of Rotherham, 8 E. & B. 906. The C. L. P. A. altered that, and said that it should not be judgment would be a fresh charge, for which a rate necessary to state an amount in any case. Can we might be made. Why should persons coming into the hold that in this case it was intended by the Legisparish five or six years after be rated for these ex-lature that the courts should act differently to what penses? [MARTIN, B.-Because they had the mis- they do in other cases?] fortune to have bad commissioners.] All the cases Dowdeswel (Pigott, Serjt. with him) contra.— were fully considered by this court in the case of The limitation of six months for making retrospective Waddington v. City of London, 28 L. J. 113, M. C.; rates points to debts incurred by the local boards and there it was held by this court, reversing the themselves, and not to such as this, which is imposed judgment of the Q. B., that the contribution order by statute: (see 2 Chitt. Stats. 370, note C.) The made by the guardians was wholly invalid, as being subsequent Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 125, ss. 10, 11), made in part to pay old debts; that the guardians had confirming the provisional order, makes that clear. no power by law to make a retrospective order, nor That order, when so confirmed, acquired the force of overseers to make a retrospective poor-rate. The an Act of Parliament. Considerable property was statute was intended to make a limitation, and vested in the board of health, and in consideration the Legislature thought six months a reasonable time. The decision of the court below was wrong, for according to it there would be no limit. they took upon themselves the debts and liabilities of the commissioners, and they were to pay and satisfy them out of the property and estate, and if Ex. CH.] WARD AND ANOTHER v. LOWNDES. [Ex. CH. they were insufficient for that purpose, the defi- | debt cannot be said to have been incurred by them; it ciency was to be charged upon the rates leviable was incurred by the commissioners, and was transunder the Public Health Act 1848. Not only were debts to be satisfied, but securities also; could it therefore be held that a man holding a bond must come and claim it within six months? Is it to be supposed that the Act should intend to impose on a person who had the security not only of the rates, but also of the property, a condition that if he did not come in within six months he should lose all right? Then it is said that an action should be brought and judgment recovered; but the Act is not to be so construed. [BYLES, J.-Would an action lie by the present plaintiffs against the local board under the words of the order?] Not unless they had funds; it would be necessary to aver that defendants had funds. How could the plaintiff's know anything of the affairs of the local board of health? It would be the greatest injustice to creditors, and it cannot be supposed that the statute intended to impose on creditors the necessity of imme-peril, and hard indeed to make them ascertain within diately rushing into litigation. The words of the statute and order are clear; the one imposes a limit, the other none. The COURT intimated that they were all of opinion that the statute of James was no bar. ferred to them; and it is not therefore within the language employed in the Act, namely, a charge incurred by them. To hold the contrary would be putting a harsh construction upon the words of the section, and lead to injustice to the plaintiffs. Are the six months, beyond which the defendant says the rate cannot be levied, to begin to run from the date of the order of transfer to the local board, or from the time of ascertaining the deficiency in the property? But in either way, to put the construction for which Mr. Smith contended would be to perpetrate an injustice that the Act could never have contemplated. Six months might not be sufficient time for ascertaining whether there were assets to meet the claim; then, inasmuch as it is plain that this proceeding cannot be sustained unless there is an ascertained deficiency, it would be driving the plaintiffs to proceed at their six months and might be utterly impossible. On the whole, I think that plea is bad. Then as to the fifteenth plea, is the plea of the Statute of Limitations an answer to this demand? The plea is general; it says that the alleged causes of action did not accrue within M. Smith, Q.C. in reply.-The current of the cases six years from the commencement of the suit; but and of legislation has been to prevent those who do there is no statute which limits the time within which not incur liabilities from being saddled with them. a party may seek his remedy by mandamus. Then as The 89th section says that "the local board of health to the declaration, I think the plaintiff has averred may make and levy the said special and general dis-everything necessary to enable him to obtain this retrict rates, or any or either of them, prospectively, in medy, and has shown sufficient to entitle him to a order to raise money for the payment of future charges mandamus. and expenses; or retrospectively, in order to raise money MARTIN, B.