Generals, and giving £80,000,000 sterling to soldiers; but he did not think they could fairly say that America had been stingy in the matter. Now, Lord Wolseley made a speech at the Mansion House, and it seemed an unfortunate thing that our Generals and Admirals were exceedingly fond of airing their eloquence before they received their money. Lord Wolseley, speaking of the officers, said they knew very well that honours in war meant promotion, and those things that were dear to mankind; but the hopes of the rank and file of the Army were different. Few honours and rewards were in store for them, and they were to content themselves with the most ennobling of all convictions that of having done their duty. He (Mr. Labouchere) hardly thought that the officers of the Army would accept this view of the motive which actuated them. If officers fought for money and reward, the soldiers fought from a conviction that they ought to do their duty. It was not surprising that while they found many gentlemen ready to be officers, it was difficult to keep up the rank and file. He thought no more cogent reason against the system of rewarding Generals had ever been used than that contained in the words of Lord Wolseley himself. If it were stingy not to give to officers, let him ask whether they considered themselves stingy in not giving to statesmen? He believed there were only four pensions given to Ministers; and it must be remembered that two things were necessary in the case of pensions to statesmen. In the first place, an ex-Minister was not to be in receipt, at the time he received the pension, of any salary; whereas Lord Wolseley was now receiving £2,700 a-year. In the second place, it was necessary that an ex-statesman, when receiving a pension, should not have any means of his own adequate for his rank as an ex-Minister. Now, could anyone tell him what the difference was? Why was a soldier to receive this pension, and a statesman not? He did not want to draw invidious comparisons, but let them take the present Prime Minis. ter and the present Leader of the Opposition, for instance. Surely, these right hon. Gentlemen had done as much for the country, they had served the country as well as Lord Wolseley, yet they were not to receive a pension. Literary men, Mr. Labouchere for instance, received nothing from the country. If a literary man spent years and years in writing works of benefit for the country, and if his wife and children were without the means of support, what did they receive? From £100 to £150 per annum. The only ground for any difference was that there was precedent for the one, and there was no precedent for the other. He really did think that it was time that they should look at these matters upon their intrinsic merits. Were they who belonged to the Liberal Party, and who inscribed on their banner Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform"-were they to vote £30,000 because they were told that sums of the like nature were voted under similar circumstances by their Predecessors ? Precedent to him had a perfectly homely sound in finance, and when "precedent was argued he always knew that something was about to be done for which there was no valid reason. Were there not precedents for sinecures; were there not precedents for perpetual pensions? They could find precedents for almost every abuse imaginable, and yet it was argued by the Prime Minister, as a reason for giving this money, that there were precedents for it. If there were a thousand precedents he (Mr. Labouchere) should consider it no argument. What was the idea upon which these military grants were based? Why, the idea was that there was something glorious in military pursuits-that there was more glory in killing than curing, and in curtailing and destroying human life than in lengthening and increasing it. The tendency of all this was to produce a military spirit-he did not mean the spirit which would induce everyone to defend his country if it were attacked, but that which dragged us into these foreign enterprizes, and made us plume ourselves that we were playing a great part before Heaven and earth, whilst what we were really doing was violating a foreign country, and destroying the peace and happiness of, perhaps, millions of people. The hon. Member for Berkshire (Mr. Walter) had told them the other day that he rejoiced at this war, and that it was a very good thing, because it re-established our prestige. [An hon. MEMBER: It did do so.] So that we were to kill any number of Egyptians and go on with these wars in order to "re-establish our prestige." Well, his view of the matter was this- therefore, reflected on himself alone. that, in the first place, we did not re- Lord Wolseley denounced the state of quire to re-establish our prestige; and the hospitals at Ismailia and Cairo, and that, in the second place, we had not there was a chorus of complaint about shown ourselves a great military nation the absence of medical equipments and by this Expedition to Egypt. He re- requirements along the line of operaspected the soldier and he respected the tions. Well, who was responsible for officer; but he did not respect the Mili- that? The Carthage was the principal tary Profession as in any way superior or hospital ship. She had 326 tons of hosin any way more ennobling than any pital equipment on board, including other. When he saw a general