alliance between the two empires, of Unkiar-Skelessi, in 1833. The casus fœderis of the latter treaty was brought on by the attempts of Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, to assert his independence, and of the Porte, which sought to recover its lost provinces. The status quo, which had been established between the Sultan and his vassal by the arrangement of Kutayah, in 1833, under the mediation of France and Great Britain, on which the peace of the Levant depended, and with it the peace of Europe was supposed to depend, was thus constantly threatened by the irreconcilable pretensions of the two great divisions of the Ottoman Empire. The war again broke out between them in 1839, and the Turkish army was overthrown in the decisive battle of Nezib, which was followed by the desertion of the fleet to Mehemet Ali, and by the death of Sultan Mahmoud II.

In this state of things, the western powers of Europe thought they perceived the necessity of interfering to save the Ottoman Empire from the double danger with which it was threatened; by the aggressions of the Pasha of Egypt on one side, and the exclusive protectorate of Russia on the other. A long and intricate negotiation ensued between the five great European powers, from the voluminous documents relating to which the following general principles may be collected, as having received the formal assent of all the parties to the negotiations, however divergent might be their respective views as to the application of those principles.

1. The right of the five great European powers to interfere in this contest was placed upon the ground of its threatening, in its consequences, the general balance of power and the peace of Europe. The only difference of opinion arose as to the means by which the desirable end of preventing all future conflict between the two contending parties could best be accomplished.

2. It was agreed that this interference could only take place on the formal application of the Sultan himself, according to the rule laid down by the Congress of Aixla-Chapelle, in 1818, that the five great powers would

§ 70a.

The Eastern
Question.

RIGHT OF SELF-PRESERVATION

never assume jurisdiction over questions concerning the rights and interests of another power, except at its request, and without inviting such power to take part in the conference.

3. The death of Sultan Mahmoud being imminent, and the dangers of the Ottoman Empire having increased by a complication of disasters, each of the five powers declared its determination to maintain the independence of that empire, under the reigning dynasty; and as a necessary consequence of this determination, that neither of them should seek to profit by the present state of things to obtain an increase of territory or an exclusive influence.

The negotiations finally resulted in the conclusion of the convention of the 15th July, 1840, between four of the great European powers, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, to which the Ottoman Porte acceded, and in consequence of which Mehemet Ali was compelled to relinquish the possession of all: the provinces held by him, except Egypt, the hereditary Pachalic of which was confirmed to him, according to the conditions contained in the separate article of the convention (e).

The Ottoman Empire has been an endless source of disturbance to the peace of Europe ever since this treaty of 1840. It occupies a peculiar and anomalous position, and all attempts to establish a permanent and satisfactory relation between this State and the other European powers have as yet proved failures. Whether the Treaty of Berlin will solve the problem or not, is still an open question. The value and permanence of the settlement then effected can only be proved by time. The situation of the inhabitants of European Turkey is in many respects unfortunate. The majority are Christians belonging to various nationalities, and subjected to the dominant and Mohammedan race of the Turks, from whom they are alienated by differences not only of religion and race, but of language, manners, and customs. The Turks are not a civilizing people. They are a nation of soldiers, who care little for the peaceful pursuits of trade, literature, and science; while many of their subjects, especially. the Greeks, are capable of attaining to the highest forms of civilization. The result has been that the governing race in Turkey have

(e) Wheaton, Hist. of the Law of Nations, pp. 563-583. [State Papers, vol. xxviii. p. 342.]

remained nearly stationary, while many of their subjects, and all the neighbouring States, have been rapidly progressing. The government of the Porte is negligently, and in some cases oppressively, carried on. Most of its Christian subjects are connected by the ties of religion and nationality with some of the inhabitants of the neighbouring countries, who are generally prepared to sympathise with and encourage them in any efforts to throw off the authority of the Porte. The result of this state of things has been to leave Turkey in Europe in a condition of chronic disturbance. Insurrections have been numerous, and, owing to the encouragement received by the insurgents from outside, have in some cases been very difficult to quell. In several instances these insurrections have led other European States to interfere between the Porte and its subjects, either on the ground that the Porte would not redress the wrongs of which the insurgents justly complained, or that the treatment of the Christians by the Mohammedans was such as could not be tolerated. The mere fact of the subjects of Turkey calling themselves Christians, although the term Christianity means something very different there to what it does in the west of Europe, has caused them to receive much more sympathy. and support than in many cases they really deserved.

These interferences, so long as force was not used to coerce the government of the Sultan, may be justified in international law. Turkey is certainly an independent sovereign State, and prima facie no other States have a right to interfere in its internal affairs. But it is not an independent State in the sense that England and France are independent. It owes its independence in recent times to the support it has received from the great Powers, and this consequently gives those Powers some right to require that its government shall be properly administered. But this right is not so extensive as to justify the use of force, and this is so not only on general principles, but by express declaration in treaties.

