sessment; and although this may be a hardship on the appellant, no weight was given to this objection in a similar caseThe King v. Staffordshire (2). If the Court hold that notice is requisite before the time for appealing runs, there may be different times for appealing for each of 500 houses, and, in fact, there will be 500 assessments, the propriety of each depending on the other; so that, until the time for the last appeal has past, no one will be able to tell whether the whole collective assessment is good or not.

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-The assessing the different houses and the giving notice at each are two successive acts going to make up the liability of the person assessed. If the act had said within fourteen days of the making of the assessment, possibly the appeal might not have been. in time; but here the act empowers the local authority to assess the houses, and after fourteen days' notice thereof to levy and collect; and then there is a vague power given to appeal with reference to another act, the words of which are not strictly applicable to the present. I think, therefore, the fourteen days must run from the time when the person's liability commenced, when the assessment may be said to have been complete.

ERLE, J.-It is clear the notice of appeal is in time. There is no assessment on the person until the person assessed becomes liable, i. e., after notice. The enactments of the two statutes are well reconciled by thus holding; the fourteen days for collecting and the fourteen days. for appeal commence concurrently from the notice.

Monk then proceeded to the other points. The appellant can scarcely hope to convince the Court, that in the expression "1s. in the pound on the assessment to the highway rate," assessment means the sum assessed and not the rateable value.

[LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-Words are not always used in their strict sense; it is too clear for argument; the rateable value at which the premises are assessed to the highway rate must be meant by assessment.]

(2) 3 East, 150.

The important question then remains, whether the proviso limits the assessment in the aggregate to this 1s., or only the annual payment. The Justices were right in holding the former to be the true construction; if the local authority found it necessary to execute structural works of such a value as this amount of 1s. would not cover, they ought to have proceeded under the 16th section and obtained the sanction of two Justices; the legislature intended to confine the power of the local authority of expending of their own motion to a comparatively small sum; the other construction would leave no practicable limit. There can be but one assessment, whether spread over several years or not, and the limit of 1s. is to "such assessment," that is, the one aggregate assessment.

Atherton and Cross, contrà.-It must be conceded that the original assessment was erroneous, the rateable value of the property being only 10l. 10s.; but on the true construction of the section, the assessment ought only to be reduced to an annual payment of 10s. 6d., being 1s. in the pound on that value. The local authority are to assess to a payment, which is to be made at once or distributed over several years. The use of the word "assessment" is conceded to be not strictly correct when meant to be applied to the rateable value; and therefore when the legislature says such assessment, it may well mean the annual assessment, or amount to be paid annually as assessed; and it is to be observed that the limit is the highway rate, which is an annual assessment; and in The Queen v. Warner (3) the Court upheld an assessment, under this very section, which was a perpetual annual payment of 6d. in the pound. Section 16. would not be applicable to the present case it refers to the same class of cases as the previous sections, viz., nuisances existing on private premises. Section 21. is the first section that applies to public nuisances.

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-Mr. Cross has satisfactorily shewn that section 16. does not refer to a public nuisance, but to those on private premises; and that the committee could not have proceeded in the

(3) 6 E. & B. 395; s. c. 27 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 144.

present case under that section; their only mode of proceeding, therefore, is that under section 22. On looking at the general scope of the act, I am of opinion that the assessment may be spread over several years, provided that in no one year the assessment exceed 1s. in the pound on the rateable value of the premises as assessed to the highway rate. We have to put a reasonable construction on the statute, which was passed for the purpose of removing nuisances of great magnitude, in the removal of which great expense would of necessity be incurred; and if we were to say that the whole sum assessed for any one work must not exceed 1s. in the pound, in very many instances this 22nd section would become wholly inoperative. Therefore, inasmuch as the legislature in this section contemplates works of great expense, provision is made for spreading the assessment over many years; and then comes the proviso, and when that says that such assessment shall not exceed a certain proportion, the annual assessment, not the aggregate assessment spread over several years, may well be understood. This I think a reasonable construction, and not likely to lead to inconvenience, whereas inconvenience would continually result from an opposite conclusion.

