nience. It is a total change, but no reform; that is, many of the open places retained, being, in practice, as much private property as the others, and the places themselves not at all more considerable. 2nd. That what you retain by preference are practically the very worst species of Representation-potwalloping Boroughs and open elections by the mob, where neither property, nor family connexions, nor the good opinion of neighbourhood, nor any other good species of influence, would weigh against adventurers from Dublin or London, with large purses, or backed by any temporary clamour. 3rd. That you admit a principle and establish a mode of applying it, both which, if good, are quite as applicable to the case of English Representation; and that, as there will be a general and apparently a well-founded opinion that 650 is too large a body for the House of Commons, this will be suggested as a natural mode of reducing the numbers here, as well as in Ireland.

The objections are so weighty, that I think it well worth while to examine the detail of the cases, on the apprehension of which this whole plan is grounded. I mean those of the actual owners of the thirty open Boroughs, who, it is supposed, may be indisposed to the measure if any compensation in money be given for those Boroughs, as it is to be given to the electors and not to them. Considering that this number of thirty is in itself not large, and that several of these persons are probably among the decided enemies of the whole measure, it might perhaps not be impossible, by private and separate discussion with the individuals concerned, to reduce the effects of their apprehended discontent, so as to be much less dangerous in its extent than even the influences of the objections I have already stated. If this could be done, the plan of a general classing by threes of all Boroughs indiscriminately would so very nearly answer in point of number, that there could be little difficulty in reducing that to practice, thus―

32 Counties and 2 Cities........

Add=383

68

383

106

...

Deduct the Bishop's Boroughs, which are four,

and they would diminish the number by

1051

And make a farther reduction for such others as might, before the measure is brought forward, be bargained for and surrendered by private agreement, and you would find the number considerably reduced, possibly below 100. The inestimable advantage of grounding the whole plan on the present rights, without any other change than that of doubling the Counties and great Cities, is so strong a recommendation of this plan, that I should think a large proportion of private accommodation, so averaged as to satisfy the proprietors of the 30 open Boroughs, very well bestowed indeed; and I should wish that the means of doing this should be examined in detail by those who are concerned with the subject, before any other plan is resorted to.

MEMORANDUM RELATIVE TO THE REPRESENTATION IN

IRELAND.

September 23, 1799.

The plan originally approved of for the Representation having been given up, as trenching in too great a degree on private interest, and new principles having been adopted as the basis of the arrangement, namely, to leave the Counties represented as at present, and to give a compensation in money to Borough proprietors, it is necessary to consider how the Representation can best be cast according to this new idea.

At the time the Union took place between England and Scotland, Representation being comparatively of little value, we find that on no part of the arrangement was there less

struggle or difference of opinion than on the distribution of the Representation. The reverse may be expected in the present instance. There is no feature of the plan of Union that will so much attract the attention, and, in fact, decide the conduct of the members of the Legislature; and the persons interested will not suffer a question so important to their private interest to remain to be settled as a separate consideration on the winding-up of the business: on the contrary, every man having Borough influence will previously expect to be informed what arrangement is in contemplation; and the majority will be decided in respect to the measure itself by the operation it will have on their local authority and interest.

Until this point is absolutely settled, it is impossible to estimate our strength. We may reckon the number of persons who are not inimical to the general principle of Union, but we cannot ascertain what increase of force the avowed enemies of the measure are likely to receive from our own ranks till the plan itself is determined on, the details settled, and the compensation adjusted. We may then form a less fallacious calculation of the numbers that are likely to adhere to us through the entire of the contest.

The policy of disarming as much as possible private interest being admitted, it is evidently an object in the arrangement to avoid committing injury which shall not admit of reparation. Where the Borough influence is in the nature of property, the electors being considered and considering themselves as trustees, there seems little difficulty: if the proprietor can be ascertained, and the quantum of compensation settled, the difficulty is at an end. The individual may, in point of feeling, prefer the authority arising from this species of influence to its value in money; to this inconvenience it is impossible to apply a remedy; and we must be prepared to find a strong repugnance to the measure grow out of this principle; but where the proprietor receives a fair equivalent for what he parts with, no injustice can be complained of, and the utmost will have been

done to reconcile those interested which the nature of the case admits of.

Where the interest, from the nature of the Charter, cannot be held to be so strictly property, and yet the return, in point of fact, is not less secure to the patron, as in the case of towns where the right of voting is in the inhabitants at large, but where the lord of the soil, by his authority, can keep the number of voters, by preventing them from registering, within such limits as to give him an indisputable control in the choice of Representatives, in such cases it is difficult, in principle, to justify making him compensation as proprietor, and yet his sacrifice will be such as to make him expect it.

The difficulty will be still greater in Corporations, where the right of voting rests in persons of a less dependent description. The person in whom the interest resides may feel assured of their support as a favour; but they would little endure that he should receive compensation for it as his property.

There are two modes of making compensation; the one by Representation, the other by money. The latter seems almost exclusively applicable to Boroughs, where the interest is so distinctly understood to be property by the parties, that all interested will acquiesce in the equitable application of the money. Where any doubt can arise on this point, which there naturally will in Boroughs where the electors are not trustees, but acting for themselves under various degrees of influence, it seems unlikely that any principle of distribution of the money itself can be adopted, to which the parties interested will consent; nor is it likely that any application of the value to local purposes would be acquiesced in. If so, the question seems to resolve itself into the principle that Boroughs understood to be property may be indemnified in money, but that Boroughs not so considered must receive an equivalent for their present right in Representation.

In estimating an equivalent to Representation to the Imperial Parliament for Irish interest, whether we consider the

relative price of a Borough or that at which seats are usually disposed of, we find it about one half. One seat, therefore, in the United Parliament may be considered as a fair remuneration for two Irish seats; and I conceive it would be universally received as such, when both seats are in the same hands: but in Boroughs where two interests prevail, and at present understand each other, a compromise becomes difficult; and, the object not admitting of partition, becomes less valuable to both. This, in some degree, operates against the measure in many of the principal towns, but showed itself to such a degree at Cork, previous to the late agitation of the measure, that nothing but a strong expectation given to the parties that the Representation would be left as at present, prevented that important City from being divided on the question.

With a view to the application of this principle, it is to be observed that the Representation at present divides itself into 32 Counties, 86 Boroughs considered as property, and 32, including the University, of a different description.

It is distinctly understood that the Counties are to be represented as at present, and it seems not less so that the gross number of Commoners should not exceed 100; if these 32 Boroughs (Cork and Dublin having a double Representation) return 34 members, with 64 from the Counties, we have 98, without allotting any to the close Boroughs. On the other hand, if the Representation is given only to the most considerable of the open towns, and the others are to be classed with the close Boroughs, the embarrassment above alluded to occurs, namely, a dimunition of privilege not admitting of compensation, which will be felt by the parties interested as a peculiar hardship, the more so as they will be injured, and which cannot fail to decide them against the measure.

Should it be decided, in order to obviate this difficulty, that the 32 open towns should each be represented, there seems no other mode of proceeding left in respect to the 86 close Boroughs, but either to extinguish them totally, paying the