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INDEX TO CASES REPORTED IN THIS VOLUME.

ABANDONMENT.

See NOVATION.

ABATEMENT.

Of nuisance: See RIPARIAN RIGHTS, 4. See PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COURTS, 23.

ACCOUNTING.

In an accounting under a decree directing that the defendants be charged for the use of certain saw-mill premises, wrongfully detained by them from the complainant for several years, and kept employed in sawing lumber, "what the use of the property would have been worth to a prudent man, with proper use, after keeping it in reasonable repair," the bare rental value under bargains entered into before the possession was taken is not the proper basis.-Eldred v. Ryerson, 526.

ACCOUNTS.

See GUARDIAN AND WARD.

ACQUITTAL.

See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 1-3.

ADMINISTRATORS.

See DECLARATION, 6: REMEDY, 2.

ADMIRALTY.

See PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COURTS, 20: WATER-CRAFT ACT, 1–4.

ADMISSIONS.

See MECHANIC'S LIENS, 1: PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COURTS, 14:
PROMISSORY NOTES, 5-6: SEDUCTION, 2.

ADOPTED STATUTES.

See JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, 3.

ADVERSE TITLES.

See POSSESSION OF LAND, 4.

ADVICE OF COUNSEL.

See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 4-6.

AFFIDAVIT.

For appeal: See PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COURTS, 16, 18. See ATTACHMENT, 5, 6: CERTIORARI, 4: PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COURTS, 3, 4.

AGENCY.

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 1-5: CITY COUNSELOR, 1-3: IN-
SURANCE, 3-6: MASTER AND SERVANT: REMEDY, 2: RENTS
AND PROFITS.

AGGRAVATION.

Of damages: See BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY, 1: DAMAGes, 2.

ALLEGATION OF DAMAGE.

See BILL IN EQUITY, 5: Evidence, 15.

AMENDMENTS.

See DECLARATION, 2-4, 5: PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT (COURTS, 4:
PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAW, 4.

AMOUNT DUE.

See POSSESSION OF LAND, 9, 10.

ANSWERS.

See EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 5-7: MECHANIC'S LIENS, 1.

APPEALS.

From justice's courts: See JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, 2-4: OFFICER: PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COURTS, 6-8, 16-18: REMEDY, 1: REPLEVIN, 7.

In chancery: See PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURt, 5–7, 8.

APPEARANCE.

See ATTACHMENT, 3

APPLICATION.

See INSURANCE, 1-8.

APPOINTMENT.

See CITY COUNSELOR, 2.

ARREST.

See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 1-6.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

See DAMAGES, 2: EVIDENCE, 15-18.

ASSENT.

See TROVER, 3.

ASSESSING TAXES.

See HIGHWAYS, 3.

ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES.

See JUDGMENT, 1.

ASSESSMENTS.

See MANDAMUS, 1–3.`

ASSIGNEE.

See CHATTEL MORTGAGES, 3.

ASSIGNMENT.

See BOUNTY, 4:, CHATTEL MORTGages, 2, 3.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.

See PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT, 3.

ASSUMPSIT.

See DECLARATION, 8.

1.

ATTACHMENT.

A service of a copy of the inventory alone is not a sufficient personal service of an attachment under the statute (Comp. L. 1871, § 6402); a copy of the attachment is required also, and the statute must be followed substantially.- Stearns v. Taylor, 88. 2. Service of an attachment upon property cannot be made in a foreign county until after service has been made in the county where the process issued; service in a foreign county in the first instance cannot be made the basis for proceeding by publication.— lbid.

3. Appearance of a defendant in such case to enter default of the plaintiffs for not declaring, does not preclude him, after the default has been set aside under a stipulation that his appearance should not waive any irregularity or defect in the process or proceedings, from making any objection to the proceedings which he could have made on a special appearance to complain of defects.Ibid.

4. A dismissal of the cause in which such proceedings had been taken, seven months after the return day of the writ, is not error.-Ibid.

5.

In proceedings before a circuit court commissioner under the statute (Comp. L. 1871, §§ 6428-31) for the dissolution of an attachment issued upon an affidavit that "the plaintiff has good reason to believe that the defendant has absconded from the state," etc., a showing that the defendant had not in fact absconded, will authorize an order of dissolution, notwithstanding the plaintiff had good reason to believe to the contrary.-Folsom v. Teichner, 107.

6. The provision of the statute (Comp. L. 1871, § 6430), that if the commissioner "shall be satisfied that such plaintiff has not a good and legal cause for suing out the writ," he may order the attachment dissolved, etc., refers to the state of facts made to appear at the hearing before him, and not what appeared to the plaintiff when the affidavit was made; and the "good and legal cause" must be one existing in fact, and not merely in the belief of the plaintiff, however well founded that belief may have appeared to him to be.-Ibid.

1.

See CERTIORARI, 1: REPLEVIN, 3.

ATTEMPT TO MURDER.

See EVIDENCE, 22.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

A client who puts his case against another into the hands of an attorney for suit is presuined to authorize and sanction such action as the latter, in his superior knowledge of the law, may

decide to be legal, proper and necessary in the prosecution of the demand; and whatever adverse proceedings the attorney may take are to be considered, so far as they affect the defendant in the suit, as approved in advance by the client, and therefore as his act, even though they prove to be unwarranted by the law; as to trespasses upon. third parties, the rule is different.-Foster v. Wiley, 244.

2. A client is held liable in this case in trespass for the taking of plaintiff's property upon an execution issued by a justice of the peace at the instance of the attorney, after an appeal had been perfected.-Ibid.

3.

The limits to the implied authority of an attorney in ordinary cases of suits brought to enforce money demands pointed out and authorities cited.—Ibid.

4. An attorney employed to carry a suit through for an agreed sum has a vested right to the compensation when he accepts and begins the service; and the subsequent appointment of such attorney to a position where it would become his official duty there. after to conduct such suit to its termination by virtue of his general employment, would not prevent him from recovering the sum agreed upon under the private contract; but if the original employment were to conduct the suit to its termination for such compensation as the services should be reasonably worth, he could only recover the value of his services prior to such appointment.-Detroit v. Whittemore, 281.

5. The employment of counsel does not differ in its incidents, or in the rules which govern it, from the employment of an agent in any other capacity or business.-Ibid.

See CITY COUNSELOR, 1-3.

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

See OFFICE, 1.

ATTORNEYS.

Minutes of: See EVIDENCE, 14.

AUDITOR GENERAL.

See CERTIORARI, 3.

AUTHORIZED ACTS.

See BILL IN EQUITY, 3.

AUTHORITY.

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 1-3.

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