and expert in it as we were ourselves, and the more especially as France would have the amazing advantage of all our inprovements in mills, machines, &c. &c. &c.? He concluded by declaring that the addrefs once voted was nothing short of a pledge on the part of the House to vote bills which were not before them, and, for any thing they knew, that might be mischievous in the extreme to the political, the revenue, and the cominercial interefts.

Mr. M. Montagu faid that the arguments which had fal- Mr. M. len from the gentlemen on the other fide of the Houfe, in the Montagu. course of the present debate, were principally directed to the commercial and political tendency of the treaty. In the detail of the former, they had met with fo complete a refutation from much abler hands, that he would only touch upon one topic, the filence of the manufacturers. This expreffion was in the mouth of every gentleman: but could the unprecedented exertions in every branch to grasp at the benefits of the arrangement, be termed a filence with regard to the commercial merits of its provifions? No. It was in their actions that we were to look for the reafon and unequivocal teftimony of their approbation, rather than to deduce their fuppofed apprehenfions from a ftrained interpretation of a former, perhaps mistaken, opinion, on a different subject, inapplicable to the present conjuncture.

With regard to the political tendency of the treaty, on which the gentlemen on the other fide of the House feemed to dwell with more energy, it appeared only neceffary to obferve, that their apprehenfions would, for the most part, be found to arife from premifes created by their own imaginations. One honourable gentleman (Mr. Grey) whose abilities he was happy, as a perfonal friend, in an opportunity to acknowledge, had drawn an argument of alarm from a clofe connection entered into between France and America, and had blamed Ministers for not interfering with a negociation to obftruct fuch an event. Had that honourable gentleman confidered, that, in the prefent ftate of prejudice and animofity on the part of America, from late hoftility and unexpired rancour, it was not fo eafy for Minifters to negociate with a nation fo alienated from its mother country. But that the filent operation of convenience would bring her, in the process of a fhort time, to that market which could best supply her wants, and give the most valuable equivalent for her produce. The skill of our manufacturers, by long experience in working for the American confumption, during our monopoly of that trade, had gained fuch a momentum in the employment of their capital to that purpose, as muft bear down all oppofition, whenever the market fhould be opened to fair competition. We had therefore little to fear

from

ham.

from any great comparative acceffion of ftrength to France, from her connection with America. A right honourable gentleman (Mr. Burke) had faid, that the advocates of the treaty were fo infatuated by the love of their darling object as to forget the language of Englishmen, and to enlarge in panegyrics on France, and to deal out invectives against Portugal. These panegyrics were probably to be found in the natural anfwers to the moft unfair inferences from the treaty, of a defire in the negociator to establish an intimate alliance with our ancient rivals. It was alledged, that France had, in the prefent inftance, given a prefumptive proof of her more pacific difpofition to this country. In what? In adopting a measure which rendered it her intereft to remain at peace. Thefe invectives he imagined were the just complaints of injured benefactors, to that nation, who had defrauded them of that juft proportion of reciprocity, to which Portugal was no lefs bound by the confideration of former important fervices on our part, than by express and literal agreement by the Methuen treaty on her own. The fame right honourable gentleman had accufed the defenders of the treaty of boafting that France was the dupe in this negociation. Look at the principle of the treaty; it is to open the most extenfive, the neareft, and, confequently, the most advantageous market to the induftry of the two nations. The one will fend her produce, the other her manufactures. If it had indeed been contended, that the exportation of manufactures, where the value arifes from the operation of labour, was more advantageous than that of produce, did it follow that the nation who confents to receive thofe manufactures in return for an extenfive confumption of her own produce, was therefore a dupe in that agreement? The measure of expediency in any propofed action was the prospect of advantage; the commercial advantages of the treaty could hardly be faid to have been contended. The political difadvantage appeared to him to be chimerical and imaginary, founded on an abfurd removal of reasonable distrust, and of a vigilant attention to national honour. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes was the motto of Oppofition. In his humble opinion, the leaft anfwerable plea to this was, What could be more practicable, and even more politic,. than receiving with the one hand presents from our enemies, whilft in the other we cautiously held a fhield to preferve us invulnerable, amidst all infidiously-concealed attempts to do us mischief.

Mr. Wynd- Mr. Wyndham said, that, in his opinion, it had been too much the practice to feparace the diftinct parts of the queftion of the commercial treaty from each other, and to talk of the commercial as oppofed to the political part, and fo

