See also Stokes v. The

individuals had peculiar and special rights. Banbury Board of Health, 13 L. T. (N. s.) 426; L. Rep. 1 Ex. 42; 35 L. J. Ch. 105, where Wood, V. C. having granted an injunction in a similar case which was disregarded, directed a sequestration to issue against the Board, and his order was confirmed by the Lords Justices on appeal, Tb. 453; 11 Jur. (N. s.) 1010. See farther, Attorney-General v. The Visitors of Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum, 19 L. T. 708; Law Rep. 4 Ch. Ap. 146; 38 L. J. Ch. 265, 481. Attorney-General v. The Corporation of Halifax, 39 L. J. Ch. 129; L. R. 5 Ch. 113; and North Staffordshire Railway Company v. Tunstall Local Board, 39 L. J. Ch. 131, where injunctions were granted against local boards to prevent their polluting public streams by the sewage of the respective districts. Even where a corporation had a right under a local Act to drain from their sewers into a public river, they were restrained by the Court of Chancery from continuing their drainage when its effect polluted the river so as to endanger the health of the persons occupying the banks of the river, although it was alleged that the stoppage of the drainage would affect the health of all the inhabitants of the Borough. AttorneyGeneral v. Mayor of Leeds, 39 L. J. Ch. 255, 711; 22 L. T. 330; L. Rep. 5 Ch. Ap. 583. In the Attorney-General v. The Corporation of Kingston-upon-Thames, 12 L. T. (N. s.) 665; 11 Jur. (N. s.) 596; 34 L. J. Ch. 481, Wood V. C. however refused to grant an injunction to prevent the Corporation of Kingston-upon-Thames from proceeding with a new scheme of drainage into the river Thames, because evidence was not laid before him of the actual existence or extreme probability of a nuisance. It was not proved that the water in the river had been rendered unfit for cattle to drink, or to be used for domestic purposes. A similar decision was pronounced by Malins, V. C. in Lillywhite v. Trimmer, 16 L. T. (N. s.) 318; 36 L. J. Ch. 525; see also Attorney-General v. Gee, L. R. 10 Eq. 131; 23 L. T. 299.

Again, in the case of The Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company v. The Worksop Board of Health, 26 L. J. R., Ch. 345, it was held that a local board of health could not justify the making a sewer which would have the effect of polluting an existing canal belonging to the complainants, and therefore the board were restrained from allowing the house drainage to communicate with a main sewer which ran into the canal.

A canal company was authorized by statute to draw water from a beck for the use of their canal. The water in the beck became polluted by the reception of drainage, and the canal consequently become very offensive and a public nuisance. The company and their lessees were indicted and convicted, see 6 B. & S. 631, Wood, V. C. granted an injunction to restrain the company from continuing to draw the polluted water from the beck. Attorney-General v. The Bradford Canal Company, 15 L. T. (N. s.) 9, L. R. 2 Eq. 71.

The case of Holt v. The Corporation of Rochdale, 23 L. T. 43; 39 L. J. Ch. 761; L. R. 10 Eq. 354, is one in which the defendants attempted unsuccessfully to defend their alleged pollution of a river under the provisions of a local Act.

These were cases in which complaints were made against the local board for polluting streams, and thus interfering with the rights of

consent in writing first had and obtained (a); and that nothing herein contained shall prejudice or affect the rights, privileges, powers, or authorities given or reserved to any person under any local or private Act of parliament for the drainage, preservation, or improvement of land, or for or in respect of any mills, mines, machinery, canal, or navigation as last aforesaid (b). **]

