obtain information as to what persons I intend to call as witnesses in support of my case [or defence, or claim] at the trial of this action.

Evidence whereby Party intends to support his Case (y).]—To the interrogatory, that I object to answer the same, on the ground that the thereby merely seeks to obtain the details of the evidence which I intend to adduce at the trial in support of my case.

Criminatory (z)].-To the

interrogatory, that I object to answer

the same, on the ground that, to the best of my [knowledge, information and] belief, my answer thereto would [or might] tend to criminate me.

be given though it involves the disclosure of names of witnesses (Marriott v. Chamberlain, 17 Q. B. D. 154, where the above objection to answer failed). It likewise failed in Humphries v. Taylor Drug Co., 39 Ch. D. 693; Birch v. Mather, 22 Id. 629; see also A.-G. v. Gaskill, 20 Id. 519, 529, explaining Eade v. Jacobs, 3 Ex. D. 335 : but it succeeded in Lyon v. Tweddell, 13 Ch. D. 375; see Johns v. James, Id. 370; and in McColl v. Jones, 4 Times Law Rep. 12; Marshall v. Metrop. R. Co., 7 Id. 49.

(y) Evidence whereby Party intends to support his Case.]—One party cannot compel the other to disclose the evidence by which he intends to support his case (Benbow v. Low, 16 Ch. D. 93; Bidder v. Bridges, 29 Id. 29; Re Strachan, [1895] 1 Ch. 439), or the manner in which he intends to frame or argue it (Ingilby v. Shafts, 33 Beav. 31); but either party can interrogate his opponent as to the facts, or some portion of the facts, on which he relies, as distinguished from the mere evidence of such facts, in order to know the nature of the case which he intends to present at the trial (Marriott v. Chamberlain, 17 Q. B. D. 154; Bolckow v. Fisher, 10 Id. 161; and see the cases cited supra, n. (x)). The substance of conversations, if relevant, may be asked for, but not the details (Eade v. Jacobs, supra; Fisher v. Owen, 8 Ch. D. 645, 657).

(z) Criminating Interrogatory.]—No person can be compelled to disclose the principal fact, or any one of a series of facts which might contribute to establish a criminal charge against him, or expose him to a penalty or forfeiture (Lee v. Read, 5 Beav. 381 ; U.S. of America v. McRae, L. R. 3 Ch. 79). And interrogatories, the answers to which would disclose such facts, may be objected to in the affidavit on this ground (Redfern V. Redfern, [1891] P. 139, 146; Allhusen v. Labouchere, 3 Q. B. D. 654 ; Fisher v. Owen, 8 Ch. D. 645.) It is sufficient to state in the answer that in the deponent's belief the answer might tend to criminate the deponent (Lamb v. Munster, 10 Q. B. D. 110). This objection may be raised to questions inquiring into the publication of a libel (Id.; see Hill v. Campbell, L. R. 10 C. P. 222). The penalty or forfeiture must be one strictly so called; the loss of a possession to which a party never was entitled (Hambrook v. Smith, 17 Sim. 209), or of an estate by the happening of an event which determines a party's right by reason of a conditional limitation (Chauncey v. Tahourden, 2 Atk. 392; Lucas v. Evans, 3 Id. 260), is not sufficient. If the objectionable matter is so mixed up with what is unobjectionable that the answer to the latter would lead to a disclosure tending to criminate the deponent, he may decline to answer at all (Lichfield v. Bond, 6 Beav. 88); though where it is separable, the unobjectionable matter must be answered (Fisher v. Price, 11 Beav. 194). The mere fact that the answer would expose illegal transactions (Williams v. Trye, 18 Beav. 366), or would injure the character of the party answering (Parkhurst v. Lowten, 1 Mer. 391, 400), or would expose other persons to actions (Tetley v. Easton, 18 C. B. 643), or prosecutions (King of Two Sicilies v. Wilcox, 1 Sim. N. S. 329), except in the case of husband and wife (Cartwright v. Green, 8 Ves. 405, 410), is not a sufficient objection.