coming three movable and two stationary hosback from Egypt, or some other officer pitals. It would be remembered that riding through the streets surrounded the seizure of Ismailia with the change by aides-de-camp and soldiers brandishing of base from Alexandria to that town knives, he did not throw up his hat in was effected with the greatest secrecy. the air and rejoice. We had far greater The change of base involved an entire heroes at home. He believed the arti- change in the medical arrangements of zan and labourer who gallantly fought the campaign; but the Surgeon General against want and penury, and vanwas never informed regarding it; he knew quished them, did a far nobler thing nothing about it, in fact, until he found than these military people. He hoped himself in the Canal. He (Dr. Cameron) the right hon. Gentleman the Prime did not say that Lord Wolseley was not Minister would be kind enough to bear perfectly justified, on military considerain mind in regard to these grants that tions, in keeping his secret to himself; almost all the Radical Clubs in the but, if he did so, he ought to bear the country had protested against them. Let responsibility, and not attempt to throw the Government remember this-if they it on other people's shoulders. Had he ignored Radical opinions and Radicals, disclosed his intention to the Medical for his own part he believed that they Department, or had he simply instructed would have reason to rue it at the next the Carthage to be ordered to accompany General Election. He begged to move the transports, she might have arrived that the House resolve itself into Com- with them at Ismailia on the 21st or mittee on that day three months. 22nd. Instead of that, the Medical Department, being kept in entire ignorance of the change of base, the Carthage did not arrive at Ismailia until August 26th, and could not get her stores landed till the 27th and following days. Meanwhile, the empty palace had been handed over as a hospital to the Surgeon General on the 22nd; engagements had taken place on the 24th, 25th, and 28th; and the changes which the arrival of the Carthage, about that busy time, involved added to the work and confusion. she and the Courland arrived, as they might have done, in time; had Lord Wolseley but given a hint, there was evidence to show that there would have been no hitch whatever. But not only was the Surgeon General kept in ignorance of the intended change of base, but when the order for embarkation, issued at Alexandria on August 17, and involving an entire redistribution of the Medical Staff, was drawn up, he was never consulted about it. Had those orders been carried out, they would have upset the whole medical system, and they had to be abandoned. He was DR. CAMERON said, that he seconded the opposition to the Bill, for the purpose of vindicating the Medical Department in Egypt against the charges which Lord Wolseley had, he (Dr. Cameron) thought, very ungenerously brought against it, and which had been sent forth to the world in all their nakedness, owing to the action of a Member of the Government in prematurely handing to one single newspaper a copy of the Report of the Morley Committee. So far as results were concerned, the Medical Department in Egypt could boast of results as brilliant in their way as those of Telel-Kebir, results secured by scientific knowledge and hard work. There had been bungling in the Medical Department, as in other Departments, but it alone had been harshly criticized. Lord Wolseley had himself severely criticized it. He (Dr. Cameron) did not say that the severity of Lord Wolseley's criticism on the shortcomings he denounced was unjustified; but he proposed to show that, for those shortcomings, Lord Wolseley alone was responsible, and his criticisms, Had informed that the Commissary General | Now, what were the facts? One of the also had been kept in ignorance of the earliest decisions arrived at, as to the proposed change of base to Ismailia. medical plan of the campaign, was that He did not know whether that officer Cyprus should be used for a base hoshad been consulted regarding the pro- pital. It was only 24 hours' sail from visions concerning the Commissariat em- Egypt, and the design was that the less bodied in the Embarkation Orders of serious cases should be sent there to August 17; but, if not, he thought that recover; and, when convalescent, rejoin the Army might be congratulated on hav- their regiments. The original intention ing fared so well as it did, and that many was that the hospital should be estabof the faults laid at the door of the Com-lished on the high land at Troodos; but, missariat might, with greater justice, be charged elsewhere. The mention of the Commissariat reminded him that Lord Wolseley repeatedly charged the Medical Staff with incapacity, with "lack of initiative," he called it, in not undertaking the work of the Commissariat Department, and purchasing against them in the local markets. Lord Wolseley had confessed, before Lord Morley's Committee, that he was ignorant of an Order which had been issued on the subject by the Minister for War no later than August 5, and which distinctly and peremptorily laid down the duties of medical officers in the matter. The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Childers) wrote as follows upon the subject: on August 4, the Director General, the