-I am of the same opinion, and I think for the payment of charges and expenses which may that to yield to Mr. Smith's argument would be to give have been incurred at any time within six months from a strained construction, and unsettle the natural the making of the rate.' The local board are placed meaning of the words used; and as to the sixteenth in the position of the commissioners. How is an plea, I think it is bad. With respect to the fifteenth amount of unliquidated damages to be ascertained ? plea, the Statute of Limitations, I am not aware that The work might be badly done, or there might be other there is any limitation of six years to a claim for the writ circumstances constituting a good defence. The new of mandamus. I must not be understood to say that if body are placed in the position of the old, with all their the debt had been barred, and that had been properly rights and liabilities, and the right of action is trans- pleaded, that it would not be a good plea; but here it ferred with other things. The maxim vigi antibus et non is not so pleaded, but only to the claim for the mandormientibus jura subveniunt applies; here the plain-damus. I think the judgment should be affirmed. tiffs have slept upon their rights, which is not permit- CROWDER, J.—Ï ain of the same opinion. ted; whereas in the present case the body upon whom [His Lordship read the 89th section of the Act the burden is to fall is a fluctuating one. In 1855 and the sixteenth plea.] The Court of Q.B. held that the this claim became a charge upon the rates, and an plaintiffs' claim was not a charge incurred by the local action might then have been, brought against the com-board, and it seems to me that it would be difficult to missioners, and the judgment would have been a new charge. The expression "charges and expenses incurred" cannot mean voluntary charges. The case of bonds, put by the other side, is not applicable. This is an implied contract, but every instalment on a bond would become a fresh charge. The case does not come within the Act, and no rate can lawfully be made to pay this debt. Southampton Bridge Company v. Local Board of Southampton, 8 E. & B. 801, was cited. WILLIAMS, J.-I am of opinion that the judgment of the Q. B. must be affirmed. The first question is, whether the sixteenth plea is a good answer, and whether the provision contained in the 89th section of the Public Health Act 1848 applies to such a charge as this. I am of opinion that it does not. The 16th plea says that the alleged cause of claim of the writ of mandamus did not accrue within six calendar months before the suit, and that the alleged debts and moneys, or any part thereof, were not, nor are, a charge or expense incurred by the local board of health at any time within six calendar months before the suit, or within six calendar months before the demand for the rate; wherefore the defendant, or the local board, cannot lawfully make a rate for payment thereof. Looking at the language of the Act, I do not think that the present demand is such a charge incurred by them within the meaning of that section. The It say when it could be a charge incurred by them within the meaning of the 89th section. Here, beyond all doubt, the charge was incurred by the commissioners under the local Act, and that charge was transferred to the local board. But when was it incurred? cannot be at the time of transfer, and can we say this is such a charge as is to be levied under the 89th section? Norate could be levied until a deficiency was ascertained. After the transfer of the debt to the local board, some period of time must elapse before the deficiency was ascertained. It must be either for the plaintiffs or for the defendant to ascertain it; but in either case the six months might elapse before it was ascertained. The contention that the statute could have intended such injustice cannot be supported. The sixteenth plea, therefore, is no answer. As to the fifteenth plea, looking at the pleadings, and that it is pleaded to the mandamus, I think it does not apply; and as to the point in arrest of judgment, I think that the declaration sets out all that is necessary to entitle the plaintiff to a mandamus, and that therefore the judgment of the court below ought to be affirmed. WILLES, J. concurred. CHANNELL, B.-I am of the same opinion. I adopt the arguments of the plaintiffs and the judgments of my learned brothers as to the fifteenth plea, and I think the construction put by Mr. Dowdeswell upon the 89th section was the correct one, and I think the judgment of the court below should be affirmed. BYLES, J.-I think that this declaration is good, and that the fifteenth plea is no answer to the claim for the mandamus. The 68th section of the C.L.P.A. 1854 provides a mode for enforcing a duty by mandamus and applies to all cases where a man has a duty to discharge; but that is not a proceeding to which the statute of James is applicable. On the whole, I am inclined to agree with the rest of the court, that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed. Judyment affirmed. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. [Q. B. the word "surgeon" simply to show what branches of the business of a dentist he carried on, and not to represent himself as a surgeon within the meaning of the Act; and, at all events, there was not sufficient evidence that he wilfully (as well as falsely) pretended to, or took, or used the name of a surgeon or other title implying that he was recognised by law as a surgeon. They thereupon disinissed the information, but, at the request of the appellant (Mr. Ladd), stated this case, and submitted three questions for the opinion of this court, which may be summed up in one-viz., whether, upon the evidence, Mr. Gould was guilty of the offence contemplated by the Act. Lush, Q.C. for the appellant.