persons; but in others the questions have arisen as to the power of the local board to intercept the supply of water, and they have been such as have been the subject of discussion in all times, namely, the rights of individuals in running streams, pools, or ponds. The full discussion of the law applicable to those rights cannot be entered into here. The local board of health have been sometimes placed in the position of a private individual disputing as to his right to enjoy or to divert the flowing stream, to intercept it for irrigation or other purposes, as or against a riparian owner, to pollute or to prevent the pollution of the water, or lastly, to drain, or restrain the drainage of underground or percolating streams. In one important case which came before the Court of Exchequer, and was the subject of appeal to the Exchequer Chamber, and ultimately to the House of Lords, the right of a local board of health, by means of their wells, to drain the underground water from the soil of a neighbouring landholder, was established. Chasemore v. Richards, 2 H. & N. 168; 7 H. L. 349. In the elaborate judgments pronounced by Cresswell, J. and Coleridge J., who dissented from the judgment of the rest of the court, will be found an elegant exposition of much of the legal doctrine applicable to this important subject of property. The decision however has been supported in The New River Company, appellants, Johnson, respondent, 2 E. & E. 435; 29 L. J. M. C. 93; and Reg. v. The Metropolitan Board of Works, 3 B. & S. 710; 32 L. J. Q. B. 105.

In another case where a canal company was empowered by their local Act to supply their canal with water from all streams, brooks, and water courses within one thousand yards of the canal, it was held that they had no ground of complaint against a local board of health, who having run a sewer under a road within that distance, made open gratings through which the rain and other surface water fell into the sewer. The Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company v. The Worksop Board of Health, 25 L. J. R. Ch. 25, and 26 Ib. 344.

(a) Although this consent is thus required to be given in writing, it has been sought to stay summary applications to the Court of Chancery for injunction against the works of the local board by averments of laches, such being argued as an equivalent for consent. But the defence was not successful in Attorney-General v. Luton Board of Health, 2 Jur. (N. s.), 180, where there had been much negotiation and correspondence before the commencement of the suit. See however the judgment of Wood, V. C., in the case of Attorney-General v. Bradford Canal Company, ubi supra.

(b) It must be observed that this clause prohibits the doing of the works adverted to without consent in writing first obtained; thus, it prevents the operation of the law laid down in Stainton v. Woolrych,

Local board may allow

owners

time for

CXLVI. And be it enacted, that in any case in which the local board of health may have incurred expenses for the repayment of repayment whereof the owner of the premises for or in expenses. respect of which the same are incurred is made liable by this Act, the said local board may, if they think fit, allow such owner time for repayment, and receive the same by such annual instalments, not being less than one-thirtieth part of the entire sum, together with interest at the rate of five pounds in the hundred upon the sum from time to time remaining unpaid, as they, under the circumstances of each case may consider to be just (a).

False evidence

But although time for repayment be allowed as last aforesaid, the sum due, or so much thereof as may be unpaid, shall from time to time, in case of default in payment at the times respectively appointed for payment, be recoverable in like manner in all respects as the entire sum might have been recovered if time for repayment had not been allowed.

CXLVII. And be it enacted, that every person who upon punishable any examination on oath (b) under the provisions of this Act, as perjury, shall wilfully amd corruptly give false evidence shall be liable to the penalties inflicted upon persons guilty of wilful and corrupt perjury.

Penalty for

obstructing officers, defacing boards, &c.;

CLXVIII. And be it enacted, that whosoever wilfully obstructs any superintending inspector, or any member of the

26 L. J. R. 300, that works planned by public boards under statutes may be executed, though they tend to the injury of neighbouring landowners, and consequently even without notice to them, though they may be entitled to compensation for the damage done.

(a) By several provisions the local board are empowered to do certain works for the benefit of private property, and recover the expenses either summarily or by a rate, and in the latter case they may extend the rate over thirty years. This clause, which is thus introduced among miscellaneous enactments, enables the local board to extend the time for the repayment of the expenses, where they do not resort to a rate, to thirty years by annual instalments. This appears to differ in little from the improvement rate. In 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, s. 58, will be found the provisions for creating rentcharges.

(b) See the interpretation of this word in sect. 2, ante.

local board of health, or any officer or person duly employed in the execution of this Act, or destroys, pulls down, injures or defaces any board (c) upon which any byelaw, notice, or other matter is inscribed, shall, if the same were put up by authority of the localor [general board of health], be liable for every such offence to a penalty not exceeding five pounds (d);

piers pre

works.

