meanings hereby assigned to them, unless such meanings be repugnant to or inconsistent with the context or subject matter in which such words or expressions occur (f); (that is to say,) Words importing the singular number, shall include the Number: plural number, and words importing the plural number shall include the singular number: Words importing the masculine gender shall include Gender: females: The word "person" and words applying to any person or “Person :" individual shall apply to and include corporations, whether aggregate or sole: The word "lands" (g) and the word "premises "Lands; shall include messuages, buildings, lands, and hereditaments The word "owner" (h) shall mean (i) the person for the time (f) See also the statute 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, which contains a general interpretation of the words, month, county, land, and oath. (g) It was intimated by two judges, in Oldacre v. Hunt, cit. in note on sect. 145, post, that this word included "a right of fishery," though the lords justices did not give any decisive opinion on this point. A church was held not to be included under the term Land in the Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 77. Angell v. Paddington Vestry, 8 B. & S. 500; Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 714. (h) See also the definition of this word in sect. 20, post. (2) This word appears to signify that the following is to be the only interpretation of the word owner, so that the owner of the fee simple who has let the lands upon a nominal ground rent, such as a pepper corn, is not within the definition. See Evelyn, app., Wychcord, resp., 22 Jur. 808, E. B. & E. 126. See the interpretation of this word in the Metropolitan Buildings Act, 1855, Mourilyan v. Labalmondiere, 1 E. & E. 533; Hunt and another . Harris, 12 L. T. (N. s.) 421; 34 L. J. C. P. 249; 19 C. B. (N.S.) 13; and in Lady Holland, appt., Kensington Vestry, resp., 36 L. J. M. C. 105; Law R. 2 C. P. 565. The Ecclesiastical Commissioners in whom a church not built by them was vested, were held not to be owners within the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102. Angell v. Paddington Vestry, ubi supra. In Reg. v. Kershaw, 6 E. & B. 1007, Erle, J., points out the distinction between the words include and mean in the same interpretation section, the former having an extending and the latter an excluding signification. Generally, however, an interpretation clause does not "Premises :" "Owner: "P any other being receiving (j) the rackrent of the lands or premises in connexion with which the said word is used, whether on his own account or as agent or trustee for person, or who would so receive the same if such lands or premises were let at a rackrent: The expression "rackrent" shall mean rent which is not less than two-thirds of the full net annual value of the property out of which the rent arises (k); And the "full net annual value" shall be taken to be the rent at which the property might reasonably be expected to let from year to year, free from all usual tenant's rates and taxes, and tithe commutation rentcharge (if any), and deducting therefrom the probable average annual cost of the repairs, insurance, and other expenses (if any) necessary to maintain the same in a state to command such rent (7): The word "month" shall mean calendar month: The expression "superior courts" shall include (n) Her restrain the meaning of the words interpreted. Doe v. Benham, 7 Q. B. 979. (j) In Eddleston appt. v. Francis, resp., 7 C. B. (N. s.) 570, a question was raised but not decided, whether a receiver appointed by the Court of Chancery was an owner. In Peck v. Waterloo Board of Health, 2 H. & C. 709; 9 Jur. (N. s.) 1344, it was held that the person de facto receiving the rent comes within the meaning of this definition, although not at the time entitled to it de jure. (k) See 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 109. (1) This definition is taken from the Parochial Assessment Act, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96, s. 1, and is what is set out in the column of the rate in the schedule headed Rateable Value. (m) But by the statute 12 & 13 Vict. c. 89, two of the lords commissioners of the treasury are empowered to act. (n) It is to be presumed that this word is intended to be exclusive, as it is difficult to know what other courts than those mentioned can be considered as superior courts. Majesty's superior courts of record at Westminster, and peace The word "justice" shall mean any justice of the "Justice: " acting for the place in which the matter or any part of the matter, as the case may be, requiring the cognizance of the "justice" arises: tices: The expression "two justices" shall mean two or more "Two jusjustices assembled and acting together in petty sessions, or one stipendiary or police magistrate acting in any police court, for the place in which the matter or any part of the matter, as the case may be, requiring the cognizance of two "justices" arises (p): The expression "court of general or quarter sessions shall mean the court of general or quarter sessions of quarter the peace having jurisdiction over the whole or any part (q) of the district or place, as the case may be, in which the matter requiring the cognizance of the "court of general or quarter sessions" arises: """Court of general or sessions: " tors: " The word "arbitrators" shall include a "single arbitrator;" " Arbitraand the words "arbitrators" and "arbitrator" shall include an umpire (r): The word "oath" shall mean and include an affirmation "Oath: " in the case of Quakers, and a declaration in the case of persons allowed by law (s) to make a declaration in lieu of an oath : (0) Quare, whether the court of the Chancellor of the Duchy is included? The same interpretation is found in other statutes. (p) See also the provisions contained in 21 & 22 Vict. c. 73, s. 1, which confirm this interpretation. (q) As