CROWN.

See RIGHT TO BEGIN.

RIGHT TO REPLY.

DATE OF DOCUMENT. See EVIDENCE, (2).

DECLARATION UNDER 9 & 10

VICT. C. 95, s. 121.

See COUNTY COURT, (1).

DEED.

See MINING COMPANY.

STAMP DUTY.
WILL, (3).

M. B., being seised in fee of certain premises, and being also possessed of certain stock, by a deed of settlement prior to her marriage with J. C., assigned the said stock in trust, after marriage, for her separate use, or to such person or persons as she should by deed appoint, and conveyed her said real property in trust for herself until her marriage with J. C., and then to her separate use during their joint lives; and, after her decease, to the use of her husband J. C. for life; and, after his death, "to the use of the child and children of the said M. B. by the said J. C. or other person or persons, and for such estate, and subject to such powers and provisions as the said M. B. should, notwithstanding her said intended coverture, by deed appoint:-Held, that such power of appointment was not a general one, but could be exercised in favour only of the child or children of M. B. by J. C. or other after-taken husband. Doe d. Beech v. Nall, 102

DEPARTURE IN PLEADING. See PLEADING, III.

DEPOSIT OF GOODS.

See TROVER, (2).

"DEPUTY" AND "SERVANT." See POOR-RATE,

DEVISE,

See WILL.

DIRECTOR.

See MINING COMPANY.

DISTRESS.

See POOR-RATE

LANDLORD AND TENANT, (1), (2), (3).

Machinery for the purposes of manufacture,-ex. gr. "mules" used for spinning cotton-fixed, by means of screws, some into the wooden floors of a cotton-mill, and some by being sunk into the stone flooring, and secured by molten lead, are at law distrainable for rent. Hellawell v. East295 wood,

DIVERSION.
See WATERCOURSE.

DOMICILE.

See LEGACY DUTY, (2).

EJECTMENT.

In ejectment by tenants in common, it appeared, on cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness, that there had been other tenants in common, but there was no evidence of their number:-Held, (Platt, B., dissentiente), that the lessors of the plaintiff could not recover, it not being shewn to what portion of the premises they were entitled.

Semble that, in such case, the onus probandi is on the lessors of the plaintiff. Doe d. Hellyer v. King, 791

ENTRY.

See EVIDENCE, (I).

In an action of ejectment to recover a house and premises, forming part of certain twenty-two acres of land, alleged to be parcel of the manor of H., the lessor of the plaintiff, who sought to trace his title through one Sir E. C., in order to prove a lease to one H., and assignments by the latter to P., and by P. to Sir E. C., and that the land in question was parcel of that manor, tendered in evidence an ancient book found in the muniment room of the family, to whom, at the supposed date of that book, the reversion of the manor belonged. This book, amongst other entries and receipts contended to be in the handwriting of a person suggested to be the then steward of the property, contained an entry, dated 1610, which purported to be a memorandum of the terms of certain leases and deeds. It commenced with a lease from S. to H. from 1570, for fifty-one years, of land, including the premises in question, describing them as parcel of the manor of H., and stated the recitals of that lease as shewing that the lord of the manor of H. had, in 1559, granted a lease for 100 years to L., and that L. had underlet to S. The entry then added, that H. had assigned to P., and P.'s widow to Sir E. C., who claimed ten years yet to come in the premises. There was no proof, independent of the entry, of the existence of such a lease from S. to H.:-Held, that the entry was not admissible upon the ground of reputation, nor as an entry

made in the course of business, nor as secondary evidence of the lease, of which it purported to state the effect. Doe d. Padwick v. Wittcomb, 601

(2). Date of Document.

In an action against the assignees of a bankrupt for the conversion of goods seized by them as the property of the bankrupt, it appeared that the plaintiff claimed the goods by virtue of an alleged sale of the goods by the bankrupt to him a short time before his bankruptcy; and it was proposed, on cross-examination, to ask a witness who was present at the alleged sale, whether he himself would have acted upon the transaction by delivering the goods to the plaintiff:— Semble, that the question might be put.

Certain documents, purporting to be a receipt of and a delivery order for the goods, in the handwriting of the bankrupt, and dated as of the day of the sale, were delivered to a witness by the bankrupt after his bankruptcy, and about a month after the alleged sale. There was no evidence, independent of the documents themselves, that they existed before the bankruptcy:-Held, that the documents were admissible as evidence of their existence at the time they bore date. Morgan v. Whitmore, 716

EXECUTOR. See PARTNERSHIP. WILL, (2).

FACTORY ACT, 7 & 8 VICT. c. 15.

Under the Factory Act, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 15, s. 21, it is no breach of duty to leave machinery unfenced, unless when it is in motion for some manufacturing process. Therefore, where a declaration stated that the defendants were the occupiers of a building

958 FALSE REPRESENTATION.

in which steam power was used, to work machinery employed in manufacturing cotton, and in part of which building there was certain mill gearing, being a shaft which was worked and put in motion by the said steam power; yet the defendants disregarded their duty in this, that the shaft was not securely fenced, contrary to the form of the statute, whereby the plaintiff received great bodily injury: -Held, bad in arrest of judgment, for not shewing that at the time of the accident the machinery was in motion for some manufacturing process.

Under the above statute, the leaving machinery unguarded when required to be securely fenced, is a breach of duty towards all persons, and not merely towards children and young persons. Coe v. Platt,

752

FALSE REPRESENTATION.

A tradesman, who contracts with an individual for the sale to him of an article to be used for a particular purpose by a third person, is not, in the absence of fraud, liable for injury caused to such person by some defect in the construction of the article.

