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sons who have caused this nuisance may be liable to an action or some other proceeding, they are not liable to be proceeded against under the summary power given by this act. It seems to me to be clear on looking at sections 12. and 30. that the Justices have not complete jurisdiction unless the cause and effect of the nuisance are both within the area of the local authority. Unless that be so, they have no power at all. It was never intended by the legislature that this summary mode of proceeding should be given in such a case, for if it were so it would lead to the most serious consequences. The remedy must remain as it was at common law so far as this case is concerned. The act causing the nuisance was done by Messrs. Ind & Coope in the parish of Romford by throwing the refuse of their beer barrels into the water of the river, and nothing was done by them in the parish of Dagenham. Therefore, the cause did. not arise within the area of the jurisdiction of the local authority, and the rule must be discharged.

ERLE, J.-I am entirely of the same opinion. The rule must be discharged. This summary jurisdiction is created for the removal of nuisances, and machinery is provided for doing so by the establishment of a local board; and the only nuisances within the jurisdiction of the Justices are those which are within the local area of the local authority. The remedy so given by the act is confined to cases where no great doubt as to the existence of the nuisance would exist, where it might be ascertained by the exercise of sight, touch or smell by those persons to whom the jurisdiction is given. Then everything which is ascertained to exist as a nuisance within the area of their jurisdiction may be removed by the local authority. This is very different from the trying a question of a consequential result arising from that which has been done in a distant place, and has caused a nuisance within the area of the local authority. It is admitted that the business of these brewers was carried on at Romford, and that they poured their refuse into the river Rom at that place, and caused damage at Dagenham by reason of their having poured in such refuse at Romford. If a power was given to any two Justices to try such a question as that,

it would lead to the most formidable consequences. There is no question which comes before the Courts more difficult to try than those which arise in cases of manufactories, and consequential nuisances arising from the manner in which the busi-` ness is carried on. Such questions are most complicated; they require the most scientific evidence in their investigation, and are not fit to be tried by the Justices in this way. The purview of the act shews this. "Nuisances," mentioned in section 8, are caused by the local habitatation of the origin of the smells, &c.; the word "nuisances" is to include, first, any premises in such a state as to be a nuisance or injurious to health; and next, any pool, ditch, gutter, watercourse, privy, urinal, cesspool, drain or ashpit so foul as to be a nuisance or injurious to health: that seems therefore to point to such nuisances as can be seen or smelt; and though the word "watercourse" is used, it comes in the middle of the other kinds pointed out, and is followed by "any animal so kept as to be a nuisance or injurious to health." Then the local authority may go and see whether such nuisances do exist. The mode of proceeding which is given by the act is very material. By section 16, where it shall appear to the Justices that the execution of structural works is required for the abatement of a nuisance, they may direct such works to be carried out under the direction or with the consent or approval of the board, &c.; but if the provisions of this act of parliament are to apply to the present case, the local board of Dagenham cannot go to Romford to inspect the works and houses there. Then section 22. gives power to lay down sewers where ditches, gutters, drains or watercourses are nuisances within the meaning of the act, but the local authority could not be authorized to go and cover up the ditches or drains in Romford. I am clearly of opinion with the Lord Chief Justice that it would be most dangerous to sanction the notion that such a question as this could be decided at a distance from the place where the act causing the damage is done, by a proceeding before the Justices (2). Rule discharged.

(2) Wightman, J. and Hill, J. were sitting in the Court of Criminal Appeal.

1858. LABALMONDIERE, appellant, v. Nov. 6. J ADDISON, respondent.

Metropolitan Building Act, 1855, (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122.) ss. 73, 103.-11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. s. 11.-Recovery of ExpensesLimitation of Time for Complaint.