on,

on, when in fact they mutually depended on each other, and could not well be viewed separately. He contended, that all ́ arguments like that of an honourable gentleman (Mr. Wilberforce) on a preceding day, recommending the confideration of the commercial interefts, as paramount to the confideration of the political interests, were inapplicable and injudicious. The political interest of Great Britain ought undoubtedly to be regarded firft; as long as fhe pretended to a figure among nations as a political ftate, and fo long as that fhould continue to be the cafe, cottagers were not the order and description of the people moft proper to be appealed to as judges upon queftions like that of a treaty with France. It was on all hands agreed, that the commercial treaty would operate a total change of fyftem in our trade and commerce; it was therefore, in the broadeft fense of the word, an innovation, and an innovation confeffedly of the most important, the most comprehenfive, and the most serious nature. It had already been contended, in debate, that, however the treaty, upon the face of it, referved a falvo in favour of the Portugal trade, as carried on under the ftipulations of the Methuen treaty, it must either mediately or immediately affect the trade of Great Britain and Portugal, which had been admitted to be of infinite ufe to this country, in respect to her export of falt fish, of a peculiar fpecies of woollens, and a variety of other manufactures and merchandizes; and it must also, either directly or ultimately affect our trade to other countries. These were confiderations weighty and momentous. The foreign trade of this country, as established previous to the conclufion of the commercial treaty with France, had been fettled by the wisdom of our ancestors, as the moft beneficial foreign trade which could be carried on by Great Britain; and it had undoubtedly been found extremely advantageous. All these circumstances therefore ought to be balanced before that House came to a decifion upon a queftion of that magnitude; and the rather as our political confequence was not the flighteft of the confiderations which called for our most ferious attention. Was that House prepared to facrifice national greatness to commercial intereft? Was it ready to risk a certain advantage for prefumptive benefits, and to give up a real good at a confiderable hazard, upon the uncertain hope of improvement, and of making that good better? Were gentlemen ripe to give up what had been hitherto confidered as the wisdom of their ancestors, and to declare that for a whole century the country had been under a deception, and had been misled by an ignis fatuus? A fpirit of innovation feemed to have uniformly actuated and governed the conduct of the prefent Administration. Examples of this difpofition

Mr. Gren

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difpofition appeared in the Eaft-India bill; the Irish propo fitions, and the fortification fyftem of the last year. That fpirit alone ought to excite the jealoufy, and challenge the caution of that Houfe, which certainly would not admit that innovation, in cafes of extreme importance, ought to be grounded on political fpeculation merely. What fatisfaction could be drawn from the experience of the present Adminiftration? Political experience appeared to him to be infeparable from length of days and number of years spent in executive and minifterial offices. They all knew that fome men were born poets, others orators; and indeed the right honourable gentleman himself, as well as the honourable gentleman behind him (Mr. Grey) who had first opposed the motion for an addrefs, were inftances that eloquence and argument were powers early grafped by young minds; but ftill, no man could inftance a youth who was, all at once, a profound statesman; and the reafon was obvious, early age and experience were contradictory terms, and what, in the nature of things, amounted to an impoffibility. Neither having the counfels of experience to afford a reasonable profpect of fecurity as to future confequences, nor any thing like a certainty that great difadvantage, politically, financially, and commercially, might not be the refult of thus early, and without due deliberation, coming to any thing like a conclufive vote, he felt it impoffible to avoid regarding it as the extreme of temerity to present an addrefs to the throne, of which the manifest tendency was to tie down the Houfe to they knew not what, and, at least, embarrass, if not cut off, their power of future deliberation.

Mr. Grenville entered into a detail of answers to the feveral objections ftated against the treaty. Among the firft was an answer to fome obfervations from Mr. Burke. He was happy to hear the right honourable gentleman fo eloquently, and with fuch unanfwerable and irresistible force, defcribe the capital of our country to be fuch as would command a preference in our markets for our produce and manufactures, Had he endeavoured to have difplayed the advantages of this treaty, it would have been impoffible for him to have done it with fo much truth, juftice, and eloquence as the right honourable gentleman had employed. Stating that the capital of Great Britain was fuch as to govern, and even in a violent manner to command a poffeffion of market, was certainly the best and most evident argument which could poffibly be brought in anfwer to thofe who had contended that Great Britain would be rivalled in her markets by France in confequence of this treaty. With this opinion he perfectly coincided. Such was the capital and confequence of our produce and manufacturers, that he was affured we should pof

fefs

fefs every advantage from the treaty, without France being able to enter into competition with us in any of our markets. With regard to what he had obferved relative to the affortments which France would have, from a recourse to our market, and therefore be able to serve America, this certainly was equally in our favour. By our having recourse to her markets, we should be able to obtain affortments which would enable us to serve countries we could not fupply before. Befides, admitting that America would not fend us her orders, we fhould now have an opportunity of ferving her through the medium of France. Many avenues of commerce would the treaty open in this manner.

As to the argument adduced by the right honourable gentleman refpecting Cherbourg, he had only to answer, were we neglectful of availing ourselves of every means to increase our ftrength and refources of defence? Had we not particularly exerted ourselves to increase our naval defence? (Here feveral members on the other fide of the Houfe called out, hear, hear.) Yes, (he asked) were not our naval ftores in the greatest abundance; were nc. our fhips increafing confiderably; and was not every method adopted to iender our naval ftrength fuperior in every particular to what it had been known in any former period? An honourable gentleman (Mr. Wyndham) had ftated that the manufacturers of Norwich having approved of the treaty, could not be confidered as any argument in its favour; for their trade depended chiefly on foreign markets. Surely this was the greatest argument in favour of the treaty. If they found that it would increase their commerce abroad, it was certainly the greatest proof of the benefit which would accrue to this particular manufacture. This might likewife be applied to many other trades which depended on foreign markets, that would now be opened through the medium of France. The treaty was an intercourse in which Great Britain muft neceffarily find her capital, instead of being diminished, increased; for the additional markets which fhe would poffefs muft certainly tend to increase her profits, and confequently her riches. Means of commerce, which we otherwife could never have obtained, we fhould acquire by this intercourfe. While France was endeavouring to extend her markets, we must neceffarily extend ours. Under thefe circumftances it was his decided opinion, that nothing could have been devised more ef fential to the interefts of the country than this connection with France. By this means the bleffings of peace might be prolonged, and the evils of war procraftinated. The means of commerce would be extended, and the resources of the 'country confequently increafed. Our manufactures would neceffarily flourish, and the nation become profperous.

Mr.