so far a Government on general principles, and on the advantages of the Empire, not a Government of faction. Let us inquire into the source of that memorable law of Poyning's, and we shall find that it was really granted at the desire of the Irish Commons, who proposed by that means to secure themselves from the tyranny of their Lords of Irish birth. (See Sir John Davis, p. 235.) In the time of Henry VII., therefore, Irish affairs were managed more to the advantage of this country by an English Parliament than by our own. Since that time it has been otherwise. What is the cause of the difference manifestly existing in the state of this country? In the time of Henry VII., it was too weak to excite any jealousy in England; but, about the reign of Elizabeth, it began to acquire some strength and consequence. If then, by a Union, all jealousy be removed, we shall return to the situation in which we were in the time of Henry VII., as far as relates to national suspicion; and therefore we may presume that the administration of our affairs by one Imperial Parliament will probably be accompanied by much greater advantages to this country, than we could expect from a Parliament of our own, left to its own free action, because such a Parliament would be subjected to the influence of faction, not guided by general views. I make this assertion on the ground of analogy.

Fifthly, Let us consider the influences of the intrigues of one country on the politics of the other.

In the reign of Charles I., the leaders of the revolution made the insurrection of Ireland the cloak of their designs against the constitution of England. (Hume, vi., 493.) Whilst they pretended the utmost zeal against the Irish Insurrection, they took no step towards its suppression, but such as would likewise give them the superiority in those commotions, which they foresaw must soon be excited in England. (Clarendon, ii., 435.) Whatever land they deemed necessary for aggrandizing themselves was voted under colour of enabling them to recover Ireland; and they made their

regular approaches against the constitution and the royal authority under the cloak of the Irish disturbances.

Thus, again, James II. (Hume, viii., 265) made use of the attachment of Ireland to the Romish Church as the means by which he would have overturned the Protestant Religion in both countries. Thus the King's council in Ireland was dissolved, and a new one appointed, in which there was a majority of Papists. After this, nothing was heard but impeachments against the Protestants, who were immediately committed to prison, without being admitted to bail, And, after this, the Protestants were disarmed, and plans were devised for turning the Protestant into a Catholic army. This conduct of the King brought on a war, in which this country, always a prey to the evils of having a Government distinct from that of England, suffered severely in blood and treasure.

Thus much may be said in favour of the proposed plan, as far as Ireland alone is concerned. But how much more strength does it derive from a review of our situation with respect to other countries, and particularly to France! And here, as before, let us confine ourselves to facts, and not launch out into the airy regions of political conjecture, in which any ingenious man can propose innumerable fictions of future ills or future benefit—all idle speculation, unless deduced from strict and cautious analogy; that is, from a contemplation of past facts.

I say, then, that our separate Government, and our consequent separate views of interest from that of England, have continually exposed us to the machinations of the enemies of these Islands, and have made this country the field in which the battle for English and Irish liberty was to be fought.

Thus we see that Perkin Warbeck, in the year after he had been repulsed from the coast of England, next made an attempt on this country, because it had always appeared forward to join any invader of the authority of the English Monarch. (Hume, iii., 395.)

Thus, again, in the reign of Elizabeth, the Spaniards in

vaded us, because they saw us alienated from the English by religious prejudices, and ready, as the historian says, to join every invader. (Hume, v., 246.)

In the Rebellion in 1641, the French directed their attention to Ireland, because they knew that the Irish wished to shake off the English connexion. And supplies of arms were promised to the Rebels, by Cardinal Richelieu. (Hume, vi., 479.) On the same principle did they act a few months ago.

Let me ask, could these things have happened, had we been one united people, united in one Parliament, one King; united in one mind, because in one interest? Surely we might as well expect that our enemies would have assailed England itself, nay, more probably; because Ireland is a more difficult country than England, and on this side forms a barrier against the citadel of the Empire. Let me ask, after these various instances of the tendency of this country to revolt, can we wonder at the jealousy of England? Can we wonder that England should wish to put a period for ever to such rebellions by removing the cause? Can we wonder that so many are found wise enough to support such a measure?

