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without the master's order, yet if the master were trusted by the trader he is liable." (a)

The defendant, who was a considerable dealer in iron, and known to the plaintiff as such, sent a waterman to the plaintiff for iron on trust, and paid for it afterwards. He sent the same waterman a second time with ready money, who received the goods, and did not pay for them; and the chief justice ruled that the sending him upon trust the first time, and sub sequently paying for the goods, was giving him credit, so as to charge the defendant upon the second contract. (b)

It can hardly, however, it is submitted, be contended as a general rule, that the circumstance of A. having authorized a stranger to pledge his credit on one particular occasion only, is of itself sufficient to raise an implied anthority to the stranger to pledge the credit of A. a second time. (c) A distinction must be made between a particular authority given to a special agent employed upon one occasion, and a general authority raised by implication of law from usual employment. If one person employs another for a specific purpose, a particular authority only is delegated, and the employer cannot be made liable for anything done beyond the scope of the express authority given. Whether a particular authority has been extended to an implied general authority, is a question of fact dependent upon the relative situations of the parties, the number of times that the act has been repeated with the sanction of the employer, and the nature of the employment that has been cast by the principal on the agent.

A domestic servant in the constant employ of the master is naturally supposed to be clothed with a greater degree of confidence and authority than a mere stranger; and if the master has assented to his servant's dealing on credit at all, he would be held liable. (d)

"If," observes Pothier, "it be proved that I have been in the habit of paying tradesmen for the articles of dress with which they have furnished my daughter, or for the provisions of my house supplied to my cook, the tradesman would be well entitled to demand payment from me for what my said daughter, or cook might purchase in my name, unless I could prove that I had given him notice not to supply them, or at least unless what he supplied greatly exceeded what could reasonably be required for the consumption of my family. In default of his proving that I was in

(a) Holt, C. J., 1 Show. 95. Southby v. Wiseman, 3 Keb. 625. Nickson v. Brohan, 10 Mod. 111.

(b) Hazard v. Treadwell, 1 Str. 506.

(c) Gilman v. Robinson, R. & M. 227. (d) Sir R. Wayland's case, 3 Salk, 233; 1 Ld. Raym. 255.

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the habit of dealing in this way, I ought to be discharged from his demand, by showing that when I sent my daughter, or my cook to buy food, I gave them money to pay for it." (e)

An action was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant to recover the price of a quantity of hay and straw sold by the plaintiff for the use of the defendant's horses, the plaintiff proved the delivery of the hay at the defendant's stables, with bills of parcels, &c.; but there was no evidence of his having ever seen the defendant, or of his having ever received any orders from him whatever, or any payment, or money. The defence was, that the defendant had given his servant the money for the purchase of the goods, and it appeared that the defendant kept a book, in which were entered the articles procured by the servant, and the sums advanced to him; but the advances did not appear to have been made specifically for the purchase of the articles bought, but generally from time to time; and Lord Ellenborough, in summing up to the jury, observed, "If the goods were taken up, and the money given afterwards to the servant to pay, I am inclined to think the master liable, if the servant have not paid over the money, for he has given the servant authority to take up goods upon credit. It is therefore material to see when the money was given. If the servant were always in cash before hand to pay for the goods, the master is not liable, as he never authorized him to pledge his credit; but if the servant were not so in cash, he gave him a right to take up the goods on credit, and I think he will be liable, as the servant has not paid the plaintiff, though he may have received the money from the defendant his master." (ƒ)

If the plaintiff has shown a want of due caution, or has trusted the servant to an improper extent, the principal of course will not be liable.

In an action for the price of butcher's meat, it appeared that the plaintiff had contracted with the defendant to serve him with meat “ at 5}d. per pound, ready money;" that the defendants's cook was in the habit of ordering meat, and of paying for it as soon as the bills amounted to a few shillings or a guinea, (the defendant giving the cook the money for the purpose); that this system continued for some time, until at last a new cook in the defendant's employ suffered the bills to run on until they amounted to 337. 38. 3d., and then ran away, the defendant having all the while paid her in the customary manner; and it was held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the amount from the defendant. “The con

(e) Pothier, (OBLIGATIONS,) No. 456. Arret du Journal des Audiences, tome 5.

(f) Rusby v. Scarlett, 5 Esp. 76. Pearce v.

Rogers, 3 Esp. 214. Gratland v. Freeman, id. 85.

tract," observed Lord Kenyon," was to deal for ready money, and the plaintiff, when he let the bill run on to such an amount as the sum now claimed, was giving credit to the servant and not to the defendant." (g)

A foreman intrusted with the general management of a trade or business has an implied general authority from his employer to enter into all such contracts as are usually and necessarily entered into in the ordinary conduct and management of a business. Therefore, where the foreman of a saw-mill took an order from the plaintiff for a large quantity of Scotch fir staves, and agreed to to have them ready for delivery within a particular period, it was held that his master was responsible for the nonfulfilment of the contract, although no particular authority from the master to the servant to enter into that contract could be proved. (h)

If the acts of the agent have been exercised in so open and public a manner that it may reasonably be inferred that the principal must have been cognizant of them, the principal will be liable, although no express authority was in fact given. A ship-broker advertised a ship at the Royal Exchange and at the usual places as "warranted to sail with convoy;" but the vessel subsequently sailed without convoy, and was captured: the plaintiff had shipped and insured goods on board, and brought an action against the owner of the vessel to recover the damages sustained by him through the breach of the warranty; the defendant offered evidence to prove that he had never given any authority so to represent the ship; but Lord Kenyon held that the defendant was bound by the publicity of the announcement, although no actual authority had been given; it was a question between the defendant and his agent, and the public had nothing to do with it. (¿)

In all these cases the existence of an implied authority to bind the principal is a question of fact to be determined by a jury from a careful consideration of surrounding circumstances; the rule of law being, that wherever the principal by his conduct has held out the agent to the parties dealing with him as having a general power to act in the premises, his acts bind the principal, and the liability of the latter upon the contract cannot be qualified by the existence of any private instructions which the agent may have exceeded. The principal cannot cut down or circumscribe the apparent general authority by secret limitations and restrictions of which the parties dealing with the agent are entirely igno"It is clear that the agent may bind his principal within the limits of the authority with which he has been apparently clothed by the

rant.

