is, which refolves all humanity and friendship into fe'f love. He makes it clearly appear that there is fuch a fentiment, in human nature as difinterefted benevolence; that nothing can bestow more merit on any human creature than the poffeffion of it in an eminent degree; and that a part, at leaft, of its merit, arifes from its tendency to promote the. interefts of our fpecies, and bellow happiness on human fociety. In all determinations of morality, fays he, this, circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever difputes arife, whether in philofophy or ccmmon life, concerning the bounds of duty, the queflion cannot, by any means be decided with greater certainty, than by afcertaining, on any fide, the true intercfts of mankind. If, any falfe opinion, embraced from appearances, has been, found to prevail, as foon as farther experience, and founder reafoning have given us jufter notions of human affairs; we retract our first fentiments, and adjuft a-new the boundaries, of moral good and evil.'.

In the third fection our author treats of juftice, and endeavours to fhew that public utility is the fole origin of it, and that reflections on its beneficial confequences are the fole foundation of its merit. In order to make this appear, he puts a variety of cafes, and fuppofes extreme abundance or extreme neceflity to be produced among men; perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect rapacioufnefs and malice implanted in their breasts: In all thefe cafes we are told, that by rendering juftice totally useless, we thereby totally des froy its effence, and fufpend its obligation upon mankind. • The more, fays he, we vary our views of human life; and the newer and more unufual the lights are, in which we furvey it, the more shall we be convinced, that the origin here affigned for the virtue of juftice is real and fatisfactory.'

Were there a fpecies of creatures, intermingled with men, which, tho' rational, were pofleft of fuch inferior ftrength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all refiftance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their refentment; the neceffary confequence, I think, is, that we should be bound by the laws of humanity, to give gentle ufage to thefe creatures, but should not, properly fpeaking, lie under any restraint of juftice with regard to them, nor could they poffefs any right or property, exclufive of fuch arbitrary Lords. Our intercourfe with them could not be called fociety, which fuppofes a degree of equality; but abfolute command on the one fide, and fervile obedience on the

other. Whatever we covet, they muft inftantly refign: Our permiffion is the only tenure, by which they hold their poffeffions: Our compaffion and kindness the only check, by which they curb our lawless will: And as no inconvenience ever results from the exercife of a power, fo firmly eftablished in nature, the reftraints of juftice and property, being totally useless, would never have a place, in fo unequal a confederacy.

• Were the human fpecies fo fram'd by nature as that each individual poffeft within himself every faculty, requifite both for his own preservation and for the propagation of his kind: Were all fociety and intercourfe cut off betwixt man and man, by the primary intention of the fupreme Creator: It seems evident, that fo folitary a being would be as much incapable of justice, as of social discourse and converfation. Where mutual regards and forbearance ferve to no manner of purpose, they would never direct the conduct of any reasonable man. The headlong course of the paffions would be checked by no reflection on future confequences. And as each man is here fuppofed to love himself alone, and to depend only on himfelf and his own activity for fafety and happiness, he would, on every occa fion, to the utmoft of his power, challenge the preference above every other being, to none of which he is bound by any ties, either of nature, or of interest.

But fuppofe the conjunction of the fexes to be eftablished in nature, a family immediately arifes; and particular rules being found requifite for its fubfiftance, these are immediately embraced; tho' without comprehending the reft of mankind within their prefcriptions. Suppose, that feveral families unite together into one fociety, which is totally disjoined from all others, the rules, which preserve peace and order, enlarge themfelves to the utmost extent of that fociety; but, being entirely ufelefs, lofe their force when carried one ftep farther. But again fuppofe, that several diftinct focieties maintain a kind of intercourfe for mutual convenience and advantage; the boundaries of justice ftill grow larger and larger, in proportion to the largeness of men's views, and the force of their mutual connexions, Hiftory, experience, reafon fufficiently inftruct us in this natural progrefs of human sentiments, and the gradual increafe of our regards to property and juftice in proportion as we become acquainted with the extenfive utility of that virtue.'

After

After a fhort fection upon political fociety, our Author proceeds in the fifth to fhew why utility pleafes, Ufefulness, fays he, is agreeable, and engages our approbation. This is a matter of fact, confirmed by daily observation, But useful? For what? For fomebody's intereft surely. Whofe intereft then? Not our own only: For our appro bation frequently extends farther. It muft, therefore, be the intereft of those, who are ferv'd by the character or action approved of; and these we may conclude, however remote, are not totally indifferent to us.-Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end; and 'tis a contradiction in terms, that any thing pleases as means to an end, where the end itself does no way affect us. If therefore usefulness be a fource of moral fentiment, and if this usefulness be not always confidered with a reference to felf; it follows, that every thing, which contributes to the happiness of fociety, recommends itself directly to our approbation and good-will, Here is a principle, which accounts, in great part, for the origin of morality: And what need we seek for abftruse and remote fyftems, when there occurs one fo obvious and natural?'

