C. CAS. R.]

REG. v. THOMAS GOSS-REG. v. JOSEPH Ragg.

[C. CAS. R.

The COURT said that they had no doubt about Reg. v. Abbott being a decision that they would act upon and sound in principle, but they desired the case of Reg. v. Joseph Ragg (being on the same subject), to be called on before giving judgment.

REG. v. JOSEPH RAGG.

for sale, for after the prisoner had bored the cheeses, | between indictable and non-indictable false repreand before he handed the tasters to the prosecutor, he sentations. took from his coat pocket pieces of cheese of better quality and description than those taken from the cheeses which he had bored, and privily and fraudulently put these pieces of cheese at and into the top of the scoop for the prosecutor to taste, and the cheese which the prosecutor did taste was not any portion of the six cheeses which the prisoner bored. The proseeator, at the time he bought the eight cheeses, believed that he had been tasting a portion of those cheeses, and in that belief bought them, and paid the prisoner the 34. 198. 6d. for them, which he would not have done unless he had believed that the tasters had been extracted from the cheeses which he so bought. The cheeses were delivered to the prosecutor, and he re-cutor. tained possession of them up to the trial.

The value of the eight cheeses would be about 3d. per lb.

The prisoner's counsel at the trial objected that there was no evidence to support the indictment, or of any facts which would constitute a false pretence within the

statute.

I left the case to the jury, and the prisoner was convicted; but having some doubt as to whether the case of Reg. v. Abbott, 1 Den. C. C. 273, had not been shaken by subsequent decisions (see Reg. v. Bryan 26 L. J. 84, M.C.), I reserved the case for the opinion of the Court of Appeal. JOHN H. BREWER.

No counsel was instructed to argue on behalf of the prosecution.

Joseph Ragg was tried before me at the General Quarter Sessions of the peace for the county of Leicester, held on the 3rd Jan. 1860, for obtaining money under false pretences from Henry Harris.

The indictment stated the pretence to be a false pretence as to the character and weight of a quantity of coals sold and delivered by the prisoner to the prose

It appeared in evidence as follows:-The prisoner was a coal dealer. On the 28th Nov. he called at the house of the prosecutor in Loughborough, with a load of coals in a cart, and inquired if he (the prosecutor) wanted to buy a load of "Forest" coal. The prosecutor replied that the coals did not look like Forest coal, because they looked so dull. The prisoner replied, "I assure you they are Forest coal, and the reason of their looking so dull is because they have been standing in the rain all night; there is 15 cwt. of them, for I paid for 14 cwt. at the coal-pits, and they gave me 1 cwt. in." On this the prosecutor bought the coal, and paid 78. 6d. for the load. The prisoner unloaded the cart, and packed the coals in the prosecutor's coal-place. When the prosecutor saw the coals in the coal-place, they appeared to be much too small a quantity to weigh 15 cwt., and he had them weighed, when it was found that they weighed 8 cwt. only.

The prisoner had at this time received his money and gone away, but the prosecutor went after him, challenging him with the fraud, and asking for redress. The prisoner, however, refused to make any, stating "that he did not make childish bargains, and that the prosecutor could not do anything to him, because he had not sold the coal by weight but by the load."

The prosecutor stated that he had bought the coal on the representation of the prisoner that there were 15 cwt., and the size of the cart and the appearance of the coal therein warranted the belief that there were 15 cwt.; but it turned out that the coal was loaded in a particular manner, technically known as "tunnelling ;" that is, the coal (which is in large lumps) is so built up in the cart that one lump rests on the edges of that below it, and large spaces are left between the lumps of coal, and thus there is an appearance of a greater quantity of coal than there actually is.

