PAGEO

First National Bank v. Watkins, 21 Mich., 483.

500

Kimmell v. Willard's Administrators, 1 Doug., 217.

447

Newberry v. Detroit & Lake Superior Iron Co., 17 Mich.,

O'Hara v. Carpenter, 23 Mich., 410.

180

Pearsons v. Eaton, 18 Mich., 79.

51

People v. Auditors of Wayne County, 5 Mich., 223.

People v. Brigham, 2 Mich., 550.

People v. Highway Commissioners of Caledonia, 16 Mich.,
People v. Highway Commissioners of Nankin, 14 Mich., 528.

Powers v. Irish, 23 Mich., 429.

128

42

63.

People v. Jenness, 5 Mich., 323.

People v. Jones, 6 Mich., 182.

People v. Miles, 2 Mich., 348.

People v. Millspaugh, 11 Mich., 278.

People v. Molitor, 23 Mich., 341.

People v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich., 499.

People v. Supervisors of Ingham, 20 Mich., 95.

503

263

People v. Judges of Branch Circuit, 1 Doug., 319.

People v. Township Board of La Grange, 2 Mich., 187.

83

People v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich., 452.

People v. Township of Overyssel, 11 Mich., 222.

People v. Townships of Porter and Calvin, 18 Mich., 101.
People v. Treasurer of Wayne County, 8 Mich., 392.
Richardson v. Woehler, 26 Mich., 90.

Ripley v. Davis, 15 Mich., 75.

.

Shurtz v. Schoolcraft & Three Rivers R. R. Co., 9 Mich., 269.
Stewart v. Hill, 1 Mich., 265.
Taylor v. Boardman, 24 Mich., 287.
Tefft v. McNoah, 9 Mich., 201.
Tucker v. Tucker, 24 Mich., 426.

Vos v. Dykema, 26 Mich., 399.

Watkins v. Wallace, 19 Mich., 57.

Wayne County v. Detroit, 17 Mich., 390.

Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich., 311.
Whitcomb v. Whitney, 24 Mich., 486.

Wilson v. Wagar, 26 Mich., 452.

Young v. Stephens, 9 Mich., 500.

CATTLE.

See EVIDENCE, 1-4.

CAUSES OF ACTION.

See DECLARATION, 1-4.

CERTIFICATE.

On execution sale: See MORTGAGES, 13. See OFFICE, 3, 5, 7.

1.

2.

3.

CERTIORARI.

Certiorari will not lie to review proceedings of a circuit court com.
missioner in dissolving an attachment, to try the title to the goods
attached, upon a claim of the plaintiff in attachment that the goods
are his own. An attachment is not the proper process to obtain
possession of goods which the plaintiff claims are his property;
his remedy is replevin.—Mendelsohn v. Smith, 2.

A certiorari to review proceedings whereby a new school district
has been created out of old districts must be applied for before the
district has been organized and assumed the functions of a corpora-
tion; after that time the proper course is, to take measures to try
the legality of its corporate existence by quo warranto, or other
direct proceedings against the alleged corporation or its officers.—
Fractional School Dist., etc. v. School Inspectors, etc., S.

The action of the auditor general in charging back to a county
certain taxes, in his settlement with the county, being the exercise
of an official discretion belonging to an executive department of the
state government, is not subject to judicial review, and cannot,
therefore, be examined upon certiorari.—Supervisors of Midland
County v. Auditor General, 165.

4. In certiorari to review the proceedings of a commissioner upon a
habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the imprisonment of one
held on an execution from a justice's court in an action of replevin,
the statement in the affidavit for the certiorari, of the contents of
the justice's docket in the replevin suit, cannot be received as
evidence of what such contents were unless adopted by the return
as true.-Tomlin v. Fisher, 524.

See PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COURTS, 5: PRACTICE IN SUPREME
COURT, 1.

CHANGE OF VENUE.

See PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT Courts, 9.

CHARGE TO THE JURY.

1. It is not error to refuse to repeat, on separate requests, charges
already fully given in as intelligible form.-Leonard v. Pope, 145.
2. A court cannot charge as a question of law upon inferences to be
drawn from physical symptoms. If they are intelligible without

medical testimony, they are for the jury and not for the court to
interpret.-Sheahan v. Barry, 217.

3. A court cannot be required to direct the jury not to be governed
by their sympathies, but to disregard them, where they are suffi-
ciently cautioned that they must be governed by proof.-Ibid.
4. No evidence having been given tending to show any defense to
the plaintiff's claim, the jury should have been instructed that if
they believed the plaintiff's evidence (which was wholly uncon-
tradicted), they should find a verdict in his favor.-Roberts v.
Field, 337.

