Is mere noninterference sufficient?

Suggested law on this point.

Cases where agency held

satisfied that the candidate, or any one of his principal agents, has full knowledge of his efforts and approves and sanctions them-then he is an agent.

In the second Taunton Case (2 O'M. & H., 74), Mr. Justice Grove intimated that mere non-interference by the candidate with persons who were to his knowledge actively exerting themselves in his interest would not be enough to constitute agency. But this ruling must be considered with reference to the particular facts before his lordship, because the decision of the present Lord Blackburn in the first Taunton Case (1 O'M. & H., 181; 21 L.T., n.s., 169) shows that there are cases where mere non-interference with the notorious action of partizans will make the latter the candidate's agents. It is obvious that if a candidate, knowing that certain persons are actively working in his behalf, lies by, and accepting the full benefit of their services, does nothing to repudiate them, it will take a very slight additional circumstance to lead to the conclusion that he sanctioned their proceedings. Especially is this so where the persons who are so acting are proved to have been working in close concert with him in political matters immediately prior to the election. It is suggested that an intelligible distinction which will reconcile the two Taunton cases (quoted supra) and make them accord with the Harwich Case (3 O'M. & H., 6, 69; 44 L.T., n.s., 189) is this: Where the alleged agents are found in intimate communication with the candidate prior to the contest, and during the contest work in his interest openly, but apparently independently, they are prima facie his agents unless he repudiates them; but where no privity is established between the candidate and the alleged agents either before or during the election, the mere fact that he does not repudiate them taken by itself will not make them his agents.

In the Tewkesbury Case (3 O'M. & H., 99; 44 L.T., n.s., to be proved. 192) the alleged agent was seen frequently in the candidate's committee-room, going out of it in the company of bodies of men who divided themselves and canvassed in different districts. He had a canvass book, and on one or two occasions (though not at the times when the corrupt acts were com

agency held

mitted) had canvassed in the candidate's company. It was held in these circumstances that his agency was established. In the Hereford Case (1 O'M. & H., 195) it was proved Cases where that the person who was charged with bribery had, at the to be proved. request of an agent, canvassed two voters, that on one occasion he canvassed in the respondent's company, and that after the election was over he received a letter of thanks for his exertions from the respondent. It was held that the agency was established.

In the Stroud Case (3 O'M. & H., 11) the alleged agent was proved to have canvassed three times a week, though he did not have a regular canvass book, he was attending continually at the committee-room, and was bringing up voters on the polling day, and after the election he was employed in connection with the petition. It was proved that the respondent's principal agent had told the alleged agent that he would not employ him in connection with the election, but inasmuch as the learned judge was satisfied on the facts that other agents of the respondent, working side by side with the principal agent, had countenanced and employed him, the decision was that he was an agent for whose acts the candidate was responsible. His lordship laid down the law of agency in the terms in which it has generally been expressed. "It is clear that a person is not to be made an agent by his merely acting, that is not enough; he must act in promotion of the election, and he must have authority, or there must be circumstances from which we can infer authority." Here he held there were circumstances.

A person who is an agent may have implied authority to appoint sub-agents necessary to carry out the work assigned to him, and in that case the candidate is bound by the acts of those sub-agents, though he may never have seen them or had any communication with them. (The Bewdley Case, 1 O'M. & H., 17; 19 L.T., n.s., 677.) On this principle, when the wife of an agent bribed, it was held that inasmuch as an agent may use the instrumentality of another, the candidate was bound. (The Cashel Case, I O'M. & H., 288.) In the Westminster Case (1 O'M. & H., 89; L.T., n.s., 238) the son

Agent may

act by sub

agent.

Liability of candidate for acts of political associations.

The Blackburn Case.

Liable when he adopts committee of

association as

his election committee.

of an agent bribed and it was held the candidate was not bound. These two cases have been quoted in at least one work of authority as sustaining the proposition that a candidate is bound by the act of his agent's wife, but not of his agent's son. It is submitted they give no support to such a distinction. The wife as well as the son can only bind on the principle of delegated authority; and all that the two cases quoted above show is that on the facts the Court was satisfied that in one case authority had been conferred and in the other it had not.