Merewether for the prisoner.-This case was reserved in consequence of the remarks of some of the judges upon the case of Reg. v. Abbott, 1 Den. C. C. 273; S.C. 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 430, which was decided upon the authority of Reg. v. Kenrick, 5 Q. B. 49. The facts in the present case are precisely the same as in Reg. v. Abbott; and unless that case can be impeached, this conviction must, no doubt, be upheld. In Reg. v. Roebuck, 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 126; S.C. 1 Dears. & B. C. C. 24, Lord Campbell, C.J. said: "If this were res integra, I should not agree with Reg. v. Abbott, because I think that there the intention of the prisoner was to obtain a better bargain, and not animo furandi; but that having been decided by ten judges, I do not wish on the present appeal to disturb it." So in Reg. v. Eagleton, 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 559; S.C. 1 Dears. & P. 515, the authority of Reg. v. Abbott and Keg. v. Kenrick was much disputed in the course of the argument; but the court said that it did not then become necessary to consider those cases. In Reg. v. Bryan, 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 312, the defendant, in order to obtain a loan on a quantity of plated spoons, represented to a pawnbroker that they were of the best quality, and were equal to Elkington's A (meaning spoons and forks made by Elkington, and stamped with the letter A); that the foundation was of the best material, and that they had as much silver upon them as Elkington's A. The jury found that these representations were wilfully false, and that by means of them the loan was obtained. Held (Willes, J. and Bramwell, B. dissentientibus) that the conviction was It further appeared that on the same day, and a very wrong, and that the representation being a mere exag-short time after the coal was sold to the prosecutor, geration or puffing of the quality of the goods in the course of a bargain, it was not a false pretence within the statute. In Reg. v. Sherwood, 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 270, the prisoner, after he had agreed with the prosecutor to sell and deliver a load of coals at a certain price per cwt., falsely and fraudulently pretended that the quantity which he had delivered was 18 cwt., and that it had been weighed at the colliery, and the weight put down by himself on a ticket which he produced, he knowing it to be 14 cwt. only, and thereby obtained an additional sum of money; and this was held to amount to a false pretence within the statute. In that case a difficulty was felt by the court in drawing the line

From further evidence, it appeared that the coal was not Forest coal at all, and had not been bought at the pits, but was Rutland coal, and bought that same morning at a wharf in the town of Loughborough: that the cart, when loaded at the wharf, had weighed 8 cwt. only, and although the prisoner stated that other coal had been added to it from another cart-load purchased at the same time from the wharf, there was no evidence of this produced at the trial.

the prisoner had offered the same load to another person as containing 13 cwt., but on looking at the cart it was evident that the coal was "tunnelled," and the prisoner was then and there challenged with the fact, and told that there was not above 8 cwt. in the cart, or 13 cwt. at the most.

The prisoner was not defended by counsel, and the jury found him guilty.

With respect to the false pretence as to the "character" of the coal, it appeared to me, on inquiring of the witnesses, that there was not much real difference in value between the Forest coal and the Rutland coal, and that the preference of one over the other

C. CAS. R.

REG. v. JOSEPH RAGG-Oram v. GAIT.

[Q. B.

was rather according to the idea of the customer, than | upon the sale of his goods. It is of great public imthe actual value of the article; and I should not have portance to endeavour to draw the line distinctly considered it a case of false pretences under the statute between false representations which are indictable and had this been the only misrepresentation; but I considered that the evidence showed, not merely a false statement as to the quantity, but a preconceived intention to defraud, and a mode of packing the coal, resorted to for the purpose of fraud, and that therefore the jury properly found the prisoner guilty.

those which are not. In the present case there was a false representation that an article was a genuine substance, and so passing off a counterfeit substance, and that was an indictable offence. My brother Willes, J., in Reg. v. Bryan, threw a great deal of light on the law as to false pretences, and though he On referring, however, to the case of Reg. v. differed from the majority of the judges in the decision, Sherwood, I found that some of the learned judges he did not differ from the principle of that decision, but who gave judgment therein had apparently drawn a only upon the application of that principle to the case. distinction between the case of a false representation The majority of the judges thought the representation made during the bargaining and that made after the there to be a matter of opinion only; my brother Willes sale was completed; and in the present case, as the thought it a representation of the substance, as if the false pretence was made in the course of the progress representation had been, there is as much silver in the of a sale," I did not feel justified in sentencing the spoons as in Elkington's A, and in his judgment it was prisoner until the subject had come under the consider- the false representation of a definite fact. We are ation of the judges. I therefore postponed the sen- therefore of opinion that this conviction must be tence, and directed that the prisoner might be liberated affirmed. on bail to appear and receive sentence at the next Easter sessions.

HY. J. HOSKINS, Deputy Chairman. No counsel were instructed either for the prosecutor or prisoner.

