STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. at Liverpool, "to order or to our assigns, paying for freight for the cotton nothing, being owners' property;" and M. & Co. indorsed the bill of lading-"Deliver the within to the Bank of Liverpool, or order." M. & Co. informed B. & Co. that they had drawn bills upon them for the cargo on their account by the Charlotte, and desired them to insure the cotton. M. & Co. also sent to B. & Co. an abstract invoice, which stated that the cotton was shipped by M. & Co. on board the Charlotte for Liverpool, by order, and for account and risk of B. & Co. there, and addressed to order." M. & Co. afterwards sent a full invoice, stating that the cotton was shipped for Liverpool, "by order and for account of B. & Co. there, and to them consigned." M. & Co. not having sufficient funds of B. & Co. to pay for the cotton, sold the bills to a bank at Charleston, and delivered to the bank the bill of lading so indorsed as a security for payment of the bills; which were dishonoured, and taken up by M. & Co. B. & Co. became bankrupt before the arrival of the vessel; and on its arrival M. & Co., by their agent, claimed to stop the cargo in transitu, and it was afterwards stowed in the warehouse of the defendants. The assignees of B. & Co. having brought detinue, the defendants traversed the possession of the assignees, and also set np the right of M. & Co. as against them:Held, first, that the property in the cotton did not vest absolutely in B. & Co., notwithstanding the delivery on board their ship; for, by the terms of the bill of lading, M. & Co. reserved to themselves a jus disponendi of the goods, which the master acknowledged by signing the bill of lading, making the cotton deliverable to their order or assigns, although by so doing the master might have exceeded his authority. SURVIVORSHIP. SWANSEA CANAL CO.'S ACT, 34 GEO. 4, c. 109, s. 49. In 1779, J. B. P. demised certain land, of which he was then seised, to M. & Co. for a term of sixty-five years. In 1794 an Act was obtained (34 Geo. 3, c. 109) by the Swansea Canal Campany, for the purpose of making a canal through part of the land in question; and by the 47th section of that Act it was enacted, that, upon payment or tender of certain sums of money, adjusted by certain commissioners or assessed by a jury, for the purchase of any such lands, &c., it should be lawful for the Canal Company to enter upon such lands, or before such payment or tender, by leave of the owners or occupiers; and that, thereupon, such land should be vested in the Company for the purposes of the Act. In 1797, and during the continuance of the lease, the Duke of B. entered into an arrangement with M. & Co., the lessees, by which a canal, made by the latter, was extended through part of the same land, and formed a continuation of the Swansea Canal. No payment or satisfaction was made or agreed to be made to the owners of the lands, but everything was done by the Duke of B. with the full consent and in accordance with the wishes of such owners and proprietors. Upon the termination of the lease of 1779, the assignees of the reversion brought ejectments against the assignee of the Duke of B., who continued in possession of the canal made upon the land demised:-Held, that the mere consent of the owner of the property to the construction of the canal, did not bring the case within the 47th section of the Act; and that the lessors of the plaintiff were entitled to the possession of the land. Doe d. Patrick v. The Duke of Beaufort, 498 "TENEMENT AND HEREDITAMENT." See LAND TAX. TITLE. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER. TOLL. See LAND TAX. TORT. See PLEADING, II. (3). RAILWAY COMPANY, (5). TOWNSHIP. See POOR LAW COMMISSIONERS. TRESPASS. See CORPORATION AGGREGATE. TENANCY AT WILL. TROVER. See BANKRUPT. (1). Conversion. The plaintiff being lawfully possessed of certain bills of exchange given him by D., a trader, the defendant, acting on behalf of creditors of D., who had taken proceedings to make him bankrupt, came to the plaintiff when ill in bed, and demanded the bills, and, on the plaintiff's refusal to give them up, told him that if he did not, the expense of the bankruptcy would fall on him, and the Commissioner would be very severe with him. The plaintiff was much agitated, and delivered up the bills. The plaintiff's agent afterwards, while the bills were in the defendant's possession, informed him of the circumstances under which they had been given to the plaintiff, and told him that he (the defendant) and his employers had no right to them; but the defendant, notwithstanding, handed them over to his employers. In trover for the