-This case raises the Reported by JOHN THOMPSON, T. W. SAUNDERS, and C. J. B. question whether the use of the word "surgeon" in connection with the words "and mechanical dentist," was a using of the title of a surgeon within the 40th section of the Medical Act. The question was whether on the evidence the party was guilty. CROMPTON, J.-That is a question on which the magistrates were bound to draw their own conclusion from the facts. COCKBURN, C. J.-I do not think there was any false pretence in using the name of a surgeon. CROMPTON, J.-The respondent has called himself 'surgeon and mechanical dentist," which he thought meant much the same as "surgeon-dentist." LADD (appellant) v. GOULD (respondent). Summary Proceedings (Justices) Act--Case-Matter of fact-Medical Practitioners Act. The Medical Practitioners Act (21 22 Vict. c. 90, s. 40) enacts that any person who shall wilfully and falsely pretend to be or take or use the name or title of (inter alia) surgeon, or any name, title, addition or description, implying that he is registered under the Act, or that he is recognised by law as (inter | " alia) a licentiate in medicine and surgery shall, upon a summary conviction, pay a sum not exceeding 201. It is a question of fact for magistrates to decide, and not one of law to be reserved for the opinion of this court, whether, by the use of the word " surgeon," cupled with " dentist," or "mechanical dentist," or 'chiropodist," or such like titles, and the other facts in each case, the party proceeded against is guilty of the offence created by the above enactment. Case stated by the magistrates at Kingston-uponThames for the opinion of this court. On the 11th Oct. last an information was laid before the magistrates at Kingston-upon-Thames against Frederick Gould, under the 40th section of the Medical Act (21 & 22 Vict. c. 90), for that he did, at his residence in Eden-street, Kingston, take and use the title of surgeon without legal qualification, he not being registered under the Medical Act; and that in that capacity he treated one Charlotte Tenniswood for a surgical complaint, and supplied her with medicine for the same, contrary to the form of the statute, for which said medicine he was paid, and for which said offence he had forfei ed a sum not exceeding 201 When the information was heard the prosecution was conducted by Mr. Ladd, the secretary of the London Medical Registration Society; and it was proved by the informant Charlotte Tenniswood, that on the 5th Aug. last she went to Gould's shop, and told him she had knocked her elbow, and that it caused a great numbness in her arm and fingers. Gould examined her arm, and said she had undoubtedly jarred the marrow of the bone, and gave her a liniment, for which she paid him 18. She said she noticed that he had " surgeon on the side of his door, and she believed him to be a surgeon, or she would not have gone to him; but she afterwards said that the word surgeon was followed by the words "and mechanical dentist." It was also proved that Gould's name, with the words "chemist and druggist," was on his shop front, and that the woman went to his shop, which was also a chemist's and druggist's, because, she said, she thought he would supply her with something cheaper than by going to a doctor's. She also stated that she had made no complaint to the registration society, but that, on the day after she had got the liniment, she consulted a surgeon, Mr. Ellis, and that he gave her a lotion and told her not to use the liniment. Mr. Ellis afterwards called upon her with a gentleman, and asked her name, and said they should want her as a witness. The magistrates were of opinion that Gould had used [MAG. C.] COCKBURN, C. J.-The magistrates were of opinion that the case was not within the Act, and I should have come to the same conclusion. CROMPTON, J.-I think there was evidence upon which the magistrates might have found either way, but the court will not find for them. Lush, Q.C.-The magistrates meant to leave to the court whether the evidence brought the party within the meaning of the Act. COCKBURN, C.J.-I do not think it does, but this is a question of fact. It is like the case of persons who call themselves "surgeon-dentists," who are known generally not to be surgeons, though some of them are. CROMPTON, J.-It is like the case of the " surgeonchiropodists." But it is a matter of fact for the magistrates. The statute gives power to put questions of law only to this court, not questions of fact. COCKBURN, CJ.