ERLE, J. (4)—The argument of Mr. Monk was, that if the local authority determined on making large structural works, they must apply to two Justices, to obtain their sanction for works involving a very large outlay, and that without their sanction the limit of expenditure imposed was that of a sum not exceeding in the whole 1s. in the pound on the rateable value. But I am satisfied that the distinction taken is right-that section 16. applies to structural works required in respect of private nuisances, to which alone sections 12, 13. and 14. relate; and that the order of Justices is only required when it becomes necessary to enter on private premises to abate the nuisance, who may in such case, by section 16, order the formation of structural works. The act, having by the succeeding sections disposed of the costs of this class of cases, then proceeds to a new class, viz., those connected with

(4) Wightman, J. and Hill, J. were in the Court for Crown Cases Reserved.

the highway, and by section 21. the surveyors are empowered to enter lands lying near it, to cleanse ditches, &c. Then comes section 22, by which the local authority may take such measures, by structural works or otherwise, mero motu, on the highway, as may seem reasonable, as long as they do not invade private rights. And then comes the question, are they limited by the proviso to an expenditure, in the whole, of 1s. in the pound on the rateable value liable to the highway rate? It is quite obvious that the removal of such nuisances as are contemplated by that section may require works of much greater value than such an assessment of 1s. would meet; and the legislature says in such a case you shall make the requisite works, but you shall distribute the expense over several years; and the proviso must mean in such a manner that in no one year the assessment be greater than the 1s. in the pound.

By section 47. of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71. (the Act for regulating the Metropolitan Police Courts), it is enacted, that where by any act or acts, any penalties or forfeitures, or shares of any penalties or forfeitures, are or shall hereafter be made recoverable in a summary manner before any Justice or Justices of the Peace, and by such act or acts respectively the same are or shall be limited and made payable to, &c., or to any person or persons whomsoever, save the informer, who shall sue for the same, &c., in any case the same, if recovered or adjudged before any of the said Magistrates, shall be recovered for and adjudged to be paid to the Receiver for the Metropolitan Police District, &c. By section 8. of the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38. (the Act for the Suppression of Gaming

Houses), it is enacted, that one-half of any pecuniary penalty, which shall be adjudged to be paid under that act, shall be paid to the person laying the information, &c., and the remaining half shall be applied in aid of the poor-rate of the parish in which the offence was committed, and shall be paid for that purpose to the overseer or other person authorized to receive poor-rates in such parish-Held, that where a conviction under the latter act took place at a police court in the metropolis, and a penalty was adjudged to be paid, and was paid, the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police District was entitled to claim one-half of such penalty.

Special CASE stated for the opinion of this Court.

The case was substantially as follows:The action was brought by the plaintiff, as Receiver for the Metropolitan Police District, to recover from the defendant, under section 47. of the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, intituled, "An Act for regulating the Police Courts in the Metropolis," a moiety of a penalty or forfeiture of 50l. imposed upon Abraham Levy Goodman, under the following circumstances :-Before and at the time of the passing of the said act, a police court was and now is established at Marlborough Street, within the metropolitan police district, under the name of the Police Office, in the parish of St. James, Westminster, and P. Bingham, Esq. is a Magistrate of the said court, and executes the duties of a Justice of the Peace, under the said statute, at the said court. On the 22nd of July 1857, the said A. L. Goodman was convicted at the said court, by and before the said Magistrate, for using, on the 15th of July 1857, for the purpose of unlawful gaming being carried on therein, a certain room of which he was occupier, in Coventry Street, &c., within the limits of the Metropolitan Police District. The following is a copy of the conviction :

County of Middlesex, Be it rememberand Metropolitan Po-ed that on the lice District, to wit. 22nd day of July A.D. 1857, at the Police Court, Marlborough Street, in the county of Middlesex, and within the Metropolitan Police District, Abraham Levy Goodman is convicted before the undersigned, one of the Magistrates of the police courts of the metropolis,

sitting at the police court aforesaid, for that he, the said Abraham Levy Goodman, on the 15th day of July, in the year aforesaid, being then the occupier of a room in Coventry Street, in the parish of St. Martinin-the-Fields, in the said county, and within the said district, did use the said room for the purpose of unlawful gaming being carried on therein, contrary to the statutes in such case made and provided. And I adjudge the said Abraham Levy Goodman, for his said offence, to forfeit and pay the sum of 50l., to be paid and applied according to law; and if the said sum be not paid forthwith, I adjudge the said Abraham Levy Goodman to be imprisoned in the House of Correction for the said county at Cold Bath Fields, in the said county, and within the said district, for the space of six weeks, unless the said sum shall be sooner paid.-Given under my hand and seal, &c. P. Bingham (L.S.).

