its diplomatic agents, it was stated that, though no government could be more prepared than the British government was to uphold the right of any State or States to interfere, where their own immediate security or essential interests are seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another State, it regarded the assumption of such a right as only to be justified by the strongest necessity, and to be limited and regulated thereby; and did not admit that it could receive a general and indiscriminate application to all revolutionary movements, without reference to their immediate bearing upon some particular State or States, or that it could be made, prospectively, the basis of an alliance. The British government regarded its exercise as an exception to general principles of the greatest value and importance, and as one that only properly grows out of the special circumstances of the case; but it at the same time considered, that exceptions of this description never can, without the utmost danger, be so far reduced to rule, as to be incorporated into the ordinary diplomacy of States, or into the institutes of the Law of Nations (o). $ 66. The British government also declined being a party Congress of to the proceedings of the Congress held at Verona, in 1822, which ultimately led to an armed interference by France, under the sanction of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, in the internal affairs of Spain, and the overthrow of the Spanish Constitution of the Cortes. The British government disclaimed for itself, and denied to other powers, the right of requiring any changes in the internal institutions of independent States, with the menace of hostile attack in case of refusal. It did not consider the Spanish Revolution as affording a case of that direct and imminent danger to the safety and interests of other States, which might justify a forcible interference. The original alliance between Great Britain and the other principal European powers, was specifically designed for the re-conquest and liberation

(0) Lord Castlereagh's Circular Despatch, Jan. 19, 1821. Annual Register, vol. lxii. Part II. p. 737.

Verona.

§ 67.

War between
Spain and her
American
colonies.

of the European continent from the military dominion of France; and having subverted that dominion, it took the state of possession, as established by the peace, under the joint protection of the alliance. It never was, however, intended as an union for the government of the world, or for the superintendence of the internal affairs of other States. No proof had been produced to the British government of any design, on the part of Spain, to invade the territory of France; of any attempt to introduce disaffection among her soldiery; or of any project to undermine her political institutions; and, so long as the struggles and disturbances of Spain should be confined within the circle of her own territory, they could not be admitted by the British government to afford any plea for foreign interference. If the end of the last and the beginning of the present century saw all Europe combined against France, it was not on account of the internal changes which France thought necessary for her own political and civil reformation; but because she attempted to propagate, first, her principles, and afterwards her dominion, by the sword (p).

Both Great Britain and the United States, on the same occasion, protested against the right of the Allied Powers to interfere, by forcible means, in the contest between Spain and her revolted American Colonies. The British government declared its determination to remain strictly neutral, should the war be unhappily prolonged; but that the junction of any foreign power, in an enterprise of Spain against the colonies, would be viewed by it as constituting an entirely new question, and one upon which it must take such decision as the interests of Great Britain might require. That it could not enter into any stipulation, binding itself either to refuse or delay its recognition of the independence of the colonies, nor wait indefinitely for an accommodation between

(p) Confidential Minute of Lord Castlereagh on the Affairs of Spain, communicated to the Allied Courts in May, 1822. Annual Register, vol. lxv.; Pub

lic Documents, p. 94. Mr. Secretary Canning's Letter to Sir C. Stuart, 28th Jan. 1823, p. 114. Same to the Same, 31st March, 1823, p. 141.

Spain and the colonies; and that it would consider any foreign interference, by force or by menace, in the dispute between them, as a motive for recognising the latter without delay (q).

The United States government declared that it should consider any attempt, on the part of the allied European powers, to extend their peculiar political system to the American continent, as dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power they had not interfered, and should not interfere; but with respect to the governments, whose independence they had recognised, they could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. They had declared their neutrality in the war between Spain and those new governments, at the time of their recognition; and to this neutrality they should continue to adhere, provided no change should occur, which, in their judgment, should make a corresponding change, on the part of the United States, indispensable to their own security. The late events in Spain and Portugal showed that Europe was still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof could be adduced than that the Allied Powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interpositions might be carried, on the same principle, was a question on which all independent powers, whose governments differed from theirs, were interested,-even those most remote,—and none more so than the United States.

The policy of the American government, in regard to Europe, adopted at an early stage of the war which had so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless

(9) Memorandum of Conference between Mr. Secretary Canning and Prince Polignac, 9th October, 1823. Annual

Register, vol. lxvi. p. 99. Public Documents.

§ 67a.

The Monroe doctrine.

remained the same. This policy was, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of the European powers; to consider the government, de facto, as the legitimate government for them; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy; meeting in all instances, the just claims of every power,-submitting to injuries from none. But, with regard to the American continents, circumstances were widely different. It was impossible that the Allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of these continents, without endangering the peace and happiness of the United States. It was therefore impossible that the latter should behold such interposition in any form with indifference (r).

This policy of the United States has acquired the name of "the Monroe doctrine," from its having received its most explicit enunciation in President Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress in

"In the wars of the European powers," said the President, "in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced, that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more intimately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. We owe it, therefore, to candour and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety" (s). This political formula has been to a great extent acted upon by the United States, especially with regard to their taking no part in European politics. Nevertheless it still exists only as a "doctrine," and has not been incorporated into any legislative enactment or into any convention (†). The attempted construction of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama has given a fresh importance to this doctrine. The United States

(r) President Monroe's Message to Congress, 2nd December, 1823. Annual Register, vol. lxv. Public Documents, p. 193.

(s) [President's Annual Message to Congress, 2nd Dec. 1823. See States

man's Manual, vol. i. p. 556. Calvo, Droit International, Bk. III. §§ 143, 144.]

(t) [Calvo, loc. cit.; Wharton, Dig. §§ 45, 57.]

contend that any such canal should be under American control, and that government refuses to surrender this control to any European Power, or to any combination of European Powers (u). And when recently it was thought that the French government might afford financial or official assistance to the canal company, the United States Senate resolved, that the government of the United States would look with serious concern and disapproval upon any connexion of any European government with the construction or control of any ship canal across the Isthmus of Darien or Central America, and must regard any such connexion or control as injurious to the just rights. and interests of the United States, and a menace to their welfare (x). On the other hand, it has been well pointed out, that Great Britain is an American Power with interests which cannot be disregarded, and the application of the Monroe principle to the canal will hardly be accepted by the maritime Powers to the extent claimed by the United States (y).

The United States authorized the attendance of its delegate at the West African Conference at Berlin, 1885, but has neglected to ratify the General Act, which would impose upon its government a duty in respect of the territorial integrity and neutrality of distant regions where it has no established interests or control of any kind (z).

$68.

interference

in 1826.

of Portugal

Great Britain had limited herself to protesting against British the interference of the French government in the internal in the affairs affairs of Spain, and had refrained from interposing by force, to prevent the invasion of the peninsula by France. The constitution of the Cortes was overturned, and Ferdinand VII. restored to absolute power. These events were followed by the death of John VI., King of Portugal, in 1825. The constitution of Brazil had provided that its crown should never be united on the same head with that of Portugal; and Dom Pedro resigned the latter to his infant daughter, Dona Maria, appointing a regency to govern the kingdom during her minority, and at the same time, granting a constitutional charter to the European dominions of the House of Braganza. The Spanish government, restored to the plenitude of its absolute authority, and dreading the example of the peaceable establishment of a constitutional government in a neighbouring kingdom, countenanced the pretensions

(u) [Wharton, Dig. § 287.] (x) [Times, 8th Jan. 1889.]

(y) [Lawrence, Modern I. L., Essay III.]

(*) [Wharton, Dig. § 51.]