and son so long as they or the survivor should live and no longer.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Perpetuities, Cent. Dig. § 11; Dec. Dig. § 4.*]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Charles County, in Equity; Geo. C. Merrick, Judge.

pressed in writing-and provided the trustee shall consider it for the manifest advantage of the said William T. Stoddert-to determine the trust hereby created and to convey by deed the legal title to the real estate, herein before mentioned, to the said William T. Stoddert in fee simple, without having recourse to a court of equity."

Bill by Elizabeth S. Reeder and another against Gustavus T. Brown to determine the validity of certain deeds. Defendant Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BURKE, having died pending this suit, Catesby BRISCOE, PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, and Graham Brown and others, his heirs at law, WORTHINGTON, JJ. were made defendants in his place. Decree for complainants, and defendants Affirmed.

appeal.

W. Mitchell Diggs and L. Allison Wilmer, for appellants. W. Roy Stephenson and Adrian Posey, for appellees.

WORTHINGTON, J. The more essential facts of this case, briefly stated, are as follows: Mrs. Elizabeth S. Bowie, widow, of Charles county, Md., being the owner in fee of a certain tract of land located in that county, containing about 500 acres, known as "Wicomico," on the 18th day of June, 1880, made a deed of the same to one Gustav A. Rasch of Baltimore City, in trust for the use and benefit of herself for life, and after her death "in trust for the use and benefit of her son, William T. Stoddert, and his heirs forever"; her son's name having been changed from Bowie to Stoddert to please his grandfather, Maj. John T. Stoddert. Subsequently, on August 4, 1885, during the lifetime of his mother, William T. Stoddert died, leaving one daughter, Mrs. Elizabeth S. Reeder wife of Foster M. Reeder, as his only heir at law, who, together, with her husband, is the appellee in this case. Mrs. Elizabeth S. Bowie, the mother of William T. Stoddert, died on June 8, 1905, at the advanced age of 85 years. A few days before her death-that is to say, on May 17, 1905-she executed a deed in fee simple of the same land to her nephew, Gustavus T. Brown, the original defendant in this case, who died pending the suit, leaving a son and two daughters, as his only heirs at law, who were made defendants in his place and now appear as the appellants in this court. The last-mentioned deed from Mrs. Bowie to her nephew, Gustavus T. Brown, was, of course, of no avail beyond the conveyance of her

The following is a copy of the deed of trust executed by Mrs. Elizabeth S. Bowie to Gustav A. Rasch, June 18, 1880: "This deed made this 18th day of June in the year eighteen hundred and eighty, by Elizabeth S. Bowie of Charles county in the state of Maryland: Whereas the said Elizabeth S. Bowie is desirous to make provision for herself and her son William T. Stoddert against future contingencies, and for the maintenance and support of the said William T. Stoddert; and Gustav A. Rasch of Baltimore City in the state aforesaid is willing to accept the trust under these presents, and to discharge and execute the same according to the true intent and meaning thereof: Now this deed witnesseth, that the said Elizabeth S. Bowie, in consideration of the premises, and the sum of one dollar, doth grant, bar gain and sell unto the said Gustav A. Rasch and his heirs, unto the use of him and his heirs, all that tract or part of a tract or parcel of land called 'West Hatton' and the 'Reserve,' being a part of 'Wicomico Field,' and other parcels or tracts called 'Ford's Amendment,' being parcels held in connection with the principal tract, and lying on the Wicomico river in the lower part of Charles county aforesaid: Containing five hundred acres more or less and now known as 'Wicomico.' To have and to hold the said tract, part of a tract or parcel of land, for the following purposes and none other; that is to say in trust for the use and benefit of the said Elizabeth S. Bowie during her natural life, and so as she alone, or such person as she shall appoint, shall take and re-equitable life estate, provided for in her ceive the rents, issues and profits thereof; deed to Rasch, if that deed was itself a and from and after the decease of the said valid conveyance; but as Brown and his Elizabeth S. Bowie in trust for the use and heirs, the appellants, claimed the land under benefit of the said William T. Stoddert and the deed of May 17, 1905, on the ground that his heirs forever; the said trustee to collect the deed of trust of date June 18, 1880, viothe rents, issues and profits from said land lated the rule against perpetuities and was and pay the same to the said William T. therefore void, and Mrs. Reeder, the appelStoddert, or to permit the said William T. lee, claimed the property by virtue of the Stoddert to use and occupy the said land, deed of trust, which, as she contended, did whichever the said trustee may consider not violate the rule against perpetuities, but most advantageous to the said William T. was a perfectly valid deed, while, on the Stoddert. It is hereby declared and provided other hand, as she insisted, the deed to that said trustee shall have power at any Brown was void, as well because of Mrs. time after my death, with the approbation and Bowie's mental incapacity at the time it was consent of the said William T. Stoddert ex-executed, as of her want of title at that

time, except as to her equitable life estatė, | v. Pollitt, 104 Md. 172, 64 Atl. 1040; 13 Cyc. a bill of complaint was filed by Mrs. Reeder 363. The courts are first, by an inspection and her husband, the appellees, in the circuit court for Charles county, in equity, on August 9, 1905, for the purpose of having the validity of the two disputed deeds judicially determined. The lower court upheld the deed of trust to Rasch and declared the deed to Brown null and void and of no effect whatever. The substituted defendants, heirs of Gustavus T. Brown, deceased, have prosecuted this appeal.

