CHAPTER VI.

1853-1856.

BRITISH ENLISTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES-RECALL OF THE ENGLISH MINISTER AT WASHINGTON-THE OSTEND CONFERENCE.

TW

WO topics entirely unexpected by Mr. Buchanan when he accepted the mission to England must here claim some attention. The first relates to an occurrence which brought upon the United States the necessity of demanding a recall of the British minister who then represented the queen's government at Washington. This was Mr. John F. Crampton, a wellmeaning and amiable gentleman, who had long resided in this country as secretary of the British legation, and had been made minister some time previously, but whose zeal in the service of his government had led him into a distinct violation of our neutrality in the war between England and Russia. It is altogether probable that in his efforts to promote enlistments of men to serve in that war, Mr. Crampton did not keep within the letter of his instructions. It was, at all events, somewhat difficult, for a good while, to convince Lord Clarendon that Mr. Crampton was personally implicated in the unlawful acts which were undoubtedly done. But there was but one course for the American government to pursue. The history of this affair is somewhat curious.

When in April, 1854, Mr. Marcy had occasion to acknowledge the receipt from Mr. Crampton of a note stating the new rule that would be observed by Great Britain, in the war with Russia, towards neutrals, after expressing his gratification, and, at the same time, saying that the United States would have been still more gratified if the rule that "free ships make free goods" had been extended to all future wars to which Great Britain should be a party, he took the precaution to remind Mr. Crampton in courteous terms of the severe restrictions

imposed by our laws against equipping privateers, receiving commissions, or enlisting men within our territories to take any part in a foreign war. Lord Clarendon, too, at a later period (April 12, 1855), wrote to Mr. Crampton that "the law of the United States, with respect to enlistment, however conducted, is not only very just but very stringent, according to the report which is enclosed in your despatch, and her Majesty's government would on no account run any risk of infringing this law of the United States."* For a time, Mr. Crampton acted cautiously, but in the course of the summer of 1855, Mr. Marcy received evidence which convinced him that the British minister was personally implicated in carrying out arrangements for sending men to Nova Scotia, under contracts made in the United States to enlist as soldiers in the British army after their arrival in Halifax; and that the means for sending them had been supplied by him and other British functionaries. Mr. Buchanan was first instructed to bring this matter to the attention of Lord Clarendon, before Mr. Crampton's direct agency in it had become known to our Government. His letter of July 6, 1855, to Lord Clarendon, was a forcible presentation of the grounds on which the United States complained of such doings as an infraction of their laws and a violation of their sovereignty. A long correspondence ensued, which was conducted at times with some approach to acrimony, but which never actually transcended the limits of diplomatic courtesy. At length the proofs that Mr. Crampton was a party to this unlawful proceeding became so forcible that the British government yielded to the request that he might be recalled, and he was transferred to another diplomatic post. The whole affair was attended at one time with serious risk of an interruption in the friendly relations of the two countries. Mr. Marcy's course in the correspondence was greatly tempered in its tone by the advice which he received from Mr. Buchanan, although the hazard of an unfortunate issue of the trouble was much enhanced by the sending of an unusual naval force to the coasts of the United States, which the British government ordered while this affair was pending, but without any special reference to it.

* A copy of this note was delivered to Mr. Marcy in the course of the month of May, 1855.

The so-called "Ostend Conference," which at the time it occurred made a great deal of noise, and in which Mr. Buchanan was directed by his Government to participate, requires but a brief explanation. It was not a meeting in any sense suggested by him, nor was there anything connected with it which should have given rise to alarm. When in the summer of 1856 he had become the nominee of the Democratic party for the Presidency, as is usual on such occasions, biographical sketches of his public and private character were prepared and circulated. Among them was a small volume in duodecimo form of 118 pages, written with far greater ability and precision than was common in such ephemeral publications intended for electioneering purposes. Its account of the whole matter of the "Ostend Conference" is so exact and lucid that I do not hesitate to quote it as a true history of that proceeding :*

THE OSTEND CIRCULAR.

It is the rare good fortune of Mr. Buchanan to have sustained a long career of public life with such singular discretion, integrity, and ability, that now, when he is presented by the great national party of the country as their candidate for the highest dignity in the Republic, nothing is seriously urged by political hostility in extenuation of his merit, save the alleged countenance to filibuster enterprise and cupidity, inferred by his enemies from a strained interpretation of the recommendations and views of the Ostend Conference. The political opponents of Mr. Buchanan call upon his supporters to vindicate the claim they assert in behalf of Mr. Buchanan to conservatism, by reconciling that assumption with his participation in the American Diplomatic Conference at Ostend and Aix la Chapelle, and with his adoption and endorsement, jointly with the ministers of the United States to France and Spain, of the views and recommendations addressed by the three ambassadors to the Department of State, on the 18th of October, 1854, in the letter commonly known as the Ostend Manifesto. The circumstance that the opposition meet the nomination of Mr. Buchanan with no other objection impugning his qualifications for the Presidential trust, cannot fail to confirm the popular belief in the justice and wisdom of the judgment that governed the Cincinnati convention in selecting a statesman so unassailable in the record of his political life, and so little obnoxious to personal censure and distrust, as the candidate

