tion-that he is an object of moral disapprobation, and is worthy of punishment when his volition is evil, and when, notwithstanding the voice which speaks within him, and which warns him of its nature, he yields to its impulse. The gold which incites the midnight plunderer to rob is not blamable, though it is the immediate cause of the volition which induces the evil deed. It is the volition itself which is evil, and which requires to be rectified, and punishment is the process, the moral discipline, by which its correction is effected.

Thus, then, we seem to have a clear and just conception of the manner in which the whole train of circumstances, which forms the character and induces the conduct of moral agents, may be entirely the appointment of the Deity, while the agents themselves are at the same time the subjects of praise and blame, of reward and punishment.

Were there no evil in the world, there could be no possible objection to this view of the subject.* Were every one virtuous and happy, every heart would rejoice to trace to the Deity its excellences and its pleasures. But how can he who is perfect in benignity be the author of evil? It is this which perplexes the mind; and the answer to the question involves the great inquiry, about which intelligent and pious persons have in all ages exercised their most anxious thoughts, and leads directly to the consideration of the design of the Deity in the administration of the world. Into the consideration of this subject, we shall enter in the next section; but, before proceeding to it, it may be proper to notice an objection of minor importance, which is sometimes urged against the doctrine of providence, and which has been stated and answered in so excellent a manner by Dr. Price, in his admirable Disquisition on Providence, (p. 47,) that it seems a kind of injustice to the subject, to employ any language but his own:

Neither would there be the same objection to it in the minds of many persons, did it only attribute to the Deity the production of natural evil. But the misery occasioned by an earthquake, or by disease, is often as great as that produced by the bad passions of mankind; and it is altogether as difficult to account for the existence of natural as of moral evil. Indeed, the same account must be given of both.

It has been often objected, that it is impairing the beauty of the world, and representing it as a production more imperfect than any work of human art, to maintain that it cannot subsist of itself, or that it requires the hand of its Maker to be always at it, to continue its motions and order.

The full answer to this objection is, that, to every machine or perpetual movement, for answering any particular purpose, there always belong some first mover, some weight or spring, or other power, which is continually acting upon it, and from which all its motions are derived; nor, without such power, is it possible to conceive of any such machine. The machine of the universe, then, like all besides analogous to it, of which we have any idea, must have a first mover. Now it has been demonstrated, that this first mover cannot be matter itself. It follows, therefore, that this objection is so far from being of any force, that it leads us to the very conclusion which it is brought to overthrow.

"The excellence of a machine by no means depends on its going properly of itself-for this is impossible-but on the skill with which its various parts are adjusted to one another, and all its different effects are derived from the constant action of some power. What would indeed make a machine appear imperfect and deformed, is assigning a seperate power to every distinct part, without allowing any place for mechanism; and, in like manner, what would really make the frame of nature appear imperfect and deformed, is resolving phenomena too soon to the divine agency, or supposing it the immediate cause of every particular effect. But I have not been pleading for this, but only, that, however far mechanism may be carried, and the chain of causes extend in the material universe, to the divine power exerted continually in all places, every law, and every effect and motion in it, must be at last resolved. This is a conclusion which the modern improvements in natural philosophy have abundantly confirmed, and which some of the first and best philosophers have received; nor can that philosophy be otherwise than little and contemptible, which hides the Deity from our views, which excludes

him from the world, or does not terminate in the acknowledgment and adoration of him, as the Maker, Preserver, and Ruler of all things."*

* The philosopher, who overlooks the traces of an all-governing Deity in nature, contenting himself with the appearances of the material universe only, and the mechanical laws of motion, neglects what is most excellent, and prefers what is imperfect to what is supremely perfect, finitude to infinity, what is narrow and weak to what is unlimited and almighty, and what is perishing to what endures for ever.'—Mr. Maclaurin's Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Discoveries, book iv. chap. ix. sect. 1.

'Sir Isaac Newton thought it most unaccountable to exclude the Deity only out of the universe. It appeared to him much more just and reasonable, to suppose that the whole chain of causes, or the several series of them, should centre in him, as their source, and the whole system appear depending on him, the only Independent Cause.'-Ibid. sect. 5.

4*

SECTION III.

OF THE DESIGN OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

SINCE, then, there is a perfect superintendence of all events, they must be directed to some end. The Deity must have some wise and benevolent object to accomplish, as the result of his administration, and that object can be nothing but the final and perfect happiness of his intelligent creatures.

Were

With this view every thing must be planned, and to this end both the natural and the moral disorders which prevail must necessarily conduce. No one can believe that the Deity has chosen evil for its own sake. this the case, he would not be good. Were he to cause the least degree of suffering, merely for the sake of producing pain, it would be utterly incompatible with benevolence. Evil in his hands, therefore, can only be the instrument of good. Nothing can have induced him to permit its existence, but the perception, that under his administration it will terminate in the production of greater good than could have been enjoyed without it. When he created the world, and first set in motion that train of events which has induced the actual state of things, he foresaw that the partial evil which would arise would terminate in the production of a larger sum of happiness than could have been occasioned by its prevention. This being the case, it is the prevention, not the permission, of this evil, which would have militated against the perfection of his benevolence. That infinite

wisdom and almighty power may secure this result from the partial prevalence of evil, is at least possible, and it is probable, because the supposition is perfectly reasonable in itself, and accounts for and reconciles every appearance.

It has been distinctly admitted, that these reasonings are conclusive, and that the doctrine founded upon them

must be allowed to be established, if the principle be granted, that evil, under the superintendence of infinite wisdom and benignity, is the means of producing ultimate good.* It is impossible to desire any other concession than this.

That no formal proof of this principle was attempted in the preceding editions of this work, arose from the author's impression, that, in assuming it as true, he only took for granted, that which all Christians not only believe, but glory in believing. That a theist-that a Christian, writing in the nineteenth century, in a country in which the doctrines of theology are so freely discussed, and the scriptures so generally read, should not only expressly deny the beneficial tendency of evil in the divine administration, but positively affirm that it is essentially and ultimately evil, and even that there is no proposition more indispensable to the existence of true religion, as a habit of the mind,t could scarcely have been expected. However, the position, that evil is not itself an end, but the means to some further end, and that that end is good, is not, it must be confessed, self-evident, and therefore it may be proper to state the proof of it. The believer in the doctrine of final restoration can have no other wish, than that it should be considered as just or

* As to Dr. Smith's reasoning, it may indeed appear perfectly conclusive, to those who are willing to admit certain leading positions on which the whole is made to rest as unquestionable truths.'-Eclectic Review, October, 1818, art. iii. p. 338.-It may be admitted, that there is a plausibleness in the hypothesis to which we have already alluded, and which includes the whole of the argument adduced in support of the doctrine of final restitution, namely, that evil, moral as well as natural, is but a means in the great machinery of the universe, essential to the higher good of the creature.'-Eclectic Review, p. 346.—The argument a priori, in favor of the doctrine of universal restoration, is not only specious, but satisfactory, if the one thing which requires to be proved is taken for granted- --if it be allowed that evil is a branch of the divine contrivance, for the production of a higher ultimate good to the creaturethat it is but the temporary name of a particular class of the dispensations of sovereign benficence-if, in a word, the foremost and favorite dogma of infidelity be conceded, that all things are as God makes them.'Ibid., December, 1818, art. iv. p. 539.

We question if there is a proposition more indispensable to the existence of true religion, considered as a habit of the mind, than this, that evil is essentially and ultimately evil.-Eclectic Review, October, 1818, p.

416.