At

This conviction took place, and the said penalty or forfeiture was adjudged to be paid under the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38. (an Act for the Suppression of Gaming Houses), by which act such penalty or forfeiture is made recoverable upon summary conviction before two Justices of the Peace; and the conviction aforesaid was made by and before P. Bingham, Esq., so being and acting as such Magistrate and Justice of the said court, having when acting as such Court, the power to exercise the jurisdiction of two Justices of the Peace. the time of the said conviction the plaintiff was, and ever since hath been, and now is, Receiver for the Metropolitan Police District. The penalty or forfeiture of 50l. was paid by the said A. L. Goodman to the defendant, as clerk of the peace for the said county of Middlesex, in open court, pursuant to an order of Quarter Sessions, he having appealed against the conviction, and one moiety thereof was paid by the defendant to the overseers of St. Martin-in-the-Fields. The 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71. s. 47, above first mentioned, enacts as follows: -"And be it enacted, that where by any act or acts, any penalties or forfeitures, or shares of any penalties or forfeitures, are or shall hereafter be made recoverable in a summary manner before any Justice or Justices of the Peace, and by such act or acts respectively, the same are or shall be limited and made payable

to Her Majesty, or to any body corporate, or to any person or persons whomsoever, save the informer, who shall sue for the same, or any party aggrieved, in every such case the same, if recovered or adjudged before any of the said Magistrates, shall be recovered from and adjudged to be paid to the said receiver for the time being, and not to any other person."

The act secondly above mentioned (the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38.) contains, at section 8, the following enactment:-" One-half of any pecuniary penalty which shall be adjudged to be paid under this act shall be paid to the person laying the information upon which the conviction takes place, and the remaining half shall be applied in aid of the poor-rate of the parish in which the offence shall have been committed, and shall be paid for that purpose to the overseer or other person authorized to receive poor-rates in such parish."

The plaintiff contends that the moiety of the said penalty of 50%., which is directed by the last of the two acts mentioned above (the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38.) to be paid to the overseers, ought to be paid to the plaintiff, as receiver for the time being of the Metropolitan Police District. The defendant denies that this is so, and contends that the said moiety was payable under the said act to the overseers of the said parish of St. Martin-in-the-Fields, and was properly paid over to them, as mentioned above.

The question for the opinion of the Court was, whether the moiety of the said penalty or forfeiture of the said sum of 50l. claimed by the plaintiff was payable to him as such receiver as aforesaid. If the Court should be of opinion that such moiety was so payable, judgment should be entered for the plaintiff. If the Court should not be of opinion that the said moiety was so payable, judgment should be entered for the defendant.

T. F. Ellis, for the plaintiff (Nov. 12). -The conviction orders the penalty to be paid and applied according to law; and it is submitted that the plaintiff, as receiver, is entitled to recover that moiety which has been paid to the overseers by the defendant. The proper way of determining the question is to find out what was the inten

tion of the legislature in passing the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38. The intention was, by section 8, to carry out the provision in the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71. s. 47; and if that construction is entertained by the Court, the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38. s. 8. will still remain in operation, for it will extend to all cases except such as arise within the area of the Metropolitan Police Courts.

[LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-You seek to import into the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38. s. 8. the words "unless recovered or adjudged before the police courts in the metropolis."]

Yes; for the former act is not repealed by the latter. He referred to The Queen v. the Justices of Glamorganshire (1), and to The Queen v. the Inhabitants of St. Peter, Barton-on-Humber (2).

