was made, and contended that by 17 Geo. 2. c. 38. s. 12. he was only liable to pay the proportion of the rate for the time he occupied the house, viz., fourteen days.

The question of this apportionment came before the Magistrate for decision, when he was of opinion that, under section 12, the appellant, being in the occupation of the house at the time the rate was made, was liable to pay the rate not only for the time during which he occupied the house, but also for the period during which the house remained empty and unoccupied up to the time when the new tenant entered into possession, and he gave his decision against the appellant accordingly.

The question of law for the opinion of the Court was, whether the appellant is liable under section 12. of 17 Geo. 2. c. 38. to pay a proportion of the rate calculated for the time during which the dwelling-house was empty and unoccupied, viz., for the period between the 8th of November, 1866, and the 10th of May, 1867, or whether he is only liable to a proportion of the rate for the fourteen days during which he occupied the dwelling-house after the making of the rate.

If the Court should be of opinion that the appellant is liable to pay the rate for the time during which the dwelling-house remained empty and unoccupied, then their judgment was to be given in favour of the respondents. But if the Court should be of opinion otherwise, then judgment was to be given for the appellant.

Kay, for the appellant.-The appellant is not liable to pay the rate for any portion of the time during which the house was unoccupied. The words of the section are that the rate shall be apportioned on the outgoing and the incoming occupiers in proportion to the time that such person occupied the premises respectively, so that the liability of each tenant is put on the same footing. Now, it will not be contended that the incoming tenant was liable for any part of the time while the house was empty. It can only be supposed that those who framed the statute imagined that one occupier would immediately succeed the other, and therefore neglected to make any provision for a liability during the time the premises are uninhabited.

The

Ambrose, for the respondents. legislature never intended to affect the liability of the outgoing tenant. Any such provision would have been unjust, first, to the collectors of the rate; secondly, to those who paid the rate immediately after they had been assessed. It was only intended to protect the parish in a case where a tenant had gone out without paying his rates. In an earlier part of the act, section 7, a machinery is provided for levying upon the goods of any person assessed in any county to which he has removed, so that if any one upon whom the rate is made were to go out at the end of six months and a new tenant were to come in the day before the year expired there would be nothing to prevent a distress upon the goods of the outgoing tenant, though it might be equitable to make the incoming tenant contribute his share. In Flatcher v. Boodle (2) the majority of the Court of Common Pleas held that the liability of the incoming tenant was only a contingent and not a primary liability, Willes, J. saying, "I think the statute 17 Geo. 2. c. 38. s. 12. was not intended to regulate generally the rights of outgoing and incoming tenants, but to give the parish officers a remedy in respect of a portion of the rate according to the time of occupation." Kay, in reply.

COCKBURN, C.J.-Our judgment is in favour of the respondents. The enactment is so worded that it is certainly not very easy to construe it to one's own satisfaction, and it is some consolation to find that the present style of drawing acts of parliament is not peculiar to our day. In order to put a construction upon this section it is necessary to look at the recital, which states that persons frequently remove out of parishes and places without paying the rates, and that other persons enter and occupy their houses part of the year, by reason whereof great sums are annually lost to such parishes and places. Now, it is quite plain that the legislature did not pass this enactment with any design of making an equitable adjustment between the outgoing and the incoming occupier, but what

(2) 18 Com. B. Rep. N.S. 152; s. c. 34 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 77.

they had in view was the prevention of any loss to the parish, from the fact that either of such occupiers might fail to discharge the liability and leave the overseers without any remedy by way of distress. It was to prevent this injustice that they enacted. that the incoming tenant should pay his proportion; but I cannot help thinking that in framing the enactment the legisla ture contemplated that the coming in of one occupier would follow immediately upon the going out of the other, and the fact that it might happen that between the time when one tenant came in and another went out, there might be an interval during which the premises would be unoccupied, so that the rate could not be adjusted between the parties according to the period of occupation, did not occur to the framer of the act. The section therefore leaves one period untouched, and I cannot suppose that the legislature intended that there should be no liability to the rate during this interval, as I find that, in section 7, provision is made for levying the rate upon the goods of any person assessed who has removed into another county or precinct, so that if we were to construe the enactment in favour of the appellant we should be doing away with the effect of the previous section. Inasmuch, therefore, as it seems clear that the intention was not to free the outgoing tenant from liability, but to give the parish officials the power of getting the rate from the second occupier, we must hold that the appellant was liable for the period for which he was rated.

MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. The main object of the statute was to protect the parish against the loss of the rates, and as the person assessed was liable for the whole rate before he left the premises, one section was intended to give a remedy for the whole rate against the outgoing tenant, and the other to give the benefit of the occupation of the incoming tenant to the parish, so long as he actually occupied. But I cannot see any ground for supposing that the legislature intended to free the outgoing tenant from any liability. I do not say that I can reconcile every word in the section, and was at first rather inclined to adopt Mr. Kay's argument. But I am now convinced that the Magistrate was

right, and that the appellant was liable for the whole period which elapsed before the new tenant came in.