-I do not think there was any falsehood, or any intention to deceive, which was necessary in order to bring the case within the Act. That was also the opinion of the magistrates, though they might have come to a different opinion. CROMPTON, J., said he thought there was evidence THE CHURCHWARDENS AND OVERSEERS OF THE The suspension of an order of removal must be made (a) This case must be understood as not deciding the question whether the use of the title of surgeon, &c. is prohi ited, but only that it was a question of fact for the justices, whether the title "surgeon" separated from the title dentist," by the word "mechanical" was a using of the title "surgeon" or a distinct title constituted of the whole description together. It appears to me that the justices were wrong in their interpretation of the term, but it was clearly a question of fact and not of law, and therefore not the subject of appeal. G Q. B.] THE CHURCHWARDENS, &C. OF LLANLLECHID . THE PARISH OFFICERS OF PISTYLL. [Q. B This was a case stated by the sessions for the opinion of this court upon an appeal. It appeared that on the 28th Sept. 1849 an order was made by justices for the removal of one Jane Jones. On the 26th Oct. following this order was suspended by reason of the pauper's sickness. On the 2nd Nov. 1858 an order was made for the payment of the expenses of the maintenance of the pauper under such suspended order. The appellants appealed against this order, and the sessions quashed it, subject to the present case. By sect. 2 of the 35 Geo. 3, c. 101, after reciting that, "whereas poor persons are often removed or passed to the place of their settlement during the time of their sickness, to the great danger of their lives," enacts, "that in case any poor person shall from henceforth be brought before any justice or justices of the peace for the purpose of being removed from the place where he or she is inhabiting or sojourning, by virtue of any order of removal, and it shall appear to the said justice or justices that such poor person is unable to travel by reason of sickness or other infirmity or that it would be dangerons for him or her so to do, the justice or justices making such order of removal are hereby authorised to suspend the execution of the same until they are satisfied that it may safely be executed without danger to any person who is the subject thereof, which suspension shall be indorsed on the said order of removal and signed by such justice or justices." Beavan appeared in support of the order of sessions, and argued that the sessions were right, for that the suspension of the order of removal was bad inasmuch as it was not made at the same time as the order of removal, which the 35 Geo. 3, c. 101, s. 2, requires; for although it is not absolutely necessary that the pauper should be present at the time when the order of removal is made, the suspension of it must take place at the time when the order of removal itself is made: (R. v. Everdon, 9 East, 101; 49 Geo. 3, c. 124, s. 1.) B. C. Robinson, contra, contended that the suspension of the order need not be made at the time of the making of the order of removal, and that the 35 Geo. 3, c. 101, s. 2, should have a liberal construction so as to meet such a case as the present, it being immaterial to the merits of the case whether the suspension takes place at the exact time of the making of the order of removal or some days after, and that it had already been held under this statute that the pauper need not be actually present when the order of removal is made, though the section in terms says, "in case any poor person shall from henceforth be brought before any justice," &c.: (Reg. v. Everdon, supra; Reg. v. Llanwinio, 4 T. R. 473.) COCKBURN, C. J.-I am of opinion that the order of sessions quashing the order for costs of maintenance is good. I am very desirous, if possible, by giving a liberal construction to this statute, to remedy the mischief which has arisen; but upon looking to the statute I think the second section applies to cases only where sickness is brought to the attention of the justices at the time of the making of the order of removal. [His Lordship here read the words of the second section.] I think, if the meaning of the Legislature was that such an order of su-pension might be made at a subsequent time, it would have spoken of the order of removal in the past, and not alone in the present tense, and would not merely have referred to sickness at the time of the making of the order, but of any subsequent sickness. The Legislature has not done so. I quite agree that the mischief in the one case may be quite as great as in the other, but we shall be straining the meaning of words, which acting judicially we ought not to do, it being for the Legislature alone to remedy the evil if it thinks fit. WIGHTMAN, J. thought that the court was at liberty to put a more liberal construction upon the section, and that, under the circumstances, the suspension of the order of removal was not illegal. CROMPTON, J.-I have looked anxiously to see if the Act could be so construed as to support this order of suspension; but, as I read the Act of Parliament, it seems to me that it only gives the justices the power of suspending the order if it appears to them, at the time of making the order of removal, that the party is too ill to be removed. I find no machinery giving the justices a new jurisdiction to make an order of suspension after the time of making the order of removal. Rex v. Everdon shows that we have a judicial power under the section; and Lord Ellenborough put a judicial exposition upon such a case, and held that it was sufficient if the case of the panper was brought judicially before the magistrates for the purpose of his removal, without his being actually present. I cannot see my way to say that the jurisdiction contended for is given by the statute. We must be careful not ourselves to legislate to remedy an evil. HILL, J.