By the Metropolitan Building Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122.), s. 73, all expenses incurred by the Commissioners in respect of any dangerous structure shall be paid by the owner; and by section 103. all expenses, to be recovered in a summary manner, may be recovered as directed by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, by section 11. of which complaint must be laid within six months from the time when the matter of such complaint arose. The owner of a dangerous structure not having taken it down, as required pursuant to the former act, the Commissioners took it down; and the amount of the expenses incurred was demanded of the owner and refused. A complaint was laid before a Magistrate, for the non-payment of the expenses, within six months of the demand and refusal, but beyond six months from the completion of the works :-Held, that the matter of complaint was the non-payment of the expenses, and that the time of limitation ran from the demand and not from the completion of the works; therefore that the complaint was in time.

Case stated on appeal by one of the Metropolitan Police Magistrates.

In the year 1856 a certain structure, of which the respondent was the owner, was certified to the appellant, one of the Assistant Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis authorized to act in the matter of the Metropolitan Building Act, 1855, to be in a dangerous state, whereupon the Commissioners, on the 16th of July 1856, duly gave notice to the respondent, requiring him, according to the provisions of the said act, to take down and secure the structure within fourteen days from the date of such notice. The respondent having failed to comply with this requisition, the Commissioners made complaint thereof to the Magistrate; and, on the 3rd of September in the same year, 1856, he made an order, in writing, upon the respondent, requiring him to take down from the top to the bottom the defecNEW SERIES, XXVIII.—MAG. CAS.

tive portions of the structure, and otherwise to render the same secure, to the satisfaction of the surveyor appointed by the Commissioners in that behalf, within one month from the date of that order.

With this order the respondent did not comply; and the dangerous structure not having been taken down, or otherwise secured, within the time limited by the order, the Commissioner, in January 1857, under the authority of the said act, caused so much of the structure as was in a dangerous condition to be taken down, repaired, and otherwise secured in such manner as was requisite. In so doing expenses were incurred by him, by virtue of the second part of the Metropolitan Building Act, 1855, relating to dangerous structures, amounting to the sum of 491. 3s. Notice of these expenses was given to the respondent by the Commissioners on the 30th of April 1858, and payment of the amount was at the same time demanded. With this demand the respondent refused to comply.

The 73rd section of the Metropolitan Building Act, 1855, provides, that all expenses incurred by the Commissioners in respect of any dangerous structure, by virtue of the second part of that act, shall be paid by the owner of such structure; and the same act provides, that such expenses may be recovered in a summary manner; and by the 103rd section of the same act it is enacted, that all expenses by that act directed to be recovered in a summary manner may be recovered in manner directed by the statute 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, intituled, 'An act to facilitate the performance of the duties of Justices of the Peace out of Sessions within England and Wales with respect to summary convictions and orders.'

The repairing and securing the works. executed by the Commissioners were completed, and the expenses occasioned thereby were incurred before the end of the month of January 1857; but no complaint was made, and no information was laid against Mr. Addison by the Commissioner respecting the expenses he had incurred as before mentioned until the 11th of May 1858, on which day the Commissioner made a complaint before the Magistrate, and a summons was issued calling upon the respondent to an

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swer it. The summons was as follows:"Whereas complaint has this day been made, before &c., by Charles Reeves, for that on the 3rd of September 1856, at &c., certain work was ordered to be done upon the premises, No. 6, Delahay Street, Westminster, within the Metropolitan Police District, of which you (the respondent) were the owner, pursuant to the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 122, and the sum of 49l. 3s. having been expended in carrying out the said work, together with the fees due thereon, and the said sum of 491. 3s. having been applied for on the 30th of April last, you have neglected and refused to pay the same, contrary to the statute, &c. These are therefore to command you, &c., dated the 11th of May 1852." (1)

The Magistrate dismissed the summons upon the ground that the complaint had not been made within six calendar months from the time when the matter of such complaint arose. In the Metropolitan Building Act, 1855, no time of limitation for complaints or information is specified, but by section 11. of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. it is enacted, "that in all cases where no time is already or shall hereafter be especially limited for making a complaint or laying an information in the act or acts of parliament relating to each particular case, such complaint shall be made and such information shall be laid within six calendar months from the time when the matter of such complaint or information respectively arose." The Magistrate determined that the matter of complaint in this case arose at the time the works were completed and the expenses had been incurred, and that the six calendar months limited by the above statute must be considered to run from that time.