Interrogatories will not be allowed in an action for penalties (Hunnings v. Williamson, 10 Q. B. D. 459; Martin v. Treacher, 16 Id. 507); nor in any action which includes a claim to enforce a forfeiture, such as the forfeiture of a lease for breach of covenant, so far as concerns the issues upon that claim (Mexborough v. Whitwood, [1897] 2 Q. B. 111).

Forfeiture (a)].-To the interrogatory, that I object to answer the same, on the ground that, to the best of my [knowledge, information and] belief, my answer thereto would [or might] tend to establish the forfeiture sought to be established in this action [or a forfeiture of my interest in the lands and premises the subject-matter of this action, or as the case may be].

13. Application for further Answer to Interrogatories (b).

day of

- 19-, pursuant to the day of, 19-. [If a vivâ

[Formal parts as usual in application to Master] for an order that the defendant [or plaintiff] do within days make and file a further affidavit in answer to [or fully and sufficiently answering] the interrogatories for his examination numbered respectively and delivered to him by the plaintiff [or defendant] on the —— order made herein by- dated the voce examination be desired, add, or in the alternative for an order that he be examined vivâ voce as to the matters referred to in the said interrogatories before one of the Masters or otherwise as such order shall direct.] And that the costs of and occasioned by this application be the [plaintiff's] in any event.

14. Order thereon.

[Formal parts as usual.] It is ordered that the [defendant] do within days make and file a further and sufficient answer to the interrogatories delivered for his examination herein, and respectively numbered and [and that the (defendant) do pay to the (plaintiff) the costs of and occasioned by this application and such further answer].

Dated

15. Order for an Oral Examination, &c., when Interrogatories not sufficiently answered (c).

[Formal parts as usual.] It is ordered that the defendant [or plaintiff] be examined orally before one of the Masters as to the matters referred to

(a) See supra, n. (z).

(b) Proceedings where Party omits to answer, or answers insufficiently.]-By Ord. XXXI., r. 10, "No exceptions shall be taken to any affidavit in answer, but the sufficiency or otherwise of any such affidavit objected to as insufficient shall be determined by the Court or a Judge on motion or summons." Possibly a summons to consider the sufficiency of the affidavit might be taken out under this Rule, but this is an inconvenient mode of proceeding (see Nicholl v. Jones, 2 H. & M. 588), and it is better to apply for a further answer.

By r. 11," If any person interrogated omits to answer, or answers insufficiently, the party interrogating may apply to the Court or a Judge for an order requiring him to answer, or to answer further, as the case may be. And an order may be made requiring him to answer or answer further, either by affidavit or by vivâ voce examination as the Judge may direct."

The notice should specify the particular interrogatories, or parts of interrogatories, to which a further answer is required.

(c) See n. (b), supra.

in the interrogatories delivered for his examination herein [or before one of the Masters upon the points as to (or the points mentioned in the paper writing hereunto annexed), his answers to the interrogatories delivered for his examination herein being insufficient on such points], and that the defendant [or plaintiff'] shall attend before the said Master for the purpose of being so orally examined, at such time and place or times and places as the said Master shall appoint for that purpose, and that the defendant [or plaintiff] do produce before the said Master, at the time and place or times and places so to be appointed as aforesaid, the following documents [here describe them shortly if any be required to be produced], [and that the costs of the said examination and of this application be paid by the in any event (d)]. [The Master may impose such terms as he thinks fit.]

(d) Where a vivâ voce examination is ordered, the Master may order that the costs of it shall be paid by the party interrogated in any event (Vicary v. G. N. R. Co., 9 Q. B. D. 168).

As to striking out the claim or defence, where a party refuses or neglects to answer, see post, n. (a), p. 282.

CHAPTER VII.

SECURITY FOR COSTS OF DISCOVERY.

