very firong reafon why it fhould be repealed. People, in their fears, have very often recourfe to defperate expedients, which, if not cancelled in feafon, will themfelves prove fatal to that conftitution which they were meant to fecure. Such is the nature of the feptennial law; it was intended only as a prefervative against a temporary inconvenience: the inconvenience is removed, but the mischievous effects ftill continue; for it not only altered the conflitution of parliaments, but it extended that fame parliament beyond its natural duration; and therefore carries this most unjuft implication with it, That you may at any time ufurp the moft indubitable, the most effential privilege of the people, I mean that of chufing their own reprefentatives: a precedent of fuch a dangerous confequence, of fo fatal a tendency, that I think it would be a reproach to our ftatute-book, if that law was any longer to fubfift, which might record it to pofterity. This is a feafon of virtue and public fpirit; let us take advantage of it to repeal thofe laws which infringe our liberties, and introduce fuch as may restore the vigour of our ancient constitution. Human nature is fo very corrupt, that all obligations lofe their force, unless they are frequently renewed: long parliaments become therefore independent of the people, and when they do fo, there always happens a moft dangerous dependence elfewhere. Long parliaments give the minifter an opportunity of getting acquaintance with members, of practifing his feveral arts to win them into his fchemes. This must be the work of time. Corruption is of fo bafe a nature, that at first fight it is extremely shocking; hardly any one has fubmitted to it all at once: his difpofition must be previously understood, the particular bait must be found out with which he is to be allured, and after all, it is not without many ftruggles that he furrenders his virtue. Indeed, there are fome who will at once plunge themselves into any bafe action; but the generality of mankind are of a more cautious nature, and will proceed only by leifurely degrees; one or two perhaps have deferted their colours the first campaign, fome have done it a fecond; but a great many, who have not that eager difpofition to vice, will wait till a third. For this reason, short parliaments have been lefs corrupt than long ones; they are obferved, like ftreams of water, always to grow more impure the greater diftance they run from the fountain-head. I am aware it may be faid, that frequent new parliaments will produce frequent new expences; but I think quite the contrary: I am really of opinion, that it will be a proper remedy against the evil of bribery at elections, efpecially as you have provided fo wholefome a law to co-operate upon these occafions. Bribery at elections, whence did it arife? rot from country gentlemen, for they are fure of being cholen without it; it was, Sir, the invention of wicked and corrupt minifters, who have from time to time led weak princes into fuch deftructive measures, that they did not dare to rely upon the natural reprefentation of the people. Long parliaments, Sir, firft introduced bribery, because they were worth purchafing at any rate. Country gentlemen, who have only their private fortunes to rely upon, and have no mercenary ends to ferve, are unable to oppose it, especially if at any time the public treasure fhall be unfaithfully fquandered away to corrupt their boroughs. Country gentlemen, indeed, may make fome weak efforts, but as they generally prove unfuccessful, and the time of a fresh ftruggle is at fo great a distance, they at laft grow faint in the difpute, give up their country for loft, and retire in defpair; defpair naturally produces indolence, and that is the proper difpofition for flavery. Minifters of flate understand this very well, and are therefore unwilling to awaken the nation out of its lethargy by frequent elections. They know that the fpirit of liberty, like every other virtue of the mind, is to be kept alive only by conftant action; that it is impoffible to enflave this nation, while it is perpetually upon its guard.-Let country gentlemen, then, by having frequent opportunities of exerting themfelves, be kept warm and active in their contention for the public good: this will raise that zeal and fpirit, which will at last get the better of thofe undue influences by which the officers of the crown, though unknown to the feveral boroughs, have been able to fupplant country gentlemen of great characters and fortune, who live in their neighbourhood.-I do not fay this upon idle fpeculation only: I live in a country where it is too well known, and I appeal to many gentlemen in the house, to more out of it, (and who are fo for this very reason) for the truth of my affertion. Sir, it is a fore which has been long eating into the most vital part of our conftitution, and I hope the time will come when you will probe it to the bottom. For if a minifter thould ever gain a corrupt familiarity with car boroughs; if he should keep a regifter of them in his clofet, and, by fending down Eis treafury mandates, fhould procure a farious reprefentation of the people, the spring of his corruption, who will be at a" tires ready to reconcile and juftify the 1. contradictory measures of his adminitration, and even to vote every crude ind gefted dream of their patron into a law; if the maintenance of his power fhould become the fole object of their attention, and they should be guilty of the moft violent breach of parliamentary truft, by giving the king a difcretionary liberty of taxing the people without limitation or controul; the last fatal compliment they can pay to the crown;-if this fhould ever be the anhappy condition of this nation, the people indeed may complain; but the doors of that place, where their complaints fhould be heard, will for ever be shut against them. W Our difeafe, I fear, is of a complicated rature, and I think that this motion is wifely