The question for the opinion of the Court was, whether the matter of complaint in this case was to be considered as arising at the time the works were completed, and the expenses incurred by the Commissioner, or at the time of the demand made by him on the respondent for payment, and the refusal to comply with such demand. In the former case, more than six months

(1) The summons was not set out in the case, but was produced to the Court, on the hearing, at the Chief Justice's desire.

had elapsed from the time when the matter of complaint arose, and the determination of the application by dismissing the summons was correct; but if the terminus was to be taken from the date of the demand and refusal, the determination was erroneous.

Quain, for the respondent, in support of the decision of the Magistrate.-The Magistrate was right; the complaint was too late. The 73rd section of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 122. says simply, "that all expenses incurred by the Commissioners in respect of any dangerous structure shall be paid by the owner;" no demand, therefore, of the money was necessary, and the money became payable as soon as the expenses were incurred, that is, as soon as the works were completed. Section 103. incorporates the summary proceedings under the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, and, by section 11. of the latter act, the time limited for making the complaint is six months from the time when the matter of the complaint arose; in the present case, the matter of the complaint arose, not on the non-payment on demand, but as soon as the money was payable on the completion of the works. In The Kennett and Avon Canal Company v. the Great Western Railway Company (2), the defendants were empowered by statute to divert the plaintiffs' canal, and it was enacted, that if the canal should be obstructed, the defendants should pay to the plaintiffs, as ascertained damages, 10l. an hour during the continuance of the obstruction, and that in default of payment on demand the plaintiffs might recover the sum by an action of debt; and no action was to be brought for anything done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of the act, but within six months after the act committed, or in the case of continuing damage within six months after the damage had ceased; and it was held, in an action for the liquidated damages for obstructing the canal, that the six months ran, but from the last obstruction.

Hawkins, for the appellant.-The limitation in the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. s. 11. does not apply; but, assuming that it does, the complaint was made in due time; the mat

(2) 7 Q.B. Rep. 824; s. c. 14 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 325.

ter of complaint is not the not doing the works ordered, but the non-payment of the expenses incurred by the Commissioners. The respondent was not and could not be in default until the money was demanded of him, or, at least, until he had notice of the amount of expense incurred, and the only notice he had was with the demand on the 30th of April, which was within six months of the complaint.

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-It seems contrary to all reason to say, that there was any liability or default in the respondent before application had been made to him, stating what the amount of expenses were and demanding payment, although a demand is not expressly required by the statute. The six months, therefore, had not elapsed when the complaint was laid.

WIGHTMAN, J.-The default of the respondent alleged in the summons is, the non-payment of the amount of expenses after having been applied to for them.

HILL, J. concurred (3).

Matter remitted to the Magistrate.

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Manslaughter- Keeping Fireworks Negligence of Servants-Remote Cause of Death.

The prisoner made fireworks, and kept them for sale in a house in the Westminster Road. In his absence, by negligence or accident a fire took place among the materials of the fireworks, which set light to a rocket and caused it to fly across the street and set fire to a house in which a person was who was burnt to death:-Held, that as the death was not caused alone by the illegal act of the prisoner in keeping the fireworks, but by the superadded act of some one else in setting them on fire, the illegal keeping the fireworks was too remotely the cause of the death to render the prisoner amenable to a charge of manslaughter.

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Willes, J. stated the following CASE:William Bennett was convicted before me, at the Old Bailey, on the 18th of August 1858, of the manslaughter of Sarah Williams. The substantial question is, whether a person who makes fireworks, contrary to the 9 & 10 Will. 3. c. 7. s. 1, is indictable for manslaughter if death be caused by a fire breaking out among combustibles in his possession, collected by him in the course of use for the purpose of his business, but not completely made into fireworks at the time.