The unfortunate error underlying all attempts to improve the condition of European Turkey has been to suppose that, because this country was situated in Europe, it was therefore capable of being benefited by European institutions and the introduction of European modes of thought and action. But this is not the case. The Turks and many of their subjects are Orientals, and quite different from Europeans; and institutions which have proved most beneficial in England and France are very likely to have quite an opposite effect when established in Turkey. No institutions can be advantageous to a country unless they are adapted to the habits and ideas of the people.

The unsatisfactory condition of Turkey makes it probable that, if left to herself, her empire in Europe might gradually crumble away, leaving the country split up into small and defenceless communities. But her geographical situation would make such a result dangerous to the peace of Europe. If the authority of the Sultan were removed, his territories might pass into the hands of Russia, Austria, or some

§ 70b.

The Treaty of
Paris.

other great State, and this might seriously alter the balance of power in Europe. The great importance of keeping Constantinople and the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles in the hands of a nonaggressive State, and of preventing Russia from planting her authority there, and converting the Black Sea into a Russian lake, has led the Western Powers, and especially England, to support and strengthen the authority of the Porte as much as possible. This was the policy that brought about the Crimean War; and until the Treaty of Berlin was executed, the maintenance in its integrity of the Ottoman Empire was one of the most firmly established principles of public law. Nor has the principle been yet abandoned. The Treaty of Berlin, though depriving the Sultan of a considerable portion of his European territories, professes to strengthen and consolidate the remainder, so as to leave him as powerful as the reduced area of his authority will allow him to be. "The Treaties of Paris and of Berlin resemble one another in that both alike are a negation of the right of any one Power, and an assertion of the right of the Powers collectively to regulate the solution of the Eastern question" (ƒ).

By the Treaty of Paris, 1856, which closed the Crimean War, England, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia declared "the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system of Europe. Their Majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of their engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest." A separate treaty to the same effect was entered into between England, France, and Austria, on the 15th April, 1856 (g). Thus, on two separate occasions in 1856, the great Powers solemnly agreed to support the Ottoman Empire, and maintain it in its integrity. And it was further stipulated in the Treaty of Paris that "if there should arise between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the other signing Powers, any misunderstanding which might endanger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte and each of such Powers, before having recourse to the use of force, shall afford the other contracting parties the opportunity of preventing such an extremity by means of their mediation" (h). The condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte was also considered in the Treaty; and a firman, issued by the Sultan for "ameliorating their condition without distinction of religion or race," was communicated to the contracting parties. At the same time it was distinctly acknowledged that this firman "cannot, in any case, give to the said Powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the internal administration of his empire" (i). The international (f) [Holland, European Concert, p. 221.]

(g) [Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. ii. pp. 1255, 1280.]

(h) [Art. viii. See Appendix F., post, p. 777.]

(i) [Art. ix.]

status of Turkey was thus clearly defined.

She was recognised as a

sovereign State, whose maintenance was deemed necessary for the welfare of Europe; and the only right over her internal administration acquired by the Powers was that already referred to, of pressing their advice on the Porte as to its methods of governing, but not of insisting by force of arms that this advice should be followed.

$ 70c.

and Declara

The first attempt to overthrow the Treaty of Paris took place in The Treaty 1870. On the 31st of October in that year, Russia addressed a note to tion of England on the subject of the neutralization of the Black Sea, the London, 1871. terms of which had been defined in the Treaty of 1856. In this note, Prince Gortchakoff asserted the principle of neutralization to be no more than a theory. "The Treaty of 1856," wrote the Prince, "has, moreover, not escaped the modifications to which most European transactions have been exposed, and in the face of which it would be difficult to maintain that the written law, founded upon the respect for treaties as the basis of public right, and regulating the relations between States, retains the moral validity which it may have possessed at other times." He then enumerated some alleged infractions of the treaty, and continued: "Our illustrious Master cannot admit, de jure, that treaties violated in several of their essential and general clauses should remain binding in other clauses directly affecting the interests of his Empire." He concluded by stating that "His Majesty [the Czar] restores to the Sultan the full exercise of his rights in this respect, resuming the same for himself " (k). Such a proceeding was utterly subversive of all international morality. If treaties solemnly entered into could be set aside at the mere wish of one of the contracting parties, all public faith was at an end; and no security could be felt as to the binding effect of any treaty whatever. To this note Lord Granville replied, on the part of England, that it had always been held, that the right of cancelling a treaty belongs only to the Governments who have been parties to the original instrument, and that whether the desire of Russia to be freed from the Treaty of Paris were reasonable or not, she could not by her own act abrogate any of its terms. He stated that Her Majesty's Government could not give their sanction to the course announced by Prince Gortchakoff, which he characterised as a very dangerous precedent as to the validity of international obligations (7).

On the 22nd of November, 1870, a conference to discuss the matter was proposed by Prussia, and ultimately it was agreed that Plenipotentiaries from the signatory Powers should meet in London. Before discussing the actual point raised by Russia, viz., the deneutralization of the Black Sea, it was deemed advisable to put forward the following declaration: "The Plenipotentiaries of North Germany, of Austria-Hungary, of Great Britain, of Russia, and of Turkey, assembled to-day in Conference, recognise that it is an

(k) [Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. iii. (7) [Ibid. p. 1898.] p. 1893.]