WOOD V. PARSONS.

or the various questions raised upon them, as the court took the evidence from the jury, and instructed them that the defendant was entitled to their verdict. If, therefore, there was any evidence in the case tending to show a state of facts which would have authorized the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff, the court erred, and the judgment should be reversed; but if there was no evidence from which they could properly so have found, the court was right in taking the case from the jury, and the judgment must be affirmed.

It sufficiently appears from the record of the proceedings in insolvency, that the insolvent was, on the 22d of April, 1870, in Detroit, in this state, and not in Canada, when the order was made for serving upon his wife, and sending copies by mail to him at Detroit; and there is no evidence in the case tending to show that he was in Canada, or that he submitted to the jurisdiction of that court until May, 1871.

It appears that in February, 1871, he had the notes with him in this state, by the sale of which the Miles note was obtained, and that this sale was made in February, 1871. There is no evidence tending to show at what time he obtained them, or that they were within the Canadian jurisdiction at the time of the insolvency proceedings, or while they were pending; and it is clear enough the notes were not found there and taken upon the attachment issued in those proceedings; and there is no evidence tending to show that the insolvent, either voluntarily or by the direction of the court, ever made an assignment of these notes or of the Miles note or any of his property, to Wood, the plaintiff, who was by the court appointed his assignee. As we have not before us, as a part of the case, the Canadian statute referred to, and cannot take judicial notice of it, we cannot determine what would have been the effect of those proproceedings upon the property of the insolvent in Canada, or upon the insolvent himself, when within that jurisdiction.

WOOD v. PARSONS.

But, whatever may have been the effect of that statute and those proceedings in Canada, it is at least clear that the Canadian court could not, by the mere force or operation of its orders or decrees, affect the property in question in this state, unless that property had been or should be within the territorial jurisdiction of the dominion of Canada, and while there, subjected to the control of that court, by seizure or some process or proceeding which would have enabled that court to enforce a sale of the property, and make that sale effectual by delivery.

Nor can it alter the case that the insolvent himself returned to Canada and submitted to the jurisdiction of that court after the purchase of the Miles note in question and before the institution of this suit; so long as it does not appear that this note was brought within that jurisdiction, or that he had assigned or conveyed it to the assignee. The judgment or decree of that court could not affect his property in this state nor his right here to dispose of it.

These conclusions seem to result from the universally admitted principle that the laws enacted by one sovereignty can have no force or effect, as laws, within the territories of another sovereignty, and that the courts of one sovereignty cannot subject persons or property in another to the direct effect of its judgments, orders or decrees.

Had the insolvent in this case, with or without the intervention or order of the court, made an assignment of this property to Wood, the plaintiff, we see no reason to doubt that such assignment would have operated as a conveyance of the title to any property of the insolvent here, except possibly in some cases, as against the claims of creditors here.-See Graydon v. Church, 7 Mich., 36.

We see no mode in which a different result can be reached in the present case, without giving to the orders and decrees of the Canadian court the same direct force and effect in this state as we give to those of our own state courts.

Certainly neither the English nor the American courts

WOOD V. PARSONS.

have yet recognized the comity of states or nations to this extent, nor is it so far recognized between the several states of the American union; and in reaching this conclusion we have applied no less liberal rule than that which is recognized between these states.-See Graydon v. Church, ubi supra.

The result is that there was no evidence tending to establish the title of the plaintiff to the property replevied, and the court properly took the case from the jury.

The judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed, with costs.

The other Justices concurred.

The People on the relation of Louis F. Long v. The Judge of the Wayne Circuit Court.

Declaration: Amendment: Statute of limitations. It is competent for the court to allow a declaration for false imprisonment to be amended by adding a new count for malicious prosecution arising out of the same transaction, at any time before the new cause of action has become barred by the statute of limitations.

Heard and decided April 22.

Application for mandamus.

Anson Dolph commenced suit by capias in the Wayne circuit against the relator on January 30, 1872. Declaration for false imprisonment was filed, to which the relator pleaded the general issue. The plaintiff, on motion, obtained leave, March 28, 1873, to amend his declaration by adding a count for malicious prosecution, and afterwards, April 8, 1873, amended accordingly.

The relator now applies for mandamus to compel the respondent to vacate the order granting leave to file such

LONG V. JUDGE OF WAYNE CIRCUIT.

amended declaration and to strike the amended declaration from the files.

Ward & Palmer, for the relator.

S. Larned and H. M. Cheever, for the respondent.

THE COURT held that the new count added by the amended declaration being for the same cause of action as that set up in the original declaration, and the right of action not being barred by the statute of limitations at the time the amendment was made, it was competent for the respondent to grant the order in question.

Mandamus denied, with costs.

The Board of Supervisors of Midland County v. The Auditor General.

Auditor general: Taxes: Settlement with county: Certiorari. The action of the auditor general in charging back to a county certain taxes in his settlement with the county, being the exercise of an official discretion belonging to an executive department of the state government, is not subject to judicial review, and cannot, therefore, be examined upon certiorari.

Heard and decided April 22.

Application for certiorari.

Application is made for a writ of certiorari to bring up for review the action of respondent in charging back to Midland county certain taxes assessed upon lands included in the land grant to the Flint & Pere Marquette railroad company.

George V. N. Lothrop presented the application.

SUPERVISORS OF MIDLAND COUNTY V. AUDITOR GENERAL.

THE COURT held that the action of the respondent in the premises, being the exercise of an official discretion belonging to an executive department of the state government, is not subject to review judicially, and cannot, therefore, be examined upon certiorari from this court.

Writ denied.

The People on the relation of Thomas Griffin v. Henry Z. Potter.

Justice of the peace: Payment into court: Garnishment: Judgment. A justice of the peace before whom a judgment has been obtained and to whom the same has been paid pending garnishee proceedings before him to reach the avails thereof, may, upon judgment being rendered, in such garnishee proceedings, against the judgment debtor and after the time for appealing therefrom has expired, apply the money so paid into court in payment of such garnishee judgment.

Application for mandamus.

Heard and decided April 23.

The relator obtained judgment before the respondent, a justice of the peace for the city of Detroit, against one Ellen O'Connor, upon which execution issued and was placed in the hands of a constable. Subsequently one Jeremiah O'Connor brought suit before the respondent against the relator, and garnished said Ellen O'Connor. To the writ of garnishment Ellen O'Connor answered admitting the indebtedness to the relator by virtue of his judgment against her.

Jeremiah O'Connor having recovered judgment against the relator as principal defendant, the respondent rendered judgment against Ellen O'Connor as garnishee defendant, upon her answer. Thereupon she paid the money into court to satisfy the relator's judgment against her, and the