ERLE, C.J.-We are of opinion that the conviction in each case was right. With reference to the case of Joseph Ragg, there was a false representation that the quantity of coals was 15 cwt., whereas only about 8 cwt. were delivered, and there was a pretence of a delivery of 7 cwt., no part of which had been delivered. This falls within the class of cases of false representations as to the quantity of goods delivered, the principle of which is a false pretence of a definite fact cognisable by the senses, which is an indictable offence within the statute. With regard to the case of Thomas Goss, there was also a false pretence of a definite fact within the cognisance of the senses; for by a sample of an entirely different cheese which he falsely represented as a sample of the cheese to be sold, he procured the purchaser to buy the inferior cheese, and part with his money. That was a false pretence as to the substance of the article for sale, whereby the prisoner was enabled to pass off a counterfeit article. In Reg. v. Roebuck, 1 Lears. & B. 24; S. C. 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 126, it was held that falsely representing to a pawnbroker that a chain is silver, the prisoner knowing it to be a base metal, is indictable. So here the drawing from the prisoner's pocket dishonestly samples from another cheese, and not the cheese intended for sale, which was a totally different substance, and falsely pretending to the purchaser that those samples were part of the substance which he was to buy, that is equally an indictable offence within the statute, and falls within the class of cases to which belong Reg. v. Abbott, where the substance of the purchase was a cheese of the identical character with the taster; and Reg.v. Dundas, 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 380, where the article sold was falsely pretended to be Everett's blacking, which was a known article in the neighbourhood, whereas in fact the article sold was a totally different thing. In the case of Reg. v. Bryan, the case of the plated spoons represented as equal to Elkington's A, having as much silver and foundations of the best material, the judge, who constituted the majority decided that case on a very sound distinction, for there the representation was matter of undefined opinion, and not within the limit of indictable offences. A great deal of dissatisfaction has been expressed with that decision, as if it must operate as an encouragement to falsehood and fraud, and lead to a great deal of mischief; but it should be recollected what an extreme calamity it is to a respectable man to have to stand his trial at a criminal bar as a cheat upon an indictment at the instance of a dissatisfied purchaser, and this he might be liable to for merely using an imaginative style of address

WIGHTMAN, J.—I am of the same opinion. I would merely add, with reference to the cheese cases and Elkin_ton's case, one observation. If the prisoner had said that the cheeses were equal to the tasters produced, that would have fallen within the Elkington's spoon case; but he said to the prosecutor, "These tasters are a part of the very cheeses I propose to sell to you;" and therefore it was a representation of a definite fact. The rest of the Court concurring,

Convictions affirmed. (a)

(a) There is no part of the criminal law so difficult to determine as the precise point at which a false representation becomes criminal, and consequently indictable. Judges and authors have alike failed to frame a precise and clear definition of the offence. It is certain that all false representations made by the seller are not criminal, for if it were exaggeration is criminal, as for instance, where a quack deso, every puff would be indictable. No amount of mere clares that his medicine will cure all diseases, or the tailor that his clothes are the best cloth and fit. But a false representation of a fact seems to be indictable, as where a chain is represented as gold, when it is not gold, or as in the above case, the cheese given to taste is represented to be part of the cheese sold, when it is not so. This definition, however, is not quite perfect, for in Reg v. Bryan, 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 312, a false representation that silver was equal to Elkington's A. was held not to be indictable, the assigned reason being that it was a mere misrepresentation of quality, and not of a fact, and it may be concluded that if the representation might have been sustained. had been that the silver was Elkington's A. the indictment

However, as the decisions now stand, the safest rule for magistrates to observe will be to treat as criminal only a false representation by a seller of goods as to some fact not for them to bear in mind that in all charges of false pretence touching their mere quality. And it is also very important there must be, not only an actual false pretence, but that it must have been known to the prisoner to be such, and that it must have been used with intent to defraud-that intent being of the essence of the crime. Consequently the proofs to be required in all such cases are of

First, the pretence itself, which may be either by words, or by acts equivalent to words.

false in fact.
Secondly, proof by the prosecution that the pretence was

Thirdly, that it was by reason of that particular false pretence that the prisoner obtained the property. this intent may be gleaned from all the circumstances of the case.

Fourthly, that he resorted to it with intent to defraud, and

Q. B.]

THE GOVERNOR, &c., OF THE NEW RIVER v. SARAH HANKIN JOHNSON.