Our author employs feveral pages in illuftrating this principle, and concludes the fection in the following manner. Thus, fays he, in whatever light we take this fub. ject, the merit, afcrib'd to the focial virtues, appears still uniform, and arifes chiefly from that regard, which the natural fentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the interefts of mankind and fociety. If we confider the principles of the human make, fuch as they appear to daily experience and obfervation; we muft, a priori, conclude it impoffible for fuch a creature as man to be totally indiffe rent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures, and not readily, of himself, to pronounce, where nothing gives him any particular byafs, that what promotes their happinefs is good, what tends to their mifery is evil, without any farther regard or confideration. Here then are the faint rudiments, at leaft, or outlines, of a general diftinction betwixt actions; and in proportion as the humanity of the perfon is fuppofed to encrease, his connexion to thofe injured or benefited, and his lively conception of their mifery or hap pinefs; his confequent cenfure or approbation acquires proportionable force and vigour. There is no neceffity, that a generous action, barely mentioned in an old history or remote Gazette, fhould communicate any ftrong feelings of applause and admiration. Virtue, placed at fuch a distance,

is like a fixt ftar, which tho', to the eye of reafon, it may appear as luminous as the fun in his meridian, is fo infinitely removed, as to affect the fenfes neither with light nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our acquaintance or connexion with the perfons, or even by an eloquent narration and recital of the cafe; our hearts are immediately caught, our fympathy enliven'd, and our cool approbation converted into the warmest fentiments of friendship and regard. Thefe feem neceflary and infallible confequences: of the general principles of human nature, as discovered in: common life and practice.

Again; reverse these views and reafonings: Confider the matter a pofteriori; and weighing the confequences, enquire, if the merit of all focial virtue is not derived from the feelings of humanity, with which it affects the fpecta-! tors. It appears to be matter of fact, that the circumftance of utility, in all fubjects, is a fource of praife and approbation: That it is conftantly appeal'd to in all moral decifions concerning the merit and demerit of actions: That it is the fole fource of that high regard paid to juftice, fidelity, honour, allegiance and chaftity: That it is infeparable from all the other focial virtues of humanity, generofity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy and moderation and in a word, that it is the foundation of the chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and fociety.

:

It appears alfo, in our general approbation or judg ment of characters and manners, that the ufeful tendency of the focial virtues moves us not by any regards to felf-intereft, but has an influence much more univerfal and extenfive. It appears, that a tendency to public good, and to the promoting of peace, harmony, and concord in fociety, by affecting the benevolent principles of our frame, engages us on the fide of the focial virtues. And it appears, as an additional confirmation, that thefe principles of humanity and fympathy enter fo deep into all our fentiments, and have fo powerful an influence, as may enable them to excite the Itrongest cenfure and applaufe. The prefent theory is the fimple refult of all thefe inferences, each of which feems founded on uniform experience and obfervation.

Were it doubtful, whether there was any fuch principle in our nature as humanity or a concern for others, yet when we fee, in numberkfs inftances, that, whatever has a tendency to promote the interefts of fociety, is fo highly approv'd of, we ought thence to learn the force of

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the benevolent principle; fince 'tis impoffible for any: thing to please as means to an end, where the end itfelf is totally indifferent. On the other hand, were it doubtful, whether there was, implanted in our natures, any general principle of moral blame and approbation, yet when we fee, in numberless inftances, the influence of humanity, we ought thence to conclude, that 'tis impoffible, but that every thing, which promotes the intereft of fociety, muft communicate pleasure, and what is pernicious give uneafinefs. But when thefe different reflections and obfervations concur in establifhing the fame conclufion; muft they not beftow an undifputed evidence upon it?

'Tis however hoped, that the progrefs of this argument will bring a farther confirmation of the prefent theory, by fhowing the rife of other fentiments of efteem and regard from the fame or like principles.'

The fixth fection treats of qualities useful to ourselves. It is introduced with the following juft obfervation, viz. that nothing is more ufual, than for philofophers to encroach upon the province of Grammarians, and to engage in difputes of words, while they imagine, that they are handling controverfies of the deepest importance and concern. Thus, fays our author, were we here to affert or to deny, that all laudable qualities of the mind were to be confidered as virtues or moral attributes, many would imagine, that we had entered upon one of the profoundest spe culations of Ethics; tho' 'tis probable, all the while, that the greateft part of the difpute would be found entirely verbal. After this he makes the two following obfervations; that, in common life, the fentiments of cenfure or approbation, produced by mental qualities of every kind, are very fimilar; and that all antfent moralifts, (the best models) in treating of them, make little or no difference amongst them. Thefe obfervations he confirms and illuftrates, in the fubfequent part of the fection, with great beauty and elegance; fhews that all the qualities, useful to the poffeffor, are approved, and the contrary cenfured; and examines the influence of bodily endowments and of the goods of fortune, over our fentiments of regard and ef

teem.

In the feventh fection, which treats of qualities immediately agreeable to ourfelves, our author fhews that there is another fet of virtues, fuch as chearfulness, dignity of character, courage and ferenity of mind, which, without any utility or any tendency to farther good, either of the community

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