libel, averred that the plaintiff carried on the business of a carpenter, builder, and surveyor, and had been appointed the surveyor, agent, and steward of a certain company or society of persons called "The New England Company;" and that the defendant published, concerning him, and concerning his said employment by the said company, and concerning him in his said trade of carpenter, builder, and surveyor, &c., in a letter to one J. G., he the said J. G. then and there being the treasurer of the said company, a certain libel, &c. It appeared, that the company in question was a corporation, and that its name was "The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England and parts adjacent, in America.". Held, that this mis-description of the company was not, under the circumstances, any ground of nonsuit. Rutherford v. Evans, 74 4. It is no objection, that a part only of one sentence in a letter is inserted in a count for libel, if it appear that enough is set out to comprise the substance of the charge made by the defendant against the plaintiff. Ibid. 5. In an action of slander, the plaintiff, in shewing special damage, must confine his proof to the evidence of persons who received the slanderous statements from the defendant himself. Ibid. 6. In an information for a libel, imputing improper conduct to A., as Town-clerk of H., it was alleged that he was Town-clerk, and that it was his duty to issue his precept for summoning the Grand Jury. The precept was signed both by the Mayor and Town-clerk:-Held, that this satisfied the allegation, that he issued his precept, and that the fact that he was an Alderman of the borough at the time when he was elected Townclerk, made no difference. Rex v. Hatfield, 244 7. Though a letter, written confi dentially by the correspondents of a foreign mercantile house, contain very strong expressions concerning third persons engaged in mercantile transactions, imputing to such persons "notoriety for every thing but fair dealing and a strict adherence to their engagements:" yet, semble, that those expressions will not, per se, take away the privilege which attaches to such a communication, and make the letter a libel. Ward v. Smith, 302 8. The Court of King's Bench will not grant a habeas corpus to discharge out of custody a person who has been convicted of libel, at the commission of oyer and terminer at the Old Bailey, on the ground, that when the verdict was returned only one Commissioner was present instead of two, as required by law. But quære, whether such a circumstance may not be assigned as error. Rex v. Carlile, 415 N. B. It was afterwards held in K. B. that it could not. 9. If the surveyor to a society which publishes an account of the different classes of ships, for the information of merchants, underwriters, &c., is requested by a ship owner to survey his ship, and does so in consequence, and makes a report to the society, who class the vessel according to his report, such ship owner cannot maintain an action against the members of the society for a libel in misdescribing the ship; nor against the surveyor, unless he made a false report. And quære, whether such an action is maintainable at all without evidence of express malice? Kerr v. Shedden, 528 10. Form of declaration in the case of Humphreys v. Miller, 7 LIEN. See BANKRUPT, 6.-TROVER, 2, 3.LANDLORD AND TENANT, 7. LIGHTS, ANCIENT. See JUDGMENT RECOVERED, 1. 638 LIMITATIONS, STAT. OF LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See ADMINISTRAtor, 1. 1. A payment of interest within six years by one of the makers of a joint and several promissory note more than six years old, will take the case out of the statute of limitations, as against the other maker of the note; and the statute 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, has not altered the law in this respect. An item of interest in an account of which the party paid the balance, is a sufficient payment of interest. Chippendale v. Thurston, 98 2. In assumpsit on a bill of exchange, to which the statute of limi. tations was pleaded, two letters were given in evidence to take the case out of the statute. They were written by the defendant to a third person; the first of them stated that he should be much obliged to the plaintiff to withdraw his outlawry, and added, that, as soon as his situation would allow, the plaintiff's claim, with others, should receive that attention that, as an honourable man, he considered them to deserve. The second letter expressed his readiness to do any thing to satisfy the plaintiff and all his credi tors. No evidence was given of any proceeding to outlawry having been taken with respect to the debt the plaintiff sought to recover. It was held, at Nisi Prius (the trial being since the 9 Geo. 4, c. 14), that, under these circumstances, the letters were not sufficiently connected with that debt to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict, and he was nonsuited; but leave was given for a motion to set aside the nonsuit. On application afterwards to the Court of Common Pleas, the nonsuit was confirmed, a rule nisi for setting it aside being refused. Fearn v. Lewis, 173 3. A letter sent by a debtor to a creditor respecting a debt, which contains, in the introductory part, these words," which is not to be used in prejudice of my rights now, or in MALICIOUS ARREST. any future arrangement that may be made or instituted," cannot be given in evidence in an action for the debt, for the purpose of taking the case out of the statute of limitations. Cory v. Bretton, 462 4. A., having become bankrupt in August, 1819, wrote, in November, 1826, a letter to B., in which he spoke of a debt of 981. 15s., due from him to B., and said, inter alia, as follows: "By the end of next month I shall have banker's account here, and I my shall remit the sum due to you in a draft on them:"-Held, in indebitatus assumpsit by B. against A. for the sum mentioned, that the letter contained a sufficient promise to answer a plea of the statute of limitations, and a plea of bankruptcy; and also, that to render the plea of bankruptcy applicable to the case, it must be shewn that the debt existed prior to the bankruptcy. Lang v. Mackenzie, 463 LUNATIC. 1. A medical man is not warranted, merely on statements made by the relations of a person supposed to be insane, in sending men to take him into custody and confine him, unless he is satisfied, from those statements, that such a step is necessary, to prevent some immediate injury from being done by the individual, either to himself or to other persons; and, if access cannot be had for the purpose of examination, application should be made to the Lord Chancellor, that the party may be taken under his authority. Anderdon v. Burrows, 210 MALICIOUS ARREST. In an action for arresting a party and holding him to bail, without reasonable or probable cause; whatever was admissible in evidence to defeat the action on which the arrest took place is also admissible on the question of the right of the party ar See CORONER. EVIDENCE, 4, 17. 