Well-Being and DeathOUP Oxford, 5 мар. 2009 г. - Всего страниц: 224 Well-Being and Death addresses philosophical questions about death and the good life: what makes a life go well? Is death bad for the one who dies? How is this possible if we go out of existence when we die? Is it worse to die as an infant or as a young adult? Is it bad for animals and fetuses to die? Can the dead be harmed? Is there any way to make death less bad for us? Ben Bradley defends the following views: pleasure, rather than achievement or the satisfaction of desire, is what makes life go well; death is generally bad for its victim, in virtue of depriving the victim of more of a good life; death is bad for its victim at times after death, in particular at all those times at which the victim would have been living well; death is worse the earlier it occurs, and hence it is worse to die as an infant than as an adult; death is usually bad for animals and fetuses, in just the same way it is bad for adult humans; things that happen after someone has died cannot harm that person; the only sensible way to make death less bad is to live so long that no more good life is possible. |
Содержание
1 WellBeing | 1 |
2 The Evil of Death | 47 |
3 Existence and Time | 73 |
4 Does Psychology Matter? | 113 |
5 Can Death be Defeated? | 155 |
Conclusion | 177 |
Bibliography | 181 |
| 191 | |
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achievementism aneurysm answer argue argument axiologies bad for someone badness of death Belshaw better causes Chapter claim consequentialist correspondence theories counterfactual cure dead death is bad death is worse depends deprivation desire satisfaction desire satisfactionism desire satisfactionist determined Difference-Making discounted discussion DMPT entails Epicurus Epimenides evaluation event evil of death example experience machine extrinsic fact feel Feldman frustrated future Geriatric going badly happened Heathwood hedonist intrinsic properties intrinsic value intrinsically bad James Dean Jens Johansson John Broome liar paradox lifetime well-being lives Luper McMahan misfortune momentary well-being narrativist object occurred one’s overall value pain paradox person Philosophical plausible pleasure posthumous harm presentists problem Progeria Patient propositions psychological connections pure hedonism question rational reason reject relevant seems Silverstein similarity relation sort Student's subsequentism Suppose theory of welfare theory of well-being time-relative interest toe-stubbing TRIA true beliefism value atoms Velleman victim well-being level Young Pedestrian