A declaration by husband and wife stated, that the defendant was the maker and seller of certain lamps, called "The Holliday Lamp," and thereupon the husband bought of him one of those lamps, to be used by his wife and himself in his shop, and that the defendant then fraudulently warranted that the lamp was reasonably fit and proper for that purpose, whereas the lamp was dangerous and unsafe, by reason whereof, when the wife attempted to use the lamp, it exploded and injured her. At the trial, it appeared that the accident arose from the defective construction of the lamp, but there was no proof that the defendant knew of the defect; and the jury found that he was not guilty of

INSOLVENT DEBTORS ACT &c.

INSOLVENT DEBTORS ACT FOR INDIA, 11 & 12 VICT. c. 21.

By the 5th section of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 21, (the Insolvent Debtors Act for India), a party imprisoned for debt may petition the Court for relief; and, by the 6th section, he is required to deliver into Court his schedule in the form contained in the Schedule to the Act; and the petitioner's schedule must contain a full and true description as to all matters required to be set forth therein, so far as the same can be described or set forth. The form given by the Schedule to the Act, inter alia, contains a heading "for the names and description of creditors of claimants, and their present or last residence."

The defendant, residing in India, drew certain bills of exchange on Messrs. R., I., & Co., which were purchased in that country for and on account of the plaintiff, Moses Symons, residing in England; and the bills were indorsed by the defendant, and transmitted to the plaintiff. The defendant, afterwards becoming insolvent, petitioned the Insolvent Court in India, and described the debt on the bills of exchange in his schedule as follows:-"Creditor, A. M. Syions, for the following bills of exchange (describing them), drawn by us upon Messrs. R., I., & Co. in favour of Moses Symons." It appeared that a person of the name of A. M. Symons resided at Calcutta, in India; but it was not shewn that he was in any way connected with the bills:Held, in an action by Moses Symons upon the bills that the defendant's description of the plaintiff's debt in his schedule was insufficient within the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 21, and, therefore, that the defendant was liable on the bills. Symons v. May, 707

The plaintiff effected a marine policy, subject to certain rules, one of which was, that ships were not to sail from any port on the east coast of Great Britain to any port in the Belts between the 20th of December and the 15th of February. The plaintiff's vessel sailed from Newcastleupon-Tyne on the 8th of February for a port in the Belts, and was lost in the Baltic on the 14th of February:-Held, that the rule in question was a warranty and not an exception; and that the word "to" in the rule meant "towards," and not "arriving at;" and consequently that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover in respect of the loss. Colledge v. Harty, 205

(2). Total Loss.

A cargo of corn was insured "free from average,' on a voyage from Dantzic to Hull, by the ship Isabella. In the course of the voyage, the vessel and cargo sustained damage by the sea, and in consequence the vessel was obliged to put into a port in Norway; and there the corn was taken out for the purpose of drying it, and repairing the vessel, and so

enabling her to proceed to England with the corn when dried. The corn, however, when taken out, appeared to have received considerable damage; and the master, after calling in advice, resolved to sell it; and it was accordingly sold (after having been partially dried) as damaged corn in the port in Norway:-Held, that the insured could not recover as for a total loss, unless the corn was in such a state in the port in Norway as that, when brought home, it could not have been sold for an amount exceeding the expense of drying and bringing it home; and that it was not a proper question to leave to the jury, whether a prudent uninsured owner would, under similar circumstances, have sold the corn at the port in Norway. Reimer v. Ringrose, 263

(3). Loss by Perils of the Sea.

A vessel laden with hides and tobacco, in the course of her voyage, shipped large quantities of sea-water. On the termination of the voyage it was discovered that the sea-water had rendered the hides putrid, and that the putrefaction of the hides had imparted an ill-flavour to the tobacco, and had thereby injured it:-Held, that the damage thus occasioned to the tobacco was a loss by perils of the seas. Montoya v. The London 451

Assurance Company,

INNUENDO.

See SLANDER.

INVENTORY.

See BILL OF SALE.

IRISH RAILWAY COMPANY. See RAILWAY COMPANY, (4).

ISLE OF MAN. See BANKRUPT, (1).

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

JOINT STOCK COMPANY. See BILL OF EXCHANGE, (2).

JURYMEN, RESWEARING. See VENIRE DE NOVO.

JUS ACCRESCENDI. See PARTNERSHIP.

JUS TERTII. See BANKRUPT, (3).

LAND TAX, 38 GEO. 3, c. 60.

By the 38 Geo. 3, c. 5, which was an Act for granting a land-tax for the year 1798, it was enacted, that all manors, messuages, lands, tenements, &c., tolls, &c., and all hereditaments, of what nature or kind soever they be, situate, lying, and being, happening, or arising, should be charged to the land-tax. By the 38 Geo. 3, c. 60, for making the landtax perpetual, it was enacted, that the sums charged by the 38 Geo. 3, c. 5, in respect of the manors, lands, tenements, and hereditaments in the said Act mentioned, should be raised for ever. The Act incorporating the Vauxhall Bridge Company authorised them to take tolls, and enacted, that the shares of the proprietors should be personal estate, and not in the nature of real property:-Held, that the Company were liable, under the 38 Geo. 3, c. 60, to be rated to the land-tax in respect of their tolls, as being a tenement and hereditament within the true meaning of that Act. The Vauxhall Bridge Company v. Sawyer,

504

LANDLORD AND TENANT. See TENANCY AT WILL. (1). Notice of Distress and Abandon

ment.

A notice of distress stated that