LUSH, J.—I am of the same opinion. We should put such a construction on the words of section 12. as will carry out the intent and object of the act. Now, it seems to me clear that the object of the legislature was not to relieve persons from the payment of rates, but to secure the parish against the loss of the rates, and with this object they framed the earlier section which enables warrants of distress to be levied out of the county on the goods of the original occupier. Now, according to the then existing law, persons entering into possession of houses were not liable to pay any portion of an antecedent rate, because it was not made upon them as occupiers; and it was therefore intended to secure the parish against loss. The primary object was to make the incoming tenant liable and to charge him, but not to discharge the outgoing tenant. The section accordingly enacts learned Judge read the section]. Now we are undoubtedly obliged to do some violence to these words, and if the section had imposed an original liability I should have thought that the language was not strong enough to charge the tenant for the time during which he was actually out of possession, and I dare say that the enactment was made upon the assumption that one tenant would succeed the other immediately. But it is not this act which creates the liability of the outgoing tenant, and I do not think that there is anything in it which distinctly affects this liability. I think, therefore, that the appellant continued liable notwithstanding the remedy against an incoming tenant.

HAYES, J. concurred.

[The

Judgment for the respondents.

Attorneys Theophilus Horrex, for appellant N. C. & C. Milne, for respondents.

ABDUCTION-taking girl under sixteen out of pos-
session of father or mother]-The prisoner met
in the street a girl, under the age of sixteen
years, and persuaded her to go with him to a
neighbouring city. He there seduced her, and
afterwards, on the same day, accompanied her
back, and parted with her in the street where
he had met her. The girl lived with her parents
at home, and immediately returned there. The
prisoner made no inquiries, and had no know-
ledge of whether the girl's parents were even
living or not, but he did not believe she was a
prostitute:-Held, (Pigott, B. dubitante), that
there was no evidence that the prisoner had
taken the girl out of the possession of her father
within the meaning of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100.
s. 55, and the conviction, founded upon that
section, was quashed. R. v. Hilbert, 61

ADMIRALTY--Jurisdiction in criminal cases on the
high seas. See Jurisdiction.

APPORTIONMENT. See Poor Rate.

ASSAULT-Conviction for, on indictment for un-
lawful wounding. See Pleading and Practice.

AUDIT AND AUDITOR-money certified to be due
from overseer: mode of recovery: offence: com-
mittal: bankruptcy]-A poor-law auditor, on the
14th of April, 1868, certified, under section 32.
of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, that a sum of money was
due from J, an overseer of the poor. J. did
not pay over the money within seven days, and
proceedings were taken, under section 99. of
4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76, to recover the money so
certified to be due. At the hearing, before the
Justices, on the 18th of May, J. set up as a
defence that he had been discharged, on the
11th of May, by the Court of Bankruptcy, on
an adjudication dated the 4th of January:-
Held, that the debt being extinguished by the
bankruptcy, the Justices had no jurisdiction
under the 99th section to order that J. should
be committed to the gaol or house of correction.
R. v. Master, 73

Semble-That the non-payment of the money cer-
tified to be due created a debt, and was not an
"offence" in respect of which the power of
commitment was given by the said section. Ibid.

BANKRUPTCY-a bar to recovery of money certified
to be due by poor-law auditor. See Audit and
Auditor.

BIGAMY-evidence: presumption of duration of life]
-The prisoner was convicted of bigamy. The
first marriage was with Victor, in the year 1836.
The second marriage was with Lumley, on the
9th of July, 1847. The prisoner lived with
Victor till the middle of 1843, when they separ-
ated, and from that time no more had been
heard of him. There was no evidence as to his
age. The Judge at the trial directed the jury
that it was a presumption of law that Victor
was alive at the time of the second marriage:-
Held, that there was no presumption of law that
life continued for seven years, or for any other
period, after the time of the latest proof of the
life of the party, and that it was a question of
fact for the jury, under the circumstances of each
case, whether a person be alive or dead at any
time within the interval of seven years, at the
termination of which the protection afforded by
statute in cases of bigamy comes into operation,
and the conviction was quashed. R. v. Lumley,

86

BOROUGH-Right of treasurer to penalties. See
Penalties.

BREAD-Sale of.

See Weights and Measures.
BUILDING-within general line. See Metropolis
Management Act.

CAB. See Hackney Carriage.

