22 & 23

Car. 2, c. 10.

lifetime, by portion or portions equal to the share which shall by such distribution be allotted to the other children to whom such distribution is to be made; and in case any child, other than the heir at law, shall have any estate by settlement from the said intestate, or shall be advanced by the said intestate in his lifetime by portion not equal to the share which will be due to the other children by such distribution as aforesaid; then so much of the surplusage of the estate of such intestate to be distributed to such child or children as shall have any land by settlement from the intestate or were advanced in the lifetime of the intestate as shall make the estate of all the said children to be equal as near as can be estimated; but the heir at law, notwithstanding any land that he shall have by descent or otherwise from the intestate, is to have an equal part in the distribution with the rest of the children, without any consideration of the value of the land which he hath by descent or otherwise from the intestate.

Section 6. And in case there be no children, nor any legal representatives of them, then one moiety of the said estate to be allotted to the widow of the intestate, the residue of the said estate to be distributed equally to every of the next of kindred of the intestate who are in equal degree, and those who legally represent them.

Section 7. Provided that there be no representations admitted among collaterals after brothers' and sisters' children; and in case there be no wife, then all the said estate to be distributed equally to and amongst the children; and in case there be no child, then to the next of kindred in equal degree of or unto the intestate and their legal representatives as aforesaid and in no other manner whatsoever.

1 Jac. 2, c. 17.

[1 JAC. 2, CAP. 17.]

Section 7. Provided also and it is further enacted that if after the death of a father any of his children shall die intestate without wife or children, in the lifetime of the mother, every brother and sister and the representatives of them shall have an equal share with her, anything in the last mentioned Acts to the contrary notwithstanding.

1 I.e., the Statute of Distribution, 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10, and the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 25.

FORMS.

BILL OF LADING.1

SHIPPED IN GOOD ORDER AND CONDITION2 by

the good ship called the

fifty casks of

whereof

in and upon is master for and

being marked and

this present voyage and now riding at anchor in
bound for
numbered as in the margin' weight and contents unknown and are
to be delivered in the like good order and condition, the act of God,s
the Queen's enemies, pirates, robbers by land or sea but not
pilferage," restraint of princes, rulers, or people, fire, jettison,

1 Ante, p. 68.

2 These words apply to the external condition only: Moore v. Harris, 1 App. Cas. 328.

3 The statement in a bill of lading as to the quantity of goods shipped is, unless there is a special provision to the contrary (Mediterranean Co. v. Mackay, [1903] 1 K. B. 297), only primâ facie, and not conclusive, evidence against the shipowner as to the amount shipped, and he may prove that in fact a smaller amount was shipped: Brown v. Powell Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 562; McLean v. Fleming, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 128; Lishman v. Christie, 19 Q. B. D. 333; Smith v. Bedouin Co., [1896] A. C. 70. By the Bills of Lading Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. e. 111), s. 3, every bill of lading in the hands of a consignee or endorsee for value which represents goods to have been shipped on board a vessel is conclusive evidence against the master or other person signing it, unless the holder of the bill of lading knew that the goods had not in fact been shipped, or unless the misstatement was caused without any default on the part of the person signing and wholly by the fraud of the shipper,

10

or of the holder, or some person under
whom the holder claims.

+ Parsons v. New Zealand Co., [1901]
1 K. B. 548.

5 Blanchet v. Fowell's Co., L. R. 9 Ex. 74. 6 As to the effect of the words 66 contents unknown," see Lebau v. General Steam Nav. Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 88; Tully v. Terry, ib. 679.

7 I.e., according to the usage at the port of delivery; Cargo ex Argos, L. R. 5 P. C. 160; Petrocochino v. Bott, L. R. 9 C. P. 360.

8 Ante, p. 29, n. 8.

9 I.e. any sovereign who makes war with or against whom war is made by the sovereign of the shipowner: The Heinrich, L. R. 3 A. & E. 424; Russell v. Niemann, 17 C. B. N. S. 163.

10 As to the meaning of robbers," see Taylor v. Liverpool Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 546; De Rothschild v. Royal Mail Co., 7 Ex. 734.

11 Where goods are stolen by persons in the service of the ship, the case is not within an exception of loss from "pirates, robbers, or thieves"; Steinman v. Angier Line, [1891] 1 Q. B. 619.

12 I., an actual (Atkinson v. Ritchie,

Forms.