But there is another argument, which, though deduced from a contemplation of the human mind, may not perhaps appear less cogent than that which may be collected from the history of past events. By keeping up the form of a separate Government, we keep alive the idea that we have separate interests; we shall always regard each other with jealousy, and never grant a favour which we can with security withhold. We are led to consider ourselves justifiable in withdrawing ourselves from England whenever it suits our convenience; and, while we falsely think that such an opportunity may occur, our attachment to England is, in the mean time, weakened. With such sophisms-I call them so, because every loyal man, whether a friend to the Union or not, allows them to be sophismsI say, with such deceitful arguments, did Roger Moore, in 1641, impose on the Irish, telling them that "a revolt, tending only

to vindicate their native liberty against the violence of foreign invaders, could never be deemed rebellion:" (Hume, vi., 479)— a sentiment which originated entirely from Ireland existing as a separate kingdom. Let not then our senses and minds be entirely impressed with the idea that we are a distinct people, and, by degrees, we shall lose the idea that we have any distinct interest connected with that of a distinct Legislature; and, when the idea of a distinct interest is once abolished, we may bid defiance to all the enemies of our liberty and happiness.

Now, on the other hand, let us consider what will be the result if we reject this measure. The Roman Catholic claims

will soon be renewed with redoubled force. These claims must be either rejected or complied with. If rejected, a very large body of the inhabitants of Ireland will become discontented-a body of men, too, now much more powerful than in the reign of George II., when this measure was before rejected. By the lenity of the English Government, by the increasing liberality of the times, the laws which bore hard on the Roman Catholics have been abolished; in truth, all, except such as would give them political power-certainly all have been repealed that stood in the way of their amassing property. By their wealth, their influence has, in proportion, been increased, and therefore their claims, which would not have been listened to in the time of George II., must now be listened to with respect, and must be rejected with great danger to the State. The conduct, therefore, of the Parliament in George the Second's time could form no rule for us at this day, when circumstances are so much changed; though I am far from admitting that even then the Parliament was wise in rejecting the measure. is, then, clear that, if the claims of the Catholics should be rejected, it would be a measure attended with the greatest national danger.

It

Now, let me ask, should we be safer in acceding to their claims? We know that James II., when he wished to overturn the Protestant religion in England, made his first step

towards it by encouraging the Catholics here; and this measure of the King's was highly acceptable to the Court of France, because they saw, in the advancement of the Roman Catholics to political power, an opportunity of producing an entire separation of Ireland from England. And Lord Sunderland, for his services in endeavouring to bring about this measure, received a gratuity from France. Indeed, it can hardly be conceived how the Roman Catholics in this country could be admitted to a full participation in political power, and the two countries continue connected as they are at present. A Protestant country and a Papist country, united under a Protestant monarch, who, by his coronation oath, was bound to maintain the Protestant religion, would be a political monster whose life must indeed be of short duration.

It is worthy of being remarked how studiously the writers against the Union abstain from bringing forward any arguments relative to the Roman Catholic question. They see that, in whatever manner they treat it, the inference either of fresh insurrections or of a final separation from England must be too manifest. In the last place, let us consider the objections to the proposed plan.

The 1st is the emigration of our nobility and gentry. This must, indeed, in some measure, take place, but, by no means, in such a degree as to form any kind of counterbalance to the advantages which will result from the Union. For, in the first place, our Commoners cannot reside entirely in England, because they would thus lose their influence with their electors, and forfeit the seat which they are so anxious to preserve. Secondly, if the Commoners go in rotation to the National Parliament, they will consider London only as an occasional residence, but Ireland their home, in which they must spend two-thirds at least of their Parliamentary life. Besides, in order that they may be enabled to act as true representatives of the people, they must be for the most part resident among them; for can we suppose that the Irish electors will

VOL. III.

E