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MEMORANDA.

IN Hilary Vacation (March 28), Lord Langdale resigned his office of Master of the Rolls, in consequence of indisposition, and was succeeded by Sir John Romilly, Knight, her Majesty's Attorney-General.

On the 18th of April, 1851, Lord Langdale died.

In the same month, George James Turner, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, one of her Majesty's Counsel, was appointed to the office of Vice-Chancellor, in the room of Sir James Wigram (a), and subsequently received the honour of knighthood, and was sworn of her Majesty's Privy Coun

cil.

In the following October, Vice-Chancellor Sir James Lewis Knight Bruce, and Vice-Chancellor Lord Cranworth, respectively resigned their offices, and were appointed Lords Justices of Appeal in Chancery, by virtue of the statute 14 & 15 Vict. c. 83.

In the same month, Richard Sorin Kindersley, Esq., one of the Masters in Chancery, was appointed to the office of Vice-Chancellor, in the room of Lord Cranworth, and James Parker, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, one of her Majesty's Counsel, was appointed to the office of Vice-Chancellor, in the room of Sir James Lewis Knight Bruce. They afterwards respectively received the honour of knighthood.

Sir James Alexander Edmund Cockburn, Knt., her Majes ty's Solicitor-General, succeeded to the office of AttorneyGeneral, vacant by the promotion of Sir John Romilly; and William Page Wood, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, one of her Majesty's Counsel, was appointed Solicitor-General. He subsequently received the honour of knighthood.

(a) See 14 & 15 Vict. c. 4.

INDEX

TO THE

PRINCIPAL

MATTERS.

ABANDONMENT OF DIS-

TRESS.
See LANDLORD AND TENANT, (1).

ACCEPTANCE OF BILL.
See BILL OF EXCHANGE, (2).

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF

PART PAYMENT.
See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

ADMISSION BY PAYMENT
INTO COURT.
See PLEADING, II. (3).

AFFIDAVIT.
See COUNTY COURT, (4), (5).

AGREEMENT.

See RAILWAY COMPANY, (1).

AMENDMENT.
See PRACTICE, (4), (5).

APPRENTICESHIP INDEN-

TURE.

By the terms of an indenture of
apprenticeship, an infant was placed

by his father (who was a party to the
indenture) as apprentice to a master,
described in the indenture as "an
auctioneer, appraiser, and corn-fac-
tor," "to learn his art, and with him
after the manner of an apprentice to
serve." After the making of the in-
denture and the commencement of
the apprenticeship, the Master wholly
relinquished the trade of corn factor;
whereupon the apprentice absented
himself from his master's service:—
Held, in an action on the indenture
by the master against the father for
the desertion of the apprentice, that
the relinquishment by the master of
his trade of corn-factor was a good
answer to the action.
Ellen v. Topp,

424

ARRANGEMENT (DEED OF).
See BANKRUPT LAW CONSOLIDATION
ACT, (1).

ASSAULT BY SERVANT.
See RAILWAY COMPANY, (b).

ASSIGNMENT OF COPYRIGHT
BY FOREIGNER.

See COPYRIGHT.

ASSURANCE.

See USURY.

ATTACHMENT. See COUNTY COURT, (1).

AUTHOR.

See COPYRIGHT.

AWARD.

(1). When Valid.

A submission empowered an arbitrator to make his award on or before a certain day, "or on some such ulterior day as he by a memorandum in writing, under his hand, to be indorsed hereon:"-Held, that the arbitrator had power to enlarge the time for making his award until such day as he should indorse on the submission.

In an action on an award, the an award, the declaration stated (amongst other things), that the arbitrator awarded that a promissory note of the plaintiff and M. K., (who was no party to the reference) should be given up to be cancelled, on condition that the plaintiff and M. K. should not, by any judgment of nonpros or other proceeding, compel the defendant to prosecute an action, theretofore commenced by him on the note, against the plaintiff and M. K. The arbitrator also awarded that the costs of the arbitration and award should be paid as follows, that is to say, two-third parts by the defendant, and one-third part by the plaintiff. Breach, that two-third parts of the costs attending the arbitration amounted to 500%., and that the defendant had not paid two-third parts of the costs:-Held, first, that the award was not bad as requiring an act to be done by a stranger, but only made it a condition precedent to the delivery of the notes, that the plaintiff and M. K. should incapacitate themselves from compelling proceedings in the action there

on. Secondly, that the breach was bad, since it left it uncertain in what way the costs were to be computed. Kirk v. Unwin, 908

(2). Invalid Execution.