Surgeon General, and the Chief of the Staff, agreed that the hospital at Troodos should be given up, and a hospital established instead at Polymenia, near the port of disembarkation. The Minute on this subject was approved by the Secretary of State for War. In the proceedings of the Committee reference was made to another Order, sent out by the Secretary of State for War on August 9, that Cyprus should be abandoned altogether; that it should not be used or relied on for hospital purposes until October. Now, that Order was never communicated to the Surgeon General. He never heard of it till January last. He (Dr. Cameron) had asked a Question on the subject, but could get no inforMinister for War (the Marquess of mation. The noble Marquess the present Hartington) referred him to the evidence before Lord Morley's Committee. He had looked there, and this was what he found. On August 30, the Carthage was at Ismailia, with 196 sick on board, Had Lord Wolseley known of the ex- ready to sail for Cyprus, when she was istence of that Order, he would have suddenly stopped by order of Lord known that it was his business not to Wolseley. Colonel Lord William Seyfind fault with the Medical Staff for mour, attached to the Naval Commanderadhering to it, but to insist on the Com-in-Chief, had given some clear and missariat, on whom the Circular laid the responsibility, performing its own proper functions. Being ignorant of the Order, Lord Wolseley had omitted to perform what was really his own duty in the matter. Lord Wolseley found great fault with the system of evacuating the sick from Egypt, and cast the blame of it entirely upon the Medical Department. In answer to Question 6,212, he said "It is essential that, except in the case of petty office or departmental purchases (which may be made by heads of Departments), there should be but one purchasing Department in the local markets, and all articles required should be supplied by means of requisitions upon the Commissariat." "I think that the Medical Department at this time were beginning to feel a little frightened at what had taken place. The hospitals were in such bad order that they got rid of the patients by putting them on board ship, and Bending them to England. In many cases, men were sent off who would have been well in a few days." Dr. Cameron impartial evidence, which explained what occurred. In reply to Question 1,638, Lord William Seymour said "There was one thing which very much put out the whole medical arrangements, which was that the Surgeon General had sent away a ship almost empty-I think it was the Orontessaying he had no further use for her, thinking that he could send the Carthage to Cyprus; but in the afternoon, he got an order that Cyprus was not to be used as a hospital. That threw 400 sick on his hands which he was not prepared for." Again (Question 1,706), Lord William Seymour narrated a conversation which he had had with the Surgeon General on the occasion, in which that gentleman said "I have just been disappointed of the whole | that it was not to be used, it would have hospital at Cyprus; I have been told not to been his duty to bring its Staff and send any sick there. I wish now I had been able to send more away in the Orontes. Instead equipment to Egypt, where extra acof the Carthage making a 24 hours' trip to commodation was much required. But Cyprus, she will probably have a much longer he was neither allowed to use Cyprus, one to make to Malta." nor told that he was not to be allowed This, be it remembered, was on August to rely on it, as arranged, until the first 30, at a moment when there had been batch of sick were on board ship on their three engagements within the six pre-way thither. Even then, he was not ceding days. Surgeon General Sir James Hanbury, in his evidence before the Commission, supplemented this evidence by an account of a conversation which he himself had had with Lord Wolseley on the following day, August 31. He told him that the Director General at home had instructed him to use Cyprus for slight cases— "As a sort of stopgap to prevent too rapid evacuation to England -exactly the fault of which Lord "Dr. Crawford does not know Cyprus as well as I do. It is much more unhealthy than this, and I believe the best way is to send the sick to England." told that the Cyprus hospital had been be desired," that "it reflected the the "Medical officers constantly held others responsible for failing to do what he considers should have been their own principal duties " purchasing against the Commissariat, to wit-and that he never "Supposes the base-hospital was never brought from Cyprus to provide accommodation at Ismailia, because the principal medical officer never thought of it at the time, or brought the subject forward." The Chief of the Staff, Sir John Adye, in his evidence, had not only given a much more favourable account of the actual state of things in the military hospitals; but he had frankly told the Committee that, from the nature of the campaign, military considerations, su And yet, in the face of that statement, Lord Wolseley now came forward and accused the Department of having become frightened at what had occurred, and of shipping the sick to England in order to get them off their own hands. To say the least of it, they should have some explanation of this very irreconcilable evidence. But the vacillation regarding