City until about one o'clock in the night. It was in the light of the moon, and not a very long walk over to the depot, which was but a few steps from the Doyle House. Had his intentions been honorable, he would most likely have remained with his intended wife at his brother-in-law's until near train time, and then walked over to the depot,- at least this would have been the more natural and appropriate course to pursue. So far as the record shows, neither the place nor time of the marriage was prearranged, nor even so much as talked about, either before or after their departure. The evidence shows that Henderson personally knew that he could not get a license authorizing their marriage in this state without some one committing perjury, and the conclusion is warranted, from the evidence, that he was destitute of means to defray their traveling expenses out of the state, or anywhere else. Although his bill at the Doyle House was only one dollar, he was not able to pay that, and was compelled to pledge his satchel and contents, consisting of a few old razors, as security for the amount, and they were still unredeemed at the time of the trial. It is reasonable to suppose his impecunious condition was known to his brother and the Shutt family, and the fact that John went over to the Doyle House Saturday morning, and called upon the prosecutrix at her room, is a circumstance tending strongly to show that he did not expect them to leave on the night train. All day Saturday, when not in or about the Doyle House, the accused was out on the streets, drinking and spreeing around as usual. At five in the evening, as heretofore seen, he and the prosecutrix, accompanied by John, returned to Shutt's in broad daylight, and deliberately took up their quarters there, both occupying the same bed at night, in utter defiance of law, decency, and public morals. Is there anything in all this tending to show that his object in taking her from the home of her parents was to make her his wife, rather than his kept mistress? If there is, we confess we have not been able to discover it.

As before indicated, the gravamen of the offense is the purpose or intent with which the enticing and abduction is done, and hence the offense, if committed at all, is complete the moment the subject of the crime is removed beyond the power and control of her parents, or of others having lawful charge of her, whether any illicit intercourse ever takes place or not. Subsequent acts are only important as affording the most reliable means of forming a correct conclusion with respect to

the original purpose and intention of the accused. It is with this view we have gone so minutely into the history and details of the case as we have.

The remaining point to be considered is, whether there is any material error in the charge of the court to the jury for which the case should be reversed. The record shows that the court gave a general charge to the jury on its own motion, and that no other instructions were asked or given. One of the objections taken to the charge is, that the court should have explained to the jury what is meant by the terms "prostitution" and "concubinage," as they occur in the statute. The court was not asked to give an explanation of these terms, and no reason is perceived why it should have done so in the absence of such request. At any rate, it would be going much further than we are prepared to go to reverse the judgment on that ground. The words in question are in general use, and we have no doubt that they were used by the legislature in their general or popular signification. They are in no sense words of art or technical terms; and if it were apprehended that they would not be correctly understood by the jury, counsel should have prepared an instruction defining the words, and submitted it to the court, to be ruled upon in the usual way. It is but a fair presumption that the jury understood the words in the sense in which they are used in the statute, and that they were used by the court in its charge in the same

sense.

It is said that "nothing short of continuous and regular illicit intercourse would constitute concubinage," within the meaning of the statute; and Slocum v. People, 90 Ill. 274, is cited in support of the statement. Conceding this to be so, it does not follow that the court erred in neglecting to give an instruction that was not asked for. With respect to the case cited, it was clearly decided right. Yet we think there are certain expressions in the opinion which were not necessary to a decision of the case, that if applied to cases under the statute that might be suggested would need modification. If by the above statement it is intended to assert that any great length of time or long-continued illicit intercourse is necessary to the establishment of that relation which results in concubinage, the proposition, in our judgment, is unsound. The relation which gives rise to the disreputable state of woman indicated by that term may, like that of marriage, be contracted or assumed in a day as easily as in a year. When a

single woman consents to unlawfully cohabit with a man generally, as though the marriage relation existed between them, without any limit as to the duration of such illicit intercourse, and actually commences cohabiting with him in pursuance of that understanding, she becomes his concubine, or, as it is usually expressed in modern times, "his kept mistress," which amounts to the same thing. So we hold in this case that when the heartless libertine, by his seductive arts or other means, induces his confiding or intimidated victim, as the case may be, to abandon home and the wholesome restraints of parental authority to accompany him whithersoever he may see proper to take her, without limit as to time or place, for the purpose of submitting to his licentious embraces, and ministering to his unbridled lust, he clearly brings himself within the provisions of the section of the statute we are now considering, and subjects himself to the punishment therein denounced. In short, we do not think any of the objections pointed out to the charge of the court materially affected the result, or are, in any view, of so serious a character as to require a reversal of the judgment. Upon the whole, we think the charge was fully as fair to the accused as it ought to have been. In our opinion, a clear case is made out against William Henderson; and if it be possible to make out a case of aiding and assisting in the commission of an offense, it must be admitted that it has been done in this, as to the other defendants. The evidence not only shows them guilty, but demonstrates that they knew at the time they were violating the law.

