power. We must argue from moral causes to moral effects. If, then, we are in a disadvantageous situation, we must of course look to those causes which have brought us into that situation. What are they?

1st. The local independent acting of the Legislature.

2nd. The general prosperity of the country, which has produced great activity and energy.

3rd. The emancipation of the Catholics.

4th. The encouragement given to the reform principles of the Presbyterians.

5th. The want of number in the Protestants.

6th. The uncertainty of counsels as to this great division of the country.

Now what is the complaint? That we have not influence in the originating Cabinet. By a Union we should have that influence.

We have no influence in the originating Parliament of the Empire. We should have a great and commanding interest there.

The want of numbers, which is the want of power, would be increased by an accession of all the Protestants of the Empire, The question of Reform would be settled.

The Catholic question would be settled.

The question then is, Can these moral causes of discontent be taken away with safety without Union?

1st. Can the Protestants of Ireland, as a separate State, gain an internal accession of strength as Protestants? No. 2nd. Can the Roman Catholic question be altered so as to preclude Reform of Parliament? It cannot.

3rd. Can a Reform of Parliament be made consistent with Protestant security? It cannot.

4th. The Representative body of Ireland will obtain a joint right with the Representative of Great Britain to legislate for the whole Empire.

PROJECT FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF IRELAND IN THE

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

The object is, if possible, to make compensation to the Proprietors of such Boroughs as, by being entirely under the influence of certain patrons, may be considered as their exclusive property.

To make compensation where the right is doubtful between the patron and electors would be difficult, as it would not be an easy matter to decide what part of the compensation should be applied to the use of the patron, what part to the electors. Where a Borough therefore is entirely open or entirely in the power of a patron, upon the score of compensation no difficulty can arise. But then another question presents itself, which is the desire of Government that the representation under the new order should be as free as possible. At the same time, Government is unwilling to make any admission which might found an argument for Parliamentary Reform, by making it a general principle of the arrangement to strike off the close Boroughs and keep those only which are open.

Some other principle is therefore required which will as far as possible effect these objects, without putting Government to the necessity of admitting any flaw in our present representation.

It is humbly submitted that, to attain these purposes in the best mode, a double principle should be adopted: first, supe riority of rank in representation; secondly, prior right. Both these principles are perfectly known to the constitution.

Under the first would come all Counties (perhaps cities which are not counties of towns ought to come under this head: this would make a difference of three, viz., Downpatrick, Cashel, and Clogher), Counties of Towns, the University. Under the second, all such Boroughs as first sent members to Parliament would be retained till the numbers of the representatives should be complete, to the exclusion of all others. One hundred is the number of members to be sent to the Imperial Parliament : of these the Counties, it is presumed, would be allowed to send

two each, and the four principal Towns in the four provinces a like number, and the University of Dublin likewise to send two, and the remaining Counties of Towns, or Counties of Cities, one member each. This, under the first principle set down, would make the representation as follows:

Add to these the three remaining cities of Downpatrick, Cashel, and Clogher, and the total representation under the first head will be 82. There will then remain 18 seats to be represented for the inferior Boroughs, which will come under the second head or principle of prior right. Upon inspecting the returns, as stated in the MS. Parliamentary Register, it is found that the following towns, in addition to many of those already mentioned, were the only ones remaining which sent members to Parliament in the year 1559:

Of these, ten, i. e., Ross, Athenry, Kildare, Naas, Athy, Thomastown, Carlingford, Kells, Navan, and Mullingar, are

close Boroughs, the remainder open. If all these Boroughs were admitted, a representation of 102 members would be the result, out of which (including Clogher) 11 members only would be returned for close towns; and if it was thought necessary, two of these close Boroughs could easily, upon compensation, be induced to surrender their right of representation, which would reduce the number to 100, having only nine members returned from close towns.

Under this arrangement, however, none of those set down as open Boroughs will be entitled to compensation, i. e., Antrim, Lisburn, Baltimore, Bandon, Mallow, Newry, Swords, Lismore, and Tallogh, all of which, with perhaps the exception of Newry and Swords, are of the nature from which the difficulty of compensation arises, i. e., where the influence of the patron is great, but not entire. Should the principles upon which this project is founded be thought worthy of adoption, it will be for Government to consider in what way compensation can best be made to the Boroughs in question, without doing injustice to those who have influence in them.

Private.

ON REDUCING THE BOROUGHS.

Cleveland Row, October 8, 1799.

I have had a very long conversation with Lord B. on the subject of the paper you sent me about Irish Representation. We were totally unable to solve the difficulty of deciding who is to receive the compensation of open Boroughs, nor indeed do I think it capable of any solution, except by arrangement with the persons concerned. If this be impossible, the result must necessarily be as follows:

which, if we adhere to our limitation of 100, leaves only two Members for 8+ Boroughs.

To extinguish these on the plea of their being created so late as the reign of James I., or by inquiring why they were created, would be very dangerous in principle, and the same plea would also, it is conceived, apply to some of the 30 open Boroughs which are meant to be retained. If, therefore, this idea must be adhered to, perhaps the best way of doing so would be to avow the plain reason, that of convenience; that, the object being to lessen the number, those are abolished which are capable of compensation in money. It would then be a question, whether to abolish them all instantly and compulsorily, giving the full value, and leaving only the 98 rights above stated, or whether it would not be best to class the close Boroughs in threes to alternate by Parliaments. To do this would abolish two-thirds of the present value, supposing it agreed that the one member to be sent to the United Parliament is equal to the two to the Irish Parliaments. These two-thirds might be given now compulsorily, and would be about £10,000 for each Borough: one-third of 8+ is 28, which, added to 98, would make the present number of Members to the United Parliament 126, liable to be reduced as often as any of the classed Boroughs should offer to take the other third in money. Some bargain of this sort might possibly be made by private contract, before the measure is brought forward. The four Bishops' Boroughs, which belong to Government, might certainly be so arranged, and the immediate increase might probably not be more than 115 or 120, instead of the 100, originally proposed. This increase, therefore, forms a very small part of the objections to this plan.

The solid reasons against it are 1st. That, while you abandon to so great a degree the principle of the actual representation, and form one quite different from it, and very unequal and artificial in its composition, your new system does not rest on any (even plausible) theory, but merely on conve