of the deed, to ascertain what the parties intended should be effected by it, and then they are to expound it so as to accomplish that intention, unless expressions are employed which positively forbid it. Peyton v. Ayres, 2 Md. Ch. 64. "It is the duty of the court (the intention being ascertained) to give the instrument such interpretation as will effectuate that intention, provided the terms and expressions employed will admit of such

construction of deeds and contracts, the courts take into consideration the language employed, the subject-matter, and the surrounding circumstances. Chesapeake, etc., Co. v. Goldberg, 107 Md. 69 Atl. 37.

The first and most important question pre-construction." Peyton v. Ayres, supra. In the sented by the record is whether the deed of trust to Rasch of June 18, 1880, violates the well-known rule against perpetuities, and is therefore void. A copy of this deed is set out in full in the report of this case preced ing this opinion. It will be observed, by referring to the deed, that it recites as follows: "Whereas the said Elizabeth S. Bowie is desirous to make provision for herself and her son William T. Stoddert, against future contingencies, and for the maintenance and support of the said William T. Stoddert; and Gustav A. Rasch of Baltimore City in the state aforesaid is willing to accept the trust under these presents and to discharge and execute the same according to the true intent and meaning thereof," etc. Then after conveying the property to Rasch and his heirs, "to the use of him and his heirs," she again declares the purposes for which the grant is made; that is to say: First, for her own use for life, and then "in trust for the use and benefit of said William T. Stod dert and his heirs forever." As to the employment of the additional words, "to the use of him (Rasch) and his heirs," we do not think they have any particular meaning or effect in this case, because the deed of trust is itself a deed of bargain and sale, whereby the bargainor herself was seised to the use, and by operation of the statute of uses (St. 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10) the use was executed in the bargainee. The additional words mentioned added nothing to Rasch's title and served no office whatever, as without them he took the legal title, and the additional use remained unexecuted in him and his heirs. Brown v. Renshaw, 57 Md. 67.

It seems only proper therefore, in this connection, to refer to certain extrinsic circumstances connected with the making of the deed, which throw light upon the purpose and object of Mrs. Bowie in executing the same. The land in question known as "Wicomico" and containing five hundred acres, more or less, originally belonged to Maj. John T. Stoddert, the father of Mrs. Bowie who by his will devised the same to Mrs. Bowie for life, and then in fee to his grandson, William T. Stoddert. Maj. Stoddert died in the year 1870. Subsequently his grandson, William T. Stoddert, became involved in debt, and in 1879 a judgment was recorded against him in the circuit court for Charles county, and all his interest in remainder in the property was sold at sheriff's sale under the judgment. This interest was purchased by Mrs. Bowie, for a small consideration, and conveyed to her by deed from the sheriff, dated May 18, 1880. One month later she executed the deed of trust to Rasch above mentioned. The future contingencies mentioned in the deed, no doubt, had reference to the apprehension of Mrs. Bowie concerning the probability of her son's again running into debt, and her purchase of his interest in remainder at sheriff's sale and the making of the deed of trust to Rasch we may very well ascribe to her desire to protect him from his own improvidence and to secure a means of support for him as long as he lived, and then to have the propIn connection with the conveyance of the erty go to his heirs in accordance with the legal title to Rasch and his heirs, the words provisions of Maj. Stoddert's will. Reading of the deed to which the appellants espe- the whole deed of trust to Rasch in the light cially refer as creating a perpetuity are of surrounding circumstances, it seems too these: "In trust for use and benefit of said William T. Stoddert and his heirs forever." Whether these words of themselves, without other words in the deed explanatory of the intention of the grantor, would create a perpetuity, we are not called upon to determine, for in construing a deed, as well as in construing other instruments of writing, we are not usually to confine ourselves to a single word or phrase, but to ascertain if possible the intention of the parties, and especially of the grantor, by considering the

plain for argument that these were the objects and purposes she had in view when she executed the deed.