[Q. B.

c. 43, upon a conviction of a tollgate-keeper for taking | works in and near the town of Hertford, and for other illegal toll.

By sect. 32 of the 3 Geo. 4, c. 126 (the General Turnpike Act), it is enacted "that no toll shall be demanded or taken by virtue of this or any other Act of Parliament on any turnpike-road for any horse, beast, or other cattle or carriage employed in carrying or conveying on the same day any hay, straw, fodder for cattle and corn in the straw which has grown or arisen on land or ground in the occupation of the owner of any such hay, straw, fodder, or corn in the straw, potatoes, or other agricultural produce," &c.

The respondent in this case had passed through a turnpike-gate in the city of Wells, driving a horse and cart laden with cans of milk. The appellant, who was the gatekeeper, claimed and took a toll for such horse and cart, whereupon the respondent summoned him before the magistrates of Wells for taking an illegal toll, the milk being, as he contended, "agricultural produce" within the exemption above stated. The magistrates being of this opinion, convicted the appel

lant.

No one appeared for the respondent.

F. Edwards, for the appellant, contended that milk does not come within the exemption in sect. 32 of the 3 Gen. 4, c. 126, and that the gatekeeper was right in demanding the toll, and that the justices were wrong in convicting him. (He was stopped by the court.)

COCKBURN, C.J.-You need not further argue the case; we are all with you upon the question. The section enumerates certain things, as hay, straw, &c., followed by the general words of, "or other agricultural produce." These latter words must be confined to things ejusdem generis with those which have preceded them. The conviction cannot be sustained. WIGHTMAN, J.-If the construction put upon this section by the magistrates could be upheld, it would exempt carts laden with meat.

CROMPTON and HILL, JJ. concurred.

Conviction quashed (a).
Wednesday, Jan. 18.

purposes" (17 & 18 Vict.), and the Acts incorporated
therein, empowered to construct certain sewers, drains
and other works, in and near the town of Hertford, and
that in doing so they drained the spring of a certain
well, belonging to a messuage and premises of the re-
spondent, in consequence of which she was obliged con-
siderably to deepen her said well, and do other works
attending the same to obtain a proper supply of water,
and in so doing had incurred the expense of 21. 168. 7d.
In the said local Act was incorporated the Water-
works Clauses Act 1847 (10 Vict. c. 17), the 12th
section of which enables the company to make (inter
alia) drains, cuts, &c., "provided always, that in the
exercise of the said powers the undertakers shall do as
little damage as can be,
and shall make full
compensation to all parties interested, for all damage
sustained by them through the exercise of such powers."
It appeared by the evidence that the company for the
purposes of their Act opened the public road in front of
the respondent's house, and that as soon as the ground
was dug out to form the sewer the water in the re-
spondent's well became less in quantity, and that the
diminishing continued till the well became quite dry.

This case was part argued on the 16th Nov. last, by Woollett for the respondent and Bovill, Q.C. for the appellants, when its further argument was postponed till the present term; but the court being now differently constituted, it desired Woollett again to state his argument.

Woollett (Foster with him) now again argued for the respondent, that the order of justices was perfectly good, and that the company were liable under the 12th section of the Waterworks Act (incorporated in the local Act) to make compensation for the damage sustained by the respondent. He contended that the company were liable, first, for interrupting the water in its access to the well; and secondly, for drawing it from the well after it had found its way there. He endeavoured to distinguish this case from Chasemore v. Richards, 33 L. T. Rep. 350, and Acton v. Blundell, 18 L. J. 280, Ex. He also cited The London and North-Western Railway Company v. Bradley, 6 Rail. Cas. 151; Staunton v. Woolrych, 26 L. J. 303, Ch.

Bovill, Q.C. (Bushley with him) was not called

upon.

THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE NEW RIVER (Appellants), AND SARAH HANKIN JOHNSON, (Respondent). Waterworks Clauses Act 1847 (10 Vict. c. 17)— COCKBURN, C. J.-I think this order must be Compensation for damage. quashed. The recent decisions fully establish what The Waterworks Clauses Act 1847 enables the under- is the correct view we are to take of Acts of Partakers to make drains, &c., and provides that in the liament when they give compulsory powers to interexercise of their po vers they shall make full compen- fere with the rights of property and provide for comsation to all parties interested for all damage sus-pensation, namely, that a party shall not be damnified tained by them through the exercise of such powers. This proviso, however, does not give a right to compensation in any case where but for the statute a right of action would not exist.

by having his right of action taken away, and that therefore, unless the company are doing something which but for the compulsory powers they could not do, they shall not be liable to make compenThe respondent was possessed of a well, and the com-sation. The question, therefore, heres, whether pany by making a drain drew off the water which percolated into the well, and by the same means drew it off by percolation after it had found its way

into the well: Held that, as no action could be maintained for this injury, so no compensation could be claimed for it

under the statute.

This was an appeal under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, against an order of the magistrates of the borough of Hertford, made upon the New River Company, for the payment by the appellants to the respondent of the sum of 21. 16s. 7d. and costs.

It appeared that the company were, in and by their local Act, entitled "An Act to enable the New River Company to construct certain sewers, drains and other

(a) This case is important, as defining what agricultural produce is exempt from tolls. It must be ejusdem generis, with "hay, straw, fodder, corn, &c.," in the way to be used by the farmer, not being carted away for sale.

the company have interfered with the rights of the respondent in such a way as would give a right of action? Mr. Woollett says that they have interfered with the water in its coming to the well, and that they have drawn it away after it has got there. Now, as regards the first injury, Chasemre v. Richards is an authority to show that the abstraction of water percolating through the earth is not a cause of action, and so in this case the abstraction would not give a right of action, and therefore there should be no compensation under the statute. Then as to abstracting the water after it has got to the well, Acton v. Blundell is an authority to show that no action will lie for that. It would be a very great pity to throw any doubt upon the proper construction of such clauses under these Acts of Parliament. Where there could be no right of action, it would be very mischievous to hold that any right to compensation is given by statute, unless upon the clearest language.

Q. B.]

THE MAYOR, &C. OF STOCKPORT v. CHEETHAM-SAME v. Davenport.

[Q. B.

WIGHTMAN, CROMPTON and BLACKBURN, JJ. con- | shown at the time of the service of the said notice, and Order quashed without costs. (a)

curred.

Nov. 15 and Jan. 26.

THE MAYOR, &c., OF STOCKPORT v. CHEETHAM.
SAME v. DAVENPORT.

Local Improvement Acts, 7 Geo. 4, c. cxviii. ss. 71,
73-1 Vict. c. cxxix ss. 107, 108, 109, 115-Con-
struction.

To an action by commissioners acting under a cal
Improvement Act against the owners, &c., of build
ings, to recover the expenses incurred in paving
flagging, soughing, cleansing, and completing a cer-
tain street, the defendant pleaded that the said street
was a public street and common highway, repair-
able and repaired by the inhabitants at large as a
common highway:
Held, on demurrer (with reference to the several local
Acts), a bad plea.

charges and expenses to be paid by the said owners respectively, according to the said Act, were afterwards ascertained by the said commissioners, and the defendant's equal share and proportion of the said charges and expenses to be paid by him and calculated according to the said Act, and ascertained as aforesaid, amounted in the whole to a large sum of money, to wit, 271. 88. 8d.; and the defendant had notice of the premises. And the defendant, although required by the said commissioners to pay the same, has refused and still refuses so to do, and the said commissioners are still unpaid and not reimbursed the same. And the said commissioners have done all things, and al things have happened and exist, to entitle the said commissioners to have payment made to them of the said sum.

