1. BETWEEN CLAIMANTS GENERALLY.-This kind of inter- INTERpleader is now based upon and regulated by the 1 & 2 Will. 4, PLEADER c. 58, and other statutes, which see infra; and by the present CLAIMANTS statute. BETWEEN GENERALLY. rities, and to make all such rules and orders applicable to the case, as were or might be given or mentioned by or in any act passed or to be passed during that present session of parliament for giving relief against adverse claims made upon persons having no interest in the subject of such claims; and whereas no such act was passed during the then present session of parliament, be it therefore enacted, that upon any such application as is in the said act and herein before mentioned, it shall be lawful for the court to exercise all such powers and authorities, and make all such rules and orders applicable to the case, as are given or mentioned by or in this present act. 1 & 2 VICT. c. 45. An Act (inter alia) to extend the Jurisdiction of the Judges of the Sect. 2. Whereas by another act passed in the second year of the reign of his late Majesty king William the fourth, intituled, "An Act to enable the Courts of Law to give Relief against adverse Claims made upon Persons having no interest in the subject of such Claims," provision is made for the relief of sheriffs and other officers concerned in the execution of process issued out of any of his Majesty's courts of law at Westminster, or of the court of Common Pleas of the county palatine of Lancaster, or the Court of Pleas of the county palatine of Durham, against goods and chattels by reason of claims made to such goods and chattels, but such relief can only be given by rule of court: and whereas it is expedient that a single judge should possess the power of giving relief in that respect, be it further enacted, that it shall be lawful for any judge of the said Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, or Exchequer, with respect to any such process issued out of any of those courts, or for any judge of the said Court of Common Pleas of the county palatine of Lancaster, or Court of Pleas of the county palatine of Durham (being also a judge of one of Costs of such the said three superior courts), with respect to process issued out proceedings. of the said courts of Lancaster and Durham respectively, to exercise such powers and authorities for the relief and protection of the sheriff or other officer as may by virtue of the said lastmentioned act be exercised by the said several courts respectively, and to make such order therein as shall appear to be just, and the costs of such proceedings shall be in the discretion of such judge. 8 & 9 VICT. c. 109. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109. Sect. 19. An Act to amend the Law concerning Games and Wagers. Sect. 19. And whereas many important questions are now tried in the form of feigned issues, by stating that a wager was laid Proceedbetween two parties interested in respectively maintaining the affirmative and the negative of certain propositions, but such questions may be as satisfactorily tried without such form, be it therefore enacted, that in every case where any court of law or ings under feigned is sues abolished. General principles. The general principles recognized in its application are:That the person applying that others may be required to interplead be already defendant in an action at the suit of one of them; That such action be strictly such as formerly came under the That the claims of both claimants be in respect of the very That the party applying claim no interest in the matter in That the same question be raisable upon the interpleader issue, as was in dispute between the original parties (Baker v. Bank of Australasia, 1 C. B. N. S. 515; L. J. 26, C. P. 93). Formerly there was also another rule introduced from the practice of the courts of equity on interpleader bills, viz., that the applicant be not under a special obligation towards either claimant in respect of the matter in dispute (Crawshay v. Thorntom, 2 Myl. & Cr. 1; Farr v. Ward, 2 M. & W. 844; James v. Pritchard, 7 M. & W. 216; Turner v. Mayor, &c. of Kendal, 13 equity may desire to have any question of fact decided by a jury, it shall be lawful for such court to direct a writ of summons to be sued out, by such person or persons as such court shall think ought to be plaintiff or plaintiffs, against such person or persons as such court shall think ought to be defendant or defendants therein, in the form set forth in the second schedule to this act annexed, with such alterations or additions as such court may think proper and thereupon all the proceedings shall go on and be brought to a close in the same manner as is now practised in proceedings under a feigned issue. SCHEDULE 2. In the Court of Queen's Bench ["Common Pleas," or "Exchequer," or in any inferior court, as the case may be]. Middlesex to wit [or such other county as may be directed]. Whereas A. B. affirms, and C. D. denies [here state fully the fact or facts in issue], and the Lord Chancellor [or such other court, &c.] is desirous of