The judgment will be affirmed.

GIST OF OFFENSE OF ENTICING UNMARRIED FEMALE FOR PURPOSE OF PROSTITUTION is the taking away of the female from the control of those legally in charge of her: People v. Demousset, 71 Cal. 611.

SCHALUCKY V. FIELD.

[124 ILLINOIS, 617.J

DEMURRER. WHERE REPLICATION IS FILED TO A PLEA, and the replica tion is demurred to, the demurrer will be carried back and sustained to the plea itself, if that is defective.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. ENTRIES IN DEPOSITOR'S BANK-BOOK CONSTITUTE "EVIDENCE OF INDEBTEDNESS IN WRITING," within the meaning of the Illinois statute (section 16), since the entries having been made by the bankers, they charge themselves with the money deposited; and where the liability of stockholders must, under the charter of incorpora tion, be regarded as that of partners, the stockholders occupy the same relation to the creditors as the bank does, so far as the statute of limitations is concerned.

AN ACTION AT LAW BY A SINGLE CREDITOR WILL LIE AGAINST ANY STOCKHOLDER of an insolvent corporation to enforce an individual liability created by its charter. STOCKHOLDERS ARE PARTNERS, AND LIABLE AS SUCH TO THE CREDITORS OF THE CORPORATION to an amount equal to the amount of stock held by them, respectively, under a provision of incorporation that “when default shall be made in the payment of any debt or liability contracted by said corporation, the stockholders shall be held individually respon sible for an amount equal to the amount of stock held by them respectively."

Blum and Blum, for the plaintiff in error.

MAGRUDER, J. This action was brought by the plaintiff in error, in the superior court of Cook County, against the defendant in error, as a stockholder in the German Savings Bank of Chicago, to recover the balance due upon certain amounts deposited by him in said bank. The judgment was in favor of the defendant, and on appeal to the appellate court of the first district, was affirmed. The case is brought before us by writ of error to the appellate court, two of the judges having granted the statutory certificate of importance. The provision in the bank's charter (being section 9 of the act of the legislature of Illinois incorporating the bank, to be found in Private Laws of 1869, volume 3, page 393), upon which the individual liability of the stockholders is founded, and upon which this suit was brought, is as follows: "When default shall be made in the payment of any debt or liability contracted by said corporation, the stockholders shall be held individually responsible for an amount equal to the amount of stock held by them respectively," etc.

This suit was begun on September 19, 1883, and an amended declaration was filed on December 26, 1883. The declaration avers that defendant was, on January 1, 1874, the owner of

fifty shares of the stock of said bank, amounting to five thousand dollars, and that since July 1, 1877, the bank has been utterly insolvent, and that demand has been made on it, etc. The declaration also avers that plaintiff made a number of deposits of money in the bank between August 8, 1874, and July, 1877, and received a number of payments out of these deposits during that period, leaving a balance due him on July 1, 1877, upon which a payment of $359.62 was subsequently made. It is further averred that the deposits and interest thereon were entered by the bank in a bank or pass book issued by it to the plaintiff, wherein the bank, when such deposits were made and the interest became due, made entries in writing, as evidence of its indebtedness to the plaintiff. The amount sued for is the balance shown to be due by the written entries in the pass-book.

The plaintiff pleaded three pleas to the amended declaration: 1. Nil debet; 2. That the cause of action did not accrue within two years next before the commencement of the suit; 3. That the cause of action did not accrue within five years next before the commencement of the suit. The plaintiff joined issue on the first plea, and demurred to the second. He filed a replication to the third plea, setting up a payment to him, on June 30, 1883, of $359.62 by a receiver of the bank, appointed in a chancery proceeding brought against the bank at the suit of certain creditors. This sum was the amount of a dividend of seventy per cent upon plaintiff's claim, declared in said proceeding and paid under the order of the court. The defendant demurred to the replication.

The cause was heard upon plaintiff's demurrer to the second plea, and upon defendant's demurrer to the replication to the third plea. The court sustained both demurrers, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant for the costs.

Even though the replication to the third plea be defective, yet the demurrer must be carried back and sustained to the third plea, if the latter is defective: P. & O. R. R. Co. v. Neill, 16 Ill. 269.

The only matter, then, which is presented for our consideration is the validity of the third plea. The question to be determined is, whether or not the cause of action in this suit is barred by the five years' limitation of the statute.

Section 15 of the limitation law provides that "actions on unwritten contracts, express or implied, . . . . and all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within