(g) Stubbing v. Heintz, 1 Peake, 66.
(h) Richardson v. Cartwright, 1 Car. & Kirw.

328.

Whitehouse v. Abberley, ib. 642. (2) Runquist v. Ditchell, 3 Esp. 64.

66

principal in respect of the subject matter; and there would be no safety in mercantile transactions if he could not." (k) So observes Pothier,The contract made by my agent in my name is binding upon me if he has not exceeded the power with which he was ostensibly invested. His neglect to follow my secret instructions may give me a right of action for damages against him, but cannot exonerate me from liability towards the party with whom he has contracted in my name conformably to his apparent authority, otherwise there would be no security for those who contract with absent persons through the medium of an agent." (1) The authority of the agent may of course be revoked at any time by the principal, so as to deprive the agent of the power of embarking in any fresh transactions after the receipt by him of the notice of revocation. (m) But in order to determine the liability of the principal to third parties who have dealt with a general agent in ignorance of the determination of his authority, the principal must make the revocation as notorious to the world at large as the existence of the previous general authority and employment. (n) If the agent was not a general agent, but had only a particular authority to enter into one or two distinct independent transactions in consequence of specific instructions, then, as he has no general continuous authority to act for the principal, no revocation of authority is needed, as there is in truth none to revoke.

An agent, unless he be the master of a ship, has no implied authority to borrow money on account of the principal, so as to render the latter responsible as the borrower, unless it can be proved that the principal had previously sanctioned such a course of dealing on the part of the agent, or had subsequently adopted and ratified the loan. (0)

The MASTER OF A SHIP forms an exception to the general rule in this respect, an exception founded on the necessities and exigencies of his position. "The law which generally provides for ordinary events, and not for cases of rare occurrence, considers how likely and frequent are accidents at sea, when it may be necessary, in order to have the vessel repaired, to pledge the credit of her owners, and therefore it is that the law invests the master with power to raise money, and by an instrument of hypothecation to pledge the ship if it be necessary." (p) He has also

() Ellenborough, C. J., 15 East, 42. Nickson v. Brohan, 10 Mod. 109.

(7) Traité des Obligations, No. 79, No. 82. (m) Raleigh v. Atkinson, 6 M. & W. 670. (n) Post, ch. 20, s. 3. La commission est toujours censée durer jusquà ce qu'ils aient été révoques, et qua la revocation ait été connue dans le public. Pothier, Traité des Obligations,

No. 449; Dig. lib. 15, tit. 4; Cod. lib. 2, tit. 13.

(0) Hawtayne v. Bourne, 7 M. & W. 599. Pott v. Bevan, 1 Car. & Kirw. 335. Waters v. Brogden, 1 Y. & J. 457.

(p) Parke, B., 7 M. & W. 600. Wright, ib. 396, post ch. 25.

Weston v.

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an implied general authority to bind the owners for necessary repairs done or supplies furnished to the vessel under his command, and by the word necessary" is comprehended such as are fit and proper for the vessel upon her voyage, and such as a prudent owner himself, if present, might be expected to have ordered. (2) The principal, in fact, having intrusted his agent with the custody of the vessel, thereby clothes him with an implied general authority to do all such acts as are reasonable and necessary for the due conservation and preservation of the thing intrusted to his charge, and this general authority cannot be circumscribed by any private contract between the master and the owners, of which the persons dealing with the master are ignorant.

When, therefore, by articles of agreement made between the owners and the master of a vessel, it was covenanted that the master should have the sole management of the vessel, and employ her for his own sole benefit and advantage for the space of eleven years; that he should pay a rent of 367. per annum at stated periods, and would at all times, at his own cost and charge, repair the vessel, her tackle, rigging, &c. It was held that the plaintiffs, who had supplied the vessel with cables by order of the master without any notice of the contract, were entitled to recover the price thereof from the owners, although at the time the articles were furnished it was not known who the owners were. It was contended in the above case that the master, being by the contract the lessee of the ship, was both owner and master; but the court said it was a private agreement and could not affect the plaintiffs, who were total strangers to the transaction. "If, indeed, a tradesman had notice of such a contract, and in consequence of it gave credit to the captain individually as the responsible person, particular circumstances of that sort might afford ground to say he meant to absolve the owners and look to the personal security of the master." (r)

The master has also, in certain cases, an implied authority to pledge the credit of the owners for such things as are absolutely necessary for the due prosecution of the voyage. Where, for example, money was required to pay the wages of the seamen, who, unless they were paid, might have refused to assist in the further navigation of the ship; it was held, that the master could pledge the credit of the owners for the necessary money. (s) So also, if it be necessary to pay harbour dues, or pilotage, or the like, in ready money, and the master has not been furnished with the necessary funds, he has an implied anthority to borrow money, and to

(q) Webster v. Seekamp, 4 B. & Ald. 352. Arthur v. Barton, 6 M. & W. 138.

(r) Rich v. Coe, 2 Cowp. 636.
(s) Robinson v. Lyall, 7 Price, 592.

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