bills:-Held, first, that the original taking was not a conversion, inasmuch as there was no such duress as would have avoided a contract, or have enabled the plaintiff to maintain trespass de bonis asportatis. Secondly, that the defendant was guilty of a conversion by delivering the bills to his employers after notice of the facts. Powell v. Hoyland, 67 (2). Pledgor and Pledgee. The plaintiff, being possessed of some plate, transferred it by bill of sale to M. & B. for a valuable consideration, but in order to defeat the execution of a judgment creditor. The plaintiff continued in possession of the plate, and the creditor having assigned his judgment to M. & B., they issued execution thereon; whereupon the plaintiff, in order to defeat the execution, deposited the plate with the defendant. In trover by the plaintiff for the plate:-Held, that the defendant was entitled to set up the right of M. & B.-Semble, that where a person pledges property to which he has no title, the pledgee may deliver it to the real owner; there being, in the ordinary case of a pledge, an implied undertaking, on the part of the pledgor, that the property pledged is his own, and on the part of the pledgee, that he will return it to the pledgor, provided it be not the property of another. Cheesman v. Exall, 341 pleaded that, the bankrupt being indebted to him before the bankruptcy, he had sued him, and had recovered judgment against him, and had sued out execution thereon, and that the sheriff had seized the goods in question, and had sold them under the writ, which was the conversion complained of.-Verification:-Held, on special damurrer, that the plea was bad, as amounting to not guilty. Young v. Cooper, 259 (4). In trover, the plea of not guilty admits the property of the plaintiff; therefore, a defence, that the goods were given by the defendant to the plaintiff, subject to a condition not performed, wherefore the defendant retook them, is not admissible under that plea. Jones v. Davies, (5). Payment into Court. 663 To an action of trover for the conversion of certain cattle, the defendant pleaded that the conversion in the declaration mentioned was the sale of the cattle by the defendant, after they had been seized by him as The surveyor of certain highways. plea concluded by payment of the sum of 107. into Court, with the usual averment of no damages ultra:-Held, on special demurrer, that the plea was bad, as being an unauthorised alteration and application of the form of payment of money into Court given by the Rule of Trin. T. 1 Vict. Key v. Thimbleby, 692 UNINTERRUPTED ENJOY MENT. See PRESCRIPTION ACT, (1). USER. See PRESCRIPTION ACT, (2). EXCH. USURY UNDER 12 ANNE, STAT. 2, c. 16. A debtor, by indenture, conveyed to trustees his life-interest in certain estates, subject to certain annuities, in trust, at any time, without his consent or concurrence, to convey and dispose of the premises assigned conformably to any arrangement the trustees should make with the creditors mentioned in a schedule to that deed, and in such manner as the trustees in their discretion should think reasonable, and for that purpose to convene a meeting of those creditors. The trustees caused several meetings to be held, and a resolution was come to, that the clear surplus income of the trust estate should be rendered available for the benefit of the creditors by a division into two parts, in the manner expressed in another indenture between the trustees of the first, the debtor of the second, and the creditors of the third part. By this deed it was witnessed, that, in pursuance of the said resolution, and in order to carry it into effect, it was thereby agreed between the parties thereto, that the trustees should hold the rents in trust, first, to pay the expenses of the trust; secondly, the annuities; and, thirdly, to divide the rents into two shares, proportioned to the amount of the debts specified in two schedules to that deed; the portion appropriated to the first schedule to be paid to the creditors specified in that schedule, equally, in discharge of their debts, and, after satisfying the debts, of the interest; and as to the shares appropriated to the creditors mentioned in the second schedule, in trust, to apply a competent sum in effecting and keeping on foot, in the names of the trustees, policies of assurance on the life of the debtor: provided, that any addition by way of bonus to the sums assured should VENDOR & PURCHASER. belong to the creditors in the second schedule, in addition to their debts, and be divided amongst them in proportion to their debts, notwithstanding the principal and interest of those debts might be through other ways and