intended to remove the first and pracipal diforder. Give the people their 2.cient right of frequent new elections; that will restore the decayed authority of parliaments, and will put our conflitution into a natural condition of working out her cvn cure. Sir, upon the whole, I am of opinion, that I cannot exprefs a greater zeal for his ajesty, for the liberties of the people, or e honour and dignity of this houfe, than bieconding the motion which the hoarable gentleman has made you. § 135. Sir ROBERT WALPOLE's Reply. Mr. Speaker, Though the queftion has been already fally oppofed, that there is no great ocCalon to lay any thing farther again it, yet I hope the houfe will indulge me the orty of giving fome of thofe reafons ich induce me to be against the motion. In general, I must take notice, that the naLure of our conflitution feems to be very ach miftaken by the gentlemen who Lave fpoken in favour of this motion. It is certain, that ours is a mixed government, and the perfection of our conftitation confits in this, that the monarchical, aritocratical, and democratical form of government, are mixt and interwoven in ours, fo as to give us all the advantages of each, without fubjecting us to the dangers and inconveniencies of either. The democratical form of government, which is the only one I have now occafion to take notice of, is liable to these inconveniencies; that they are generally too tedious in their coming to any refolution, and feldom brifk and expeditious enough in carrying their refolutions into execution: that they are always wavering in their refolutions, and never fleady in any of the meatures they refolve to purfue; and that they are often involved in factions, feditions, and infurrections, which expofes them to be made the tools, if not the prey, of their neighbours: therefore, in all regulations we make with respect to our conititution, we are to guard against running too much into that form of government, which is properly called democratical: this was, in my opinion, the effect of the triennial law, and will again be the effect, if ever it should be restored. That triennial elections would make our government too tedious in all their refolves, is evident; becaufe, in fuch cale, no prudent administration would ever refolve upon any measure of confequence till they had felt not only the pule of the parliament, but the pulfe of the people; and the minifters of state would always labour under this difadvantage, that, as fecrets of fate mult not be immediately divulged, their enemies (and enemies they will always have) would have a handle for expofing their meafures, and rendering them dif agreeable to the people, and thereby carrying perhaps a new election again them,. before they cou'd have an opportunity of justifying their meatures, by divulging thofe facts and circumstances, from whence the juftice and the wifdom of their measures would clearly appear. Then, Sir, it is by experience well known, that what is called the populace of every country, are apt to be too much elated with fuccefs, and too much dejected with every misfortune: this makes them wavering in their opinions about affairs of flate, and never long of the fame mind; and as this houfe is chofen by the free and unbiafled voice of the people in general, if this choice were fo often renew cd, we might expect that this houfe would be as wavering, and as unfteady, as the people ufually are: and it being impoffible to carry on the public affairs of the nation without the 3 E concurrence concurrence of this houfe, the minifters would always be obliged to comply, and confequently would be obliged to change their measures, as often as the people changed their minds. With feptennial parliaments, Sir, we are not expofed to either of thefe misfortunes, becaufe, if the minifers, after having felt the pulfe of the parliament, which they can always foon do, refolve upon any mealures, they have generally time enough, before the new elections come on, to give the people a proper information, in order to fhew them the juftice and the wifdom of the measures they have purfued; and if the people fhould at any time be too much elated, or too much dejected, or should without a caufe change their minds, thofe at the helm of affairs have time to fet them right before a new election comes on. ftitution to a more equal mixture, and con. fequently to a greater perfection, than it was ever in before that law took place. As to bribery and corruption, Sir, if it were poffible to influence, by fuch bafe means, the majority of the electors of Great Britain to chufe fuch men as would probably give up their liberties; if it were poffible to influence, by fach means, a majority of the members of this houfe to confent to the eftablishment of arbitrary power; I would readily allow, that the calculations made by the gentlemen of the other fide were juft, and their inference true; but I am perfuaded that neither of thefe is poffible. As the members of this houfe generally are, and muft always be, gentlemen of fortune and figure in their country, is it poffible to fuppofe, that any one of them could, by a penfion, or a poft, be influenced As to faction and fedition, Sir, I will to confent to the overthrow of our conftite grant, that, in monarchical and aristocrati- tion; by which the enjoyment, not only cal governments, it generally arifes from of what he got, but of what he before violence and oppreffion; but, in democra- had, would be rendered altogether precari tical governments, it always arifes from the ous: I will allow, Sir, that, with respect to people's having too great a fhare in the go- bribery, the price muft be higher or lower, vernment. For in all countries, and in all generally in proportion to the virtue of the governments, there always will be many man who is to be bribed; but it muft likefactious and unquiet fpirits, who can never wife be granted, that the humour he hapbe at reft either in power or out of power: pens to