work assigned to him. An agent appointed to do work of Limitations of agent's one kind does not bind the candidate if he officiously assumes authority. duties of an entirely different kind, and while he is doing the latter commits a corrupt act. Thus, a person commissioned to do subordinate work, as a mere messenger (whether paid or not), and having no authority expressed or implied to do anything except act as a messenger, is not an agent for all purposes so as to fix the candidate with liability for acts done by him while carrying on an unauthorised canvass. Windsor Case, 19 L.T., n.s., 613; 1 O'M. & H, 2; also the Durham Case, 2 O'M. & H., 137.) "There are many persons who are employed at an election, and who, in one sense, are agents of the candidate, but who are not agents in the sense that the election would be considered void by their misconduct." (Per Willes, J., in Bodmin Case, 1 O'M. & H., 119; 20 L.T., n.s. 989.) So, when a person is asked to canvass a particular class of voters-as a master to canvass his workmen (Westbury Case, 1 O'M. & H., 47; 20 L.T., n.s., 17; Blackburn Case, 1 O'M. & H., 199; 20 L.T, n.s., 823), or a landlord his tenants (North Norfolk Case, 1 O'M. & H., 236; 21 L.T., n.s., 264), he is an agent only while he is engaged in canvassing them, and the candidate is not bound by his unauthorised acts at other times, and while canvassing other persons. Equally, where a person is authorised to canvass in a particular district, and there is nothing to show he had authority, express or implied, to canvass anywhere else, the candidate is not bound by his acts in other districts. (Harwich Case, 3 O'M. & H., 69; 44 L.T., n.s., 189; Durham Case, 2 O'M. & H., 136.)

agent dis

instructions.

But if it be shown that the agent at the time Candidate when he committed the corrupt act was engaged upon the bound though particular kind of work assigned to him, the candidate is obeys his not exonerated from the consequences of his agent's act by merely proving that the latter in doing the corrupt act in question was acting against his express instructions and in defiance of his honest wishes. (The Harwich Case, 3 O'M. & H., 69; 44 L.T., n.s., 189.) This rigorous rule involves no little hardship to an honest candidate, and in this respect the liability of a principal for the act of an agent is carried

Distinction

between cases

date bound

and not bound.

much beyond the ordinary maxims of the common law; but it is founded on a principle of public policy, that no election which is tainted by the corrupt act of any agent of the sitting member can stand.

The distinction which does exonerate a candidate, where his where candi- agent at the time he offends is acting beyond the scope of his authority, in the sense that he has assumed duties which do not belong to him, but which binds him, when the agent, while keeping within the general line of his duty, disobeys his express instructions to the extent of committing a corrupt act, as he thinks to further the candidate's interest, is somewhat fine, but is now well settled. A very simple illustration of how it works is this: A is specifically authorised to canvass street X, and he has no other authority, express or implied, to act in any other way in connection with the election. He bribes a voter in street P. The candidate is not bound. A is authorised to canvass in street X, and expressly instructed in writing by the candidate, who honestly wishes his election conducted fairly, not to commit any corrupt act Nevertheless A, in street X, bribes, or treats, or intimidates a voter. The candidate is bound and the seat is forfeited. So far we have dealt with the comparatively simple case, where it is proved that the persons who are charged with some corrupt act were expressly appointed by the candidate, or his authorised agents, to take some part in the election, and then the only question can be, Was the agent at the time he offended acting within the scope of his authority? But we now come to the much more difficult and more common case in election inquiries, where there is no evidence of any direct appointment by the candidate or his authorised agents, but where the alleged agent is proved to have been more or less openly and actively working in the candidate's interest. There the question arises-Are the circumstances such that the Court can imply he had authority from the candidate, or has the latter approved and ratified his action on his behalf?

When agent actually appointed only question is extent of his authority.

Implied

agency.

Lush, L.J.,

"The difficulty," said the late Lord Justice Lush, in the upon agency. Harwich Case (quoted supra), "always is when there is no

Agent either by employment or recognition.

express appointment, to determine whether the wrongdoer did or did not stand in the relation of agent to the candidate in respect of the particular matter of the complaint. An agent is a person employed by another to act for him and on his behalf, either generally or in some particular transaction. The authority may be actual or it may be implied from circumstances. It is not necessary, in order to prove agency, to show that the person was actually appointed by the candidate. If a person not appointed were to assume to act in any department of service as election agent, and the candidate accepted his services as such, he would thereby ratify the agency. So that a man may become the agent of another in either of two ways-by actual employment or by recognition and acceptance. The next question is, if agent, what is he agent for; what is he appointed to do, or what does he profess to do? If a person were appointed or accepted as agent for canvassing generally, and he'were to bribe or treat any voter, the candidate would lose his seat. But if he were employed or accepted to canvass a particular class-as if a master were asked to canvass his workmen, and he went out of his way and bribed a person who was not his workman, the candidate would not be responsible, because this was not within the scope of his authority. And for the same reason, Candidate not if a person whom the candidate had not in any way authorised to canvass at all for him were to take upon himself rised persons. to bribe a voter, the candidate would not be responsible for that wrongful act. No candidate could ever secure a seat if he were made answerable for the acts of unauthorised persons."

