have been illegal are presumed to have been legal: Corburn v. Crittenden, 62 Miss. 125; Brigins v. Chandler, 60 Id. 862. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

DESCRIPTION OF LANDS IN DEED, SUFFICIENCY OF: Green v. Jordan, 83 Ala. 220; 3 Am. St. Rep. 711; Sherwood v. Whiting, 54 Conn. 330; 1 Am. Bt. Rep. 116, and note 123.

PRESUMPTION IS THAT ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW, and such presumption can only be repelled by clear evidence of illegality: Dubuc v. Voss, 19 La. Ann. 210; 92 Am. Dec. 526, and cases collected in note 529.

PROCEEDINGS OF BOARD OF DE FACTO DIRECTORS ARE PRESUMED REGU. LAR until irregularity is shown: State v. Kupferle, 44 Mo. 154; 100 Am. Dec. 265; Chase ▼. Tuttle, 55 Conn. 455; 3 Am. St. Rep. 64, and note 69-70.

KING V. STATE.

[65 MISSISSIPPI, 576.]

CRIMINAL LAW - HOMICIDE. - EVIDENCE THAT DECEASED HABITUALLY WENT ARMED WITH DEADLY WEAPONS, and that this was known to his slayer, is admissible in behalf of the latter, on the same principle which justifies the admission of evidence of the threats or character of the deceased.

CRIMINAL LAW - HOMICIDE. - CHARACTER OF DECEASED cannot be shown by particular acts of misconduct not connected with the accused, as that he had engaged in frequent fights in which he used deadly weapons, and therewith made deadly assaults on his antagonists, and that these facts were known to the accused. DECLARATIONS-RES GESTE. — STATEMENT MADE BY A SLAYER ABOUT A MINUTE AFTER shooting the deceased, of his reason for so doing, is not admissible in his favor.

INDICTMENT, conviction, and sentence for murder.

McCabe and Anderson, and L. W. Magruder, for the appellant. T. M. Miller, attorney-general, for the state.

ARNOLD, C. J. There is testimony in the record that Cox, the deceased, made threats against the life of appellant a short time before the homicide, and that these threats had been communicated to appellant; that the deceased was a violent, vindictive, and dangerous man, and that these characteristics were known to appellant, and that while appellant and deceased were discussing the settlement of a controversy between them pending in a justice's court, deceased declared several times, in a loud and angry manner, he would pay nothing,

and then cursed appellant, and said, "I will kill you if you keep on bothering me, or if you say anything more to me about it, and raised up and run his hand into his pocket as if he was going to kill me sure enough," when appellant drew his pistol and fired.

In this state of case appellant offered testimony to show that deceased habitually went armed with concealed deadly weapons, and that appellant was cognizant of this fact, and that deceased was generally reputed, in the community in which he lived, to go so armed, and that this was known to appellant. The court refused to allow this testimony to go to the jury, and in doing so it erred.

Under the circumstances stated, it was for the jury to determine whether or not appellant had reasonable cause to apprehend danger to his life or limb at the time of killing; and to enable the jury to do this fairly and intelligently, by putting themselves as far as possible in the place of the appellant at the time of the killing, and viewing the situation as it appeared to him, the testimony should have been admitted. The same principle which justified the admission of evidence as to the character and threats of the deceased rendered the excluded testimony competent: Payne v. Commonwealth, 1 Met. (Ky.) 370; State v. Smith, 12 Rich. 430; Moriarty v. State, 62 Miss. 654; State v. Graham, 61 Iowa, 608.

Appellant also tendered witnesses to prove that the deceased had been engaged in frequent fights in which he used deadly weapons, and that the witnesses had seen him in several fights in which he made deadly assaults on his antagonists, and that appellant knew these facts. The court properly sustained objections to this testimony. The character of the deceased could not be shown by particular acts of misconduct on his part, in no way connected with the accused. That could be proved only by evidence of his general reputation: 1 Bishop's Criminal Procedure, sec. 1117; 2 Id., sec. 617; Moriarty v. State, 62 Miss. 654

It was not error for the court to refuse to allow appellant to prove the declaration made by him after he was arrested, and but little more than a minute after the shooting, as to the reason why he shot the deceased. Such declaration was not a part of anything then being done, but a mere statement in regard to a past transaction, and was therefore incompetent: Mayes v. State, 64 Miss. 329; 60 Am. Rep. 58.

As a new trial must be awarded on account of the error

above indicated, it seems unnecessary to consider other errors assigned.

Reversed and remanded.

DECLARATIONS OR ACTS OF DEFENDANT IN HIS OWN FAVOR, unless part of the res gestæ, or of a confession, are not admissible for the defense: Lynch v. State, 24 Tex. App. 350; 5 Am. St. Rep. 888, and cases collected in note 893-894; State v. Hicks, 92 Mo. 431.

-

HOMICIDE. — ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF THREATS and statements made by deceased: Campbell v. People, 16 Ill. 17; 61 Am. Dec. 53–62, note. See Webber v. Commonwealth, 119 Pa. St. 223; 4 Am. St. Rep. 634.

