perty to his wife, Sarah Saunders, for life, with remainder amongst his children in equal shares; and he gave all the residue of his estate to his wife absolutely, and he appointed his wife and two other persons to be executrix and executors of his will. J. Saunders died on the 5th of December 1848, and his will was proved by Sarah Saunders alone. From the death of J. Saunders to the 15th of April 1853 Sarah Saunders paid various small sums, amounting in the whole to about 140., to W. Dowle on account of his security; and in 1853 a suit for the administration of the personal estate of J. Saunders was instituted, by summons, by W. Dowle. On the 6th of June 1853 he obtained an order for the administration of the personal estate; but no certificate was made upon the summons. The first intimation that Messrs. Stone & Turner received that the Oxlease titledeeds had been deposited with W. Dowle was from seeing an affidavit in the above suit. By an indenture, dated the 23rd of April 1854, the premises comprised in the indenture of the 15th of November 1847, and the debt thereby secured, and the benefit of the charge thereby created became vested in Messrs. Stone & Turner. W. Dowle died in February 1862. At the time of his death about 1821. was owing to him from the estate of John Saunders upon the above-mentioned security; and a bill was filed, by his personal representative, praying that the priorities. between himself and Messrs. Stone & Turner might be ascertained, and praying also alternative consequential accounts according as the plaintiff might be held entitled to priority or the reverse, and in default of payment of the amount found due to the plaintiff that the Oxlease estate might be sold. The defendants stated that frequent applications were made to J. Saunders to return these deeds, but produced no evidence of such applications; the deeds were not returned, but were deposited as above mentioned with W. Dowle. Mr. Amphlett and Mr. C. Roupell, for the plaintiff, contended that Dowle's security was entitled to priority. The legal estate was outstanding. The interests now in dispute were merely equitable interests. Dowle obtained the deeds innocently; and not only without notice of Messrs. Stone & Turner's security, but without any means of discovering their claim. Messrs. Stone & Turner, by their gross carelessness, had put it in J. Saunders's power to commit this fraud; and it was clear on the authorities that they must pay the penalty of their fault, and that their claim must be postponed to the plaintiffs. They cited Waldron v. Sloper, 1 Drew. 193. Mr. Bevir, for Akerman and the representatives of John Saunders. Mr. Rolt and Mr. E. R. Turner, for Messrs. Stone & Turner, submitted that, under the circumstances, fraud, or gross negligence amounting to fraud, could not be imputed to them. To postpone a first mortgagee, on the ground of his leaving the title-deeds in the hands of the mortgagor, there must be a voluntary concurrence on the part of the mortgagee in the mortgagor's retaining them Colyer v. Finch, 5 H.L. Cas. 905; s. c. Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 370. In the present case the deeds had been given to the mortgagor for a specific purpose, and were to be returned immediately that purpose was satisfied; and Messrs. Stone & Turner had attempted in vain to recover possession of the deeds. They cited Barnett v. Weston, 12 Ves. 130. WOOD, V.C. (July 13), after stating the circumstances, said that the principle to be followed in these cases was well settled, although it was very often difficult to apply it. Evans v. Bicknell (1) was a leading case on the subject. The rule of equity was, that a prior mortgagee would not be postponed to a subsequent incumbrancer, unless he had been guilty of gross negligence with regard to the title-deeds, amounting to fraud in its qualified legal sense. In giving judgment in Hewitt v. Loosemore Sir George Turner, when Vice Chancellor, had clearly explained the principle on which the Court acted as to negligence, in that a legal mortgagee is not to be postponed to a prior equitable one, on the ground of not having got in the title-deeds, unless there has been fraud or gross and wilful negligence on the part of the legal mortgagee; and that the Court will not impute such fraud or negligence to him if there has been a bona fide inquiry after the deeds, and a reasonable excuse given for non-delivery of them; but that the Court will impute fraud, or gross and wilful negligence to him, if he omits all inquiry as to the deeds. Had Messrs. Stone & Turner done all that a reasonable person could be expected to do to recover these deeds? In Martinez v. Cooper the solicitor refused to deliver up the deeds without the consent of the mortgagee. Messrs. Stone & Turner had taken no such precaution; but, as they stated in their answer, "after considerable pressure" (which shewed that they knew the impropriety of what they were doing), they parted with these deeds. Then, again, although they stated that they had made frequent applications to J. Saunders to return the deeds, they produced no evidence of any such applica tion. If inquiries had been made, they might have discovered what had become of the deeds; but it did not appear that any inquiry was made until five years after J. Saunders's death, when, finding what a fault they had committed, they paid off their client, and took an assignment of his security. Messrs. Stone & Turner had taken subject to all defects caused by their own misconduct; and his Honour must hold that they were not entitled to priority over the representatives of William Dowle. (1) 6 Ves. 174. NEW SERIES, 34.