"No one," said the present Lord Blackburn, in the Bewdley Case (1 O'M. & 17; 19 L.T., n.s., 677) "can lay down a precise rule as to what would constitute evidence of being an agent. Every instance in which it is shown that, either with the knowledge of the candidate himself, or to the knowledge of his agents, a person acts at all in furthering his election is evidence, tending to show that the person so acting was authorised to act as his agent. It is by no means essential that it should be shown that a person so employed,

liable for acts

of unautho

Agent need not be paid.

Agency a question of fact.

Mere fact of canvassing not enough.

Mere fact of

canvassing

does not prove agency.

in order to be an agent for that purpose, is paid in the slightest degree. And, I take it, that the question for the Court sitting to try the case comes ultimately to be, whether upon the aggregate of all these things taken together, of which each in itself is little, but is certainly some evidence, the person is shown to have been employed to such an extent as to make him an agent for whom the candidate would be responsible. I take it that in each case the judge must bring common sense to bear upon it, and satisfy himself whether it is sufficient or not.”

It will be observed that the question, whether the alleged briber was the candidate's agent at the time of the offence, is treated by the learned judges entirely as a question of fact, to be determined by a reference to the circumstances of the cases before them. Such facts as proof that the alleged agent was canvassing in the candidate's interest, that he had a canvass book with him, that he spoke at the candidate's meetings, that he was seen in the candidate's company in the street, are evidence, but no more than evidence, that he had authority to canvass and bind the candidate.

The mere fact that a person is actively working for the candidate does not necessarily make him an agent. "I cannot concur in the opinion that any supporter of a candidate who chooses to ask others for their votes and to make speeches in his favour can force himself upon the candidate as an agent, or that the candidate should be held responsible for the acts of one from whom he actually endeavours to dissociate himself." (Londonderry Case, 1 O'M. & H., 278; 21 L.T., n.s., 709. Staleybridge Case, 1 O'M. & H., 67; 20 L.T., n.s., 75.) The circumstance that a person canvassing on behalf of a candidate had a canvass book with him would not be sufficient to make him an agent. (The Bolton Case, 20'M. & H., 141; 31 L.T., n.s., 194) unless, of course, it could be proved he got it from an authorised agent of the candidate, which would be the strongest evidence of his appointment to

canvass.

Nor does the mere fact that a person is one of a large committee whose names are published as the General

Nor bare act of accompanying candidate.

Committee, but which committee is purely ornamental and Nor mere fact that person is has no part whatever assigned it in the conduct of the elec- one of large tion, make him an agent. This was first decided by the late Committee. Baron Martin in the Westminster Case (1 O'M. & H., 89; 20 L.T., n.s., 238), when, at the same time, he took care to point out that if the Committee, to which the alleged agent belonged, had been more than a nominal one, had been in fact a committee within the ordinary meaning of the term to which some portion of the management of the election had been confided, the decision would have been the other way. In the Westbury Case (20 L.T., n.s., 24), Willes, J., acted upon the Westminster Case, but he added "If I see a person's name on the committee from the beginning, if I find that he attended meetings of the committee, that he canvassed and his canvass was recognised so far as it went, I shall require considerable argument to convince me he is not an agent." (See also the Windsor Case, 2 O'M. & H., 89.) Again, the bare act of accompanying the candidate on his canvass is not sufficient evidence of agency to make candia date liable for bribery committed by such person at another time. (See judgment Hawkins, J., in the first Salisbury Case, 3 O'M. & H., 131; 44 L T., n.s., 193; also second Salisbury Case, 4 O'M. & H., 21; Harwich Case, 3 O'M. & H., 69; 44 L.T., n.s., 189; Shrewsbury Case, 2 O'M. & H., 36.) It must be observed, however, that the recognition of a person involved in inviting him to accompany the candidate on his canvass is an important link in the chain of facts which go to make up agency, and combined with very little more would no doubt in most cases be held to establish it. It need hardly be said that any corrupt act done by a person accompanying a candidate and in his presence is strong evidence against the candidate unless repudiated by him at the time. (See Salisbury Case, supra; Bewdley Case, 1 O'M. & H., 17.) But while the law seems to be that if a person, no matter how zealous a partizan he may be, is acting entirely of his of agency. own motion, the candidate is not bound by what he does, on the other hand, if he is found carrying on his operations in concert with the candidate's organisation, or if the Court is

What is sufficient evidence