be in at the time, the fpirit he hap when in power, they are never cafy, unless pens to be endowed with, adds a great deal every man fubmits entirely to their direc- to his virtue. When no encroachment tion; and when out of power, they are al- are made upon the rights of the people, ways working and intriguing against thofe when the people do not think themfelves that are in, without any regard to juftice, in any danger, there may be many of the or to the intereft of their country. In po- electors, who, by a bribe of ten guineas, pular governments fuch men have too much might be induced to vote for one candidate game, they have too many opportunities rather than another; but if the court were for working upon and corrupting the minds making any encroachments upon the rights of the people, in order to give them a bad of the people, a proper fpirit would, with impreffion of, and to raile difcontents a-out doubt, arife in the nation; and in fud gainft, thofe that have the management of the public affairs for the time; and thefe difcontents often break out into feditions and infurrections. This, Sir, would in my opinion be our misfortune, if our parliament were either annual or triennial: by fuch frequent elections there would be fo much power thrown into the hands of the people, as would deftroy that equal mixture which is the beauty of our conftitution: in fhort, our government would really become a democratical government, and might from thence very probably diverge into a tyrannical. Therefore, in order to preferve our conftitution, in order to prevent our falling under tyranny and arbitrary power, we cught to preferve that law, which I really think has brought cur con a caufe, I am perfuaded, that none, or very few, even of fuch electors, could be induced to vote for a court candidate; no, not for ten times the fum. There may, Sir, be fome bribery and corruption in the nation; I am afraid there will always be fome: but it is no proof of it, that Árangers are fometimes chofen for a gentleman may have fo much natural influence over a borough in his neighbour hood, as to be able to prevail with them to chufe any perfon he pleafes to recor mend; and if upon fuch recommendation they chufe one or two of his friends, who are perhaps ftrangers to them, it is not from thence to be inferred, that the two ftrangers were chofen their reprefentatives by the means of bribery and corruption. To To infinuate, Sir, that money may be iffued from the public treafury for bribing elections, is really fomething very extraordinary, especially in thofe gentlemen who know how many checks are upon every fhilling that can be iffued from thence; and how regularly the money granted in one year for the public fervice of the nation, muft always be accounted for the very next feffion, in this houfe, and likewife in the other, if they have a mind to call for any fuch account. And as to the gentlemen in offices, if they have any advantage over country gentlemen, in having fomething else to depend on befides their own private fortunes, they have likewife many difadvantages: they are obliged to live here at London with their families, by which they are put to a much greater expence than gentlemen of equal fortunes who live in the country: this lays them under a very great difadvantage, with respect to the fupporting their intereft in the country. The country gentleman, by living among the electors, and purchafing the neceffaries for his family from them, keeps up an acquaintance and correfpondence with them, without putting himself to any extraordinary charge; whereas a gentleman who lives in London has no other way of keeping up an acquaintance or correfpondence among his friends in the country, but by going down once or twice a year, at a very extraordinary charge, and often without any other bafinefs; fo that we may conclude, a gentleman in office cannot, even in feven years, fave much for diftributing in ready money at the time of an election; and I really believe, if the fact were narrowly enquired into, it would appear, that the gentlemen in office are as little guilty of bribing their electors with ready money, as any other fet of gentlemen in the kingdom. That there are ferments often raifing among the people without any juft caufe, is what I am furprifed to hear controverted, fince very late experience may convince us of the contrary. Do not we know what a ferment was raised in the nation towards the latter end of the late queen's reign? And it is well known what a fatal change in the affairs of this nation was introduced, or at least confirmed, by an election's coming on while the nation was in that ferment. Do not we know what a ferment was raifed in the nation foon after his late majefty's acceffion? And if an election had then been allowed to come on, while the nation was in that ferment, it might perhaps have had as fatal effects as the former; but, thank God, this was wifely provided against by the very law which is now wanted to be repealed. As fuch ferments may hereafter often happen, I must think that frequent elections will always be dangerous; for which reafon, as far as I can fee at prefent, I fhall, I believe, at all times, think it a very dangerous experiment to repeal the feptennial bill. 137. Lord LYTTELTON's Speech on the Repeal of the Act, called the Jew Bill, in the Year 1753. Mr. Speaker, I fee no occafion to enter at prefent into the merits of the bill we paffed the laft feffion, for the naturalization of Jews, becaufe I am convinced, that in the prefent temper of the nation, not a fingle foreign Jew will think it expedient to take the benefit of that act; and therefore the repealing of it is giving up nothing. Iaffented to it last year, in hopes it might induce fome wealthy Jews to come and fettle among us: in that light I faw enough of utility in it, to make me incline rather to approve than diflike it; but that any man alive could be zealous, either for or against it, I confefs I had