volve us in; the question is, what ought to be done, or can be done? are we really in a condition to fupport ourselves against the whole power of France, which hath been fo kindly brought upon us by exclufive and inconfiftent treaties? or are we under a neceffity of making peace to avoid being utterly ruined by the

war?

I PUT the question, because I perceive that the authors of all our misfortunes have already begun by fuggeftions in the news-papers, to found whether a peace would be acceptable to the public. What! have our conductors, averse all along to war, brought it to this already? hath Minorca been loft in order to introduce a ftill worse evil, peace: and force us into a measure advantageous to themselves, but deftructive to the nation? was war made only to gain peace, by fuffering fuch an immenfe lofs? or will thofe, who caused that lofs, have the ftill greater prefumption to propofe peace before they have indemnified the nation for it? In fhort, fhall peace be made at a time, when the war fhould be pursued more vigorously than ever? fhall peace be made, and the French fuffered to keep poffeffion of Port-Mahon? No fooner let us run all the rifques of war.

YET it must not be imagined, that Minorca, were it to be ceded, would fatisfy the French. Flushed with their fuccefs, in having conquered fuch an important fortrefs; they will not be content with what they have already acquired;

especially,

No. 56. efpecially, as they know Great-Britain (by this lofs grown little) can never recover it again, unless they defert its defence in the fame fhameful manner that our good conductors have done. No, by this acquifition, and other strange management on our fide, they know they have gotten from us thofe great advantages, which at firft we had against them; and therefore, will not part with it, unless we give them fomething in lieu thereof, which they may look on as an equivalent.

NOBODY can doubt, but the equivalent, which they would require, is the River of St. John in Nova Scotia, on account of which they forged their two contradictory fyftems of ancient limits, and began the war and as they know that the poffeffion of that river will be of infinitely more advantage to them than Minorca, this ifland, will at last, perhaps, be offered by them in exchange.

1

THE requifition of a river, which runs through the midft of another's country, has fomething in it equally abfurd and immodeft, as it is a demand no lefs unfit to be made than to be complied with. It is an infiduous way, concerted, perhaps, between both parties, of alking the whole country, under the appearance of afking only a part; fince it is evident, that whoever is poffeffed of one, will be poffeffed of the other but 'tis hoped the public will not be impofed on by fo grofs an artifice,

THE

THE French pretend, that they want this river for a communication all the year round with Canada; but, fuppofing we ought to dif oblige ourselves to oblige them; yet, as they never alledged this till now, it is clear, that the demand proceeds from another motive, namely, the advancement of their long concerted plan, to furround our American fettlements on this fide, as they have already on the other fides, by depriving us of a frontier province, which is the chief fecurity of our northern colonies. They have in view likewise to get a port, or rather ports, with which this country abounds, on the Atlantic ocean, where they have none at present; from whence they might be able at any time to infeft our colonies, and disturb our commerce; particularly the fishing-trade, which by degrees they would get into their own hands. In fhort, the furrender of St. John's River would be high treason against our colonies.

WOULD it not be another proof of m—l ability to ruin their country, if to make amends for giving up, or lofing one important place, they hould give up a much more important place? a fpacious province four hundred and twenty miles long, in lieu of a single fortress; which though of great moment to our power as well as commerce, yet being detached from the body of Great Britain, cannot prove a thorn in its fide, as it would, if immediately connected therewith, in the fame manner as St. John's River or Nova Scotia (for in this cafe they must be VOL. II.

F

con

confidered as fynonymous) is connected with New England.

AFTER all, the ceffion of St. John's River would procure a peace but for a short season. For the French, as foon as ever they had ftrengthened their American territories, by forts properly difpofed with numerous garrisons, and augmented their marine to a degree capable of coping with our naval power (which would be their first and whole care) would begin their encroachments afresh and without reserve. That this would be the cafe, is evident from their conduct ever fince the peace of Aix la Chapelle; for they feem determined not only to be superior to us in power, but to be masters in America, unless prevented by us at the prefent juncture; which is the only opportunity in all appearance we fhall ever have again to hinder them from completing our ruin. So that should we make peace with the French till we have effectually humbled them, we must either fuffer them to encroach on our colonies at pleasure, without any oppofition, or else go to war again at a time when we shall be no more a match for them, than a moufe is for a cat; or than they were for us at the commencement of hoftilities. For the fame cause that will oblige us now to make peace, muft hinder us hereafter from going to war; in which cafe we must lie, wholly, at the mercy of France.

BUT where can be the neceffity for any peace at all, much less a destructive and ignominious

2

peace ?

peace? fuch as that would be, by which Minorca and Nova Scotia, or either of them, fhall be facrificed to our enemies. Can it with any colour be pretended that it is neceffary, because there are not ways and means for raising money to carry on the war; when yet there is a ready method of raifing both men and money more than fufficient for the purpose? indeed, if money must be raised in the exhaufting way now in use, and then squandered in hiring foreign troops at a most extravagant price; I grant that it may not be practicable to raise enough to carry on the war; but if a national militia be once established (one hundred and fifty thousand of whom may be maintained at lefs expence than fixteen thousand foreigners) and money raised without increafing the public debt, by one ge neral tax upon houses, or the like, it will be no difficult matter to find money for carrying on the war, as long as neceffary to do ourselves justice.

HAVE not the people then a right to demand, and obtain this change of measures? Yes, furely, unless it can be proved, that it is better for them to want fecurity and defence, than to have ministers removed from whom they can expect neither; and to be deftroyed by an ignominious peace, than faved by measures which will prevent their running further in debt, will keep their money in the country, and enable them to purfue hoftilities with vigour and fuccefs F 2 against