ascertaining the truth by the verdict of a jury, and both parties pray that the same may be inquired of by the country: Now let a jury, &c. * The recommendation of the Common Law Commissioners (Third Report, p. 10), that in case of interpleader for relief of sheriffs, jurisdiction should be given to the common law courts, even though the claim or claims be all equitable, has not been adopted by the legislature, in consequence of the opposition referred to in the note to p. 295, ante. M. & W. 171; Lindsay v. Barron, 6 C. B. 291; Horton v. Earl of Devon, 4 Ex. 497; Oriental Bank v. Nicholson, 5 W. R. 587, Ch., Stuart, V. C., E. T. 1857): this rule is, however, altered by the present section. In Meynell v. Angell (L. J. 32, Q. B. 14), the plaintiff had contracted as principal with the defendant to complete certain work, and had completed it, and received part of the price, when C. gave notice to the defendant that the contract had been made by the plaintiff as the agent of C., and warned the defendant not to pay to the plaintiff the remainder of the price. The plaintiff then commenced an action against the defendant, who sought to make the plaintiff and C. interplead. It was held by Blackburn, J., in the Bail Court, that, whether the facts above stated brought the case within the rule acted upon in James v. Pritchard (7 M. & W. 216), and the other cases above cited, or not, yet that the latter provision of this enactment certainly applied; and he ordered interpleader accordingly. This case was approved by the Court of Exchequer in Best v. Hayes (1 H. & C. 718; L. J. 32, Ex. 129), where the defendant, an auctioneer, was intrusted by the plaintiff with furniture to sell for him, and the defendant having sold, and part of the proceeds being in his hands, received a notice from G. that she claimed the goods. An interpleader order as to the balance in the defendant's hands, after deducting his commission, was granted between the plaintiff and G., the latter being willing to allow the commission and take the issue. So in Tanner v. European Bank, Lim. (L. R. 1, Ex. 261), A. sued the defendants to whom he had intrusted a policy for certain specified purposes, and declared in trover and detinue and specially on the contract. B., who had pledged the policy with A., brought an action against the same defendants for the recovery of the policy. Bramwell, B., made an interpleader order, directing that the first action should be stayed till further order, that A. should be at liberty to defend the second action, indemnifying the defendants, and that B. should give the defendants security for costs. The Court of Exchequer, following Best v. Hayes (ubi supra), held that this order was right. The crown cannot be made to interplead, not being named in the statute (Candy v. Maugham, 1 D. & L. 745). It has been doubted whether a foreigner beyond the jurisdiction can be required to interplead (Patorni v. Campbell, 12 M. & W. 277); but consult now spirit of C. L. P. A. 1852, s. 19 (ante, p. 27). Upon the practice it is only necessary to observe That the application cannot be made before declaration, nor That it should ordinarily be made at chambers; That the application must be supported by affidavit setting Practice. SHERIFFS General principles and practice. Lewis, 8 M. & W. 264; Grazebrook v. Pickford, 10 M. & W. 279); That if he persists in his claim, and the case be fit for interpleader, he will be made defendant in lieu of the original defendant; or an issue (8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 19, and Sched. 2, ante, p. 306, n.) will be ordered; or the claims may be disposed of in a summary manner under the provisions of the 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58, s. 1 (ante, p. 302), or under ss. 14 or 15 of this act; That the order should provide for the interim protection of the matter in dispute;-and, in the case of money, by requiring it to be brought into court (Allen v. Gilby, 3 Dowl. 143); That the costs generally, as between the claimants, rest entirely in the discretion of the judge; and are disposed of after, and ordinarily in accordance with, the event (Melville v. Smark, 3 M. & G. 57; Cusel v. Pariente, 7 M. & G. 527). 2. BETWEEN EXECUTION CREDITORS AND PERSONS CLAIMING GOODS SEIZED IN EXECUTION.-Interpleader in such cases depends upon the 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58, s. 6; 1 & 2 Vict. c. 45, s. 2 (ante, pp. 303-305); and the present statute. As it was introduced for the relief of sheriffs, and of other officers executing process, it is much favoured by the legislature in its enactments, and by the courts in their interpretation of them. The principles and practice above noted may be considered applicable to proceedings in interpleader upon the application of a sheriff or other officer, subject to the following differences: A sheriff may successfully apply for an interpleader order, although no action has been commenced against him, provided that a bona fide legal claim has been actually made to goods lawfully seized (Holton v. Guntrip, 3 M. & W. 145) by him (Isaac v. Spilsbury, 