doubt that they would retract all they had faid if it fhould be neceffary to do fo. They had abufed every ruling power in France; but, whenever they had been driven by the general voice of the people to negociate, their former ill language had never been any impediment. Minifters had tried negociation, and had failed, and, because they had failed, it was to be a reafon why they fhould not perfevere. Let the people tell them to make peace, and they would make it. Without the voice of the people they never would: for they were fenfible, that in the calm moments of peace, the people would inquire of themselves for what they had been spending their best blood and treafure. They would find, that they had obtained nothing to juftify fuch expenditure and heavy calamities as war had produced. Such would be their reflections; and minifters, knowing this, wifhed to procraftinate the war. Nothing but the courage and magnanimity of the people themfelves could relieve the country. The people were bending, the duke obferved, under the accumulated weight of taxes, and it was for the rulers to take care that they did not fink. A continuance of that oppreffion, which they had endured, would either make them torpid flaves, or prepare them for revolution. If the people were driven to despair, by griping tax-gatherers, like the French, they would look up to theinfelves, and redrefs their own grievances. If he failed in ftemming the torrent, and checking that fy tem which involved the people's liberties, and threatened to plunge the country into all the horrors of

in future refrain from troubling the houfe. He would now only ob ferve, that they could not regard the addrefs propofed by minifters, as containing the fentiments of their fovereign, but their own; and, as fuch they fhould freely and vigoroufly difcufs and examine it. He then fubmitted to their lordships confideration a counter addrefs; which, after enumerating the repeated declarations, of a pacific difpofition, and overtures for peace on the part of his majefty, expreffed the "Regrets of the lords fpiritual and temporal at perceiving that his majefty had been advised to reject the first overtures for a general pac.fication on the part of the enemy; and humbly implored his majefty to give directions for the immediate renewal, if poflible, of a negociation for peace with the French republic, moft fervently befeeching his majefty to recur to thofe principles of moderation and equity, fo folemnly and fo repeatedly avowed, and which, if ftrictly adhered to, muft enfure the fpeedy refioration of all the bleffings of peace, or, render our enemies alone accountable for all the calamities too certainly attendant on a continuance of hoftilities."

Lord Borringdon faid, that a revolution, perhaps the most important that even France, herself, had yet witneffed, had lately placed on the throne of power, in that country-he would give him no epithets-he was certainly a moft celebrated and extraordinary man. Without confidering his perfonal character, it was fufficient for his purpofe, if he stated that he was very recently arrived at the poft which he occupied; that it was utterly

impoffible

impoffible to guefs how long he might remain there; and confequently equally impoffible to feel any fecurity with refpect to his power of obferving any treaty that might be concluded with him. He might be fucceeded in the government by the jacobin faction, whofe old cry of war, eternal war with England, would, no doubt, lead them to put an end to any treaty which might be depending between the two countries: when we fhould be entirely at the mercy of France. He could not pretend to determine what might be the real difpofitions of the first conful, relative to general pacification. It was, however, not a little remarkable, that though, in the first note tranfmitted, by the fecretary of ftate, to France, his majefty exprefsly ftated his intentions of acting only in concert with his allies, not one word fhould be faid, in the second French note, refpecting peace with the allies. We were exprefly invited to Dunkirk, for the purpofe of concluding peace between England and France; and no reference whatever was made to any of those allies, in concert with whom, alone, his majefty had fo properly declared his intention of acting. He argued, therefore, that even if we had acceded to the French propofitions, it was highly probable that we might have left in existence the continental we might have enabled France, in a certain degree, to have recruited her forces; and to bring her forces fo recruited, againft our allies. We might have left alive the military, habits, fpirits, and occupations, of that military nation: we might have prepared for Buonaparte's fucceffors, (for he

war :

would not, as the noble fecretary had, at leaft, imprudently done, fuppofe that general to be a faithlels obferver of treaties) a power more formidable than that now enjoyed by Buonaparte himself; more formidable from its intrinsic ftrength; more formidable from the views and principles of those who might be intrufted with the direction of it, but above all, more formidable, from the depreffed and abject ftate in which it would, moft affuredly, under fuch circumftances, find this country.

The duke of Bedford had faid, that the first note, tranfmitted by the fecretary of state to France, was not one that was likely to induce Buonaparte to acknowledge the original aggreffion of France, or to difclaim thofe principles which had contributed fo much to the commencement and continuance of the war. But, in a paragraph in lord Grenville's letter, it had been ftated, that no advantage could arife from negociation until it fhould diftinctly appear, that the principles, which originally produced the war, had cease to operate. If Buonaparte was really fincere in his profeffions (for lord Borringdon, in the courfe and animation of fpeaking, was feduced from his determination to fay nothing of Buonaparte's fincerity or infincerty)

if Buonaparte was fincere in his profeffions of peace, this would naturally have induced him, if not to make any new profeffions of principles, at leaft, to confirm those which he had already made, on the eve of his revolution, by his organ, Boulay de la Meurthe. Bat Talleyrand, in his fecond note, is made, in a great degree, to juftify all the exceffes of the former go