A very important question next arises, to what extent is a candidate liable for the acts of political and other associations in sympathy with his candidature, and exerting themselves to promote it. It need not be said that at the present time this is a subject of increasing interest; and its practical importance warrants some examination of the authorities. When the candidate adopts the committee of the association as his committee, avails himself openly of its organization, and carries on the work of the election in concert with it, no question can arise. In such a case the authorised agents of the association are to the fullest extent his agents. This was what happened in the Blackburn Case (20 L.T., n.s., 823; 1 O'M. & H., 198). There a month before the election a circular was issued by the Conservative Association, addressed to every millowner, manager and overlooker, calling upon them to use personal efforts to secure the return of the respondents. This circular was afterwards adopted by the respondents, and the association which had issued it was accepted by them in place of a committee for the management of the election. Mr. Justice Willes held that the circular must be taken to be the act of the respondents just as much as if each of them had written a letter to the same purport to the persons mentioned in it. And as to its effect he said: "It appears to me that the effect of this circular was to make an agent of every person having authority, down to the last grade, that of overlookers over the hands, and to request, and therefore authorise each such to influence the hands who were under him for the purpose of inducing them to vote for the candidates upon whose

behalf this document was issued; and any overlooker, and consequently anybody in that or any higher grade, who bond fide took up the Tory side, and who acted upon this circular, and did canvass for the sitting members, became their agent, and his acts did bind them to the extent and under the circumstances which I have already explained."

In the great majority of cases, however, the operations of Liability of the association are carried on independently of the candi- candidate for political date's organization; and then the material points to be con- associations. sidered in determining the question of agency would seem to be the previous relations of the candidate with the association, the source whence it derives its funds, and the extent or character of the connection between it and the candidate during the course of the contest.

Case.

The Westminster Case (1 O'M. & H., 89; 20 L. T., n.s., Westminster 238) is a somewhat curious case, and, opposed as it seems to be to the current of authority, it is respectfully doubted whether it is now law. There it was proved that the alleged agent was an official of an association which had actively exerted itself in the respondent's interest. The latter had been its president, and he and his partners supplied a very large portion of its funds. During the progress of the contest the canvass books of the association (which had been supplied by the respondent's election agent) were compared with the canvass books kept at the respondent's committee-rooms, Submitted it and there was an interchange of information in relation to the election between the two organizations. On these facts Baron Martin held that the officials of the association engaged in the election were not the respondent's agents. It is obvious that if this case were a governing authority on the subject there would be an open door to the most flagrant evasions of the law against corruption.

Case.

In the Westbury Case (3 O'M. & H., 78) bribery was Westbury suggested on the part of the responsible agents of a political association in sympathy with the respondent, but inasmuch, though he was invited to stand by this association, no communication whatever was established between him and it during the election, it was held that its acts did not bind him.

Wigan Case.

Harwich Case.

When candidate takes conduct of

election himself, not bound.

In the Wigan Case (1 O'M. & H., 188; 21 L. T., n.s., 122) it was proved that some months before the election a subagent of a political association of which the respondent was a member, and to the funds of which he subscribed, was guilty of a corrupt act. It was held that there was no such privity between the respondent and the association as would avoid the election.

The Harwich Case (3 O'M. & H., 69; 44 L.T., n.s., 189) is an instructive one. There it was proved that a political association (1) invited the respondent to contest the seat; (2) its committee considered and revised his election address; (3) it met during the election from time to time at rooms for which the respondent paid; and (4) several of its leading members attended him in his canvass. It was suggested that one of the latter had been guilty of bribery, and the question of the relation established between the respondent and the association became material. The Court held that the facts above stated afforded primâ facie evidence of the agency of the association, but upon the respondent proving that at the outset of the contest he bonâ fide declared his determination to canvass the constituency personally without the aid of committees, and announced that determination, the ultimate decision was that the proof of agency failed. This case is an authority for the proposition that a candidate can protect himself against the misdeeds of persons whom the law would otherwise construe as his agents by taking the whole burden of the management of the election upon himself, and expressly forbidding all other persons to take any part in it upon his behalf.

Turning to the cases where a candidate has been fixed with responsibility for the acts of a political association, the first case in order of time carries the liability a long way. In Taunton Case. the first Taunton Case (1 O'M. & H., 181; 21 L.T., n.s., 169) it was proved that there had been formed in the borough a body called "The Conservative Association," for the purpose of conducting the registration in September, and the election in the following November; that during the election people met at the rooms of the association, and that papers and cir