-I agree with my Lord and my brother Crompton that this order was bad. It is impossible, I think, to escape from the words of the statute, that the suspension must be made whilst the case of the pauper is before the justices. If there is any inconvenience in this, it is not for the court to supply the remedy. (a) Order of sessions confirmed. REG. v. FITCH. Metropolis Local Management Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120 -Lighting rate-Scale of rate-3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 90. By the Metropolis Local Management Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, the district board are directed, in their orders to the overseers to levy rates, to distinguish in cas s where the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 90 (Lighting Act) has been in force, and under which land is rated in respect of lighting at a less amount than houses; and by sect. 165 it is enacted that in any parish in which at the time of the passing of the 18 19 Vict. c. 120, the Act of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 90, is in force, "the owners and occupiers of houses, buildings and property other than land shall be rated to erery lighting rate made under this Act at a rate in the pound three times greater than that at which the occupiers of land shall be rated in such lighting rate.” Before the coming into operation of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, part only of the parish of Fulham was under the operation of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 90. After the passing of the said 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, the whole of the parish of Fulham was (with another parish) formed in a district, and that part of the parish of Fulham not before under the Held, that such part was not entitled to have its land Will. 4, c. 90, was assessed to a lighting-rate: assessed at a lower rate than its houses; but that all the assessable property should be assessed at one rate, and that the higher rate. & 4 Vict. c. 45, s. 11, upon two appeals against a rate This was a case stated by consent under the 12 & 13 made under the Metropolis Local Management Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), for lighting the parish of Fulham, and another rate, being a general rate made by the same authority. 66 the above Act, a portion of the parish of Fulham had (a) This case is important, and should cause the justices at the same time as they make the removal itself. to be very careful to make the suspended order of removal Q. B.] REG. v. FITCH-REG. v. THE INHABITANTS OF AYLESFORD-CATES v. SOUTH. Under the Metropolis Local Management Act the parish of Fulham and the parish of St. Peter and St. Paul, Hammersmith, were formed into a district called the "Fulham District." Under that statute the powers of the inspectors under the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 90, ceased. And by sect. 158 of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, powers are given to the district board to levy rates for the purp ses of the Act. That section enacts, "that the district board shall from time to time require the overseers of the several parishes in their district to levy the sums which the board may require for defraying the expenses of the execution of the Act, and the board are to distinguish in their orders sums required for sewers, and also where the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 90, or any other Act by virtue whereof land is rated in respect of expenses of lighting at a less amount in proportion to the annual value thereof than houses, or is wholly exempted from being rated to such expenses, is in force in any parish or any part of any parish at the time of the passing of this Act, distinguish, as regards such parish or part, the sum required for defraying expenses of lighting their parish or district from sums required for defraying other expenses of executing this Act." By the 165th section it is provided that in every parish or part of a parish in which at the time of the passing of this Act the Act of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 90, is in force," the owners and occupiers of houses, buildings and property other than land shall be rated to every lighting-rate made under this Act at a rate in the pound three times greater than that at which the owners and occupiers of land shall be rated in such lighting-rate," &c. It appeared that the board had duly rated the part of Fulham parish which had formerly been under the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 90, but that now that they had assessed the remainder of the parish to the lighting-rate they were in doubt as to the principle to be adopted, and it appeared that in fact they had assessed the whole of such part upon the lower scale, irrespective of its consisting of houses or land. This was now admitted to be erroneous, and that the rate must be amended; but it was contended, on the part of the occupiers of land only in that part of the parish not before under the operation of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 90, that the occupiers of land only were entitled to be rated at one-third