in many of them, as may well induce us to bear with resignation those whose design we cannot so fully comprehend, until it shall please our heavenly Father to give us clearer light and stronger vision.

It is true that the evil we suffer, and, indeed, that the general train of events, is the result of laws which we cannot without absurdity suppose the Deity to be continually changing and suspending, for the benefit of individuals. Neither does any rational believer in a Providence maintain such an opinion. It is not necessary to his argument, to suppose that these general laws have ever once been suspended. From a conviction, that he has evidence of the fact, he may believe that on some occasions of supreme importance they have been suspended; but the great argument for the doctrine of a Providence would remain just the same, even though it could be demonstrated, that the laws by which the universe is governed have operated with undeviating regularity from the beginning. For whoever believes that these general laws were appointed by a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness, must admit that he foresaw all the consequences which would result from their operation, in every instant of time, and to every individual. If, therefore, when he appointed them, he foresaw that they would give rise to any event inconsistent with perfect benevoolence, he would have so modified them, as effectually to have prevented its occurrence, or he would have provided for its counteraction, by the operation of secondary causes. Whether the Deity govern the universe by such an original adjustment as secures, with undeviating order, the occurrence of every thing in its proper season, place, and manner, according to the plan which his wisdom and goodness have ordained, or whether he govern it by a continual superintendence of events, every thing, on either supposition, is entirely in his hands. It is possible that the first is his plan; he may have adopted the second; both must be alike easy to him. But, since both were equally in his power, he can have been induced to choose the one rather than the other, only because the one is better adapted than the other to accomplish the

purposes of benevolence; and it seems scarcely possible for us not to conclude, that these purposes may be better effected by the second than by the first, and therefore that this is the plan which he has adopted.

To sum up the whole argument, if of every event all the care is not taken which it is right should be taken, the administration of the world is imperfect; but the wisdom, power, and goodness, which are spent on the minutest and the meanest object we can contemplate, necessarily lead to the conclusion, that their Author possesses these attributes in a perfect measure; and, since they have been exerted in the production of particular objects, they must be employed in the government of the whole. We have therefore the most solid ground to adopt the sublime and cheering conclusion, that nothing can happen without the knowledge and permission of unerring wisdom and perfect goodness, and that all the vast affairs of the universe, in every particular circumstance, and in every instant of time, are under the wisest and the best direction.

The preceding arguments are founded on the perfections which the Deity is universally acknowledged to possess, and their truth must be admitted by every consistent theist. But if God have given to his intelligent offspring a revelation of his will-if he have altered the course of nature, in attestation of its truth-if, to prove the divinity of the mission of the great personage whom he raised up to communicate it, he endowed him with the power of performing such stupendous works as no being, unassisted by him, could possibly accomplish-if mankind were in want of a revelation-if the revelation actually given be in every respect suited to supply it-if it be calculated to rectify their errors, to purify their hearts, to exalt their hopes, to dignify their pursuits, to promote their truest welfare here, and to prepare them for pure and ever-increasing happiness hereafter-if all the circumstances of time, place, and method, were admirably adapted to give it effect, and to secure the most important objects it is designed to accomplish, then is the doctrine of providence established on a new

basis. Every Christian must believe that the affairs of mankind are under the direction of the Deity-that he has not cut himself off from all interference with the wants and happiness of his creatures-that he does interpose for their welfare as he sees occasion; for the Christian system is one of the most illustrious and delightful instances of that interposition.

If, from the fact itself of a divine revelation, we descend to the particular doctrines which it contains, we shall find the most decisive evidence of this truth. It is recognised in every page—it is affirmed on innumerable occasions, and in every variety of form. God is there represented as the Sovereign Arbiter of events—as the Great Being who sitteth on the circle of the earth, judging among the nations. It is he who causeth the sun to shine, and the rain to descend; it is he who giveth healthful and fruitful seasons; it is he who rideth on the wings of the wind, and it is his voice which thunders in the storm. By him kings reign and princes decree justice. He exalteth one and abaseth another. He turneth round the mighty wheel of events, retaining every individual in the situation which he judges fit. He hath made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on the face of the earth; he hath determined their appointed times, and the place of their habitation.'

Our reverend Master assures us, that not even a sparrow falleth to the ground without the will of our heavenly Father, and that the very hairs of our head are all numbered; meaning, it is evident, that our most trifling concerns are appointed by him. Behold,' says he, 'the fowls of the air; for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they? And why are ye anxious about raiment? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin; and yet Solomon, in all his glory, was not arrayed like one these. Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which flourisheth to-day, and to-morrow is cast into the furnace, will he not much more clothe you? Take not, therefore, anxious thought, saying, What shall

we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewithal shall we be clothed? For your heavenly Father knoweth that you have need of all these things. But seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.'

The argument which our Lord here employs is beautiful and affecting. Every one must have felt its force. When, in a solitary ramble, our eye has been struck with a little flower blooming in a secluded spot-when we have examined the perfection of all its parts-the richness, the variety, the exquisite beauty of its tintswhen we have considered the care which has been taken of this humble plant, and the inimitable skill employed in the construction of it, which of us has not been deeply impressed with the truth which our divine Instructer here teaches us? Which of us has not said to himself, Can so much skill have been lavished in forming, can so much care have been taken in preserving, this little flower, and can I, humble and insignificant though I am, be overlooked by the Author of my being? It is impossible. There must be a God; there must be a Providence; and I, and the myriads of creatures who, in common with me, enjoy the boon of existence, have reason to rejoice.

SECTION II.

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT IS ADMINISTERED.

WHEN the Deity is represented as appointing and controlling every event, it may seem difficult to conceive how this can be reconciled with the agency and accountability of man. A little consideration, however, will show that these truths are not incompatible with each other.

Though the Sovereign Arbiter of events regulates and determines every thing, yet he carries on the administration of the world by the instrumentality of other beings. Seldom does he act directly; seldom is he the immediate cause of any thing. He has left the developement of his vast plan to the operation of what are termed secondary causes; but these can act only so far, and in such a manner, as he has appointed.

The material world is governed by certain general laws, which are never interrupted except on occasions of supreme importance, foreseen and provided for from the beginning. These laws, though thus steady and invariable in their operation, bring about, in every instant of time, precisely that condition only of the material world. which he appoints, and which is necessary to carry on his purposes with regard to his animal and moral creation. The animal and moral world he governs by laws equally fixed and invariable; but, being of a nature different from that of the material world, they require to be governed by different laws. By different laws, therefore, they are governed; by laws admirably and exactly suited to its nature, each is guided to its destined end.

The material world, being without sensation and thought, is governed by a particular set of laws. The animal world, possessing sensation and thought, is governed by another set. By sensation and thought, an