BLACK V. WARD.

by expressing what they wish, and not leaving it to implication.

It is worthy of remark that Judge Story in his Conflict of Laws, originally laid down the doctrine that such a note as this, made here and payable in Canada, would in the absence of any words to the contrary, be payable by the American standard.-Confl. L., §§ 271, 271 a. But he subsequently added a section making the place of payment control in the absence of any thing to the contrary.— § 272 a. It is not strange that persons contracting for a payment abroad, where the foreign law is certainly not presumed to be known here, unless by a presumption much further removed, should prefer to make their papers intelligible on their face.

We hold the note in controversy to be a note payable in Canada precisely as if it had been made there without qualification, or in other words, to be payable in the lawful money of Canada.

Where words bear a natural and known legal meaning which will maintain the validity of a contract, it would be mischievous to permit evidence to give a meaning which would destroy it. Negotiable paper is intended to circulate generally, and not in confined localities, and if there should happen to be a meaning in one place which differed from that elsewhere, a purchaser would be defrauded without remedy if he were compelled to go behind the terms of the security. If parties desire to give a confined meaning, it is easy to express it. If they choose to make notes payable in chattels, they should say so. But the language used here is in our opinion too plain to be perverted, and there is no reason to believe the maker of the note meant any thing but what he said.

The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted.

The other Justices concurred.

MURRAY U. MOROSS.

Alexander Murray v. Christopher Moross.

In an

Landlord and tenant: Covenant to keep in repair: Charge to the jury. action upon a covenant in a lease to keep the premises in repair during the term, and at the end thereof to deliver them up in like condition as when taken, reasonable use and wear thereof and injury by the elements excepted, it is not error to charge the jury that the defendant had no right to remove a box stall he had put up in the barn on the leased premises, if the removal would injure the freehold.

Error to Wayne Circuit.

Heard April 24. Decided April 29.

Browse T. Prentis, for plaintiff in error.

0. Kirchner, for defendant in error.

COOLEY, J.

Moross sued Murray for breach of covenant contained in a lease, by which Murray had bound himself to keep the premises and every part thereof in good repair during the continuance of the lease, and at the end of the term to yield and deliver up the same in like condition as when taken, reasonable use and wear thereof and injury by the elements excepted. It appeared on the trial that Murray had put up a box stall in the barn for the occupation of his horses, and had afterwards torn it out again. There was some evidence that the necessity for putting it in was occasioned by injury the horses had done the barn, and testimony was given to show that it could not be taken out and leave the barn in like condition as before. The court charged the jury that Murray had no right to remove the box stall if the removal would injure the freehold, and this in substance was given in various forms with explanations.

The charge was correct. Murray could not surrender the premises in like condition as before, if he tore out improvements and necessarily caused an injury by so doing.

MURRAY . MOROSS.

Another point is made by the brief of plaintiff in error, but as there is nothing in the record to show how it bears upon the present case, or whether it bears at all, we pass it by.

The judgment must be affirmed.

The other Justices concurred.

Augustus P. Tucker and another v. Hiram A. Tucker and another.

Mortgages: Use of a horse and buggy. The allowance made by the court below for the value of the use of a horse and buggy under a stipulation secured by mortgage made by a son to his parents, to furnish the same as required, will not be disturbed except upon clear and satisfactory showing that it is unreasonable.

The arrangement must be presumed to have been made in view of the exist ing relations of the parties, and subject to such conditions as might naturally arise in their daily business and exigencies, and could not be properly so construed as to require obedience to the caprices or unreasonable demands of the mortgagee.

Heard April 24 and 25.

Decided April £9.

Appeal in Chancery from Branch Circuit.

This was a bill to foreclose a mortgage given by Hiram A. Tucker to his parents (the complainants) to furnish them a house and maintenance, and the use of a horse and buggy, and to perform some other conditions. The case

was before this court at the April term, 1872 (see 24 Mich., 426), and was then remanded to the court below to proceed to an inquiry to ascertain and determine the amount of compensation which should be allowed to the complainant, Augustus P. Tucker, for the failure to furnish him the use of a horse and buggy, and upon such ascertainment and determination to make the usual decree of foreclosure and

TUCKER V. TUCKER.

sale to satisfy the amount found due, with costs of both courts. The cause was accordingly referred by the court below to a commissioner, who reported finding due the complainant the sum of two hundred and seventy-three dollars, being at the rate of one dollar and fifty cents a week. This report was confirmed, and decree entered in accordance with it. From this decree the complainant, Augustus P. Tucker, appealed.

Ward & Palmer, for complainants.

N. P. Loveridge, for defendants.

PER CURIAM. We think the allowance made by the court below was reasonable.

The stipulation for the use of a horse and buggy is, in its terms and in its application, extremely indefinite, and it is quite impossible to settle the amount to be paid under it without resorting somewhat to probabilities. The meaning of the parties can only be approximately ascertained by considering the general nature of the arrangement, the position and relation of the parties, their condition in life, and what must have been contemplated by all concerned.

The arrangement was a family one, and made between. a son and his parents. The parties were farmers, residing in the country, and in fair circumstances, and it is reasonable to conclude that all anticipated such attentions and accommodations as were usual in such cases.

It could not have been imagined that a horse and buggy, and a servant to harness and unharness, would be hourly or even daily required throughout the year. Neither could it have been imagined that an expense would be necessitated every year exceeding the value of a first-class establishment.

The position of appellant, however, leads to this latter result. Upon the whole, we think the amount found by the court below is perhaps as near the equity and justice

TUCKER v. TUCKER.

of the case as possible, considering the vague nature of the arrangement and the impossibility of obtaining data for precise results.

In view of the probability that inquisitions may be hereafter required, and as these must be attended with expense, we think it well to suggest that should it appear that defendant, before the inquiry, has reasonably tendered to complainant an amount equal or exceeding the sum found due, that circumstance would justify the court in requiring the costs of the particular inquiry to be charged against complainant and deducted from the amount found.

The order below must be affirmed, with costs.

Frank Giddey v. Ida Altman.

Contract construed: Right of possession. A contract for the sale of a piano apon condition of the delivery by the purchaser to the vendor in payment therefor of certain tickets of subscription for a newspaper and to a premium drawing, the vendee agreeing to repurchase, at a price specified, all such tickets that remained unsold after a day named, and the vendor to use reasonable exertion to sell the same in the meantime, which provides that the piano "is to remain the property of the vendor and subject to his directions, and not to be moved from place to place without his written assent until all of the conditions herein specified are fulfilled;" and that in case of default in any of the conditions, the vendor "may declare this agreement void and take possession of the piano wherever found, without legal process, and retain payments made, as damages for non-performance," etc., does not give the vendor the right of possession until he has exercised his right to declare the contract of sale terminated; and his tendering the tickets back, and on payment being refused, putting them into the hands of an attorney for collection, could not operate to give him the right of possession.

Replevin: Right of possession: Title. In an action of replevin by one claiming under the vendees in such contract against vendor's agent, who had taken possession without a previous demand, the judgment below in favor of the plaintiff will not be disturbed, because of a ruling that this contract transferred the title to the vendees, in the absence of any showing that the vendor had taken any steps to declare the contract void, whether the ruling be correct or not.

Heard April 25. Decided April 29.

Error to Wayne Circuit.