commented upon by the newspapers all over the country. One meeting gives rise to others, men's minds are enlightened and warmed, and the public opinion acquires by degrees an amount of moral force, any resistance to which would be useless. It is not without reason, therefore, that the people of this country set so high a value on the right to assemble for the discussion of public affairs, and place it in the first rank of their constitutional prerogatives.

Besides yielding obedience to the existing laws, we are under a collateral obligation to be loyal to the sovereign who rules over us. Loyalty is hence another of our chief public duties, for, as already defined, loyalty is only another form of respect for the state, with which our public and private welfare is intimately associated.

In the United States of America, in which the executive is lodged in an elective president, the people call themselves citizens, not subjects; and what we mean by loyalty to the sovereign, they term duty to the commonwealth. It is obvious that there is little essential difference practically between these phrases, whatever there may be in feeling. The subjects of Great Britain are as free as any people in the civilised world. These explanations are perhaps useful in admonishing us not to vex ourselves about mere words and sounds. Our duty clearly consists in appreciating the numerous blessings we enjoy in our public and private relations, by whatever name these relations may be called. We are individually fractional parts of a great nation, whose honour we are called on to sustain through good and bad report. Let us remember that individual virtue can alone promote social happiness, and that social happiness and peace form the basis of political independence. No man can be a good and respectable subject or citizen who is a bad son, a bad husband, a bad father, or a bad master. The nation is but a composition of a great many families, knit together by kindred sentiments and mutual wants; and how can it be

great, or worthy of esteem, if its component parts exhibit in their constitution the worst of vices ?

Loyalty to the sovereign leads to a subordinate, but important duty. It leads us to respect inferior constituted authorities. All judges, magistrates, or other civil functionaries, stand in the light of representatives of the sovereign. The king cannot be everywhere at once, and he deputes these individuals to attend to the wants of his subjects, and to keep good order in society. To shew contempt for any court of justice, or for any magistrate, is therefore equivalent to shewing contempt for the king himself, as well as for the laws, and is justly punishable. To shew our respect both for the laws and the sovereign, we must respect the decisions of judges and magistrates, and support their due execution by our personal influence. Nevertheless, it is in every one's power, when they feel themselves aggrieved by these decisions, to appeal to higher authorities for redress; such being the only means allowable by the constitution in opposing the legal power of the established courts of civil and criminal jurisprudence.

A becoming obedience to the laws, and a generous respect for the supreme and inferior constituted authorities, are naturally productive of good order and peace in society. Every one is not acquainted with the different ramifications of the common and statute law; indeed, it would be impossible for us to acquire a correct knowledge of these things, unless we devoted a lifetime to the study. This difficulty in acquiring a knowledge of the laws has sometimes given rise to a low jeering at our constitution, and it has been represented as cruel to compel an obedience to laws which few can have an opportunity of learning. But this is a fallacy into which we hope our young readers will not fall. The administration of the common law, such as that which applies to inheritance, debtor and creditor, and civil rights generally, rests with a body of educated men, or lawyers, whose services may at all

times be commanded. Besides, we may, if we please, purchase digests of these laws for our private amusement and instruction. The other description of law which is made applicable to the preservation of the peace of society, any one can understand, if he have the ability to know right from wrong. We surely all know that it is illegal and criminal to steal, to rob, to murder, to break into our neighbours' houses, or to attack their persons by violence. It can require no reading of acts of parliament to understand this. Common sense here serves us instead of legal knowledge. Our duty in this matter is very easily defined. We must ever bear in mind that one of the principal acts of duty which the constitution enforces, is the abstaining from meddling violently with the persons and property of our fellow-subjects. In this well-regulated realm, the person of every man, woman, and child is inviolable from private attack. It is a crime almost punishable with the highest penalty of the law to strike any one, either from an idea that they have injured us, or through the influence of passion and prejudice. If we consider that we have been injured, we must apply to the law or the magisterial authorities for redress. We are only permitted to use physical force when in absolute danger of losing our lives or property by violence, there being then no time to apply to the law for protection. It would be gratifying if these regulations were more generally attended to than they seem to be. There are many young men who, from what they are pleased to term a love of fun, but which can be no other sentiment than a love of mischief, or from gross ignorance, assail the persons of individuals of both sexes, to their great discomfort, and sometimes serious injury. Now, it is clearly illegal to do so, and is generally punished by the infliction of penalties by the civil magistrate, though seldom marked with that ignominy which it deserves. Inasmuch as it is held that ignorance of the law does not excuse its infraction, so is it reckoned an invalid apology for the commission of crime to say

that you were under the influence of intoxication at the time. Drunkenness is very properly esteemed an aggravation, not a palliation of the offence.

CONDUCT AT PUBLIC MEETINGS.

T

HE right of meeting together publicly to discuss matters connected with our social condition, being so invaluable a prerogative, it is right and fitting that all young men entering into the busy scenes of life should make themselves well acquainted with the rules which have been established by general consent for the proper conducting of such assemblages.

According to usage, a public meeting is not constituted until a person be appointed to preside, or to 'take the chair.' Without this ceremony, the meeting is a tumultuary assembly, or a mob. The first movement is therefore the appointment of a chairman. This functionary, on taking his seat, is for the time supreme in the meeting. His chief duty is the preservation of order. He allows only one to speak at a time, giving the preference to him who has first caught his eye in the act of rising, and giving every speaker a fair hearing. Another of his chief duties is the preventing of speakers from wandering from the subject under discussion; and if they do, he must remind them to keep to the point. In the execution of these and other duties he claims the support of the meeting, and all are bound to yield to his reasonable dictates, and help to maintain his authority. In proportion to the firmness, yet mildness of

manner, of the chairman, so is the meeting likely to be well or ill conducted.

At some public meetings there is no set plan of operations, and a general discussion on the subjects which are brought forward takes place; but at all meetings for specific important objects, there is a previous arrangement among a certain number of individuals to bring forward particular points to be spoken upon. In this case, speakers are prepared, and the business assumes the form of the proposal and carrying of a set of resolutions or motions. The following is the routine of procedure: The chairman having stated the object for which the meeting has been called, an individual steps forward and proposes a resolution for the adoption of the meeting. Whether he enforces the propriety of carrying such a resolution by a speech on its merits, or simply propounds the matter, he must be seconded by another individual (with or without a speech), otherwise the meeting cannot entertain his resolution for a moment. If duly seconded, then the motion is fairly tabled. It is before the meeting. After a resolution is proposed and seconded, it is the duty of the chairman to ask the meeting if it be carried or not; if agreed to by a general acclamation, or by an obvious majority, he pronounces the word 'carried,' which settles the point, and the business proceeds by the bringing forward of the other resolutions in the same manner. It is unusual for any member of a meeting to oppose the passing of a resolution, unless he have a better to offer in its stead. If he have, and if he wishes 'to take the sense of the meeting' on the subject, he has a right to be heard. Yet this can only be permitted, provided the meeting has been called in general terms. For instance, if the inhabitants of a town or district generally be called, in order to consider of the propriety of such and such measures, in that case every one is entitled to give his opinion, and to oppose the formal resolutions brought forward. But if the meeting be described by advertisement to consist of those inhabitants