was agreed that the said rate should be amended by assessing, for the purposes of this case, the said wet dock, tidal basin and canal at the sum of 21d. in the pound on the sum of 6,250l., and the residue of the said premises at the sum of 63d. in the pound on the sum of 6,2501.

Tindal Atkinson and Murphy, in support of the order of Sessions (June 1). The question arises on the construction of section 33. The appellants contend that they are only to be rated as the occupiers of "land"; while, on the contrary, the Sessions have held that they ought to be rated as the occupiers of property "other than land." The land, which is now covered with water, is taken out of agricultural possession, and is made profitable for commercial purposes. The principle is laid down in The Queen v. the Midland Railway Company (1), where the question being whether the railway was made rateable, "land" being excepted, the Court said, "Reading the two clauses together as comprehending all real property, we think that the exception extends only to land used for the purposes of agriculture, or gardening, or any kind of mere vegetation, together with the roads and other matters that are ancillary to those purposes; and that hereditaments in which capital has been invested for habitation, or for purposes of profit from manufacturing or mechanical industry are to be rated."

[ERLE, J.-Are the two statutes identical?]

No, they are not; but the principle applies equally to the one under which this question arises; and a certain benefit is derived by the appellants in consequence of the external area being lighted and watched by the parish. The next section (34.) contains the proviso, "That every courtyard, yard or garden (such garden not being a market-garden or nursery ground) shall be included in and make part of the assessment to be made on the house, buildings or other property, to which they may be respectively attached." Here the whole area, basins, warehouses and all, are inclosed within a wall.

(1) 4 E. & B. 958.

[CROMPTON, J.-I thought that warehouses were ancillary to docks, not docks to warehouses. Is not the real question, what is the meaning of "land"?]

Yes, that is the question; and it is submitted that "land" is used in the limited sense of land occupied for agricultural purposes, as defined in The Queen v. the Midland Railway Company.

[ERLE, J.-The act there contained the word "works," and the Court held that the line of railway was a work."]

But "land" was defined in the judgment. The Queen v. the Southwark and Vauxhall Water Company (2) is distinguishable, for there the land which the appellants were rated for could not be benefited at all by the watching and lighting.

[LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-Must not this be taken to be unum quid? It appears to me that you cannot sever this part from the rest.]

Bovill, for the appellants.-In reality the area of these docks is land covered with water, used for the passage and floating of ships. It was intended by the statute to effect an equitable adjustment of property, the assessment being made as for the poor-rate. Section 34. enacts that it shall be lawful for the overseers, and they are hereby required, whenever, according to the rate made for the relief of the poor, one and the same person shall be rated in one sum in respect of land, and also of houses, buildings and other property, &c. That shews that "property," in section 33, means property ejusdem generis with the houses and buildings. The " courtyards," mentioned in section 34, would have been "land" if there had not been a special provision to the contrary; both sections must be read together. The Queen v. the Southwark and Vauxhall Water Company is conclusive in favour of the appellants; it was there held, that the company were only rateable at the lower amount; but water-pipes are nothing but reservoirs, and reservoirs are land. The Court is asked to say that there is a difference between a large and a small reservoir in considering the question whether they are land or not. In The Queen v.

(2) 6 E. & B. 1008.

The Court differing in opinion, the following judgments were now delivered.

ERLE, J.-This case turns upon the construction of section 33. of the 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 90, directing the rate for lighting and watching to be the same as the poor-rate, except that the rate on houses, buildings and property other than land, is to be three times greater than the rate on land. The appellants, lessees of the Victoria London Docks, admit that all houses and buildings whatsoever, such as warehouses, wharfs and locks, are to be rated at the higher rate; but they contend that the area of the dock, being mere land covered with water used for the passage and the floating of ships, amounting to 95 acres out of 165, ought to be rated at the lower rate as land. In answering the question thus raised, we must consider the words of the enactment describing the two classes of property, and the purpose for which the two classes were made. All rateable property is included under the term "land," and land is here divided into two classes: the one consisting of houses, buildings and property of that sort, the other consisting of all land not included in the first-named class. The general rule is well known, that specific words, when followed by wider terms, restrict the extension of those terms. According to the rule of construction, the class of property subjected to the higher rate is confined to houses and buildings, and other property of the same sort as houses and buildings; and this stands decided in The Queen v. the Southwark and Vauxhall Waterworks Company. If we refer to the purpose of the enactment the incurrence of charge

(3) 14 East, 609.