means fully discharged; and, in consideration thereof, all the creditors gave the debtor a license to live anywhere without molestation to his person or goods, provided that, if any creditor should molest him, contrary to the license, his debt should be considered as released, and the indenture might be pleaded in bar to an action for it. The trustees effected assurances, and, after the death of the debtor, received the sums assured, and also a bonus, the whole of which was claimed by the widow of the debtor, on the ground that the stipulation for the payment of the bonus to the creditors in the second schedule rendered the indenture usurious and void-Held, first, that the indenture was not, by reason of that provision, or in any respect, void for usury. Secondly, that no action at law could be maintained by the debtor's widow against the trustees to recover either the balance unapplied or the sums received from the insurance office; nor would such action lie even if the transaction were usurious. Semble, that the license to the debtor was not a "forbearing" of a debt within the 12 Ann. stat. 2, c. 16; but only a relinquishment of his personal liability. O'Brien v. Lord Kenyon, 382 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. In an action to recover the expenses incurred by the plaintiff in investigating the defendant's title to mortgage certain lands, upon the ground that the defendant's title had turned out to be defective, the declaration stated, that, in consideration VENDOR & PURCHASER. the plaintiff would advance 20007. upon the security of a mortgage of the land, upon the defendant's making out a good title to mortgage the said lands to the plaintiff, the defendant promised the plaintiff to pay him the expenses to which he might be subjected in case the loan should go off by reason of the defendant changing his views, or of the defectiveness of the defendant's title. The evidence of the defendant's title was as follows:-The defendant, shortly before the agreement with the plaintiff, had contracted to purchase the premises of one W. E., who claimed as heirat-law ex parte maternâ to one B. H., the person last seised. J. H., the father of B. H., married E. E., and died in 1787, aged 59, and devised the property to his son B. H. and his two daughters, and, after their death, to B. H. in fee. The daughters both died, unmarried, before B. H., who died a bachelor, in 1839. In order to negative the existence of any heirs ex parte paternâ, depositions in a Chancery suit of E. v. E., in 1843, had been forwarded to the plaintiff, in which the deponents stated, that they were well acquainted with B. H., who had told them that "he had no relation left." And the deponents stated, that they believed B. H. had no relation left, on his father's side, living at the time of his death. WAIVER OF TRESPASS. 985 in which the declarant stated, that B. H. and his sisters had told him, on several occasions, that they had no relations whatever on their father's side, and that they had often heard their father declare that he had no relations whatever, but that he was the last of his family:-Held, first, that the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant was not within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds; and secondly, per Pollock, C. B., Alderson, B., and Platt, B., that the defendant had not made out a good title to the land; for that by 66 a good title" was to be understood such a title as a Court of Chancery would adopt as a sufficient ground for compelling specific performance, and such a title as would be a good answer to an action of ejectment by any claimant; dissentiente Martin, B., who held that it was sufficient to establish a legal title in point of fact. Jeakes v. White, 873 VENIRE DE NOVO. After the jury were sworn at Nisi Prius, and during the examination of the first witness, it was discovered that there were thirteen jurymen in the box. Twelve of the same jury were afterwards resworn by the direction of the Judge, and the cause was recommenced. It further appeared, that two issues had been directed in the same suit, in which both parties claimed the property as heir to B. H. ex parte maternâ; and that the jury had found, upon two occasions (the cause having been tried twice), first, that B. H. did not leave any heir ex parte paternâ; and secondly, that the plaintiff in that suit (W. E., from whom the defendant claimed), was the heir-at-law of B. H. ex parte maternâ. A statutory declaration had also been furnished to the plaintiff, To this the de fendant's counsel objected, and re- WAIVER OF TRESPASS. See MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED, (3). sss 2 |