5. A charge to the jury is to be considered together as a whole;
and if an erroneous statement in one part of it is so naturally
and intimately connected in sense with others explanatory thereof,
as to be understood by the jury as intended to be considered
together, and as relating to the same point, and the charge con-
sidered as a whole is in substantial compliance with the requests
of the party complaining of such error, his objection will not be
sustained.-McGinnis v. Kempsey, 363.

6. Where there was no evidence tending in any way to prove justi-
fication, it was improper to give any charge on the subject;
but this was not an error against defendant.-Johnson v. McKee,
471.

7. When witnesses are contradictory, it is proper to caution the jury
concerning the care to be used in considering the testimony.-
Ibid.

See EVIDENCE, 3: INSURANCE, 5: LICENSES, 2: PRACTICE IN
CIRCUIT COURTS, 11-13: PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT, 12:
SEDUCTION, 5-7: TROVER, 2: WILLS, 5.

CHARGE UPON THE OWNER.

See TAXES, 2.

CHARTER OF LANSING.

See MANDAMUS, 1.

CHASTITY.

See SEDUCTION, 1-7.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

1. The description of property in a chattel mortgage, after enume-
rating certain articles specifically, concludes, carpets, bedding,
bedroom furniture and other personal property in and about said
house and premises; except herefrom such personal property as
is exempt from execution by the laws of the state of Michigan,
to wit: stoves in use, family pictures, library and school books,
clothing, provisions, fuel and sewing machine; also excepting
household goods, furniture and utensils therein, of the value of
two hundred and fifty dollars;" the mortgagors had at the time
in said house two hundred and fifty dollars worth of goods, fur-
niture and utensils, besides the enumerated articles and those
exempt from execution:-

Held, That, construing this mortgage in the light of the facts
found, the exception applies to the property described generally,
and not to the articles specifically enumerated, and that the spe-
cific articles are intended to be mortgaged unconditionally.—Gid-
dey v. Uhl, 94.

2. A finding of facts which shows that a chattel mortgage was
assigned to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration, in the
absence of any showing that there was any other instrument to
which the mortgage was collateral, will be construed as a finding
of an assignment which was effectual to pass the interest of the
mortgagee, and is not open to the objection that it fails to show
an assignment of the debt, and is therefore insufficient; it will
not be presumed in such case that the mortgage was collateral
to any other instrument; on the contrary, the presumption is the
other way.-Ibid.

3.

Whether the assignment of a mortgage collateral to some other
instrument by which the debt is witnessed does not convey the
mortgage to the assignee, as trustee for the owner of the debt,
so as to authorize that trustee to maintain a suit at law for the
property or its proceeds:-Quære?—Ibid.

See FIXTURES, 2.

CHILDREN.

See STREET RAILWAYS, 2-5.

CIRCUIT COURT COMMISSIONER.

See ATTACHMENT, 5, 6: CERTIORARI, 4: POSSESSION OF LAND,
7-10: PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAW, 3.

CIRCUIT JUDGE.

See EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 1: PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT
COURTS, 12, 13.

CITY.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2.

CITY COUNSELOR,

1. The city counselor of Detroit being required by the city ordi-
nances to appear as attorney and counsel in behalf of the city in
all suits, prosecutions or proceedings, brought in any circuit court
or the supreme court of the state, or in any United States court,
by or against the city, or any board thereof, etc., and to prose-
cute or defend therein, to the termination thereof, and his official
bond being required to be conditioned for the performance of all
his duties as prescribed by the charter and ordinances, one who
has, previous to his appointment as such counselor, been employed
to bring and carry through to its termination a suit in behalf of
the city, cannot recover on a quantum meruit for services in said
suit performed after he became city counselor, in the absence of
any agreement that the business of carrying on such suit, though
falling within his official duties, should not be considered as
included among the services paid for by the annual salary, but
should be compensated for in some other way.-Detroit v. Whitte-
more, 281.

2. Where the duties performed by one holding the position of city
counselor are official duties, such as that officer is by law required
to perform, and such as by his official bond he has agreed to
perform, it is impossible to infer, in the absence of any express
contract to that effect, entered into when he accepted the appoint-
ment, that such duties were to stand apart from the official duties
in general, and to be paid for separately, because of some previ
ous understanding which was had when the official appointment
was not contemplated; all such previous understandings will be
regarded as terminated by and merged in the appointment, unless
otherwise expressly agreed.—Ibid.

3. In this suit, which is framed and conducted on the theory that
the services for which recovery is sought were excepted by the
previous understanding, from the official duties of city counselor
for which the salary was intended as compensation, and not on
the theory that no compensation was fixed and allowed by the

27 MICH.-71.