Having thus ascertained that it was Mrs. Bowie's intention to create a trust so as to provide for the maintenance and support of herself and of her son, so long as they or the survivor of them should live, and no longer, it is our duty to effectuate that intention, unless some rule of law or language in the deed should forbid it. In the case of Long v. Long, 62 Md. 65, this court, speaking by Al

We have carefully considered the able brief submitted by the counsel for the appellants, and have examined the authorities referred to therein; but we cannot see that the deed of trust to Rasch could by any reason

settled upon the most indubitable authority | time of Mrs. Bowle, and Adrian Posey havthat the extent of the legal interest of a ing been duly appointed in his place, and havtrustee in an estate given to him in trust is ing accepted the trust, he is the proper permeasured, not by words of inheritance or son to make such conveyance, as the lower equivalent terms, but by the object and ex- court by its decree directed him to do. tent of the trust upon which the estate is given." And so in this case, though the deed to the trustee, Rasch, is to him and his heirs, yet, as there was no duty whatever for the trustee to perform after the death of both the grantor and her son, there was no practi-able and fair construction create a perpetuity cal or useful purpose for continuing the trust beyond their lives, and it will not be inferred that, when the purposes of the trust have been accomplished, the grantor still intended that the trust should continue throughout all generations. In Phelps, Equity, at section 198, it is stated: "That the duration of a trustee's estate is measured by the substantial objects and purposes of the trust, and not by the technical form of the words creating it."

such as is condemned by the policy of the law, and the court will never strain a point to declare a deed of trust within the rule against perpetuities merely in order to strike it down, but, on the contrary, will uphold it by every fair intendment so as to effectuate the purpose and object of the grantor as ascertained from an inspection of the whole deed and every part of it, as read in the light of surrounding circumstances, and duly considering the subject-matter. In the case Whatever title, if any, remained in Rasch of Johnson v. Preston, 226 Ill. 447, 80 N. E. or his heirs, or vested in any substituted trus- 1001, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 564, cited by the aptee, after the death of the equitable life pellants, the court held that the rule against tenants, it was a mere naked legal title, while perpetuities applies to the creation of a term the whole equitable estate in fee was vested of years as well as to a freehold estate; but in Mrs. Reeder, the only child and heir at our predecessors have held that a lease for law of William T. Stoddert, deceased. In 99 years, renewable forever, does not violate contemplation of a court of equity, an equi- the rule against perpetuities, because the table estate in lands may be aliened or de- property was not thereby placed extra comvised, or, in the absence of either alienation mercium, which is the test. Banks v. Hasor devise, it descends in the same manner as kie, 45 Md. 207. Neither do we think the legal estates. 2 Washb. Real Property, 532; property in this case was so placed by the Reid v. Gordon, 35 Md. 174; Brown v. Ren-deed of trust from Mrs. Bowie to Rasch, and shaw, 57 Md. 67. The barren legal title in the trustee is of importance to the owner of the equitable title only as it may be required to give the latter a standing in a court of law. Matthews v. Ward, 10 G. & J. 449, Reid v. Gordon, supra. Both in the Barnum Will Case, 26 Md. 119, 90 Am. Dec. 88, and in the Deford Will Case, 36 Md. 175, as well as in the case of Missionary Society v. Humphreys. 91 Md. 131, 46 Atl. 320, 80 Am. St. Rep. 432, all of which are relied upon by the appellants to sustain their contention, the trustee had active duties to perform and discretion to exercise, so that "a court of equity would be bound to supply a trustee to execute the trust to remote generations." Missionary Society v. Humphreys, supra.

In this case all the powers and duties of the trustee were required to be performed, if at all, during the lifetime of Mrs. Bowie and her son, William T. Stoddert. Since they are both dead, the entire equitable estate in the land is vested in Mrs. Reeder. Even assuming that the trustee still holds title to the property, it is at most only a dry legal title with no power or discretion to exercise, and no duty to perform, and she has the right to call upon him for a conveyance of the same to her, so that she may have indubitable standing in a court of law, as well as in a court of equity. Rasch having voluntarily resigned the trust some years ago, in the life

we find no words in that deed and no rule of law which forbid our giving effect to the intention of the grantor therein.

Having determined that the deed to Rasch is a valid deed, and that the whole equitable title to the property was vested in Mrs. Reeder from and after the death of Mrs. Bowie, and that the lower court was right in directing the legal title to be conveyed to Mrs. Reeder, it becomes unnecessary to consider the circumstances under which the deed to Brown, of date May 17, 1905, was made, as Mrs. Bowie then had no title to convey except her equitable life estate, which came to an end at her death, on June 8, 1905.

We think the decree of the lower court correctly determines the dispute between the parties concerning the whole controversy, and that decree will therefore be affirmed. Decree affirmed, with costs.

is a gambling contract, and no action can be maintained upon it.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Gaming, Cent. Dig. 8 25, 26; Dec. Dig. 14.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 4, pp. 3028, 3029.]