1. A person acting as a medical man, whether licensed or unlicensed, is not criminally responsible for the death of a patient, occasioned by his treatment, unless his conduct is characterized either by gross ignorance of his art, or gross inattention to his patient's safety. Rex v. Long, 398 2. On an indictment for manslaughter, where the death is occasioned by the application of a lotion to the skin, evidence may be given of the effect of the lotion when applied to other patients. Ibid. 3. Where a person, undertaking the cure of a disease, (whether he has received a medical education or not), is guilty of gross negligence in attending his patient after he has applied a remedy, or of gross rashness in the application of it, and death ensues in consequence of either, he is MASTER AND SERVANT. See APOTHECARY, 1, 2, 4, 5.-INFANT, 2, 3, 4, 5. 1. If a servant has left his service for a considerable time, the presumption is, that all his wages have been paid. It seems that a master is not bound to provide a menial servant with medical attendance and medicines during sickness; but if a servant fall ill, and the master call in his own medical man to attend such servant, the master will not be allowed to deduct the charge for such medical attendance out of the servant's wages, unless there be a special contract between the master and servant that he should do so. Sellen v. Norman, 80 3. Semble, that a person dismissed under such circumstances is not entitled to wages even for the time during which he has served. Ibid. 4. To justify a master in dismissing a yearly servant before the expiration of the year, there must be, on the part of the servant, either moral misconduct, pecuniary or otherwise, wilful disobedience, or habitual neglect. Callo v. Brouncker, 518 MONEY HAD & RECEIVED. See APOTHECARY, 1.-ATTORNEY, 4. See Regula Generalis. MONEY LENT. See Regula Gereralis. MONEY PAID. See Regula Generalis. 607 607 607 against it; nor, if the accident could have been avoided, but for the negligence of the plaintiff's own men in not being on board his barge at a time when it was lying in a dangerous place. Lack v. Seward, 106 2. Where notice was given to the occupier of adjoining premises, of an intention to pull down and remove the foundations of a building, on part of the footing of one of the walls of which one of the walls of such adjoining premises rested:-It was held, that the party giving the notice was only bound to use reasonable and ordinary care in the work, and was not bound in any other way to secure the adjoining premises from injury, although, from the peculiar nature of the soil, he was compelled to lay the foundation of his new building several feet deeper than that of the old. Massey v. Goyder, 161 3. A tradesman, who has a cellar opening upon the public street, is bound, when he uses it, to take reasonable care that the flap of it is so placed and secured, as that, under ordinary circumstances, it shall not fall down; but if the tradesman has so placed and secured it, and a wrongdoer throws it over, the tradesman will not be liable in damages for any injury occasioned by it. Daniels v. Potter, 262 4. In an action for an injury to the person, occasioned by the negligent and careless placing of such flap, the declaration of one defendant, who has suffered judgment by default, cannot be used as evidence against the other defendants. Ibid. 5. A publican, who has a flap-door in the foot pavement of the street, opening into a cellar underneath his house, is bound, when he uses it, to conduct his business with such a degree of care as will prevent a reasonable person, acting with an ordinary degree of care, from receiving any injury by it. Proctor v. Harris, 337 6. In an action on the case against stage coach proprietors for an injury done by the mismanagement of the coach, whereby a person was struck by the luggage on the coach; the guard of the coach is not a competent witness for the defendants, without a release; but a release given by one of the defendants is sufficient. 383 Whitamore v. Waterhouse, 7. Semble, that in such an action the proprietors and the coachman may be Ibid. sued jointly. 8. If the carriage of A. strike against the cart of B., and a person who sees it demand the address of the owner of the carriage, the address given by a person in the carriage is admissible in evidence; but a statement by the latter, that any damage done will be paid for is not so. Beamon v. Ellice, 585 9. In an action for negligent driving, a plan, which is to be put into the hands of the witnesses, should merely shew the street, the pavement, the turnings, corners, &c., and not the supposed position of the carriages; but, if it does so, the Judge will not allow it to be used. Ibid. 10. If one, being the owner of a shop and goods, allow A. to be at this shop, and, in his own name, to sell and dispose of the goods as he pleases, and a portion of these goods be destroyed by the negligent driving of the coachman of B. while the servant of A. is carrying them-A. has such a qualified property in these goods as will entitle him to maintain an action on the case against B. Whittingham v. Bloxham, 597 11. In an action for the negligent driving of the defendant's coach, the plaintiff gave evidence of the goods destroyed being in the possession of his servant. The witness who proved this was cross-examined, with a view of shewing the goods to be the property of P., and the defendant called witnesses to prove them the See BILL OF EXCHANGE, 7. 1. If A. and B., being partners, dissolve their partnership, and in the deed of dissolution it be stipulated that A. shall receive all debts due to the firm, and afterwards C., a debtor of the firm, accept a bill of exchange drawn by B. for the amount of the debt due to the firm:-Held, that this stipulation in the deed of dissolution is no defence to an action by B. against C. on this bill of exchange. King v. Smith, 108 2. Either partner, after a dissolution of partnership, may receive debts due to the firm, notwithstanding such a stipulation in the deed of dissolution; and, after a dissolution of partnership, either partner may give a release to a debtor of the firm. PATENT. Ibid. 1. A party took out a patent for an improved shearing machine, to shear woollen cloths, and claimed four things as his invention: one of them was, a proper substance to brush the cloth. In describing the machine in the specification, he directed plush to be used for this purpose, but he nowhere stated that this was an essential part of his machine. Before the time of this party's invention, some |