And if the occupier of any premises prevent the owner upon occuthereof from obeying or carrying into effect the provisions venting of this Act, any justice to whom appplication is made in this execution of behalf shall, by order in writing (which may be according to the form contained in the schedule (F.) to this Act annexed, or to the like effect), require such occupier to permit the execution of the works required to be executed, provided that the same appear to such justice to be such as are necessary for the purpose of obeying or carrying into effect the provisions of this Act (e);

And if within a reasonable time after the making (f) of such order the occupier against whom it is made refuse (g) to comply therewith, he shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding five pounds (h) for every day afterwards (i) during the continuance of such refusal;

(c) The 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, s. 66, and the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 90, s. 45, provide a penalty upon any person injuring or damaging the works or materials, or property of the local board.

Refer to Frost v. Lloyd, 11 Jur. 59, as to the pleadings in the case of an obstruction.

(d) See sect. 129, ante, and the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 127, which imposes directly imprisonment in case of non-payment of penalties not exceeding 51. (e) See also the provision in the Nuisances Removal Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 121, s. 37, in the Appendix. It appears by the form of the order given in the Schedule, that the occupier must be summoned before the justices previous to the issuing of this order.

(f) In the Nuisances Removal Act the word used is service, but as the time referred to in the text is a reasonable one, that will be properly construed by considering when the notice was served.

(g) The clause uses the word refuse. Hence, mere neglect will not, as it seems, bring the party within the clause. The language of the Nuisance Removal Act is different. There the words are do not comply therewith.

(h) See sect. 129, ante, as to the recovery of this penalty.

(i) "Afterwards" must mean after the refusal.

Occupiers to disclose owner's

name.

Consents of board of

health and local board

to be in writing.

And if the occupier of any premises, when requested by or on behalf of the local board of health to state the name of the owner of the premises occupied by him, shall refuse or wilfully omit to disclose or wilfully mis-state the same, any justice may, on oath made before him of such request, and refusal, omission, or mis-statement, summon the party to appear before him or some other justice at a time and place to be appointed in such summons, and if after being so summoned he neglect or refuse to attend at the time and place so appointed, or if he do not show good cause for such refusal, or if such wilful omission or mis-statement be proved, the justice before whom the party is so summoned may impose upon the offender a penalty not exceeding five pounds (c).

CXLIX. ** And be it enacted, that (d) whenever the consent, sanction, or approval or authority of the general board of health is required by the provisions of this Act, the same shall be in writing under their seal and the hands of two or more members thereof;* **

And whenever the consent, sanction, approval (e), or authority of the local board of health is so required the same shall (in the case of a non-corporate district) be in writing (ƒ) under their seal and the hands of five or more of

(c) See sect. 129 as to the recovery of this penalty.

(d) Though these matters will not occur hereafter, yet it may be necessary to prove them in regard to past transactions.

(e) The acts of the board itself need not be sealed as here provided, but only such as sanction the acts of others. Therefore recommendations of a committee of the board, adopted and carried into execution by the board itself, did not require to be sealed and signed by five members to make them valid. Barnsley Local Board v. Sedgewick, 15 L. T. (N. s.) 569; Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 185; 36 L. J. M. C. 153; 8 B. & S. 202. Smith v. Hirst, 23 L. T. 665, cited in note on section 37, ante.

It was, after much consideration, ultimately held that the rate made by the local board must be signed by five members and sealed. Reg. v. Worksop Board of Health, 10 L. T. (N. s ) 297; 34 L. J. M. C. 223.

(f) See further 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, s. 61, which enables the clerk of the board to authenticate certain documents by his signature. It was observed by Kindersley, V. C., in Ex parte Llanelly, 17 Jur. 108, that a local board of health, if other than a corporate borough, was not made a corporation by this Act. But now see the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 90, s. 46, which, as already noticed, has made all noncorporate local boards corporations.