with such materials, sewers, soughs, gutters, sinks, drains and watercourses, as the said commissioners in the said notice directed, and the said commissioners did by the said notice give the defendant and others, the said owners and occupiers, notice, that in case they neglected or refused, for the space of six calendar months after the said notice, to level, pave, flag, drain, sough, cleanse, repair, amend and otherwise complete and put the said street into good order and condition, and with such materials, sewers, soughs, gutters, sinks, drains and watercourses as aforesaid, pursuant to the said notice, that then and in such case the said commissioners would cause the same to be done, and recover the costs, charges and expenses thereof, in case of refusal to pay the same, in such manner as in the said Act is mentioned; and the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant and other the said owners neglected and refused, for the space of six calendar months next after These were actions brought by the mayor and cor- the said notice, to pave the said street, and with such poration of Stockport, as commissioners under an Act materials as aforesaid, pursuant to the said notice; and for improving and regulating the borough. The de- thereupon afterwards the said commissioners caused the clarations stated that, after the passing of the said Act, levelling, paving, flagging, draining, soughing, repairdivers streets within the said borough, and amongst ing and amending of the same, to be done according others a street called York-street, were respectively to the said Act, and the charges and expenses of and laid out, but were not paved, flagged, soughed, cleansed, attending their doing the same amounted in the whole completed, and put into good order and condition into a large sum of money, and the proportions of such such manner and with such materials and with such drains as were to the satisfaction of the said commissioners appointed for putting the said Act, and the several powers therein contained, into execution, and the same respectively for and during all the times hereinafter mentioned had buildings, tenements, yards and inclosed places other than such as were used only as arable, meadow, or pasture land at the respective sides thereof, to the extent of one-half part of the whole length of the said streets respectively, and exclusive of streets. squares, places, lanes, roads, paths, ways, courts, and other public passages and entries leading into, out of, or across the same; and the defendant was the owner of a house, building, ground, and land within the said street called York-street, and divers other persons were also owners of houses, buildings, ground, and land within and adjoining that street; and that street continuing not levelled, flagged, Seventh plea. That the said street, called Yorksoughed, drained, completed, and put into good order street, was before and at the times of the giving or and condition as aforesaid, the said commissioners leaving of the said notices, and thence hitherto has deeming it just, necessary and proper to cause the same been, and still is, a public street and common highway to be levelled, flagged, soughed, drained, cleansed, re-epairable and which theretofore had been repaired paired, amended, completed, and put, inclusive of streets, squares, places, lanes, roads, paths, ways, courts, and other public passages and entries leading into, out of, over, or across the said street, into good order and condition, and having power and authority to do so under and by virtue of the said Act, did cause their clerk to give and leave notice in writing to and with the defendant and each and every other of the owners and occupiers of the buildings, lands, grounds, and hereditaments within and adjoining to the said street, called York-street, so to be levelled, paved, flagged, drained, soughed, cleansed, repaired, amended, completed, and put into good order and condition as aforesaid, requiring the defendant and other such owners, and each of them collectively, to level, pave, flag, drain, sugh, cleanse, repair, ainend, complete and put the said street, inclusive of all streets, square, places, lanes, roads, paths, ways, courts and other public passages and entries leading into, out of, over, or across the same street, into good order and condition, in such manner and according to a certain plan produced and

(a) This is in accordance with a recent series of decisions that have determined that there is no property in water percolating through the earth to a well by no defined channel, and that it may be abstracted by digging elsewhere; so also that when water has entered the well it may be abstracted by percolation by another well.

There were also counts for money payable and for money paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant's use.

and kept in repair, and during all the times aforesaid ought to have been, and still ought, to be repaired and kept in repair, when and as often as necessary, by the inhabitants at large of a certain district or division within which the same was and is situate, and the inhabitants of which district or division, from time whereof the memory of man is not to the contrary, have been used and accustomed to repair and amend, and during all the times aforesaid ought to have repaired and amended, and still ought to repair and amend, when and as often as necessary, all common highways situate within the said district or division, and which otherwise would be repairable by the parish at 1 rge.

Demurrer and joinder in demurrer.

Collier, Q.C. (Welsby with him), for the plaintiff, contended, first, that the fact of York-street being a common highway repairable by the inhabitants at large of a certain district or division, does not exclude the jurisdiction of the commissioners or discharge the defendant from liability to pay the expenses sued for. Secondly, that York-street is a street within the meaning of the "Act for improving and regulating the borough of Stockport in the several counties of Chester and Lancaster: " (1 Vict. c. exxix.) Thirdly, that the expenses sued for were incurred in respect of matters and works within the jurisdiction of the commis

THE MAYOR, &c. OF STOCKPORT v. CHEETHAM-SAME v. Davenport.

sioners, and which the inhabitants at large of the I was made to the preamble of the statute to enforce said district or division were not liable to do or perform. that view. The statute is for improving the borough Fourthly, that the persons liable to the said expenses are the owners of the houses, buildings, ground or land within or adjoining the said street.