N° 588. allow Mr. Hobbes to know beft how he was inclined; but in earnest, I fhould be heartily out of conceit with myself if I thought myself of this unamiable temper as he affirms, and fhould have as little kindness for myself as for any body in the world. Hitherto I always imagined that kind and benevolent propenfions were the original growth of the heart of man; and, however checked and overtopped by counter inclinations that have fince fprung up within us, have ftill fome force in the worst of tempers, and a confiderable influence on the beft. And methinks it is a fair ftep towards the proof of this, that the most beneficent of all beings is HE who hath an abfolute fulness of perfection in himself, who gave exiftence to the universe, and fo cannot be fuppofed to want that which he communicated, without diminishing from the plenitude of his own power and happiness. The philofophers before mentioned have indeed done all that in them lay to invalidate this argument; for, placing the gods in a state of the moft elevated bleffednefs, they defcribe them as felfifh as we poor miferable mortals can be, and fhut them out from all concern for mankind, upon the score of their having no need of us. But if HE that fitteth in the heavens wants not us, we ftand in continual need of him; and, furely, next to the furvey of the immenfe treasures of his own mind, the most exalted pleasure he receives is from beholding millions of creatures, lately drawn out of the gulf of non-existence, rejoicing in the various degrees

of

of being and happiness imparted to them. And as this is the true, the glorious character of the DEITY, fo in forming a reasonable character he would not, if poffible, fuffer his image to pass out of his hands unadorned with a refemblance of himself in this moft lovely part of his nature. For what complacency could a mind, whose love is as unbounded as his knowledge, have in a work fo unlike himfelf; a creature that fhould be capable of knowing and converfing with vaft circle of objects, and love none but himfelf? What proportion would there be between the head and the heart of fuch a creature, its affections, and understanding? Or could a fociety of fuch creatures, with no other bottom but felf-love on which to maintain a commerce, ever flourish? Reason, it is certain, would oblige every man to pursue the general happinefs as the means to procure and establish his own; and yet, if, befides this confideration, there were not a natural inftinct, prompting men to defire the welfare and fatisfaction of others, felf-love, in defiance of the admonitions of reafon, would quickly run all things into a ftate of war and confufion. As nearly interefted as the foul is in the fate of the body, our provident CREATOR faw it neceffary, by the conftant returns of hunger and thirst, those importunate appetites, to put it in mind of its charge; knowing that if we should eat and drink no oftener than cold abftracted fpeculation fhould put us upon thefe exercises, and then leave it to reafon to prefcribe the quantity, we

fhould

fhould foon refine ourselves out of this bodily life. And, indeed, it is obvious to remark, that we follow nothing heartily unless carried to it by inclinations which anticipate our reafon, and, like a bias, draw the mind ftrongly towards it. In order, therefore, to establish a perpetual intercourfe of benefits amongst mankind, their Maker would not fail to give them this generous prepoffeffion of benevolence, if, as I have faid, it were poffible. And from whence can we go about to argue its impoffibility? Is it inconfiftent with felf-love? Are their motions contrary? No more than the diurnal rotation of the earth is opposed to its annual; or its motion round its own centre, which might be improved as an illustration of felf-love, to that which whirls it about the common centre of the world, answering to univerfal benevolence. Is the force of self-love abated, or its intereft prejudiced by benevolence? So far from it, that benevolence, though a diftinct principle, is extremely ferviceable to felf-love, and then doth most service when it is leaft defigned.

But to defcend from reason to matter of fact ; the pity which arifes on fight of perfons in diftrefs, and the fatisfaction of mind which is the confequence of having removed them into a happier ftate, are inftead of a thoufand arguments to prove fuch a thing as a difinterested benevolence. Did pity proceed from a reflection we make upon our liablenefs to the fame ill accidents we fee befall others, it was nothing

to

to the prefent purpose; but this is affigning an artificial caufe of a natural paffion, and can by no means be admitted as a tolerable account of it, because children and perfons most thoughtlefs about their own condition, and incapable of entering into the profpects of futurity, feel the moft violent touches of compaffion. And then, as to that charming delight which immediately follows the giving joy to another, or relieving his forrow, and is, when the objects are numerous, and the kindness of importance really inexpreffible, what can this be owing to but consciousness of a man's having done fomething praife-worthy, and expreffive of a great foul? Whereas, if in all this he only facrificed to vanity and felf-love, as there would be nothing brave in actions that make the most shining appearance, fo nature would not have rewarded them with this divine pleasure; nor could the commendations, which a perfon receives for benefits done upon felfifh views, be at all more fatisfactory than when he is applauded for what he doth without defign; because in both cafes the ends of felf-love are equally anfwered. The confcience of approving one's-felf a benefactor to mankind is the nobleft recompenfe for being fo; doubtlefs it is, and the moft interefted cannot propofe any thing fo much to their own advantage, notwithstanding which, the inclination is neverthelefs unfelfish. The pleasure which attends the gratification of our hunger and thirst, is not the cause of these appetites they are previous to any fuch profpect; and fo VOL. VIII. likewife

N

likewife is the defire of doing good; with this difference, that, being feated in the intellectual part, this laft, though antecedent to reason, may yet be removed and regulated by it; and, I will add, is no otherwife a virtue than as it is fo. Thus have I contended for the dignity of that nature I have the honour to partake of; and, after all the evidence produced, I think I have a right to conclude, against the motto of this Paper, that there is fuch a thing as generofity in the world. Though, if I were under a miftake in this, I should fay as Cicero in relation to the immortality of the foul, I willingly err, and I fhould believe it very much for the intereft of mankind to lie under the fame delufion. For the contrary notion naturally tends to difpirit the mind, and finks it into a meanness fatal to the God-like zeal of doing good: as, on the other hand, it teaches people to be ungrateful, by poffeffing them with a perfuafion concerning their benefactors, that they have no regard to them in the benefits they beftow. Now he that banishes gratitude from among men by fo doing ftops up the ftream of beneficence for though in conferring kindness a truly generous man doth not aim at a return, yet he looks to the qualities of the perfon obliged, and as nothing renders a perfon more unworthy of a benefit than his being without all refentment of it, he will not be extremely forward to oblige such a man.*

*

By the Reverend Mr. HENRY GROVE.

*The learned and worthy author of this, and three other Papers in this volume, was a much refpected Diffent