(4) 1 M. & S. 635.

(5) 8 E. & B. 212; s. c. 27 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 177.

NEW SERIES, XXVIII.-MAG. Cas.

must be intended to be in proportion to the benefit derived. The charge here is the price for lighting and watching, which is a need created by dense habitation, for which the legislature has repeatedly made provision, treating it as an incident to towns. Thus, in local acts for the improvement of towns, in the Metropolis Local Management Act and the Municipal Corporations Act, the charge for lighting and watching is imposed by various descriptions on the locality frequented by numerous inhabitants, where light is required in respect of personal passage, and watchmen are required for keeping good order. By the Plymouth Local Act the charge was on the populous or town part of the borough, which was further described to be within 100 feet of the end of a continuous row of houses-see Luscombe v. the Plymouth Board of Health (6). In the Municipal Corporations Act no part of the borough shall be included in the watchrate which is more than 200 yards from a street or line of houses regularly watched -see Hallett v. the Overseers of Brighton (7). In the Metropolis Local Management Act the words are the same as in the statute now in question. This construction of section 33. of stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 90. is made more clear by section 34, giving the ratepayer rated for land and for houses, buildings and property other than land in one sum, a right to require that each class of property should be separately assessed, and providing that courtyards, yards and gardens other than marketgardens or nursery-grounds shall be in the same class as the houses and buildings to which they are attached. The legislature implies by this section that all landed property, where the surface is free from any houses or buildings thereon, was presumed to be in the class of land, for it provides that land, although so circumstanced, still if it is a courtyard, yard or garden attached to a house, it shall be excepted out of the class land and taken into the class of houses; while all other land, with a surface free from houses or buildings thereon, remains in the class land. By this section the yards that are classed

(6) 27 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 306. (7) 7 E. & B. 355.

2 I

If the

with houses are in the nature of curtilages; and as they alone are specified, it seems clear timber-yards and the like, where the surface is used merely for a store, and which are in no way attached to any dwelling, ought not to be so classed. According to this construction, the property in question is in the class of land, and not in the class of houses, buildings and the like. It is a water-way for ships to come to the warehouses and jetties, and resembles a private way for carriages through fields to a house. The ships pass through the lock and canal to the basin, where they would lie on the mud at low tide, as usual in tidal harbours, if the water was not retained by the lock, such mud being clearly mere land, though used by ships. The lock is rated as a building, because it is masonry; but it seems unreasonable to say that mud approximates in any sense to a building because it is covered with water. principle of charging in proportion to the benefit be applied, then according to the facts of the case the property in question derives absolutely no benefit at all. It was contended that land meant only land used for agriculture, and that houses, buildings and other property of that sort meant all land in which property had been invested for any other purpose than agriculture. But such a construction is not supported by any words nor by the context. Where the legislature so intended the intention was expressed, as in the Metropolis Local Management Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120; the 163rd section, relating to the sewers-rate, defines "land" to be all land used as meadow or pastureground, woodland, orchard, market-garden, hop, herb, flower, fruit or nursery ground; but section 165. divides the rateable property into the two classes of buildings and land, without that restriction to agricultural land.

The Queen v. the Southwark and Vauxhall Waterworks Company decides that land in which capital has been invested for commercial profit, entirely exclusive of agriculture, is to be rated in the class "land" and not in the class buildings. There the capital was in water-pipes used under the land, and the decision and the reason thereof are in point for the appellants in this case, there being no distinction between water confined in pipes for household purposes

and water confined by lock-gates for shipping purposes, each being equally far from agriculture. Also the decision in The Queen v. the Midland Railway Company is in point for the appellants; for a railway was held rateable, under the statute there in question, where the rate was imposed on houses, warehouses, shops, cellars, vaults, &c., and all buildings, erections, works, tenements and hereditaments, except houses under 5l. and land: the Court held a railway rateable only because works were mentioned; and the judgment is, in effect, that, but for that word, it would be land, and so not be rateable under that statute. In the present statute there is no such word as "works," and this case also is therefore by implication an authority in favour of the appellants. Upon the words, and the context, and the authorities, I think judgment should be for the appellants.