-CHANC. This case came on upon an adjourned suminons. The question was as to the order of priority in which two judgment creditors were entitled to rank against certain real estate situate in the West Riding of Yorkshire. It appeared that Richard Kirkman Lane obtained a judgment in the Court of Queen's Bench, dated the 13th of October 1848, which he registered at Wakefield on the 20th of November 1848, and in the registry of the Court of Common Pleas on the 16th of May 1856. The plaintiff, William Tanner Neve, also held a judgment, which was dated the 17th of May 1850, and was registered in the Common Pleas on the same day. It was also registered at Wakefield, under the 5 Ann. c. 18. on the 31st of May 1850. The chief clerk decided that the date of the registration in Yorkshire must govern the priorities; and that the registration by the plaintiff in the Common Pleas previous to Lane's registration there, could not take away his priority under the County Registration Act. The plaintiff took out a summons, and now sought to vary the certificate. Mr. Selwyn and Mr. Wickens, for the plaintiff.—The plaintiff's judgment is entitled to priority. It was completely registered before that of R. K. Lane. If lands are not situate in a register county then the judgment takes effect, not from its date but according to the registration in the Common Pleas; but in a register county a different practice prevails, and a registration both in the county and in the Common Pleas are essential to give priority to the judgment creditor. This was in N effect decided in Westbrook v. Blythe (1) and in Hughes v. Lumley (2). [The MASTER OF THE ROLLS.-Is not the priority fixed by the county register?] Mr. Selwyn.--In Benham v. Keane (3) Mr. Beavan had a judgment which he registered in the Common Pleas. Mr. Robins subsequently obtained a judgment which he registered, not only in the Common Pleas, but also in the county of Middlesex; by that his title was complete, and he obtained a right to priority, and it was held that the subsequent registry of Mr. Beavan's judgment in the county register could not disturb the right to priority which Mr. Robins had obtained. In the present case Mr. Lane's title was not complete; when he registered his judgment in the county he had no legal charge under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, as his judgment was not registered in the Common Pleas. It was from that date alone that it could be said that Mr. Lane had any charge on the estate. The two acts of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. and the 5 Ann. c. 18. must be read together; but a general law for the whole realm must take precedence and control a particular act which was confined in its operation to a particular district. Until, therefore, the charge was complete by being registered in the Common Pleas there was no ground for registering it in the district: were it otherwise, the registration under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, which says nothing about priorities, might be postponed until the judgment was to be enforced. In Beavan v. Earl of Oxford (4) it was held, that a prior judgment once registered did not lose its position by not being re-registered. The charge therefore first complete was not displaced by something coming after; and it was not to be assumed that an act done under a local act created a charge, and that the act done under the general act had no effect. The only way to reconcile the two was to consider (1) 3 El. & B. 737; s. c. 23 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 386. (2) 4 El. & B. 274; s. c. 24 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 57. (3) 1 Jo. & H. 685; s. c. 31 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 129. (4) 6 De Gex, M. & G. 492; s. c. 25 Law J. Rep. (N.8.) Chanc. 299. the requirements by each essential to priority. Mr. Southgate and Mr. Kingdon, for R. K. Lane, were not called on. The MASTER OF THE ROLLS.