Forms.

barratry, the neglect and default of pilot, master, or crew in the
navigation of the ship, and all and every the dangers and accidents
of the seas, rivers, and navigation of whatever nature or kind'
excepted, unto
or to his assigns, they paying freight for the
said goods, and all other conditions as per charterparty, with primage
and average accustomed. The ship is not liable for leakages or
breakage, loss or damage by heat, sweat, rust, or decay, unless

occasioned by improper stowage or for any damage to any goods which is capable of being covered by insurance.

In witness whereof the master or purser of the said ship hath
bills of lading all of this tenor and date, the one of

affirmed to
which bills being accomplished, the other [

] to stand void.

Forms.

Dated

A CHARTERPARTY.

IT IS THIS DAY MUTUALLY AGREED between A. B., owner of the good ship
or vessel, called the
A 1 of the measurement of tons

or thereabouts, now in the port of
[or now at sea
having sailed weeks ago], and C. D. on behalf of E. F., merchants;
that the said ship being tight, staunch and strong, and every way fitted
for the voyage shall with all convenient speed sail and proceed in the
usual and customary manner with usual dispatch according to the
custom of the port [or in regular turn] [or shall sail from
on or before the

the charterer's control to

except in the case of accidents beyond
or so near thereunto as

she may safely get, and there shall loads from the factors of

from the default of the shipowner or master servants or crew: Phillips v. Clark, 2 C. B. N. S. 156; Czech v. General Steam Nav. Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 14. Damage done to goods by leakage or breakage of other goods is not within the exception: Thrift v. Youle, 2 C. P. D. 432.

1 This does not include theft: Taylor v. Liverpool Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 546.

2 Price v. Union Co., [1903] 1 K. B. 750.

3 Ante, p. 113.

4 The statement that the ship is of a particular class is a condition which is fulfilled if the ship is of that class at the time when the charterparty is made: French v. Newgass, 3 C. P. D. 163: Hurst v. Usborne, 18 C. B. 144; Routh v. Macmillan, 2 H. & C. 750. See, as to conditions precedent and warranties, ante, pp. 66, 67.

The statements as to the place where the ship is lying (Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751), as to the time when it sailed (Ollive v. Booker, 1 Ex. 416), that it shall sail at a certain date (Glaholm v. Hays, 2 M. & Gr. 257; 58 R. R. 399; Croockewrit v. Fletcher, 1 H. & N. 893), that it

has "now sailed or is about to sail "
(Bentsen v. Taylor, [1893] 2 Q. B. 274),
and (unless the charterparty operates as
a demise of the ship) a statement that
the ship is tight, &c. (Steel v. State Line
Co., 3 App. Cas. 77; Stanton v. Richard-
son, L. R. 7 C. P. 421), are conditions
precedent. But a statement that the
ship shall sail at some uncertain time, as
"with all convenient speed," "within a
reasonable time," "with the first favour-
able wind," is a warranty only: Mac-
Andrew v. Chapple, L. R. 1 C. P. 643;
Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 754.

6 An ordinary event of nature, such
as a snowstorm, is not an accident:
Fenwick v. Schmalz, L. R. 3 C. P. 313.

7 I.e., the ship must go to the place named, unless there is some obstacle, physical or other (Nelson v. Dahl, 12 Ch. D. 568; 6 App. C'as. 38), which prevents her from going there for what would be an unreasonable time, having regard to the intentions of charterer and shipowner. See Tharsis Co. v. Morel, [1891] 2 Q. B.

647.

8 In the absence of special agreement the shipowner has to load the cargo

Forms.

the said
a full and complete cargo,' say about
tons 2 not exceeding what she can reasonably stow away and carry, over
and above her tackle, apparel, provisions, and furniture (the charterer's
stevedore to be employed by the ship), and being so loaded shall there-
with proceed to
or so near thereunto as she may safely
get and deliver the same in the usual and customary manner on
being paid freight as follows: viz.,
shillings per ton delivered

(the act of God, the King's enemies, fire, and all and every other dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers, and navigation, of whatever nature and kind soever during the said voyage, always excepted)." The freight to be paid on unloading and right delivery of the cargo,' running days 10 are to be allowed the said merchant (if the ship is not sooner dispatched), for loading the said ship at

days on demurrage" over and above the said lying-days at per day, days of detention by ice not to be reckoned as lyingdays. It is further agreed that the liability of the charterers shall