1. Rules (R. S. C.) as to giving Security for Costs of Discovery.

By Ord. XXXI., r. 25, "In every cause, or matter, the costs of discovery, by interrogatories or otherwise, shall, unless otherwise ordered by the Court or a Judge, be secured in the first instance as provided by Rule 26 of this Order, by the party seeking such discovery, and shall be allowed as part of his costs where, and only where, such discovery shall appear to the Judge at the trial, or, if there is no trial, to the Court or a Judge, or shall appear to the taxing officer, to have been reasonably asked for" (a).

By r. 26, "Any party seeking discovery by interrogatories shall before delivery of interrogatories, pay into Court to a separate account in the action, to be called Security for Costs Account,' to abide further order, the sum of 57., and, if the number of folios exceeds five, the further sum of 10s. for every additional folio. Any party seeking discovery otherwise than by interrogatories shall, before making application for discovery, pay into Court, to a like account, to abide further order, the sum of 51., and may be ordered further to pay into Court as aforesaid such additional sum as the Court or a Judge shall direct. The party seeking discovery shall, with his interrogatories or order for discovery, serve a copy of the receipt for the said payment into Court, and the time for answering or making discovery shall in all cases commence from the date of such service. The party from whom discovery is sought shall not be required to answer or make discovery unless and until the said payment has been made" (b).

2. Request for Lodgment of Money to be paid in under R. S. C., Ord. XXXI., r. 26 (c).

High Court of Justice: King's Bench Division.

I.-Request for Lodgment of Money.

To the Agent of the Bank of England (Law Courts Branch).

No.

Please receive £ for the account of the Paymaster-General for the

(a) This rule does not apply to inspection under Ord. XXXI., rr. 15, 18 (Moore v. Peachey, [1891] 2 Q. B. 707), or under a common law right to inspect (Brown v. Liell, 16 Q. B. D. 229).

The Master has a discretionary power to dispense with the deposit (Newman v. L.& S. W. R. Co., 24 Q. B. D. 454); he is not bound to dispense with it simply because the parties consent to his so doing (Aste v. Stumore, 13 Q. B. D. 326).

(b), (c) For notes (b), (c), see p. 280.

time being for and on behalf of the Supreme Court of Judicature, which amount is paid in to security for costs account on behalf of [state name of party, and whether plaintiff or defendant].

(Signature)

The above-stated sum has been this day received.

3. Rules (R. S. C.) as to Payment out of Money paid in under Ord. XXXI.,

r. 26.

By Ord. XXXI., r. 27, "Unless the Court or a Judge shall at or before the trial otherwise order, the amount standing to the credit of the 'Security for Costs Account' in any cause or matter, shall after the cause or matter has been finally disposed of be paid out to the party by whom the same was paid in on his request, or to his solicitor on such party's written authority, in the event of the costs of the cause or matter being adjudged to him, but, in the event of the Court or Judge ordering him to pay the costs of the cause or matter, the amount in Court shall be subject to a lien for the costs ordered to be paid to any other party."

By r. 27A, "If after a cause or matter has been finally disposed of, by consent or otherwise, no taxation of costs shall be required, the taxing officer, Master, or Chief Clerk (as the case may be) may, either by consent of the parties, or on being satisfied that any party who has lodged any money to the Security for Costs Account' in such cause or matter has become entitled to have the same paid out to him, give a certificate to that effect, which certificate shall be acted on and have effect in all respects as if the same had been an order made in the said cause or matter.”

4. Master's Certificate as to Person entitled to Money in Court, under R. S. C., Ord. XXXI., r. 27A (d).

High Court of Justice: King's Bench Division.

Title of cause or matter

in which the money was

V.

originally lodged:

19-,

No.

Ledger credit: [If same as title of cause, state "As above.”]

(b) As to the deposit upon discovery from two or more defendants, see Joyce v. Beale, [1891] 1 Q. B. 459. An additional deposit may be directed subsequently to the order for discovery (Cooke v. Smith, [1891] 1 Ch. 509).

(c) This is the form No. 11 in the Appendix to the Supreme Court Funds Rules, 1894, and its use is prescribed by r. 32 of those Rules. See ante, p. 164, n. (c).

(d) This is the form No. 14 (C.) in the Appendix to the Supreme Court Funds Rules,