The prisoner had a house and firework shop in the Westminster Road,

where, for some time before the fire hereinafter mentioned, he openly carried on the business of selling fireworks; he had also a workshop at a neighbour's, named Sunter, and a factory at Peckham. He had contracted to supply Vauxhall and Cremorne Gardens with fireworks, which he regularly did in considerable quantities. He made and kept his stock of fireworks at the factory at Peckham; from there he used to take the supply necessary for the Gardens daily to the house in the Westminster Road, where they used to be kept for two or three hours, until they were taken away for the use of the Gardens. In the room at Sunter's the smaller sort of rockets were made, excepting heads for holding stars; these heads were added at the house in the Westminster Road. At the house in the Westminster Road fireworks were offered for sale. No fireworks were made there, except as follows: first, the finishing the smaller rockets, as already mentioned, and making stars for them of combustible matter; secondly, making fireworks called "serpents"; thirdly, making cases with combustible matter called

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red, blue, and green fire." It is to this last-mentioned part of the business that I ought to direct particular attention.

This fire was employed for filling coloured cases used to imitate revolving lights in fireworks called "wheels." These cases were not used by themselves, but in connexion with other fireworks, to add to their effect. The contents of the cases of fire made at the Westminster Road were combustible, and the red fire would explode if struck hard. Five or six pounds of fire

were made every day in the Westminster Road and filled there, in the back room, into the cases with a rammer and mallet, by persons employed for the purpose. At the time of the fire there was a quantity of red and blue fire in the house, in the room where it was put into the cases, in order to be used as already mentioned in the course of the business, and a quantity of fireworks for the evening. On Monday, the 12th of July, about six in the evening, the prisoner being out of the house, and not personally interfering, a fire broke out. in the red and blue fire, which communicated to the fireworks, causing a rocket to fly across the street and set fire to a house at the opposite side in which the deceased Sarah Williams was burnt to death. The fire was accidental, in the sense of not being wilful or designed. It did not happen through any personal interference or negligence of the prisoner, and he is entitled to the benefit of any distinction between its happening through negligence of his servants, and by pure accident without any such negligence.

It was contended that there was no case against the prisoner, insomuch as the cases of red fire were only parts of fireworks, and not within the statute, and that it did not appear that by reason of making fireworks the mischief happened; and that, at all events, the death of the deceased was not the direct and immediate result of any wrong or omission on the prisoner's part; and there was cited a case from the Sessions Reports at the Old Bailey, in which Alderson, B. is reported to have held, that an indictment for manslaughter was not maintainable under such circumstances. I, however, overruled these objections, holding that the prisoner was guilty of a misdemeanour in doing an act with intent to do what was forbidden by the statute; and that as the fire was occasioned by such misdemeanour, and without it would not have taken place, or could not have been of such a character as to cause the death of the deceased, which otherwise would not have taken place, a case was made out. The question of a nuisance, independent of the statute 9 & 10 Will. 3. c. 7. and the consideration arising upon it, need not be noticed as it has been disposed of upon the facts in favour of the

prisoner. Entertaining doubts upon the above points, I request the opinion of the Judges.

Giffard, for the prisoner, was stopped by the Court.

Martin, for the Crown.-The prisoner is responsible for the consequences of his unlawful act of keeping the fireworks contrary to the statute.

COCKBURN, C.J.-The prisoner kept a quantity of fireworks in his house, but that alone did not cause the fire by which the death was occasioned. It was the superadded negligence of some one else that caused it. Had the death proceeded from the natural consequence of this unlawful keeping of the fireworks, as, for instance, if from the prisoner's negligent keeping of them a rocket had gone off in spontaneous combustion, and so caused the death, the conviction might, I think, have been maintained. But here the death was caused by the act of the defendant plus the act of some one else.

WILLES, J.-Having given very full consideration to this case since the trial, I concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice, that the intervening of the negligent act of the servant makes the death too remotely caused by the illegal act of the prisoner in keeping the fireworks, and so disconnects it from his act, and that the conviction cannot be supported.

The other Judges concurred.
Conviction quashed.

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