CATTLE-straying on highway. See Highway.
CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT. See Jurisdiction.
CERTIORARI-discretion of Court to grant: order
on county treasurer to pay a sum of money:
order obeyed]-Where an order made by three
Justices of a petty sessional division of a county,
on the county treasurer, for the payment of the
expenses of special constables, who have been
called out and have served in such division,
under the 1 & 2 Will. 4. c. 41, has been obeyed
by the treasurer, and the expenses have been

incurred, the money paid, and the item allowed
in his accounts, the Court will not issue the
writ of certiorari for the purpose of quashing
the order, upon grounds affecting the regularity
of the proceedings in respect of the appoint-
ment of the constables, or the making of the
order. R. v. Newborough, 129

Semble-That such an order should only be made

at a special sessions of the Justices of the
division, &c. summoned for the particular pur-
pose of making such order, and not at an ordi-
nary petty or special sessions. Ibid.

-

Semble further That such an order is in the
nature of a direction to the officer of the Jus-
tices, and need not shew on the face of it that
the Justices signing it had jurisdiction to make
it. Ibid.

CHILDREN. See Abduction. Factory.

COMMISSION OF OYER AND TERMINER-Power to
divide the Court. See Jurisdiction.

COMMITMENT-for an offence. See Audit and
Auditor.

COMPENSATION-Lands Clauses Consolidation Act:
yearly tenant: loss of trade profits]-A railway
company, in pursuance of their act of parlia-
ment, served notice upon the yearly tenant of a
public-house, of their intention, after the expira-
tion of six months from the date thereof, to
enter upon and take the premises in his occupa-
tion. The company nevertheless did not take
possession at the expiration of the specified
period, and the tenant continued his business
on the premises for a further space of two
years, but at a reduced rate of profits, the
company having by virtue of their powers
demolished the surrounding neighbourhood.
At the end of the two years the tenant
received a summons from a Metropolitan Police
Magistrate, under 8 Vict. c. 18. s. 121, to
appear for the purpose of having the amount
ofcompensation due to him assessed. On the
hearing of the summons the tenant, in addition
to the usual items of compensation, claimed in
respect of reduced profits of trade consequent
upon the demolition by the company of the sur-
rounding neighbourhood from the time of the
expiration of the six months' notice to the date
of the hearing of the summons:-Held, that he
was not so entitled, the claim being one which,
in the absence of statutory powers, could not
have been made the subject of an action, and
the keeping on of the business at a reduced rate
of profits, after he might have compelled the
company's acceptance of the premises, being his
own voluntary act. R. v. Vaughan, 49
DISEASED MEAT-Seizure of. See Nuisance.
DISORDERLY HOUSE-place used for public enter-
tainment or amusement on Sunday: religious
worship: registration]-A place duly and hon-
estly registered as a place of public worship
(though that worship be not according to any
established or usual form), in which no music

but sacred music is performed or sung, where
nothing dramatic is introduced, where the dis-
courses delivered are intended to be instructive
and contain nothing hostile to religion, where
the object of the promoters may be either to
advance their own views of religion, or as they
allege "to make science the handmaid of reli-
gion," is not a place "used for public entertain-
ment or amusement" within 21 Geo. 3. c. 49.
s. 1. Baxter v. Langley, 1

The fact that payment is required for admission to
a reserved portion of the place, the doors being
open gratuitously, does not deprive the pro-
moters of the protection of 1 W. & M. sess. 1.
c. 18, continued by section 8. of 21 Geo. 3. c. 49.
Ibid.

DISTRICT RATE exclusive occupation: floating
barge: posts fixed in bed of river]-The cor-
poration of Oxford were the owners of the
soil and bed of the river Isis. A boat-club,
composed of members of the University of
Oxford, were possessed of a barge or house-
boat floating on the river, and moored there
at a distance of about thirty feet from the
bank, by two iron rings fixed to the barge
and passing loosely and movably round two solid
fixed posts driven into the bed of the river.
These posts were of such a diameter as to allow
the rings to pass freely up and down them, and
to allow the barge to rise and fall with the
water of the river. Between the barge and the
bank four other posts were driven into the bed
of the river, and the club were possessed of a
movable frame of boards laid down on the top
of these four posts, but not fixed either to them
or the bank, so as to form a gangway from the
barge to the bank. The posts had remained
driven in the bed of the river without the
express licence of the corporation for more than
twenty years, and no rent had ever been paid
by the club in respect of any of the posts. The
barge was used as a means of access to boats,
and as a dressing-room :-Held, that the club
were not rateable as occupiers of the posts and
of the barge attached to them. Grant v. the
Local Board of Oxford, 39

local board of health: assessment of general
district rates: power of appointing special
valuer]- The power given to local boards
by the Local Government Act, 21 & 22 Vict.
c. 98. s. 56, of making a special valuation of pro-
perty subject to the general district rates, where
the assessment for the poor-rate is in the judg-
ment of the board an unfit criterion for making
a general district rate, is not affected by the
new provisions respecting valuations of parishes
in unions prescribed by the Union Assessment
Act, 1862. The North-Eastern Rail. Co. v. the
Local Board of Scarborough, 65

DYING DECLARATION. See Evidence.
ELECTION. See Larceny.

EMBEZZLEMENT- clerk or servant: treasurer of
friendly society] - A treasurer of a friendly