-This point I consider to be settled by authority. I am not aware that it has been decided that, as between two judgment creditors, where there has been no great laches on either side, the subsequent judgment by being first registered in the Common Pleas obtains priority over an earlier judgment Two propositions are quite clear: first, that the statute 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. says nothing about priorities; and, secondly, that the 5 Ann. c. 18. s. 4. speaks of nothing except priorities, and the decisions say that both the acts must be read together. If, therefore, the statute of Anne is considered to fix the priorities, and I say that by virtue of the registry under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. different priorities are given, I am in effect repealing the 5 Ann. c. 18. It was argued that at any rate only one-half of the debtor's lands could be charged as against the plaintiff, but it is clear that this is not so. All that the 5 Ann. c. 18. does is to fix the priorities, while the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. determines the extent and nature of the charges. Both the case of Westbrook v. Blythe and that of Hughes v. Lumley determine that the priorities are to be fixed by the priorities of the registration in Middlesex; and Benham v. Keane confirms those cases in the strongest manner. The registry of the judgment in the Common Pleas does not operate to charge lands in a register county until the judgment is also registered in the county register, and then only from the date of such registry. Here Mr. Lane's judgment is registered in the county of York in November 1848; the plaintiff's was not registered there until May 1850; and unless I repeal the 5 Ann. c. 18. I must give priority to Mr. Lane's judgment. I am of opinion, therefore, that the chief clerk is right, and the summons must be dismissed, with costs. -- Jurisdiction-Insolvent Debtor-Right to sue- Demurrer Multifariousness Practice Alteration of Bill after being signed by Counsel. The Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to entertain the suit of an insolvent debtor to set aside a sale alleged to have been collusively made under the insolvency, notwithstanding he may not have obtained a revesting order or an order to annul the proceedings. A bill was filed by T. (against whom a vesting order in insolvency had been obtained, but all whose debts had been fully discharged) against a mortgagee from him, the assignees under his insolvency, and certain purchasers of the mortgaged property, alleging that by collusion between the mortgagee and the assignees the former was enabled to establish a larger claim than he was entitled to, and also that by collusion between the mortgagee, the assignees, and purchasers, the mortgaged property had been sold to the latter at a considerable undervalue, and praying that an account might be taken of what was due on the mortgage, and that the sale might be set aside. No revesting order or order to annul the proceedings in the insolvency had been obtained; but the bill alleged that an application, by the plaintiff, for such an order to the Commissioner in Insolvency had been refused, except upon the terms of his confirm ing the acts complained of. Upon demurrer, by the purchasers, for want of equity and multifariousness,-Held, by the Lord Chancellor (reversing the decision of the Master of the Rolls), that the demurrer must be overruled. If counsel discovers that a bill has been tampered with after being signed by him, he should apply to have it taken off the file with costs to be paid by the plaintiff. This was an appeal, by the plaintiff, from a decision of the Master of the Rolls allowing a demurrer for want of equity and multifariousness. The bill stated, in effect, that in 1844 the plaintiff, who had some time since purchased a considerable quantity of freehold building ground at Hastings, mortgaged the same for 1,000 years to the defendant Ricardo, for money to be from time to time advanced for building purposes, reserving power, with the consent of the mortgagee, to demise any part or parts thereof upon building leases, with a proviso, that when the yearly groundrents reserved by such leases should amount to 3007., the mortgagee should release his security upon the rest of the premises comprised in the mortgage. Ultimately, by a special agreement dated the 16th of October 1849, the mortgage claim was restricted to three unfinished houses, and the plot of a fourth house. In anticipation of proceedings, which were afterwards taken against him in the Insolvent Debtors Court, the plaintiff in September 1852 executed a deed of trust for the benefit of his creditors, and in May 1855 he executed another deed giving unlimited powers to the Court of Chancery for the payment of the few debts due from him, and for the protection of his interests, intending that the case should be treated as one for management and protection under the powers of the Court; and it was provided that the trusts should expire when all the claims against the plaintiff were discharged, after which the plaintiff's property was to belong to him free from the trusts. In 1853 the plaintiff was taken in execution