no idea. What affects our religion is, indeed, of the highest and molt ferious importance: God forbid we fhould ever be indifferent about that! but I thought this had no more to do with religion, than any turnpike-act we paffed in that feffion; and, after all the divinity that has been preached on the fubject, I think so still. Refolution and fleadiness are excellent qualities; but, it is the application of them upon which their value depends. A wife government, Mr. Speaker, will know where to yield, as well as where to refift: and there is no furer mark of littleness of mind in an administration, than obflinacy in trifles. Public wifdom, on fome occafions, muft condefcend to give way to popular folly, especially in a free country, where the humour of the people must be confidered as attentively as the humour of a king in an abfolute monarchy. Under both forms of government, a prudent and honeft miniftry will indulge a fmail folly, and will refilt a great one. Not to vouchfafe now and then a kind indulgence to the former, would difcover an ignorance in human nature; not to refift the latter at all times would be meannefs and fervility. 3 E 2 Sir, Sir, I look on the bill we are at prefent debating, not as a facrifice made to popularity (for it facrifices nothing) but as a prudent regard to fome confequences arifing from the nature of the clamour raifed againft the late act for naturalizing Jews, which feem to require a particular confideration. It has been hitherto the rare and envied felicity of his majesty's reign, that his fubjects have enjoyed fuch a fettled tranquillity, fuch a freedom from angry religious difputes, as is not to be paralleled in any former times. The true Chriftian fpirit of moderation, of charity, of univerfal benevolence, has prevailed in the people, has prevailed in the clergy of all ranks and degrees, instead of thofe narrow principles, thofe bigoted pleafures, that furious, that implacable, that ignorant zeal, which had often done fo much hurt both to the church and the ftate. But from the illunderflood, infignificant act of parliament you are now moved to repeal, occasion has been taken to deprive us of this ineftimable advantage. It is a pretence to disturb the peace of the church, to infufe idle fear into the minds of the people, and make religion itfelf an engine of fedition. It behoves the piety, as well as the wifdom of parliament, to difappoint thofe endeavours. Sir, the very wort mifchief that can be done to religion, is to pervert it to the purpofes of faction. Heaven and hell are not more diftant, than the benevolent fpirit of the Gospel, and the malignant fpirit of party. The moft impious wars ever made were thofe called holy wars. He who hates another man for not being a Chriftian, is himself not a Chriftian. Chriflianity, Sir, breathes love, and peace, and good-will to man. A temper conformable to the dictates of that holy religion, has lately diftinguished this nation; and a glorious diftinction it was! But there is latent, at all times, in the minds of the vulgar, a fpark of enthufiafm, which, if blown by the breath of a party, may, even when it feems quite extinguished, be fuddenly revived and raifed to a flame. The act of laft feffion for naturalizing Jews, has very unexpect edly adminiftered fuel to feed that flame. To what a height it may rife, if it fhould continue much longer, one cannot eafily tell; but, take away the fuel, and it will die of itfelf. It is the misfortune of all the Roman Catholic countries, that there the church and the state, the civil power and the hier END OF THE archy, have feparate interefts; and are continually at variance one with the other. It is our happinefs, that here they form but one fyftem. While this harmony lafts, whatever hurts the church, hurts the ftate: whatever weakens the credit of the governors of the church, takes away from the civil power a part of its ftrength, and fhakes the whole conftitution. Sir, I truft and believe that, by fpeedily paffing this bill, we fhall filence that obloquy which has fo unjuftly been cast upon our reverend prelates (fome of the most refpectable that ever adorned our church) for the part they took in the act which this repeals. And it greatly concerns the whole community, that they fhould not lofe that refpect which is fo juftly due to them, by a popular clamour kept up in oppofition to a meafure of no importance in itfelf. But if the departing from that meafure, fhould not remove the prejudic fo maliciously raifed, I am certain that further flép you can take will be able to remove it; and, therefore, I hope you will ftop here. This appears to be a reasonable and fafe condefcenfion, by which nobody will be hurt; but all beyond this would be dangerous weaknefs in government: it might open a door to the wildeft enthufiafm, and to the moft mifchievous attacks of political difaffection working upon that enthufiafm. If you encourage and autho rize it to fall on the fynagogue, it will go from thence to the meeting-house, and in the end to the palace. But let us be careful to check its further progrefs. The more zealous we are to fupport Chriftianity, the more vigilant fhould we be in maintaining toleration. If we bring back perfecution, we bring back the Anti-chriftian fpirit of popery; and when the fpirit is here, the whole fyftem will foon follow. Toleration is the bafis of all public quiet. It is a charter of freedom given to the mind, more valuable, I think, than that which fecures our perfons and eftates. Indeed, they are infeparably connected together; for, where the mind is not free, where the confcience is enthralled, there is no freedom. Spiritual tyranny puts on the galling chains; but civil tyranny is called in, to rivet and fix them. We fee it in Spain, and many other countries; we have formerly both feen and felt it in England. By the bleffing of God, we are now delivered from all kinds of oppreffion. Let us take care, that they may never return. THIRD BOOK. |