EVIDENCE OF BAD CHARACTER OF DECEASED FOR TURBULENCE and violence is not admissible in favor of defendant in case of homicide, unless the conduct of deceased at the time of killing was such as to create in the mind of the accused a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm: Lang v. State, 84 Ala. 1; 5 Am. St. Rep. 324, and note 328.

CASES

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS

OF

NEW YORK.

PEOPLE V. O'BRIEN.

[111 NEW YORK, 1.]

CORPORATIONS. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE HAVE NO AUTHORITY, UPON THE DISSOLUTION OF A CORPORATION and the appointment of a receiver, to maintain a supplementary action against the receiver, the corporation, and others, for the purpose of obtaining a declaration of the rights and liabilities of the several parties, determining what were the assets of the company, and the extent of the interests of the several parties therein, and restraining the mortgagees, contractors, and others from taking legal proceedings to enforce their rights in and liens upon the property of the corporation. Per Ruger, C. J.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CORPORATIONS. THE POWER TO REPEAL ACTS OF INCORPORATION, though reserved in such acts, must be exercised in subjection to the provisions of the federal constitution.

CORPORATION MAY ACQUIRE THE FEE IN PROPERTY, though created for a limited period only.

AN INTEREST IN THE STREETS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK MAY BE GRANTED IN PERPETUITY, and irrevocably, by the city authorities.

GRANT OF FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN A STREET-RAILWAY

WILL BE CONSTRued as an IRREVOCABLE GRANT IN PERPETUITY, though the corporation to which it is granted was created for a limited period only. FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN A STREET-RAILWAY is not a mere license or privilege enjoyable only during the life of the grantee, and revocable at the will of the state. It has been uniformly regarded as indestructible by legislative authority, and as constituting property in the highest sense of the term.

CORPORATIONS. REPEAL OF A LAW AUTHORIZING CORPORATIONS does not destroy organization formed under it.

DISSOLUTION OF A CORPORATION DOES NOT TAKE AWAY OR DESTROY ITS PROPERTY OR ANNUL ITS CONTRACTS. Such dissolution has no other operation upon its contracts or property rights than the death of a natu ral person has on his.

RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO REPEAL THE CHARTER OF A CORPORATION enables a legislature to effect a destruction of the corporate life, and disable it from continuing its corporate business; but personal and real property acquired by the corporation during its lawful existence, rights of contract or choses in action so acquired, and which do not in their general nature depend upon the powers conferred by the charter, are not destroyed by such repeal. FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN A STREET-RAILWAY SURVIVES THE DISSOLUTION of the corporation grantee, resulting from the repeal of its charter enacted pursuant to a right of repeal reserved by the legislature. UPON THE REPEAL OF AN ACT OF INCORPORATION, all the property and rights of the corporation become vested in the directors then in office, or in such persons as by law have the management of the business of the corporation, in trust for the stockholders and creditors, unless the repealing law provides for the appointment of other persons than the officers of the corporation as trustees. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-STATUTE ATTEMPTING TO TAKE FROM THE BROADWAY SURFACE COMPANY, ITS STOCKHOLDERS and creditors, its franchise and property, and bestow them upon the municipality of New York, or to direct a sale of such franchise, and the payment of the purchase price to such city, is unconstitutional, and therefore void.

STATUTE MUST NOT BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT unless its language expressly requires it.

CHARACTER OF A Statute is NOT DETERMINED BY ITS TITLE, but by its provisions, unless its language is ambiguous, in which event its title and the occasion of its enactment may be considered to assist a correct understanding of its terms.

STATUTE PROVIDING PROCEEDINGS TO BE TAKEN ON THE DISSOLUTION OF A CORPORATION BY ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE MUST BE GIVEN A PROSPECTIVE OPERATION, and cannot be applied to a corporation so dissolved prior to the enactment of the statute.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. WHEN, BY REASON OF THE DISSOLUTION OF A CORPORATION, ITS PROPERTY HAS VESTED IN ITS DIRECTORS, in trust for its stockholders and creditors, the legislature has no power to subsequently provide for the appointment of a receiver and the transfer of the corporate assets to him; such appointment to be made by a court in an action to which such directors are not parties, and in which the court has no other judicial discretion or authority than to designate such receiver. STATUTE FORBIdding a STREET-RAILWAY COMPANY from leasing its rights

or franchises to any person or company operating a road parallel thereto does not inhibit traffic contracts with parallel roads for the partial use of their respective routes beyond the line of parallelism.

ACTION by the attorney-general in the name of the people against John O'Brien, receiver of the Broadway Surface Railroad Company, the mayor of the city of New York, the Broadway and Seventh Avenue Railroad Company, the Twenty-third Street Railway Company, Francis A. Palmer and William II. Hayes, trustees under certain mortgages. The president and trustees of the Broadway Surface Railroad Company, at the