Atherton (Maude with him), for the defendant.-If the later act were read without any knowledge of the earlier one, there could be no doubt as to the answer to be given to the question, for upon the face of section 8. there is no reference to

any particular district. It was competent for the legislature to repeal the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71. s. 47. by express words, or by necessary implication; and though, no doubt, there are no repealing words, it is submitted that by necessary implication the legislature has repealed it. The fact that particular districts are referred to does not shew that this is not the right construction; and there is nothing in the words to lead one to the belief that it was intended that the two acts should be incorporated.

[HILL, J.-If they are not incorporated all these proceedings are void, for by the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38. s. 4. the penalties are to be recovered before two Justices; and it is by the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71. s. 14. that any one of the Police Magistrates is empowered to do alone any act which is directed to be done by more than one Justice.]

That is so; but it does not follow that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, for the 8th section disposes conclusively of the whole penalty, giving one-half to the overseers, and one-half to the informer; and the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71. does not touch a

(1) 13 Q.B. Rep. 561; s. c. 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 118.

(2) 17 Q.B. Rep. 630; s. c. 21 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 23.

new offence, and a new penalty neither of which were known or contemplated, at the time it was passed.

T. F. Ellis, in reply, referred to The Seamen's Hospital Society v. the Mayor, &c. of the Borough of Liverpool (3), where the plaintiffs sought to recover certain penalties imposed for breaches of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 112. (the Merchant Seamen's Act). These penalties had been paid over to the treasurer of the borough, but inasmuch as by the 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 126, which authorized that to be done, it was provided that nothing therein contained should extend to any penalties or forfeitures recovered under any act relating to the Customs, Excise, and Post-office, or to trade or navigation, &c., and inasmuch as the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 112. was an act relating to trade and navigation, it was decided that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover.

Cur. adv. vult.

The judgment of the Court was now delivered by

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-What we have to consider in this case is, whether the legislature, by the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38. s. 8, meant to repeal the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71. s. 47, so far as concerns the application of penalties to be recovered under the former act before a Police Magistrate of the metropolis. The prospective enactment, directing the application of penalties thereafter to be made recoverable in a summary manner, would be in full force as to the application of such penalties made recoverable by a subsequent statute, unless that statute contains a repeal, either partial or total, of the prospective enactment; but, of course, the legislature might at any time repeal this enactment, either partially or totally. Without any express repeal, if a subsequent enactment is contrary to, and inconsistent with, a prior enactment, the prior enactment is repealed. Whether the two enactments in this case are contrary and incompatible must depend upon whether the second does or does not impliedly contain the exception, "unless recovered or adjudged before the police courts in the metropolis." We have en

(3) 4 Exch. Rep. 180; s. c. 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 371.

tertained great doubts whether this exception ought to be understood; but upon the whole we think that by implying the exception, we shall have the best chance of fulfilling the intention of the legislature. In the year 1839, when the Act for the Regulation of the Police Courts in the Metropolis passed, the legislature, merely legislating for the metropolis, enacted that all such penalties recovered before a Police Magistrate of the metropolis should be paid to the receiver of the police; and that the enactment should extend to all penalties created by any subsequent statute. This may be tantamount to an enactment that this clause, as to the application of the penalties, where the recovery is before a Police Magistrate, shall be understood to be included in every subsequent act by which penalties are created. Such a clause would not be inconsistent with the 8th section of the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, and it might either follow that section, or be introduced as a proviso upon it. Therefore, that section will have full operation over the whole kingdom, except within the area of the metropolis Police Courts, and there even, if the penalties are recovered before two Justices of the Peace, instead of a Police Magistrate. It is difficult to suppose any reason that should have induced the legislature to apply penalties under the Gaming Act recovered before Police Magistrates differently from all other penalties so recovered; and there being an express prospective enactment, we ought not unnecessarily to imply a repeal. There can be little use in referring to cases where a similar question has arisen on acts of parliament differently framed, for they only illustrate the general principle, which is not in dispute. But the case to which Mr. Ellis referred seems to be identical with the present; and although it cannot be considered by any means a conclusive authority, the point not having been argued, it may be entitled to some weight, for it did present this point; and the argument that the receiver was not entitled to the penalties, if well founded, would have been fatal to the application which the Court granted. We therefore think that we ought to give

Judgment for the plaintiff.