2. GAMING (§ 12*) SPECULATIVE TRANSAC-
TIONS SALES FOR FUTURE DELIVERY
"WAGER.
A contract for the sale of goods to be de-
livered at a future day is valid, even though
the seller has not the goods nor any other means
of getting them than to go into the market and
buy them; but such contract is only valid when
the parties really intend a delivery by the seller
and payment of the price by the buyer. And if
the real intent be merely to speculate in the
rise and fall of prices, and the goods are not
to be delivered, but the difference is to be paid
between the contract and market price at the
date for executing the contract, then the trans-
action is nothing more than a wager.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Gaming, Cent. Dig. § 22; Dec. Dig. § 12.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 8, pp. 7365-7368, 7831.]

nature.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Gaming, Dec. Dig. § 11.*]

4. GAMING (§ 11*)-SALES ON MARGIN.

A speculative contract for the purchase and sale of stocks on margin is valid, where the broker undertakes at once to buy the stock selected, and agrees to advance the money required beyond the per cent. furnished by the customer, and carry or hold the stock for the benefit of the customer so long as the margin agreed on is kept good, or until notice is given by either party that the transaction must be closed, and agrees at all times to have in his name and under his control, and ready for delivery, the shares purchased, or an equal amount of other shares of the same stock, and deliver such shares to the customer when required by him on receipt of advances, commissions, and interest, or sell such shares on the order of the customer on payment of the sums due him and account to the customer for the proceeds of such sale, and the customer undertakes to pay the margin agreed upon, and keep it good according to the fluctuations of the market, and take the shares whenever required by the broker, and pay the difference between the percentage advanced by him and the amount due the broker.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Gaming, Cent. Dig. § 23; Dec. Dig. § 11.*]

the value of their testimony, although this should not prevent the appellate court from reversing the decree if it is not warranted by the evidence. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3979-3982; Dec. Dig. § 1010.*1

7. GAMING (8 49*)-REMEDIES OF PARTIES— EVIDENCE.

Evidence, in an action to recover money paid a broker on an alleged gambling contract, held insufficient to show that the contract was a gambling contract.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Gaming, Dec. Dig. § 49.*1

8. BROKERS (§ 38*)—LIABILITIES TO PRINCI

PAL-ACTIONS EVIDENCE.

Evidence, in an action against a broker to recover for failure of the broker to perform his until it should decline to a specified price, held contract to carry stock purchased for plaintiff insufficient to establish an agreement to carry

the stock in that manner.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Dec. Dig. § 38.*]

9. BROKERS ($ 24*)-DUTIES TO PRINCIPAL"STOP ORDER.'

A "stop order" is a direction by a purchaser to his broker to sell the stock purchased at the best available price if it should touch the price named in the order, while it is being held by the broker; but it does not impose an obligation on the broker to hold it until it reaches that price, as it is a measure of protection which the purchaser provides for himself against loss beyond a certain point in a fluctuating market. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Dec. Dig. § 24.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 7, p. 6669.]

Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; James P. Gorten, Judge. Action by Bruno Richter and others against From a decree Philip L. Poe and others. dismissing the complaint, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, BURKE, THOMAS, and HENRY, JJ.

William S. Bryan, Jr., for appellants. J. Cookman Boyd, William M. Maloy, and George M. Brady, for appellees.

BURKE, J. This case comes before us on appeal from a decree of the circuit court No. 2 of Baltimore city, dismissing the appellants' bill of complaint filed in that court. Bruno Richter, who is engaged in the chat5. GAMING (§ 49*)-REMEDIES OF PARTIES-AC-tle loan business in Baltimore city, had cerTIONS EVIDENCE. In an action against a broker to recover tain stock transactions during the months of money paid him under a contract to purchase August and September, 1907, with the apstock which plaintiff claims was a gambling contract, the validity of the contract will be presumed, and the burden of proof is upon plaintiff to establish the fact that it is a gambling contract.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Gaming, Cent. Dig. & 100; Dec. Dig. § 49.*]

6. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1010*)-FINDINGS OF COURT-CONCLUSIVENESS.

Where the greater part of the testimony is taken orally before the judge who decides the case, it is proper for the appellate court to consider that the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and the manner of testifying, and had the best means of deciding upon

pellees, who are stockbrokers, and also the agents in Baltimore city of the New York brokerage firm of T. A. McIntyre & Co. The suit involves an inquiry into the nature of certain transactions concerning 500 shares of stock of the Amalgamated Copper Company, upon which Bruno Richter had paid to the appellees the sum of $4,200, and had given a mortgage on certain property in Baltimore county for $10,000 as additional security in part payment of the purchase price of the stock. The specific relief pray