*The copy of this little biography which is before me is entitled, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF JAMES BUCHANAN of Pennsylvania. Twentieth thousand. New York: Published by Livermore & Rudd, 310 Broadway, 1856. It was published anonymously, but I am informed that the name of the author was Edward F. Underhill.

of the great national party of the Union for the highest dignity in the Republic. For it is demonstrable that an erroneous impression exists as to the purport of the Aix la Chapelle letter; and that the policy therein declared by Mr. Buchanan and his associates, is identical with that which has uniformly been regarded and avowed as the policy of the United States in respect to the Island of Cuba. And a belief endeavored to be inculcated, that the policy of the Ostend conference was adopted in consultation or co-operation with the Red Republicans of Europe, is equally erroneous. This belief has originated in another supposition equally unfounded, that Mr. Soulé was in league with the leaders of the European revolutionary movement. The truth is, that fundamental differences existed between the policy of Mr. Soulé and Mazzini, Ledru Rollin, Kossuth, and Louis Blanc; and besides which fact it is well known that these revolutionary leaders themselves were agreed only upon one point, the necessity of revolution, and that they seldom speak to one another. The policy of the revolutionary party of Europe in reference to Cuba was this. They desired the United States to assist the Democratic party of Spain in creating a revolution at Madrid, which should dethrone the queen, and place the Democratic party in power, by the establishment of a republic, and then leave Cuba at her option to either remain a portion of the Spanish republic, or seek annexation to the United States. This concession to the United States was to be in return for material aid furnished in effecting the Spanish revolution. The revolution thus accomplished was intended to be the initiative of further revolutions on the Continent. The Pyrenees range of mountains which forms the boundary line between France and Spain are populated on either side by the most liberal men in either empire, the great mass of the inhabitants being Republican; and could a republic be established in Spain, the Pyrenees would not only furnish points from which to begin their revolutionary designs against France, but would form a barrier behind which they could defend themselves against any attack which Louis Napoleon might make. The revolution accomplished in France, Kossuth and Mazzini would have but little difficulty in overthrowing the power of Austria in Hungary and Italy. Such were the objects which the revolutionary leaders of Europe had in view in endeavoring to secure the influence of the United States Government in support of their policy.

It is needless to say, that neither the Ostend conference nor the cabinet at Washington gave any countenance to this policy. The Ostend conference looked at the Cuba question solely from an American point of view, and quite disconnected from the conflicts and interests of European politics, or the aspirations of revolutionary leaders. On this account, so far from that policy receiving the favor of the Red Republicans, they were as pointed in their hostility to it as any of the monarchical organs of Europe, and did not hesitate to privately, and sometimes publicly, denounce Mr. Soulé for having signed the Ostend circular, as recreant to the expectations which they had formed in regard to him. Mr. Buchanan from first to last opposed the policy which would lead to the United States becoming involved in the European struggle,

and held strictly to the American view of the question, in accordance with which the Ostend letter was framed.

The conference at Ostend had its origin in the recommendation of Governor Marcy, who justly conceived that the mission with which Mr. Soulé was charged at the court of Spain might excite the jealousy of other European powers, and that it was important for the purpose of facilitating the negotiations there to be conducted, that explanations should be made to the governments of England and France, of the objects and purposes of the United States in any movement that events might render necessary, having in view the ultimate purchase or acquisition by this government of the Spanish Island of Cuba. The object of the consultation suggested by Mr. Marcy was, as stated in a letter to Mr. Soulé, “to bring the common wisdom and knowledge of the three ministers to bear simultaneously upon the negotiations at Madrid, London and Paris." These negotiations had not necessarily in view the transfer of Cuba to this country; though that was one of the modes indicated, and seemingly the most effective, of terminating the constantly recurring grievances upon the commerce of the United States, upon the honor of its flag, and the personal rights of its citizens, which disturbed the cordial relations of the two countries, and infused acrimony into their intercourse connected with the prosecution of commerce. Another expedient which Governor Marcy regarded with favor, was the independence of the Island under the Creole sovereignty. At that time, in the summer of 1854, apprehensions of some important change in the social and political condition and relations of Cuba, were generally felt in this country. Rumors prevailed, founded on the then recent decrees and modifications of law pertaining to the servile condition, that it was in contemplation to establish the domination of the blacks in the Island; that the slaves were to be freed and armed, and that an extensive introduction of native Africans was to be resorted to as a means of re-enforcing the strength of the dominant party.

Such, indeed, was the policy of Great Britain; first, to keep alive the slavery agitation in the United States, not from motives of philanthropy, but, by thus inciting internal discord between the people of different sections of the Union, the United States would be prevented from turning its attention to further schemes of territorial extension; and second, to flood Cuba with negroes under a system of apprenticeship, in order to render it valueless to the United States. The execution of such a scheme was regarded as eminently dangerous to the peace and safety of this country, and was one which the United States could not suffer, as the inevitable effects of such a policy, carried out, would be, sooner or later, to induce a servile insurrection in the Southern States. With a colony containing a million and a half of free negroes, immediately off our shores, an expedition could at any time be organized under European aid, and sent from Cuba to our Southern States to incite a rebellion, with all its attendant horrors, among the slaves. Mr. Soulé was instructed to ascertain whether it was in contemplation, and, if so, to seek to prevent it from being carried out, and to avert its baleful consequences to