Cyprus did not end with the stoppage of the Carthage on August 30. After further communication with Cy. prus, the Chief of the Staff, on September 4, gave the Order-" Sick may be sent to Cyprus." On September 6, 72 sick were there, and, on September 13, 300 were shipped and ready to start, when, owing to the decisive result of Tel-preme above everything else, had comel-Kebir, their destination was altered, and they were sent home. As the result of this shilly-shallying, the hospital was locked up at Cyprus when most needed in Egypt, and did not arrive at Alexandria until September 30. There was some further delay in getting it on to Cairo. Hence the unfurnished state of the Cairo hospital, of which Lord Wolseley complained. Now, had the hospital at Cyprus been used, as originally intended, it would have been invaluable. Had the Surgeon General been informed pelled troops to be sent forward to Amendment proposed, to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House will, upon this day three months, resolve itself into the said Committee," Question proposed, "That the words. proposed to be left out stand part of the Question." cal Department of the Army. Lord Wolseley found fault with the Medical Staff for not "taking the initiative," and undertaking the work of another Department. After the experience they had had of his Lordship's baneful fond--(Mr. Labouchere,)—instead thereof. ness for taking the initiative, and undertaking the management of the Medical Department, of which he knew nothing, but whose responsible heads he never appeared to think it worth while to consult, it seemed to him (Dr. Cameron) a matter of congratulation that one class of officers, at least, among those serving under him, had been found who were content to devote themselves strictly to their own duties. To that it was to be attributed that, despite all that Lord Wolseley had done to mar their efficiency, they had been able to bring the European forces through this arduous and trying campaign, in an unhealthy climate, with a total death-rate, per 1,000 per annum, including deaths in battle, from sickness and from wounds, exceeding by a mere fraction that which normally prevailed in the civil population of this Metropolis. To this, it was to be attributed that they had been able entirely to ward off pyæmia, to deprive ophthalmia of its terror, and to deal with the wounded after Tel-el-Kebir, with a promptitude and efficiency characterized by the Committee as unparalleled in military history. Lord Wolseley had talked a great deal about initiative; but he (Dr. Cameron) considered that he would have displayed a much sounder and wiser initiative, as well as much more intelligent solicitude for the well-being of the sick and wounded, if he had instructed the Surgeon General to order the Carthage to accompany the transports to Ismailia, and, acquainting him with his views regarding Cyprus, had left him to utilize its hospital appliances elsewhere, than he displayed in acting as he had done-leaving the Medical Department in ignorance of his intentions and decisions; arbitrarily overturning its most fundamental arrangements; writing home that all was well, "false and malicious reports to the contrary notwithstanding;" and then coming home and coolly casting on the shoulders of the Medical Department the entire responsibility for shortcomings directly the outcome of his own peculiar mode of conducting the medical business of a campaign. Dr. Cameron MR. GIBSON said, he should like to make one or two very short observations in consequence of what had fallen from the hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron). Everyone must be aware of the great interest the hon. Member had taken in the particular subject he had brought under the notice of the House, and the right he had to speak on this subject with authority. He (Mr. Gibson) himself took considerable interest in the matter from the point of view from which the hon. Member had approached the question, and should himself be prepared to vindicate and assert the position of the Medical Service and those who were responsible for it at a more convenient time, when the discussion which would take place could be reported in a manner that was essential for the proper understanding of the case and the due vindication of this great Service. He had read with all the care he could the charges which had been made against the Medical Service in Egypt. He had read very closely the evidence of Lord Wolseley and of the distinguished Medical Officers who were responsible for the Medical Service, and his opinion was that the charges against the Medical Service could be placed in the point of view indicated by the hon. Member for Glasgow, and that they could be thoroughly investigated and placed before the public opinion of the country in a fair and favourable light. At the proper time he should himself be prepared to call attention to these charges and to refute them to the best of his ability, and, if he might presume to say so without offence, to challenge all those who held a contrary opinion to repeat these charges in the the face of day, and express their belief in them. When his challenge was put forward he would undertake to say that there would be very few who, on their responsibility, would be found to get up and defend the charges which had been made against the Medical Department, |