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-My Brothers Wightman and Crompton have read the judgment which I now read. I am of opinion that in this case the Sessions came to a right conclusion. The whole of the premises in respect of which the appellants were assessed at the sum of 351l. 11s. 3d. to the rate in question appear to me to be property other than land within the meaning of section 33. of statute 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 90. From the "plan," which is to be taken as part of the " case," it appears that "The Victoria London Docks," constructed under the powers of two local acts of parliament, consist of one great commercial establishment, occupying an area of 165 acres, surrounded by a wall. Of this area ninety-five acres are now usually covered with water, forming two basins for the reception of merchant ships, the one called the "Tidal Basin" and the other the "Inner Dock"; but both have been excavated for this purpose, and are beneath the level of the adjoining River Thames at low water. They are surrounded by stone walls, and intersected by a great number of jetties, which run to the centre of the space covered by water, with warehouses and cranes on the sides and extremities of these jetties. The cargoes of the ships lying in the dock and basin are landed at these jetties and deposited in these warehouses. I am of opinion that the dock

and the basin are property ejusdem generis as the "houses and buildings." The dock and basin may, no doubt, in one sense of the word, be considered "land," and they would well pass by deed or will by the description of "land covered with water." But in the enactment to be construed the legislature appears to have intended to divide land into two classes: one where capital is invested in it for commercial purposes; and the other where it remains in its natural state or is cultivated for agricultural purposes. Generally speaking, the first class might be expected to derive much greater advantages from lighting and watching than the second, and therefore it is to be assessed at a higher rate. The 34th section of statute 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 90, respecting "gardens," seems to shew clearly the intention of the legislature that what is accessory to "houses and buildings" should come within the same category, and that the other category should only comprehend land used for agricultural purposes. When I look at the subjectmatter rated here, I do not see how the dock and basin are to be separated from the jetties and warehouses. The dock and basin would be useless without the jetties and warehouses, and the jetties and warehouses would be useless without the dock and basin. They all form one undertaking and one establishment. There is no doubt that a large capital must have been laid out in excavating and puddling the dock and basin, and surrounding them with walls. If they had been used for carrying on a manufactory without any buildings being erected upon them, and without water being introduced into them, they could not possibly have been considered "land" within the meaning of this section of the act of parliament. And can it make any difference that, instead of their being paved and goods being deposited upon them, water is introduced into them, which supports floating warehouses in which the goods are stowed? This is the view we took of a similar enactment in a local act in The Queen v. the Midland Railway Company, where we held, that the word "land" so used must mean land occupied for cultivation, and could not include land used for a line of railway, although there was no building upon it nor anything

beyond a rod of iron. The case of The Queen v. the Southwark and Vauxhall Water Company was much relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants. When the facts of that case and the ratio decidendi are examined, it will be found not at all to be at variance with the doctrine which I now propound. Certain conduit mains and pipes belonging to a water company passed under the soil of the highways in the parish of Putney, and it was expressly found that "the company had no works in the parish." They were, therefore, to be considered as the occupiers of the land on which the pipes lay. Coleridge, J. said, seeing that the appellants would be rateable only as occupiers of land, they are clearly not to be rated at the higher rate. Wightman, J. said pipes are not rateable per se, but only because the owner of them occupies land. So, being an occupier of land, he is liable to the lower rate. Erle, J. said, "Pipes are not houses or property of that kind"; and Lord Campbell, C.J. said, "The appellants are not rated as being occupiers of pipes; they are rated as being occupiers of the land which they occupy by means of those pipes." In this case the property in the basin and dock may derive material benefit from the approaches to the establishment being lighted, at the expense of the rate; and it must be greatly protected by the watchmen who are appointed by the Commissioners to guard it. I have only further to add, that the size of the dock and basin, so much dwelt upon, seems to me quite immaterial, and that this attempt to separate the part of the establishment which, for the purposes of the establishment, is covered with water, from the rest of the works, cannot succeed unless the appellants could have supported a claim to be rated on the lower scale for half a rood of land used within the inclosure as a reservoir for water to supply the boiler of a steam-engine which aids the operations going on in the establishment. For these reasons, I am of opinion, with my Brothers Wightman and Crompton, that we ought to give judgment for the respondents.

Judgment for the respondents.