10 Bing. 3; Green v. Brown, 3 Dowl. 337); a claim by a partner (quá partner) is not within the acts (Holmes v. Mentze, 4 A. & E. 127); nor is mere notice of other writs (Salmon v. James, 1 Dowl. 369; Day v. Waldock, Ib. 523); or of bankruptcy (Bentley v. Hook, 2 Cr. & M. 426). The sheriff is not entitled to call upon a claimant to interplead, where the sheriff has committed some injury, distinct from the mere seizure of the goods (Hollier v. Laurie, 3 C. B. 334; but see Winter v. Bartholomew, 11 Ex. 704; and Mercer v. Stanbury, L. J. 25, Ex. 316) and here it may be noticed that the acceptance by the execution creditor of an issue is not an affirmance of previous torts committed by the sheriff (Woollen v. Wright, 1 H. & C. 554; L. J. 32, Ex. 513, Ex. Ch). Where goods have been wrongfully seized under a fi. fa., and are afterwards sold under an interpleader order, the execution creditor is not liable for any loss that may accrue by such sale, or by any proceedings subsequent to the interpleader order (Walker v. Olding, 1 H. & C. 621). The sheriff need not by his affidavit deny collusion (Bond v. Woodhall, 4 Dowl. 351). The sheriff may disentitle himself to relief by collusion, or by taking an indemnity (per Patteson, J.; Ostler v. Bower, 4 Dowl. 605); or by being interested personally, or by his under-sheriff (Ostler v. Bower, ubi supra); or where he has himself brought the claim about (Cox v. Balne, 2 D. & L. 718); or where he has acted upon his own discretion in the matter of the dispute (Crump v. Day, 4 C. B. 760; Tufton v. Harding, L. J. 29, Ch. 225; but see upon these latter points, Holt v. Frost, 3 H. & N. 821); or where he has been negligent (Brackenbury v. Laurie, 3 Dowl. 180); or where the application is unreasonably delayed (Mutton v. Young, 4 C. B. 371; Tufton v. Harding, L. J. 29 Ch. 225; and see Bagshaw v. Farnsworth, 2 L. T. N. S. 390, Ex. T. T. 1860, where an interpleader rule was refused to a sheriff who had seized crops supposed to be growing, but not above the ground). The execution creditor is entitled to be the defendant upon the feigned issue. See Shingler v. Holt (7 H. & N. 65; L. J. 30, Ex. 322), where a married woman was the claimant, and a verdict that the goods were hers as against the execution creditor, was supported. Proceedings against the sheriff will be stayed pending the issue. If the execution creditor does not appear upon the sheriff's application to interplead, the sheriff will be ordered to withdraw, or to pay over the proceeds of the goods if sold; and he will be protected against any claim of the execution creditor in respect thereof (Eveleigh v. Salisbury, 3 Bing. N. C. 298); but the execution creditor will not, according to the better opinion, be liable to costs, in ordinary cases. Where the claimant fails to appear, his claim to the goods, and against the sheriff, will be barred; but any remedy that he may have against the execution creditor will be left open (Ford v. Dilly, 5 B. & Ad. 885, and cases there cited); and he will not be liable to costs. The costs are in the discretion of the judge, and are ordinarily disposed of after the claim has been abandoned, or otherwise finally determined; and generally follow the event ( Staley v. Bedwell, 10 A. & E. 145). If the sheriff does not successfully support his application it may, and often will, be dismissed with costs (Anderson v. Calloway, 1 C. & M. 182; Re Sheriff of Oxfordshire, 6 Dowl. 136). He will rarely be allowed any costs, because the relief sought is purely beneficial to himself (Cox v. Fenn, 7 Dowl. 50; Jones v. Lewis, 8 M. & W. 264; Gebhardt v. Rose, 2 Weekly Notes, 1867, p. 19, C. P. H. T.) The right of the sheriff to poundage fees, and expenses of execution, is dependent upon the validity of the seizure; and therefore abides the event of the claim (Clark v. Chetwode, 4 Dowl. 635); but he may entitle himself to possession money for possession after the order, either by consent, or by order of the judge (Dabbs v. Humphries, 1 Bing. N. C. 412; Bland v. Delano, 6 Dowl. 293); and where the parties come, after any issue has been directed, to an arrangement, he is entitled to possession money from the date of the order (Scales v. Sargeson, 4 Dowl. 231); and if the execution creditor recovers any portion of his debt, the sheriff may be entitled to his charges pro tanto. These interpleader sections do not apply to interpleader in Chancery, or in the county courts. As to interpleader in Chancery by sheriffs, see Tufton v. Harding (L. J. 29, Ch. 225); Child v. Mann (L. R. 3, Eq. 806). As to interpleader in the county courts, see 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 118; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 72; and C. C. Rules 130–133. It may not be amiss to add here, although it does not strictly come within the present subject, the important provision contained in "The Bankruptcy Act, 1861," s. 74, relating to sales by sheriffs under judgments, where the amount claimed in the action exceeds 501., which is as follows:-"Wherever the goods and chattels of a debtor are sold under an execution upon any judg |