where the district runs into two counties two courts of quarter sessions will have jurisdiction over the respective parts, it seems that this definition would give authority to both and consequently to either. (r) As this cannot be universally applicable, the interpretation will be modified by the context. (8) See 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 49, and c. 82. "Corporate borough: 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76: "District: " The expression "corporate borough" (t) shall mean any corporate borough mentioned in the schedules annexed to an Act passed in the sixth year of the reign of King William the Fourth, intituled "An Act for the Regulation of Municipal Corporations in England and Wales," and any borough incorporated by charter granted or to be granted in pursuance of that or any subsequent Act (u): The word "district" shall mean the entire area, places, or parts of places comprised within the limits of any district to which this Act or any part thereof shall be applied by order in council, or provisional order of the general board of health sanctioned by parliament (v): (t) By 12 & 13 Vict. c. 94, s. 10, it was declared and enacted," that the expression corporate borough' whenever used in the Public Health Act, 1848, shall be construed to include any city, borough, port, cinque port, or town corporate named in the schedules annexed to an Act passed in the sixth year of the reign of King William the Fourth, intituled 'An Act to provide for the Regulation of Municipal Corporations in England and Wales,' and to any city, borough, port, cinque port, or town corporate incorporated by charter granted or to be granted in pursuance of that or any subsequent Act; and the word 'burgesses' wherever used in the said Public Health Act shall be construed to mean citizens in the case of a city." A similar definition of the word borough is given in 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, s. 2, post. (u) It is well to note here as regards the word Parish, that the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 113, s. 18, enacts that "in all statutes, except there shall be something inconsistent therewith, the word parish shall among other meanings applicable to it, signify a place for which a separate overseer is or can be appointed." (v) See the definition of the term "limits of the district" in 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, s. 7, post. In a district bounded by the sea, which was governed by a special Local Act, so much of the shore as was between high and low water mark was held to be within the district. Blackpool Board of Health v. Bennett, 4 H. & N. 127; 28 L. J. M. C. 203. But by the 31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, s. 27, the part of the sea-shore to the low water mark is annexed to and incorporated with the parish to which it adjoins, in proportion to the extent of the Common Boundary for all civil and parochial purposes. It may be however contended that this provision will not affect districts constituted before the Act was passed. See as to the boundaries of parishes abutting on the sea-shore and on navigable rivers, McCannon v. Sinclair, 28 L. J. M. C. 247, and Bridgwater Trustees v. Surveyors of Highways of Bootle-cumLinacre, L. R. 2 Q. B. 4; 7 B. & S. 348. The expression "corporate district" shall mean a district "Corporate in which the powers, authorities, and duties of the local district: " porate dis The expression "non-corporate district" shall mean a "Non-cordistrict in which the powers, authorities, and duties of trict: "" the local board of health of the district are not exercised and executed by the council of a corporate borough : The word "street" shall apply to and include any high- “Street:” way (w) (not being a turnpike road), and any road, public bridge (not being a county bridge), lane, footway, square, court, alley, passage (), whether a thoroughfare or not, and the parts of any such highway, road, bridge, lane, footway, square, court, alley, or passage within the limits of any district (y) : The word "house" shall include schools, factories, and "House:" other buildings in which more than twenty persons are employed at one time (z): (w) The 15 & 16 Vict. c. 42, a. 16, interprets the word "highway," but only as it is used in ss. 68, 69, hereafter. (x) See in Le Neve v. Vestry of Mile End Old Town, 22 Jur. 660, 8 E. & B. 1032, an illustration of the word street. In Galloway v. The Corporation of London, 35 L. J. R. Ch. 493, Lord Chelmsford, in his judgment states, "the word 'street' does not mean the roadway, but a thoroughfare with houses on each side." See however The London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company v. Corporation of London, 19 L. T. (N. s.) 250, in which it was held that the strict prima facie meaning of the word street is confined to the roadway and footways, though it may include the houses abutting thereon. An unfinished road, private property, and not dedicated to the public, containing inhabited houses along part of it, communicated with another road containing houses at long intervals,—and was held not to be a street, Q. v. Vestry of Islington, E. B. & E. 743. Where the justices found a road to be a street, the Court of Common Pleas refused to interfere with their decision. Newman, appt., Baker, resp., 8 C. B. (N. s.) 200. See further Q. v. Fulford, in note on 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, s. 34. (y) See 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, s. 7, post. (2) See the cases upon the parliamentary and municipal franchises, and upon settlement under the Poor Law for illustrations of the word "house." Prima facie a house means a dwelling house; Surman v. Darley, 14 M. & W. 181; or a building calculated for use as such; 8 Scott. Rep. 794, 949; but the above interpretation extends the signification. A church was held not to be a house under the Metropolis |