Where a submission to arbitration contains a clause empowering the arbitrator to direct what, if anything, shall be done by the parties, an invalid execution of such power does not vitiate the whole award. Semble, it is otherwise where the terms of the submission are obligatory. Nicholls v. Jones, 373

(3). When Award may be remitted back to Arbitrator.

To an action of covenant on a mortgage-deed, the defendant pleaded non est factum, and payment. After issue joined, the cause and all matters in difference were referred to an arbitrator, the costs of the cause and of the reference and award and all other costs to abide the event. The submission contained the usual clauses, that "if either party, by affected delay or otherwise, should wilfully delay or otherwise wilfully prevent the arbitrator from making the award, he should pay costs. And in case of either party disputing the validity of the award, and moving the Court to set aside the same, the Court should have power to remit the matters referred to the arbitrator." The arbitrator awarded, de præmissis, "that, on a settlement of all matters in difference, accounts, claims, and demands between the parties up to the date hereof, there is due from the defendant to the plaintiff 3007. 15s. 9d. ;” and he ordered the same to be forthwith paid. The defendant having moved to remit the award to the arbitrator, and also that, upon payment of the sum awarded, satisfaction

should be entered on a judgment, and that the plaintiff should pay costs for having wilfully delayed the making of the award:-Held, first, that the award, if invalid, might be remitted back on the application of the defendant, and that the clause in question was not confined to cases in which the Court might exercise the power adversely to the party seeking to impeach the award. Secondly, that the award was good upon the face of it, since it sufficiently appeared that the arbitrator had awarded on all the matters referred to him.

Semble, that the clause respecting "wilful delay" is confined to cases where the completion of the award is prevented, and does not apply where an award has been in fact made. Bradley v. Phelps,

(4). Payment to Stranger.

897

In an action on an award, a plea that the arbitrators did not publish their award of and concerning the matters in difference modo et formâ, merely puts in issue the fact that such an award as that declared on was made concerning the premises, and does not put in issue the validity of the award.

Where two parties of the one part, and one of the other, submit to arbitration all matters in difference between them, the arbitrator may award on matters in difference which the two parties, or either of them, has with the other, jointly or severally.

An award, that one of the parties to the submission shall pay money to a stranger, for the benefit of the other party, is good. Adcock v. Wood, 814

(5). Costs of Abortive Award. Where an award is referred back to the arbitrators on the gronnd of defect, and the arbitrator hears fresh

evidence and makes a new award, the costs of such matters as are strictly connected with the abortive award are to be borne equally by the respective parties to the award. Blair v. Jones,

701

BANKING COPARTNERSHIP.

Where a banking firm makes payments professedly on behalf of a customer (who has a banking account with the firm), but without his authority, and the sum so paid is entered to his debit in the books of the firm, and the firm afterwards admits new partners, the new firm is not liable to the customer for such payments, unless there be an agreement between the two firms and the customer that the new firm shall take upon themselves the actual liabilities of the old firm. Craufurd v. Cocks,

BANKRUPT.

See EVIDENCE, (2).

287

(1). Proceedings against Shareholder in Banking Copartnership established under 7 Geo. 4, c. 46.

A shareholder in a joint-stock banking copartnership established under 7 Geo. 4, c. 46, cannot be proceeded against in bankruptcy upon a debt due from the copartnership, where no judgment has been obtained against the public officer of the copartnership, although the business has been relinquished, and an order has been obtained to wind up the affairs of the Company under the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 45, prior to the proceedings in bankruptcy. The rule is the same, although there be not any public officer of the Company.

A fiat in bankruptcy issued against the plaintiff, dated the 20th of July, 1849, upon a debt due from a banking copartnership, of which the plain

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