under a judgment obtained by one Wade, his former attorney; and an order in insolvency was obtained vesting the plaintiff's property in the defendant Samuel Sturgis, though, as the plaintiff alleged, he was not insolvent, but was the owner of real property valued at more than 100,000l., while the claims against him amounted to only about 2,000l., and were amply provided for. In November 1854, the defendants F. Roe and J. Brighton were appointed assignees under the vesting order, and paid 2,844l. 5s. 9d. into court. In 1856, a second vesting order was obtained upon a judgment recovered by the defendant Charles Moreing, and shortly before the Insolvent Debtors Court was abolished, the Commissioner, being satisfied that all the plaintiff's debts had been paid in full, and that there were no claims against him under either of the insolvencies, made an order that the sum of 850l. in court should be paid to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff received the same under protest. In 1862 the plaintiff applied to the Com missioner to annul the insolvencies, but His Honour declined to do so, unless the plaintiff would sign an undertaking to confirm all the proceedings that had been taken under them, which he refused to do, and consequently no revesting order or order to annul the insolvencies could be obtained. The bill further set out an account by which it appeared that the sum due to Ricardo for advances made on his security was 7,1207., which was amply covered by the 3007. yearly rental, valuing the same at twenty-five years' purchase, and alleged that Ricardo and one of the other defendants colluded together to establish a fraudulent claim for 11,500l., and having caused the name of Sturgis, the provisional assignee, to be substituted for that of the plaintiff in a suit for redemption, conspired with certain other defendants to cause the freehold premises, together with leasehold premises of the plaintiff, which were not in mortgage, to be sold under the insolvency in such a manner as to enable them to obtain possession of the property themselves for a nominal price. The property was accordingly advertised for sale by auction, and was sold at the auction mart in the city of London for 5,600, subject to the mortgage for 11,500l. alleged to be due to Ricardo, the defendant Moreing being the purchaser on behalf of himself and two other defendants. The bill prayed that an account might be taken of what was due to Ricardo upon his mortgage securities, and that the sale might be set aside, with consequential relief. The defendants were Francis Ricardo the mortgagee, Charles Moreing, Wyndham Holgate and William Ansell Day, the purchasers at the sale. George Task Tweed, the solicitor who had the conduct of the sale, and was also alleged to be interested in the purchase, and John Brighton, Freeman Roe and Samuel Sturgis, the assignees in insolvency. The defendants Holgate and Day demurred for want of equity and multifariousness, and the demurrer was allowed by the Master of the Rolls. The plaintiff appealed. Mr. Selwyn and Mr. T. A. Roberts, for the appellant. The question in the Court below was whether the plaintiff had any right to file a bill without having a revesting order. Such an order could not be obtained, for the Insolvent Debtors Court had ceased to exist; and if it were otherwise, that Court would refuse to make any order, except on the terms of the plaintiff confirming all that had been done under the insolvency. They referred to- Ex parte Bennett, 10 Ves. 381. 596; s. c. 26 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Ex parte Cook, 29 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) At the end of the argument for the appellants, the Lord Chancellor remarked upon a number of impertinent and improper allegations contained in the bill, and was informed that they had been introduced by the plaintiff after the draft had been signed by counsel. His Lordship said counsel ought to have insisted upon having the bill taken off the file; and in all future cases of a like nature coming before him, he would order this to be done, with costs to be paid by the plaintiff. He would not have anything palmed upon the Court under the sanction of counsel's signature, which had been introduced after that signature was appended. Mr. Baggallay and Mr. Martineau, for the demurring defendants, referred to the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. ss. 37, 44, 45, 47, 62, 63. and 92, and contended that the plaintiff, not having obtained a revesting order, had no locus standi in this Court. Though the Insolvent Debtors Court Commissioners had ceased to exist, the plaintiff might have obtained a revesting order from the London Commissioners of the Court of Bankruptcy: Tudway v. Jones, 1 Kay & J. 691; s. c. 24 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 507. They also cited— Grange v. Trickett, 2 El. & B. 395; s. c. Wormald v. De Lisle, 3 Beav. 18. |