only the amount at which the occupiers of houses were rated, and that they were entitled to the advantage of this lower rating under the provisions of sect. 165 of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, in the same way as though they had before been under the operation of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 90. Lush, Q.C. (Hance with him) for the district board. -Whilst he admitted that the present rate was erroneous in being made upon the lower scale and must be amended, he contended that, as the part of Fulham parish now first assessed to a lighting-rate was not before the coming into operation of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, under the 3 & 4 Will. c. 90, it was not within the operation of sect. 165 of the former Act, and therefore that land had no exemption to be rated to the lightingrate at a less rate than houses: (West Middlesex Waterworks Company v. The Wandsworth District Board of Works, 31 L. T. Rep. 162. Hawkins, Q.C. (Cleasby with him), contra, contended that the whole parish was now entitled to be rated to the lighting-rate upon the same principle, namely, that laid down in sect. 165 of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, as though the whole parish had formerly been lighted under the 3 & 4 Will. c. 90, and that land should be rated at three times less than houses. [Q. B. visions of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, and that the rate in respect of such other part of the parish should be uniform and upon the higher scale. The lighting-rate to be amended accordingly. Other points were argued which it is unnecessary to notice. REG. v. THE INHABITANTS OF AYLESFOrd. Police-rate-Lands held in ancient demesne. Lands held by tenants in ancient demesne are not exempt from being assessed to the county and police-rates. This was an appeal by the parish of Aylesford, Kent, against an assessment to the county police-rate. The sessions confirmed the rate, subject to a case. It appeared that all the lands in the parish of Aylesford were, in the time of William the First, ancient demesne, and were so entered in Domesday, under the title of "Terra regis." They were afterwards granted by the Crown to private individuals, and have remained in such possession since the reign of Queen Mary. The possessors have always paid poor-rates, but by virtue of the tenure of the lands have enjoyed certain privileges, such as being exempt from serving upon juries at the assizes and sessions. By the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 88, s. 2, the justices are, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the county police, to make a fair and equal police-rate, assessable on all messuages, lands, &c., liable to the county rate; and by the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 81, s. 2 (the County Rate Act), the justices are to appoint a committee for preparing a basis or standard for fair and equal county rates, such basis or standard to be founded and prepared rateably and equally according to the full and fair annual value of the property rateable to the relief of the poor in every parish, &c. M. Smith, Q.C. (Deeds with him) appeared in support of the order of sessions, but the court called upon Pickering, Q.C. (Denman with him) who argued that tenants in ancient demesne were, amongst other privileges, free from all taxes and tailage imposed by Parliament except expressly exempt: (12 Geo. 2, c. 39; 4 Mau. & Sel. 437; Scriven, 2 vol. 582; Comyn's Dig. tit. "Ancient Demesne," let. K; 1 Salk. 57; Fitz. Nat. Bre. Bridgman, 277; 4 Inst.) The COURT were of opinion that the claim to the exmeption was unsupported, and that tenants in ancient demesne were liable to be rated. Order affirmed. Saturday, Nov. 12. c. 49. CATES (appellant) v. SOUTH (respondent). Beerhouse-Saturday night-Sunday-11 & 12 Vict. On an information for opening a public-house for the sale of spirits before half-past twelve p.m. on Sunday, it appeared that the front door was open at twentytwo minutes past twelve on Sunday morning, and a policeman found in the commercial room four persons, one of whom was a traveller; there was a small quantity of spirits and water in a glass, from which one of the persons had been drinking. The landlady was sitting in the parlour. No spirits had been sold after twenty minutes before twelve o'clock on Saturday night: Held, that the fact of the house being open at twentytwo minutes past twelve on Sunday morning was no proof that it was open for the sale of beer, &c., before half-past twelve on Sunday afternoon, within 11 & 12 Vict. c. 49, and that the above stated facts did not warrant a conviction. This was a case stated under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. At a petty sessions of her Majesty's justices of the peace for the county of Essex, held at Great Dunmow in the said county, on the 4th July 1859, before us the Rev. Vicesimus Knox Child, clerk, and the Rev. Edward Francis Gepp, clerk, The COURT, however, were clearly of opinion that the exemption in the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 90, is kept alive only in those parts of the parish of Fulham to which it was formerly applied, and that the rest of the parish does not derive the same exemption under the pro- An information by Daniel South, a police-constable, |