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vernment,

vernments, and to plead the caufe of those whofe aggreffions had originally provoked the war. Had Buonaparte been really defirous of peace, is it not probable that he would have taken advantage of the invitation which he had juft read, to announce his dereliction of thofe principles and objects which had hitherto guided the different governments in France, and to confirm thofe profeflions which he had made through Boulay de la Meurthe? This organ, Boulay de la Meurthe, is, however, ordered to renounce them when no negociation is depending: but his organ, Talleyrand, when negociation is depending; when he is invited to renounce them; and when the renunciation of them might remove an obftacle to peace-his organ, Talleyrand, is then ordered to adopt and juftify them. Lord Borringdon afked if that looked like a fincere defire of continuing the peace. Lord Romney had little faith to place in Buonaparte's profeffions. The chief conful might mean by thefe merely to perplex our government, and to render himself popular at home. But, in this cafe, we had laboured that he might gain his end. We certainly fhould have entered into negociation, and feen what terms he would have offered We should have faid, We formerly made propofitions of peace to you, let us now hear the nature of yours." From this, no bad confequence could have followed. All military operations were fufpended at any rate, and the preparations might have gone on with equal vigour for next campaign. If the terms offered by Buonaparte fhould have been unreasonable, they might have been rejected with dildain.

us.

The odium of continuing the war' would thus have been thrown on Buonaparte, and every Englishman would have contributed with cheerfulness to carry it on.

The earl of Carlifle faid, that, by carrying on the war, their lordfhips had obtained every object they had propofed to themfelves in beginning it. We had deftroyed that monfter which preyed on the vitals of the conftitution, and threatened its exiflence. We had checked the career of the conquefts of France. We had obtained fecurity, and fecurity we thould continue to enjoy, by continuing the war, and in this way only. He was confident that to enter into a negociation at prefent would be to ruin the country, and would there fore vote heartily for the addrefs. As to the violent anfwers that had been returned to the overtures of the French government, minifiers might not improbably have reafons to juftify thefe, unknown to their lordships. He thought very highly of minifters. They had, by their prudence and fteadinefs, faved the country, which would inevitably have been ruined, had the oppofition been allowed to carry into execution their impolitic projects.

Lord Holland made the following, among a great variety of obfervations:-One great point was now afcertained by the correfpondence, which, in a most important degree, changed the relative fituation of the two powers. We could no longer fay, as formerly, that the continuance of the war was to be afcribed to the avowed animofity of the enemy. It was not faid, now, that the enemy would not make or liften to overtures : but, that the English minifters did

not

not like to liften to, or to make overtures: that is, that it was our animofity that precluded a negociation for peace. One of the principal objections now urged, to any negociation with France, was the recency of the late revolution. On former occafions, minifters themselves had not confidered fuch a circumstance as affording any objection again negociation, as of itfelf it could be none. It was faid, that Buonaparte might be infincere. There were no good grounds for fuppofing that the French government was infincere: on the contrary, every day tended to demonftrate its fincerity. Was it reasonable to fuppofe that Buona. parte fhould admit that the guilt of the original aggreffion lay with France? The noble fecretary himfelf, in an official correfpondence, during a former negociation, had exprefly ftated that there was no realon to go into the queftion, who was right or wrong in a preceding negociation. The object was, to negociate on the actual circumftances of relative fituation, and on the real grounds in difpute.. It was not Talleyrand who began this conteft about the original aggreffion. He merely stated, that the original aggreffion was not the queftion. Suppofe that Buonaparte, defirous to obtain peace by every means, fhould fit down to confider how he would fucceed in the object of his wishes, what does lord Grenville's note allow him to do? He would find, indeed, that the reftoration of the hereditary line of kings was the only cafe in which a fpeedy peace was admitted to be poffible. His own government must be proved, by experience and the evidence of

facts, before it was admitted to ne gociate. But what was this experience and the evidence of facts? Formerly fix weeks were deemed fufficient. Now the probation required was neither afcertained by its direction, nor by the mode in which it was to be conducted. Unfortunately it was too true, that the example of this country might give to France an apology for fome part of her violence. What had been our conduct to neutral powers? Had not we violated the neutrality of the grand duke of Tufcany, in fpite of the moft folemn treaties? Had we not violated the neutrality of Genoa? What was the conduct of our allies? Did not the Ruffians violate the neutrality of other states? Did it not prefcribe to the king of Denmark that no clubs fhould be permitted in his dominions? The noble fecretary, in juftif; ing the conduct of minifters in rejecting all negociation, drew many of his arguments from the fecond letter of Talleyrand. But nothing in that note could be the leaft palliation of the refufal to negociate; because the decifion of minif ters was pronounced, before they would know or fufpect that a fecond meflenger would be received. It was objected, that the French had faid nothing of a general peace, to which alone we could agree. The letter of the chief conful however, to his majesty, alluded to the miferies of war every where, and expreffed a defire, every where (in fair conftruction) to put an end to them. At any rate, we might have faggefted the propriety of an explicit avowal. The noble fecretary had enumerated the evils that would arife from negociation. But [G 3]

thefe